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This study examines social constructions of infertility in Malawi. The literature on 
infertility consists of epidemiological studies, describing patterns of infertility in 
terms of its incidence, causes and health seeking behaviour; studies of the 
psychological correlates of infertility; and ethnographic studies which describe 
experiences, perceptions and management of infertility within specific socio-cultural 
contexts. In addition, some studies discuss social aspects of medical practice in 
relation to infertility. Overall, studies of infertility in developing countries emphasize 
its many serious psychological and social consequences, usually attributed to cultural 
norms mandating parenthood. There appear to be several lacunae in the literature: 
men with fertility problems are rarely included, an in-depth examination of 
practitioners’ views is missing, and no qualitative study has been conducted on 
infertility in Malawi, which has a considerable secondary infertility rate. 
Furthermore, although ethnographic studies highlight the interpersonal (related to 
others’ judgements), normative (related to ideas about what ‘ought’ to be) and moral 
(related to ideas about what is good or bad) issues involved in infertility, no study 
has investigated how these issues are managed in situ, in verbal interactions. 
However, it has been argued that ‘talk’ is a prime site for the management of issues 
such as blaming and deflecting responsibility.  Hence, this study addresses several 
gaps in the literature. It focuses on Malawi, and includes a wide range of 
participants: women and men with a fertility problem, significant others, indigenous 
and (Malawian and expatriate) biomedical practitioners. Semi-structured interviews 
with 63 participants were recorded and transcribed, and translations were obtained of 
interviews in which interpreters were used. For the analysis, I used discourse analysis 
(DA), informed by conversation analysis (CA). This analytic approach, novel in 
infertility studies, examines the interpersonal functions of statements in interactions, 
such as blaming or justifying.  
Use of DA and CA has led to novel insights into how respondents construct 
infertility, its causes, solutions (sought and offered), and consequences, and how they 
thereby manage interpersonal, normative, and moral issues, revolving around 
accountability, blame and justification, and attribution of (problematic) identity 
categories.  For instance, I have shown how respondents construct childbearing as a 
cultural, normative requirement, and how this can be used to justify practices like 
extramarital affairs, or polygamy, as necessary solutions. In addition, identifying 
causes appears to be problematic for people with a fertility problem due to certain 




medical knowledge. Practitioners can be seen to work up and bolster an identity of 
professional, competent expert in constructions of causes of infertility, and by 
attributing problems in helping infertility clients to external factors, including 
patients’ intelligence.  
This study has several theoretical, practical, and methodological 
implications, although I discuss some thorny methodological issues, 
especially those concerning the use of translations and the transferability of the 
analytic findings. A first contribution pertains to methodological debates and 
developments in conversation analysis, and in studies of infertility and other health 
issues which rely upon people’s self-reports. Second, my study contributes to 
theoretical developments in health psychology and health promotion. My analysis 
points to the relevance of social and normative considerations for engagement in 
‘risky’ behaviours, such as extramarital affairs. This challenges cognition models 
which treat health behaviour as the outcome of individualistic decision-making 
processes, and see providing information as the main way of changing people’s 
behaviour. Therefore, a third set of implications is of a practical nature: some of the 
findings can contribute to health promotion, as well as to improvement of health 
services. For example, practitioners’ attribution of failures and (communication) 
problems to their patients, may prevent them from reflecting critically on, and 
addressing, their own contributions to problems. Overall, this thesis shows that when 
one wants to ‘give voice’ to people who are suffering from infertility, it is valuable to 
examine what they say in detail, within its interactional context, and the concerns 
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‘Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be 
counted.’ (Albert Einstein, attributed) 
 
 
‘Only when such a researcher moves beyond the gaze of the tourist, bemused with a 
sense of bizarre cultural practices (‘Goodness, you do things differently here!’) do 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
In this thesis, I examine social constructions of infertility, its causes, solutions and 
consequences, in Malawi. This means that I aim to gain an understanding of how 
various people in Malawi create realities regarding infertility in interactions (cf. 
Berger & Luckmann, 1966; cf. Burr, 1995; cf. Gergen, 1999), rather than of what the 
causes and consequences of and solutions for infertility ‘really’, ‘in essence’ are. 
‘Various people’ include women and men with a fertility problem, significant others 
of people with fertility problems and (biomedical and indigenous) health 
practitioners. Perhaps counterintuitively, infertility is a significant public health 
problem in developing countries, particularly in sub Saharan Africa, and has been 
found to have many social and psychological consequences for people suffering from 
it. It is therefore in dire need of policymakers’, health practitioners’ and researchers’ 
attention.   
I will focus specifically on how people construct infertility, its causes, 
consequences and solutions in (interview) talk. This is important, as verbal 
interaction appears to be the prime site for the management of interpersonal, moral 
and normative issues (Bergmann, 1998; Drew, 1998; Linell & Rommetveit, 1998), 
which various studies show to be central to the problem of infertility in developing 
countries. People without, or with few, children are seen as deviating from cultural 
norms to bear children, they are stigmatised and blamed, and their relationships at 
both a community, family and conjugal level are affected (van Balen & Inhorn, 2002; 
Gerrits, Boonmongkon, Feresu & Halperin, 1999; Inhorn, 1994).   
In order to analyse constructions of infertility in talk, I use discourse analysis, 
informed by conversation analysis. This form of analysis has not been used before in 
infertility studies. As a result, my PhD study leads to innovative insights, which can 
contribute to the understanding and alleviation of the burden of infertility in 
developing countries like Malawi.  In section 1.1, I will discuss in more detail why 
infertility is a problem in sub Saharan Africa and Malawi, and how my doctoral 
research can contribute to the development of reproductive health programs and 






1.1 Infertility in Malawi 
Infertility is commonly defined as the inability to conceive after exposure to 
conception for a period of between one and two years (WHO, 1975). Often, the 
criterion of inability to conceive is replaced by the criterion of absence of ‘fertile 
pregnancy’, i.e. a pregnancy resulting in a live birth (cf. Leonard, 2002). 
Demographers usually use a longer period of five to seven years in their definition of 
infertility.  Normally, a distinction is made between primary infertility, when a 
woman has never conceived or given birth to a live child, and secondary infertility, 
when a woman has given birth at least once, and subsequently becomes infertile 
(WHO, 1975).  
An increasing number of studies report that, for several reasons, infertility is 
a serious problem in the developing world in general, and in sub Saharan Africa in 
particular. First, it has been found that infertility has many serious psychological and 
especially social consequences for people in developing countries. It appears that 
men, and especially women, with fertility problems are often stigmatised and 
ostracised in their communities, and pressurized by their family to solve their fertility 
problems and give birth (Gerrits et al., 1997; Inhorn, 1994; van Balen & Inhorn, 
2002).  
Second, in sub Saharan Africa, infertility is intertwined with other serious 
public health problems, like sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), and the Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus or acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS). 
STDs are one of the main causes of infertility in sub-Saharan Africa (Ericksen & 
Brunette, 1996, Inhorn, 1994). At the same time, infertility appears to be one of the 
factors which contributes to the spread of STDs, including AIDS. This is so because 
infertility often leads to marital instability and increase in number of sexual partners 
(van Balen & Inhorn, 2002; Favot, Ngaluka, Mgalla, Klokke, Glumodoka, & 
Boerma, 1997). In addition, studies in several African countries have found that 
some people fear that using contraceptives, including condoms, can lead to 




Savelsberg, 1994; Gerrits et al., 1999). Therefore, fears of becoming infertile can put 
people at risk for STDs and AIDS, as well as impede family planning. 
Third, infertility is a matter of considerable relevance to public health 
because infertility clients can place a large demand on the limited health care 
resources in sub Saharan Africa (Leonard, 2002; PATH, 1997). It has been observed 
that people with fertility problems often seek solutions relentlessly, from various 
sources, including biomedical health services (Rowe, 1999; Sundby, 2002). In a 
hospital in Cape Town, it was found that the average number of consultations of 
infertility couples was seven, with over 20% of couples having had between 11 and 
40 consultations (Rowe, 1999). In some African countries, it has been reported that 
one third of gynaecological consultations pertains to infertility cases (Rowe, 1999). 
Okonofua (1996) even found that in Nigeria, infertility is the main reason for 
gynaecological consultations. The high numbers of infertility consultations are 
unfortunate, especially as the medical possibilities to solve fertility problems are very 
limited in sub Saharan Africa (Leonard, 2002; Rowe, 1999; Sundby, 2002). Thus, it 
appears that the large numbers of medical consultations for infertility are expensive, 
time consuming and often frustrating for both practitioners and people suffering from 
fertility problems.   
Infertility can be expected to be an important public health problem in 
Malawi as well. Malawi is one of poorest countries in the world, and has a very low 
rank order of 165 out of 177 on the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2005) 1. It 
has a primary infertility rate of 2%, and a much higher secondary infertility rate of 
17% of couples between 20 and 44 years old (Larsen & Raggers, 2001). This rate is 
considerable and falls in the upper middle range of infertility rates in sub Saharan 
Africa, which range from 5% to 23% (Barden-O’Fallon, 2005). The 2002 
Reproductive Health Policy of Malawi acknowledges the seriousness of fertility 
problems, the demand for infertility services, and the importance of preventing and 
treating this health problem (personal communication, Len Verhoeven, 2003).  
It is to be expected that also in Malawi, there is a strong mutual relationship 
between infertility and STDs and especially HIV/AIDS, where incidence of STDs 
                                                 
1 The Human Development Index combines several indicators of development, such as life expectancy 
( 39.7 in Malawi, vs. 46.1 in sub Saharan Africa ), literacy rate (64% of population older than 15 




and particularly HIV are high (Daly, Franco, Chilongozi & Dallabetta, 1998).  
Malawi’s HIV incidence is 14.4%, varying from 4% to 36%, dependent on 
geographical area, gender and age category (Family Health International, 2002). 
Highest rates have been found amongst young women between 15 and 24 years. A 
significant number of women who engage in extramarital sexual relationships 
because their own or their male partner’s marriage remains childless, can be expected 
to be fall in this age category.   
Frequent consultations by infertility patients will form a considerable burden 
on Malawi’s health care system, which is said to suffer from ‘an acute human 
resources crisis’ (Grant & Logie, 2005, p.7). In governmental hospitals, which form 
65% of Malawi's health services2, a mere 1.6 physicians, and 28.6 nurses are 
working per 100.000 inhabitants3 and 10 gynaecologists for its 12 million inhabitants 
(Grant & Logie, 2005). Not only is the quantity of Malawi’s biomedical health 
services limited, but also the quality. In their report for the Scottish Executive, Grant 
& Logie (2005, p.7) describe health services in Malawi as ‘suffering from lack of 
drugs, poor staff-client relations, and poor quality diagnosis and treatment and even a 
lack of lighting’. Thus, it is likely that infertility consultations in Malawi are often 
frustrating, and, literally, fruitless, for both providers and couples suffering from 
fertility problems. 
In sub-Saharan African countries4, including Malawi, infertility has not 
received the attention from researchers and policymakers which it requires, 
considering its highly problematic nature (Dyer, Abrahams, Hoffman, van der Spuy, 
2002; Berer, 1999; Gerrits, 1997; Upton, 2001). This neglect has been attributed to 
the tendency to associate Africa with a problematic surplus of fertility, rather than 
with fertility problems (Dyer et al., 2002; Upton, 2001; van Balen & Inhorn, 2002). 
Women’s health activists have criticised reproductive health programs for their 
                                                 
2  35% of the health services in Malawi is provided by the Christian Health Association of Malawi 
(CHAM). I could not obtain official figures about numbers of practitioners working in these mission 
hospitals, although through personal communication I was informed that there is only one 
gynaecologist working in CHAM hospitals (S.Makin, 18th of March, 2006).  Grant and Logie (2005) 
restrict themselves as well to the governmental health services. 
3 This number is low in comparison to other African countries: Tanzania for example has 4.2 
physicians and 85.2 nurses per 100.000 inhabitants, South Africa respectively 25.1 and 140. 
4 In developing countries in South America and Asia, more therapeutic possibilities have been made 
available, such as assisted reproductive technologies (in particular IVF), although this involves its 




narrow focus on peri-natal services and birth control, and their attention to the needs 
of a limited range of women: those who fall in the ‘reproductive age’ categories and 
are, moreover, fertile (Gerrits et al, 1999).  In 1994, at the United Nations’ 
International Conference on Population and Development (ICDP), infertility was put 
on the international reproductive health agenda for the first time (Gerrits et al., 1999; 
van Balen & Inhorn, 2002). The ICDP’s Program of Action acknowledges that 
infertility is one of the factors affecting reproductive health, and calls for an increase 
in the scope of reproductive health services by incorporating treatment and 
prevention of infertility (UNFPA, 1994). However, as Sundby (2002) states, in 
Africa, the aim of adequate, comprehensive reproductive health care services has not 
yet been achieved.  
Nevertheless, both the ICDP’s program of action and various scholars have 
pointed the way forward, and have highlighted requirements which adequate, 
comprehensive reproductive health programs and services for infertility and other 
issues ought to meet. First, programs and services should be based on the interests, 
needs and rights of individuals, rather than on the aim of achieving population targets 
(Gerrits et al., 1999; Tremayne, 2001; UNFPA, 1994, Upton, 2002). Second, they 
should be culturally sensitive. This means that reproductive health programs should 
take into account the socio-cultural context which informs reproductive health 
problems, needs, and behaviours (UNFPA, 1994). Therefore, in order to be culturally 
sensitive, reproductive health services and programs ought to be based on local 
perceptions, experiences and explanations (UNFPA, 1994; Walraven 2001; Dyer et 
al., 2002; Feldman-Savelsberg, 1994, Gerrits et al., 1999, Harrison & Montgomery, 
2001; Tremayne, 2001; Upton, 2001).  
Therefore, there is a need for research on reproductive health issues in 
general, and infertility in particular, which can provide insights into people’s needs, 
and their own views and understandings, and thereby inform the development of 
reproductive health programs (cf. UNFPA, 1994).  My doctoral research on social 
constructions of infertility in Malawi seems particularly well placed to address this 
need, for several methodological reasons. 
 First of all, I use a definition of infertility to which people’s own 




academic definitions of infertility, described above, are not necessarily meaningful 
for people in developing countries (Gerrits et al, 1997; Leonard, 2002). For instance, 
as pregnancy is often expected within months of marriage, people can have a fertility 
problem long before they would ‘count’ as infertile according to official definitions 
and statistics. In addition, infertility studies often focus on married women, whereas 
unmarried women may also experience fertility problems, especially considering that 
fertility problems often result in divorce (Gerrits et al., 1997; Leonard, 2002). 
Therefore, for the purposes of my study, I consider women or men as having a 
fertility problem when they consider themselves, or are seen by others as, having 
fertility problems, regardless of duration, number of children or marital status. Note 
that whereas authors like Gerrits (1997) and Meera Guntupalli and Chenchelgudem 
(2004) have also based their definition of infertility on people’s own views, I include 
the views of others as well, as these can be expected to matter for categorisations of 
people as infertile.  
Second, my study uses a qualitative methodology, which appears ideal for 
gaining insight into local views and explanations. Indeed, several authors have 
identified a need for qualitative research on reproductive health issues like infertility 
(Dyer, 2002; Harrison & Montgomery, 2001; Mbizvo & Bassett, 1994). The open, 
‘bottom up’ rather than ‘top down’ nature of qualitative research enables the 
exploration of issues, which one cannot predict on the basis of one’s cultural or 
academic framework (Willig, 2000). In addition, as Obermeyer (2005) argues, 
qualitative studies are particularly apt for providing insight into variable, 
contextualised meanings of behaviours.  
Third, I use the qualitative methodology of discourse analysis (DA, Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987), informed by conversation analysis (CA, Sacks, 1992). 
Characteristic for this particular qualitative method of analysis is a commitment to 
basing analytic claims on participants’ displayed understandings and concerns, 
rather than on pre-conceived analytic ideas and concepts. This will be discussed 
further in chapter 3. In addition, the literature (see chapter 2) suggests that infertility 
is intertwined with various interpersonal, normative and moral issues. As I will 




into the situated, interactional management of interpersonal, normative and moral 
issues, such as blame and accountability, in talk about infertility. 
1.2 Overview of the thesis 
In chapter 2, I review the relevant literature. I discuss four categories of infertility 
studies: large scale epidemiological and demographic studies, quantitative studies of 
psychological correlates of infertility, ethnographic studies of local perceptions and 
experiences of infertility and studies of biomedical practice in relation to infertility. 
As I will show, these studies demonstrate that infertility is a serious personal, social 
and public health problem, and draw attention to the interpersonal, moral and 
normative dimension of infertility and medical practices related to infertility. 
However, overall, the studies of infertility are restricted in their range of participants, 
little attention has been paid to Malawi, and none of these studies has used discourse 
analysis or conversation analysis to examine talk about infertility in its interactional 
context. 
 In chapter 3, I discuss the methodology of the study. I describe the particular 
kind of discourse analysis which I use, and explain how it incorporates conversation 
analytic and ethnomethodological principles. In addition, I show how conversation 
and discourse analysis has been used before to examine the management of morality 
and normativity in talk. I subsequently describe the method of data collection, 
including sampling and recruitment strategies, the participants and interview process, 
and describe the process of analysis. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of 
methodological issues related to the use of interview data, at times mediated by an 
interpreter, in which the participants are non-native speakers, and belong to a 
different socio-cultural community than the analyst.   
 In chapter 4, I begin my discursive analysis of the normative and moral 
dimensions of infertility, by discussing how men and women with a fertility problem, 
significant others, and health care practitioners, construct infertility as a problematic 
deviation from normative expectations. In the literature on infertility in developing 
countries, references to norms of childbearing are common. However, no one has 
examined how cultural norms are actively constructed in situ. This leads to valuable 




an interactional, rhetorical function: I show how respondents use it to justify certain 
practices, like engaging in extramarital affairs when no children are born. This 
analytic finding resonates with Parsons’ (1951) ideas that illness is a deviant state for 
which people ought to find a solution. In my interview data, respondents construct 
infertility as deviation from the norm, which therefore ought to be solved, for 
example by engaging in extramarital affairs.  
  Many scholars have paid attention to what people perceive to be the causes of 
health problems, partly because they are seen as informing people’s health seeking 
behaviour. In chapter 5, I examine how men and women with a fertility problem talk 
about and construct causes of infertility, rather than taking stock of what causes are 
put forward. This brings to the light certain interactional and interpersonal issues 
involved in talking about causes. For example, displays of knowledge about causes 
appear to be informed by normative expectations about who has an entitlement to 
medical knowledge and by the potential problem that undesirable conclusions are 
drawn about respondents’ personal experience with sensitive issues like STDs and 
abortions. The interpersonal, normative and moral issues involved in making 
knowledge claims, problematizes the idea that verbal statements provide access to 
people’s individualistic or collective  illness cognitions, as well as the link between 
illness cognitions and illness behaviours. 
 In order to develop a more social understanding of people’s illness  
behaviour, I focus in chapter 6 on how men and women with a fertility problem talk 
about the actions they took to solve their fertility problem, and especially about not 
seeking help (anymore). I will show that respondents emphasize the effort they put 
into seeking a solution, treat not seeking help as accountable, and provide warrants 
for not seeking help which draw upon factors which lie outside their responsibility. 
Again, these findings are in accordance with Parsons (1951) idea of ‘the sick role’ as 
involving an obligation to seek competent help. McHugh (1979) argues that being 
labelled as deviant depends partly on the assessment that other (non-deviant) actions 
could have been taken. These ideas suggest that demonstrating that one has tried to 
seek help but was ‘forced’ not to take action (anymore), is a way for men and women 




accounts about illness behaviour point at the moral and normative nature of infertility 
and its management.  
  Considering that infertility appears to raise various interpersonal issues, it 
seems appropriate to look at how relationships between people with a fertility 
problem and their spouses, significant others and other people in the wider 
community are constructed. This is the theme of chapter 7. The literature frequently 
reports that infertility has negative consequences for people’s relationships. 
Surprisingly, it appears that in my data, men and women with a fertility problem and 
significant others regularly construct their relationships as good. If respondents do 
discuss problems, they tend to avoid blaming others or being blamed. This can be 
understood as a response to interpersonal and interactional delicacies which talk 
about problems, complaining and blaming involves, as several conversation analysts 
have pointed out (Bergmann, 1998; Linell & Rommetveit, 1998). These findings 
suggest that scholars’ characterisations of relationships of people with a fertility 
problem as marked  by social exclusion, stigmatisation and abandonment gloss over 
the unproblematizing, mitigation and blame avoidance which respondents may attend 
to when talking about their relationships. 
  In chapters 8 and 9, I shift the analytical gaze to the interpersonal, normative 
and moral issues at stake for health practitioners, both traditional healers and 
biomedical practitioners. In chapter 8, I examine the rhetorical design of health 
practitioners’ claims about causes of infertility. I will show how practitioners deal 
with their accountability for their claims, for instance by making relevant category 
attributes associated with scientific experts, such as testing and reading literature.  I 
argue that in so doing, they bolster an identity of health expert. In addition, I will 
discuss how, when asked about non-biomedical causes, Malawian and western 
biomedical practitioners juggle an identity project of biomedical expert with other 
interpersonal demands, like not coming across as ethnocentric or being a proper 




indigenous knowledge and practices are of a fundamental social, that is interpersonal, 
nature, rather than the (application of) neutral scientific ‘textbook’ knowledge or 
(distorted) socio-cultural beliefs. 
 Successes, failures and problems in health care are central to practitioners’ 
perceived competence. In chapter 9, I examine how biomedical practitioners and 
traditional healers account for successes and failures in helping infertility patients. I 
show that whilst respondents attribute success to their own actions, they mitigate 
their accountability for problems. I argue that in this way, respondents can bolster 
their competence. This chapter then, suggests that interpersonal issues like upholding 
professional competence inform practitioners’ accounts about successes, failures and 
problems in helping infertility patients. Hence, both chapters 8 and 9 show how 
accounts of both biomedical practitioners and indigenous healers are worth 
investigating for the interactional, interpersonal and moral work they perform. 
 In chapter 10, I summarize the main findings, discuss several methodological 
issues which this study raises, related in particular to the use of (translated) 
interpreter-mediated interviews, and evaluate the quality of the analysis. Thereby I 
address the generalizability of the analytic findings. Thereafter, I discuss how this 
study makes various contributions; to the (infertility) literature, methodological 
developments and debates, theoretical developments in health psychology and health 
promotion, and practical attempts to alleviate the burden of infertility through health 
promotion and improving the quality of (reproductive) health services. I conclude 
with suggesting that in future research, discourse analysis and conversation analysis 
could be used to study other important (reproductive) health problems in developing 
countries to which moral and normative issues seem pertinent, such as abortions, 




Chapter 2. The literature on infertility 
 
In this chapter, I review the literature on infertility, focussing where possible5 on 
studies of infertility in the developing world. I will discuss four categories of 
infertility studies6,7. I derived these categories by comparing and contrasting papers 
on infertility in terms of the reported studies’ aims, the themes they address, and 
methodology used, including the level of analysis (i.e. individuals, collectives, or 
individuals-in-context). From this, four clusters of studies emerged which could 
reasonably be grouped together: epidemiological studies, studies of psychological 
correlates of infertility, ethnographic studies and studies of the social nature of 
biomedical practice in relation to infertility 
 I will first discuss epidemiological studies of infertility, which have described 
patterns of infertility in various nations, in terms of its incidence, causal correlates 
and health seeking behaviour, that is behaviour aimed at the promotion of health, or 
in this case, fertility (cf. MacKian, 2003) (section 2.1). These studies do not provide 
insight into what infertility means for people. A second category provides some 
insight into this, by studying the relationship between infertility and various 
psychological factors (section 2.2). These studies ignore the social situation in which 
infertility is experienced and dealt with, unlike a third category of infertility studies 
(section 2.3), which describe local experiences, perceptions and management of 
infertility, in relation to the socio-cultural context. Some of these, mainly qualitative 
and ethnographic studies include descriptions of biomedical and indigenous practices 
in relation to infertility. These studies are most similar and therefore most relevant to 
my work. They highlight the social, normative and moral nature of infertility, but 
most do not address the social aspects of medical practices. This is the central theme 
of the fourth category of infertility studies which I will discuss (section 2.4), which 
tend to focus on work of biomedical practitioners who work in western IVF clinics.  
                                                 
5 As will become clear, some types of infertility studies focus virtually exclusively on the west.  
6 These categories are necessarily ‘ideal types’, in that they are based on a selection of characteristics 
common to most studies in the category.   
7 This review is necessarily selective. I will not discuss studies of assisted reproductive technologies 
(ART) in the developing world (see e.g. Bharawadj, 2002; Inhorn, 2002), as possibilities for ART are 




In section 2.5, I will identify several omissions in the literature. In particular, scant 
attention has been paid to certain social actors and to social aspects of medical 
practices regarding infertility in non-western countries, and no qualitative study has 
been conducted in Malawi. Furthermore, no study has looked in detail at how people 
talk about infertility, and the context of infertility has either been ignored, or 
addressed only in terms of the macro, cultural, context. As I will argue, my study of 
how Malawian people construct infertility in talk addresses these lacunae. 
  
2.1 Epidemiological and demographic studies: Patterns of 
infertility 
A first category of infertility studies which I want to discuss are studies which 
compare and describe patterns of infertility in various parts of the world, especially 
in terms of its incidence, causal correlates, and people’s health seeking behaviour. 
These studies are based on large scale quantitative surveys, at times combined with 
medical investigations (e.g. Barden-O’Fallon, 2005; Cates, Farley and Rowe, 1985; 
Favot, Ngalula, Ngalla, Klokke, Gumodoka & Boerma, 1997). Data collected are 
analysed using descriptive and inferential statistics, like logistic regression analysis8. 
Frequently cited papers in this category of infertility studies are Ericksen and 
Brunette’s (1996) and Cates, Farley and Rowe’s (1985). Ericksen and Brunette's 
(1996) study is a comparison of Demographic Health Surveys (DHS) and World 
Fertility Survey (WFS) data from the 1980s of 27 African nations. Cates et al.’s 
(1985) paper is based on an international WHO study of infertility clients in clinics 
in developing and developed countries, on all continents. Although by now, both 
papers and the data on which they are based are relatively old, and thus possibly 
outdated, both papers are still widely quoted. 
 
2.1.1 Incidence of infertility 
The epidemiological and demographic studies demonstrate that infertility rates are 
considerable in sub Saharan Africa. Ericksen and Brunette (1996) calculated the 
percentages of women, between 20 and 41 years, who have been exposed to 
                                                 




conception but have not given birth for a period of at least 5 to 7 years9. Excluded 
were women who use contraception, or had never had sex, or had not been 
menstruating for 5 years. As table 1 shows, Ericksen and Brunette (1996) found that 
overall, primary infertility rates are low across Africa: most rates are below 4%.  
According to Ericksen and Brunette (1996), Malawi has a primary infertility rate of 
1.1%. More recently, Larsen (2000), using a similar definition of infertility, reports a 
slightly higher primary infertility rate in Malawi of 2%.  
 
Table 1. 
 Selection of infertility rates in African nations, from Ericksen and Brunette (1996) 
Nation Infertility Range (%) Midpoint (%) Primary infertility (%) 
Burundi 8.6-11.5 10.5 1.3 
Ghana 10.1-13.5 11.8 1.6 
Sudan 10.6-14.0 12.3 3.1 
Nigeria 10.5-14.6 12.6 4.0 
Cote d’Ivoire 11.5-14.8 13.2 5.0 
Malawi 12.2-15.0 13.6 1.1 
Kenya 13.7-16.7 15.2 2.7 
Zambia 13.8-17.5 15.7 1.4 
Botswana 14.9-21.0 18.0 3.6 
Zimbabwe 16.8-22.4 19.6 2.8 
Lesotho 17.1-21.5 19.3 4.0 
Sub-Saharan 
average 
12.5-16.0 14.5  
 
However, secondary infertility is much more common than primary infertility in 
Africa, unlike in other parts of the world where primary infertility rates appear higher 
(Cates et al., 1985). According to Ericksen and Brunette (1996), combined primary 
and secondary infertility rates vary between African nations from 8.6% to 22.4 % of 
women between 20 and 41 years old.  They found that Southern Africa has the 
highest incidence of infertility, although others argue that they are highest in Central 
                                                 
9 Ericksen and Brunette (1996) calculated infertility rates for both the criterion of 5 and 7 years, and 




Africa, also called ‘the infertility belt’ (Collet, Reniers, Frost, Gass, Yvent, Leclerc, 
Roth-Meyer, Ivanoff &  Meheus, 1988).10  
  In Malawi, Ericksen and Brunette (1996) found an incidence rate between 
12.2% and 15%, with a midpoint of 13.6%, whilst Larsen (2000) reports a somewhat 
higher secondary infertility rate of 17%. Ericksen and Brunette (1996) point out that 
the total number of women suffering from infertility during some period in their 
lives, is higher than these infertility rates suggest. Their survey points out that a 
significant proportion of currently fertile women had infertile, childless intervals for 
a period of 5 to 7 years in previous periods in their lives. In Malawi, this was the case 
for 15.8% of currently fertile women. 
 
2.1.2 Causes of infertility  
Epidemiological studies show that the most common cause of infertility in Africa 
appears to be infections, leading to pelvic inflammatory disease (PID) (Cates et al, 
1985; Larsen, 1995; Sundby, 1997). PID can cause infertility when it results in 
blocked fallopian tubes, pelvic adhesions (Cates et al., 1985) or ectopic pregnancies 
(Bhatti & Fikree, 2002).  Cates et al. (1985) report that in their study, in over 85% of 
infertility cases in Africa, the diagnosis was related to infections, in comparison to 
36% in the developed world.  
  The infections responsible for PID can be related to unsafe, unhygienic 
pregnancies and abortions (Cates et al., 1985; Ericksen and Brunette, 1996; Larsen, 
1995; Sundby, 1997) and STDs (Cates et al., 1985; Collet et al., 1988; Samucidine, 
Barreto, Lind, Mondlane & Bergstrom, 1999), especially HIV/Aids (Favot et al, 
1997), and gonorrhoea and chlamydia (Ericksen & Brunette, 1996). Syphilis can lead 
to infertility as well, by causing miscarriages or stillbirths (Cates et al., 1985; Larsen, 
1995). 
 It should be noted that findings regarding the relationship between STDs and 
infertility are somewhat ambiguous. According to Ericksen and Brunette (1996), 
70% of PID cases in Africa is due to STDs, especially gonorrhoea and chlamydia. 
However, Barden-O’Fallon (2005) and Favot et al. (1997) found that STDs were not 
                                                 
10  Therefore, when authors speak about the ‘infertility belt’ of Africa, they sometimes refer to Central 





significantly associated with infertility, in respectively Malawi and Tanzania. In 
addition, although Barden-O’Fallon (2005) found an association between self-
reported infertility and HIV positivity in Malawi, the relation was not significant. 
However, they point out that a rather large percentage of participants did not want to 
be tested for HIV (20% of women, 33% of men). As this group was included in the 
group with negative HIV test results, which was compared with those who tested 
positively, this may have diluted the findings.   
 Despite some ambiguity in the findings of epidemiological studies, STDs 
including HIV are normally seen as one of the main causes of infertility in the 
developing world. Other factors which are thought to lead to infertility in Africa, 
although mentioned less often, are malaria, as it can cause miscarriage (Larsen, 
1995), malnutrition (Sundby, 1997), female circumcision (Gerrits, 1997; Sundby, 
1997, Larsen, 1995), the insertion of intrauterine devices (IUD) (Gerrits et al., 1999) 
and cervical cancer (Gerrits et al., 1999). 
 The factors discussed so far pertain mainly to women. Factors leading to male 
infertility are discussed much less in the literature on infertility in the developing 
world. This can partly be attributed to the fact that many studies focus on women 
only. The medical literature on infertility in general identifies various reasons for 
male infertility, related to problems of the sperm (e.g. not enough sperms, low sperm 
motility), the seminal fluid (e.g. containing pus) or blocked ejaculatory seminal duct 
(McConell, 1993, Wood, 1994).  These problems can be either congenital or caused 
by environmental factors, like infections (Dunitz, 1993). Cates et al. (1985) found 
that in Africa, main causes of infertility in men were varicocele, enlarged veins in the 
scrotum (20%), and accessory gland infection (11%). Both causes were more 
common in infertile men in Africa than in other parts of the world. Inhorn (2003) 
points out that psychosexual dysfunctions, like premature ejaculation or impotence 
can also contribute to fertility problems. 
 Epidemiological and demographic studies have identified several more distal 
causes, that is, behavioural correlates of infertility. Examples of these are being 
sexually active at an early age, usually defined as below 13 years (Ericksen & 
Brunette, 1996, Larsen, 1995), and having had a relatively large number of sexual 




Barden-O’Fallon (2005) found that in Malawi, having exchanged money or goods 
for sex was associated with fertility problems in men, but not in women. They note 
that this is an important gender difference, but do not attempt to explain it.  
 Furthermore, demographic factors which have been found to correlate with 
infertility are being in a polygamous marriage (Barden-O’Fallon, 2005), being or 
having been divorced (Ericksen & Brunette, 1996, Favot et al., 1997; Larsen, 1995) 
and urban, rather than rural residence (Ericksen & Brunette, 1996, Larsen, 1995). In 
addition, Ericksen and Brunette (1996) find a relationship between ethnicity and 
infertility in various African nations, with some ethnic groups within the same nation 
having higher infertility rates than others.   
 The relationship between socio-economic class and infertility has been 
examined as well, but findings are equivocal. Larsen (1995) reports that in Cameroon 
and Nigeria, socio-economic class, education and occupation are not significantly 
related to infertility. By contrast, Barden-O’Fallon (2005) found that in Malawi, 
being in the highest income group is significantly associated with infertility, but only 
in men.  
 It is worth noting that correlational data do not allow determination of the 
direction of the associations between infertility and the various related factors. Thus, 
STD and HIV can both be the causes of infertility, and the result of an infertile 
status, for example because people with fertility problems may engage in more 
‘unsafe’ sexual relationships, in an attempt to bear children. In addition, being 
sexually active from a young age, having more sexual relationships, polygamy and 
divorce can be seen as risk factors of STDs and HIV/AIDS (cf. Ericksen & Brunette, 
1996), and may therefore increase the chance of becoming infertile. However, with 
the exception of being sexually active at a young age, these characteristics can also 
be a result of an infertile condition. 
  
2.1.3 Health seeking behaviour 
In addition to patterns in incidence and causes, some studies have examined patterns 
in people’s health seeking behaviour for infertility, that is, the actions taken to solve 
a fertility problem. They show that people in Africa frequently seek help for 




less than 60% sought biomedical or indigenous treatment for fertility problems. 
Walraven et al. (2001) found in their study of reproductive illness in the Gambia that 
this percentage is higher than for any other reproductive health problem. 
 Cates et al. (1985) found that, like incidence and causes, also patterns of 
health seeking behaviour are different in Africa than in other regions of the world. 
Women in Africa appear to use infertility services when they are relatively young: 
42% of the women in the study by Cates et al. (19985) who sought biomedical care 
in Africa were below 24 years, compared to 25% in the developed countries. At the 
same time, Cates et al. (1985) found that women in Africa had waited significantly 
longer before seeking biomedical health services than women in the developed 
world. In Africa, 33% had waited for more than 2.5 years, whereas in the developed 
world, 50% had waited less than 2 years (Cates et al., 1985). Hence, it appears that 
for women in Africa infertility problems become apparent at a relative young age.  
 Cates et al. (1985) found that, unlike women, men in Africa who sought 
biomedical care tended to be older than men in other parts of the world. Barden-
O’Fallon (2005) found that in Malawi, women consult biomedical practitioners more 
often than men.  These findings seem to indicate that men are less eager than women 
to seek biomedical services, especially when they are younger.  
 Several studies indicate that people consult indigenous healers more 
frequently than biomedical practitioners (Barden-O’Fallon, 2005; Favot et al., 1997; 
Walraven et al., 2001). Barden-O’Fallon (2005) for example found that in Malawi, 
74.7% of all women in their survey who had made use of some form of health care, 
had consulted indigenous healers, and 80% of all men who had sought help from 
health services. It appears that when people consult healers, they do so frequently: in 
the study by Favot et al (1997), infertile women reported on average 5.9 visits to 
indigenous healers, and 1.7 visits to western health services. 
 Regarding demographic factors associated with use of health services, 
Barden- O’Fallon (2005) found a significant positive association between being 
educated and seeking biomedical or indigenous treatment in Malawian women with 
fertility impairments. However, this association was not found in men: for them 








Large scale, survey based studies, of demographic or epidemiological nature, show 
that the incidence of secondary infertility is high in sub Saharan African countries, 
affecting in Malawi 17% of couples between 20 and 44 years. Considerably more 
couples are affected by fertility problems if one includes all infertile periods in 
people’s lives. In addition, they have identified infections as the main causes of 
infertility infections, related to pregnancy and abortion complications, and STDs, 
including HIV/AIDS, which lead to pelvic inflammatory disease. Furthermore, 
several behavioural and demographic factors appear to correlate with infertility, like 
being sexually active at an early age, having many sexual relationships, being 
divorced or being in a polygamous marriage, and living in town. Use of biomedical 
and especially indigenous care for infertility appears to be common.    
  These epidemiological and demographic studies are thus useful for the 
identification of patterns in infertility, and can sketch the ‘profile’ of the ‘average’ 
infertile person in African countries. However, they are limited in their possibilities 
to provide insight into underlying social or psychological mechanisms which can 
explain observed patterns. Ericksen and Brunette (1996, p.217) acknowledge this in 
relation to the ethnic variation of infertility rates which they observe. They point out 
that ethnic variation cannot be accounted for by the factors in their regression model, 
and suggest that there are therefore ‘cultural-specific influences’ which would have 
to be further investigated in demographic and non-demographic studies. Ericksen 
and Brunette (1996) suggest studies of a historical and ethnographic nature.  
 Epidemiological and demographic studies are limited in their ability to 
explain patterns in infertility, partly because there is little room in these studies for 
local views and meanings, which can be expected to be important for people’s 
actions. The reliance on ‘etic’ academic perspectives and conceptualisations in 
epidemiological and demographic studies is apparent for instance from the 
definitions of infertility which they use. Infertility is usually defined as failure to 




unprotected intercourse. Many authors have pointed out that such definitions are of 
little meaning in non-western settings, as people will be considered to have a fertility 
problem long before 5 to 7 years have passed (Gerrits et al., 1999; Leonard, 2002; 
Sundby, 2002)11. In addition, the use of quantitative survey methodologies, in which 
responses are transposed into a limited number of pre-established categories, 
prevents gaining insight into issues as deemed relevant by people themselves.  
 
2. 2 Studies of psychological correlates of infertility 
A significant number of studies focus on the meaning which infertility has for 
people, in that they examine whether and to what extent infertility is associated with 
certain psychological states and processes. The main domains of investigation in 
these studies are psychological correlates of infertility and its treatment, such as 
depression, anxiety, and marital (dis)satisfaction, the mediating effect of factors such 
as gender, coping style and cognitions, and decision making regarding solutions and 
treatment.  
 Studies of psychological correlates use predominantly quantitative 
methodologies, either questionnaires, structured interviews or, most commonly, pre-
existing, standardized psychometric tests (see table 3 in the Appendix)12. Data 
obtained are analysed using descriptive and inferential statistics. These studies tend 
to recruit clients at infertility clinics, and compare them either with the population 
norms provided for standardized tests, or with a fertile control group (Greil, 1997). 
Virtually all of the studies of psychological correlates of infertility have been carried 
out in the west.  
 Central to my review of this category of studies is Greil’s (1997) widely 
quoted review of the psychological distress literature, although I have included more 
recent articles as well. 
  
                                                 
11 This is likely to be the case in western countries as well, but more so in non-western developing 
countries, in which people are expected to fall pregnant sometimes within months after marriage.   
12 Qualitative, descriptive studies of psychological well-being in relation to infertility have been 
conducted as well. I do not discuss these in this section, because they are more similar to ethnographic 





2.2.1 Psychological correlates of infertility and its treatment 
Until the 1980s, scholars were interested in psychological factors as causes, rather 
than consequences of infertility (van Balen, 2002; Greil, 1997). Unexplained 
infertility, that is when no biological cause of infertility can be established, was 
commonly attributed to psychogenic factors, such as unconscious ambivalence or 
resistance to becoming a mother (van Balen, 2002). Van Balen (2002) points out that 
nowadays, psychogenic explanations are more tentative, pertain mainly to stress, and 
are usually thought to perpetuate rather than cause infertility (Anderheim et al., 2005; 
Pook, Krauze & Rohrle, 2000; Lancastle & Boivin, 2005). However, more profound 
psychological attributions of infertility, to for instance unconscious psychodynamic 
factors (Haynes & Miller, 2002) or personality characteristics (Fasssino, Garzaro, 
Peris, Amianto, Piero & Daga, 2002) can still be found.  
  Since the late 1980s, studies tend to focus on the psychological consequences 
of infertility, and even more commonly, on the consequences of infertility treatment, 
like IVF procedures (van Balen, 2002). These studies compare clients of infertility 
clinics with ‘healthy controls’, using psychometric tests like the Hospital Anxiety 
and Depression Scale, which measures (trait and state) anxiety and depression (Lord 
& Robertson, 2005) or the General Health Questionnaire which measures somatic 
complaints, anxiety, social dysfunction and depression (van den Akker, 2005). Some 
studies use a psychometric assessment specific to infertility, like Fertility Problem 
Stress Inventory (Abbey et al., 1992). This inventory measures stress resulting from 
infertility in a personal domain (stress on mental and physical health), marital 
domain (strain produced by infertility on marital and sexual relationships) and social 
domains (effect of infertility on relationships with family and friends and workmates) 
(Abbey et al., 1991). 
Most studies have indeed found an association between infertility (Aghanwa, 
Dare & Ogunniy, 1999; Souter, Hopton, Penney & Templeton, 2002; Dyer, 
Abrahams, Mokoena, Lombard & van der Spuy, 2005), or its treatment (Rajkhowa, 
2006; Domar, 2004), and negative psychological consequences.  However, there are 
also some studies which find no effect of infertility, or its treatment, on people’s 
psychological well-being (Dhillon, Cumming & Cumming, 2000; Edelmann, 




symptoms are observed, authors disagree about whether they fall within the clinically 
relevant range, that is whether scores regarding symptoms are not only higher than 
the average norm, but also elevated to the extent that they can be called pathological 
(Greil, 1997). 
 Studies have examined the effect of infertility or its treatment on marital 
satisfaction as well.  Like other psychological correlates, marital satisfaction is 
normally measured with pre-existing scales, like for instance the ‘ENRICH marital 
inventory’ (Fowers & Olson, 1989). This inventory examines communication in the 
marriage, conflict resolution and sexual relationships, amongst other issues. Some of 
its subscales assess social relationships, outside the marriage, like feelings and 
concerns about relationships with relatives and friends.    
  Findings regarding the effect of infertility on marital relationships are mixed 
(Greil, 1997). For instance, Guttmann (2004) compares marital satisfaction of 
childless couples with the satisfaction of first time parents, and found that it was, on 
average, lower. On the other hand, Sysdjö, Ekholm, Wadsby, Kjellberg and Sydsjö 
(2005) found that infertile couples had stable relationships which they evaluated in a 
positive way, both before and after IVF treatment, and regardless of whether 
treatment had been successful.  Greil (1991) found that relationships in couples 
facing fertility problems improved.  Some authors argue that it is differences in 
men’s and women’s emotional and coping reactions to infertility, rather than 
infertility itself, that have a negative effect on the quality of and satisfaction with 
marital relationships (Merari, Chetrit, Modan, 2002; Pasch, Dunkel-Schetter, 
Christensen, 2002; Peterson, Newton & Rosen, 2003). 
 
2.2.2 Psychological correlates and mediating factors: Gender, coping 
and illness cognitions.  
Another theme in studies of psychological correlates of infertility is whether certain 
factors, such as gender, coping style and illness cognitions, mediate psychological 
consequences of infertility. Most studies which have looked at gender differences, 
claim that women react more adversely to infertility than men (Greil, 1997). 
However, some find no or few differences (Edelmann & Connolly, 2000; Berg, 




which uses a longitudinal design to examined gender differences in psychological 
characteristics of infertility clients. They assessed infertility clients two or three 
times between the start and end of a treatment cycle. Although they found gender 
differences in psychological distress, these became smaller over time. In addition, 
Edelmann and Connolly (2000) point out that some of the gender differences which 
they found are to be expected as they are in accordance with default gender 
differences as recorded in normative scores of the psychometric tests they used. 
Therefore, they argue, as others have done (Berg et al., 1991), that several 
methodological flaws in infertility studies impair the validity of claims that 
psychological consequences of infertility are more severe for women. Examples of 
methodological problems are studies’ cross-sectional rather than longitudinal design 
(Edelmann & Connolly, 2000), which renders making claims about the effect of 
infertility or its treatment difficult, and the failure of researchers to take into account 
that, in general, men tend to express psychological problems less intensively, and 
less frequently than women (Berg et al., 1991; Edelmann & Connolly, 2000).  
  Coping style is another mediating factor between infertility, its treatment, and 
psychological outcomes which has been examined, using standardized assessments 
like the COPE (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989), or an infertility specific 
measurement like the Coping with Infertility Questionnaire (Benyamini et al., 2004).  
Infertility studies looking at coping largely conceptualise it as a cognitive process.  
Many studies drawn upon Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) model of coping with 
stress. This model proposes that coping is a response following cognitive appraisals 
of a threatening or taxing situation, in which the situation and possible reactions are 
assessed. Some studies of coping style and psychological consequences of infertility 
are informed by Leventhal’s self-regulatory model of coping (Leventhal, Meyer & 
Nerenz, 1980; 1984).  According to Leventhal et al. (1984), the first phase of coping 
is that, when faced with a health threat, people form various cognitions about 
features such as causes, controllability and severity. These cognitions subsequently 
inform people’s response. Hence, also in this self-regulatory model, coping is seen as 
a cognitive process.  
 Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) model distinguishes between two kinds of 




concerned with doing something about the stressor and solving the problem, emotion 
focused coping is aimed at reducing and managing the accompanying stress (Lazarus 
& Folkman, 1984). Others, like Carver, Scheier and Weintraub (1989) have 
subsequently refined these distinctions, and added new styles of coping, like denial, 
that is denying the reality of a stressor, mental disengagement, that is engaging in 
activities or thoughts to avoid thinking about the stressful situation, or positive re-
appraisal of a stressor (Carver, Scheier & Weintraub, 1989). Some styles of coping 
are considered less functional than others, and therefore are seen as ‘maladaptive’ or 
‘dysfunctional’, although it is acknowledged that this can differ per person and 
situation (Carver, Scheier & Weintraub, 1989). 
Also regarding infertility, certain coping styles have been found to be 
associated with more negative psychological consequences (van den Akker, 2005; 
Benyamini, Gozlan & Kokia, 2004; Gannon, Butler, Glover & Abel, 2000; Hynes, 
Call, Terry & Gallois, 1992; Lord & Robertson, 2005; Schmidt, Holstein, 
Christensen & Boivin, 2005). For example, ‘coping through avoidance’ or ‘seeking 
social support’ has been found to be related to greater distress than ‘problem 
focussed coping’ and ‘direct action’ (Hynes, Callan, Terry & Gallois, 1992).  
Beyamini et al. (2004) found that ‘inward-anger’ strategies, such as denial, self-
blame, self-neglect, social avoidance, were associated with reduced well-being and 
heightened levels of distress. On the other hand, ‘self-nurturing’ strategies such as 
self-care, keeping busy, investing in myself, were related to higher levels of well-
being (op cit.).  
 Inspired by Leventhal’s et al. (1984) idea that people form cognitions about 
features of the health threat such as causes, controllability and severity, which inform 
their coping response, some studies have examined people’s illness cognitions 
regarding infertility, and their relationship with psychological outcomes. These 
studies commonly employ a standardized measurement to assess people’s illness 
cognitions, like the Illness Perception Questionnaire (Weinman, Petrie, Moss-Morris 
& Horne, 1996), although qualitative assessments have also been used (Vieyra, 
Tennen, Affleck, Allen, McGann, 1990).  Cognitions which have been found to be 
associated with greater distress are more severe perceived consequences (Beyamini 




(Benyamini et al., 2004) and attributions of infertility (Lord & Robertson, 2005; 
Vieyra et al., 1990) and IVF failure (Litt, Tennen, Affleck, Klock, 1991) to factors 
related to oneself, like one’s own actions. However, Abbey and Halman (1995) 
found that self-attributions were unrelated to life quality, whereas attributions of 
infertility to physicians were negatively related to measurements of quality of life. 
Litt et al. (1991) found that women’s attribution of infertility to one’s own actions 
rather than to others was negatively associated with distress felt after IVF failure. 
They suggest that ‘some women may need to have a sense that the world is not 
uncontrollable’ (Litt et al., 1991: 183).  In addition, Vieyra et al. (1990) note that 
findings regarding attributions and distress have to be interpreted with caution. They 
found that for all attributions which they measured, including behavioural self-
blame, but also chance and biomedical factors, stronger endorsement of an 
attribution was associated with greater distress. They point out that the direction of 
the association is unknown and suggest that greater distress may stimulate people to 
search for causes of their infertility.  
 As certain coping styles and cognitions are more associated with negative 
outcomes, a common suggestion is that some people’s problems can be alleviated by 
cognitive therapy, which can help them change their ‘unhelpful’ cognitions and 
coping styles and decrease their negative psychological effects (van den Akker, 
2005; Benyamini et al., 2004; Lord & Robertson, 2005).  
  
2.2.3 Health seeking behaviour   
Psychological correlates have been studied as well in relation to people’s health 
seeking behaviour for infertility, in terms of, for instance, decision-making and 
motivations. Van Balen, Verdurmen and Ketting (1997) conducted a survey about 
the different kinds of actions, which couples can engage in to solve a fertility 
problem (i.e. medical help, adoption, and foster care), and the motivations associated 
with these different options. Desire to have a child was the motive most frequently 
mentioned, for all options, and altruistic motives were mentioned most frequently by 
those considering adoption and foster-care. In another survey study, van Balen and 
Verdurmen (1999) found that uneasiness and anxiety about medical settings was 




adoption. In a survey, Greil and McQuillan (2004) investigated health seeking 
behaviour of American ‘subfecund’ women. They found factors like (lower) locus of 
control, intent to become pregnant and self-identification as having a fertility 
problem to be related to the seeking of medical help, as well as (higher) income and 
(higher) education level. Rhajkowa, McConnell and Thomas (2006) found in their 
survey study that stress was one of the main reasons for couples to stop IVF 
treatment, and Domar (2004) reaches a similar conclusion on the basis of a literature 
review. According to Peddie, van Teijlingen and Bhattacharya (2005) unrealistic 
expectations about treatment are related to people’s decision to stop treatment. 
 
2.2.4 Conclusion  
Studies of psychological correlates of infertility show that overall, infertility and its 
treatment has an impact on people’s, and especially women’s, psychological well-
being. However, there is some ambiguity regarding the extent to which well-being is 
affected, as well as regarding the effect of infertility on marital satisfaction. 
Psychological consequences have been found to be mediated by various factors like 
gender, coping style and cognitions, although these results are equivocal. Several 
psychological factors (e.g. motivations, locus of control) and demographic factors 
(e.g. income and education), have been found to correlate with, and thus to some 
extent predict, people’s health seeking behaviour.  Discontinuation of IVF treatment 
appears associated with the stress which it causes. 
 Greil (1997, p.1700) describes the psychological distress literature as 
disappointing: the outcomes are often ambiguous, and many seem unsurprising. This 
goes for example for the finding that anxiety about medical settings results in not 
using medical treatment (van Balen & Verdurmen, 1999), or that ‘inward-anger’ 
coping strategies are related to lower well-being and more distress. Greil (1997) 
suggests that the disappointing results of quantitative psychological studies of 
infertility are due to several methodological and conceptual shortcomings. First, 
studies use a selective sample of participants. They tend to focus on those seeking 
treatment, in particular in the form of assisted reproductive technologies, like IVF 




these are more often people who belong to ethnic minorities or  lower socio-
economic classes, these groups are under-represented as well (op cit.). 
  In addition, there is an over-reliance on women (Greil, 1997). Although there 
are various studies in which both men and women participated, these tend to focus 
specifically on gender differences, thus necessitating involvement of both sexes. 
Authors usually do not explain why they include only women. When they do, a 
common argument is that women carry the main burden of infertility (Benyamini, 
Gozlan & Kokia, 2004; Dyer et al., 2005; Van den Akker, 2005). However, this 
claim does not seem to warrant the exclusion of men, as it requires a comparison 
between men and women. In addition, if infertility is more problematic for women, 
this does not mean that it is not distressing for men. 
  A second, more fundamental conceptual shortcoming of these studies of 
psychological correlates, identified by Greil (1997), is that they do not acknowledge 
the relevance of the socio-cultural context and transform ‘what should be understood 
as a characteristic of a social situation’ into a trait of individuals (Greil, 1997: 1693).  
The individualistic approach of psychological studies is demonstrated by their focus 
on internal states, like anxiety and depression,  and their attention to social 
relationships in terms of individuals’ cognitions or feelings about them, as 
demonstrated by the concept ‘marital satisfaction’. In addition, coping and decision-
making are conceptualised as internal processes, based on people’s cognitions. An 
implication of this individualistic cognitive approach is that alleviation of the burden 
of infertility is sought in cognitive therapy for people with a fertility problem, in 
which they can learn to change their perceptions and cognitions. Thus, socio-cultural 
aspects also tend to be ignored as potential starting points for alleviating 
consequences of infertility. The conceptualisation of the hardship of infertility as 
dependent on people’s maladaptive cognitive responses seems unfortunate, as it can 
lead to victim blaming (cf. van Balen, 2002).  
 The studies by Aghanwa, Dare and Ogunniyi (1999) and Dyer et al. (2005) 
are exceptions in that they acknowledge the need to tackle socio-cultural practices 
and meanings, in addition to providing counselling for people with a fertility 
problem. Interestingly, these studies are the only two studies in non-western 




However, the almost exclusive focus on western, developed countries is not 
acknowledged; studies suggest that the phenomena they examine, and their findings, 
are of universal relevance and applicability. This can be inferred for example from 
titles like ‘choices and motivations of infertile couples’ (van Balen, Verdurmen, 
Ketting, 1997) or ‘differences between husbands’ and wives’ approaches to 
infertility’ (Pasch et al., 2002). This is then, another illustration of the neglect of the 
socio-cultural nature of infertility. As Greil (1997: 1693) explains, ’if one does not 
conceptualise infertility as social constructed, one might not stop to think that 
different groups might construct it differently’. 
 Greil’s (1997) review is published in the high impact journal of Social 
Science and Medicine, and widely cited: 77 citations are reported in the database of 
Web of Knowledge as of October 2006. However, whilst authors refer to Greil’s (op 
cit.) overview of findings regarding psychological distress, the methodological and 
conceptual criticism, which he put forward in the same article, is virtually ignored. 
One possible explanation for the lack of methodological and conceptual reflexivity in 
studies of psychological correlates can be found in van Balen’s (2002) work. He 
argues that much of the psychological research agenda is dictated by the medical 
profession, which has a vested interested in having a large clientele, and thus in 
understanding the effect of psychological factors on patients’ satisfaction, on 
(dis)continuation of treatment and on success rates of assisted reproductive 
technologies. The medical research agenda of infertility studies could explain the 
over-representation of clients of infertility clinics; the larger interest in psychological 
consequences of treatment procedures than of infertility itself (van Balen, 2002); and 
more in general, the individualistic approach of many infertility studies, which, as 
Greil (1997) points out, fits in with a medical model of illness. One could even argue 
that the conceptualisation of infertility distress as the outcome of individualistic, 
potentially pathological traits, to be remedied by counselling and psychotherapy, is in 
the interest of the medical profession.  
Thus, after nine years and 77 citations, there is still a strong need to take into 
account Greil’s (1997) recommendation to re-direct attention to social actors with a 
fertility problem rather than infertile patients, to infertility as a social state rather than 




(cf. Dyer et al., 2005). As I will show in the next section, ethnographic infertility 
studies, pay much more attention to the social context of infertility. 
 
2.3 Ethnographic studies: Experiences and perceptions of infertility  
Since the second half of the 1990s, scholars’ interest in infertility in the developing 
world has increased (van Balen & Inhorn, 2002). In particular, there is a growing 
number of studies which describe local experiences and perceptions of infertility, its 
causes, solutions and consequences. Studies have examined infertility in various non- 
western developing countries. However, no study has yet examined local views of 
infertility in Malawi. Four main themes which are examined in these studies of local 
experiences and perceptions are perceived causes of infertility, health seeking 
behaviour, solutions offered, and psychological and social consequences of 
infertility.  A fifth, less central theme in these studies is how individuals manage the 
stigma of infertility and their infertile and gender identities.  
These studies use predominantly qualitative methodologies, and tend to 
collect several types of data. Particularly common is the combination of semi-
structured interviews and observations. They relate their findings to the socio-
cultural context. Considering these features, these studies can be said to be of an 
ethnographic nature. The form of data analysis used is usually left implicit, but often 
seems to be a form of thematic analysis, in which relevant themes are deduced from 
the content of people’s statements13.   
 The field of descriptive studies of experiences and perceptions of infertility in 
developing countries is relatively young and very much in development. Although 
this makes it difficult to identify seminal papers, it is clear that Inhorn’s (1994) work 
on infertility in Egypt is of major influence. Her book ‘Quest for conception: Gender, 
Infertility and Egyptian Medical Traditions’ (Inhorn, 1994) was the first detailed 
account of the experiences of infertile women in a non- western country. 
  
                                                 




2.3.1 Causes from indigenous perspectives 
Many studies of infertility in developing countries discuss local or indigenous 
‘knowledge’, ‘perceptions’ or ‘beliefs’ regarding causes, terms which tend to be used 
interchangeably.  Indigenous perceptions are often compared and juxtaposed with 
biomedical knowledge regarding causes, as described in epidemiological studies.  
Sometimes, local and biomedical ideas are found to overlap. For example, studies 
have found that people consider abortion and sperm abnormalities (Gerrits et al., 
1999), blocked tubes (Dyer et al., 2004) and STDs (Dyer et al., 2004; Gerrits et al., 
1999, Mariano, 2004) to be causes of infertility.  More attention is paid, however, to 
differences in biomedical and indigenous perspectives. Thus, various 'indigenous' 
beliefs regarding causes have been reported, including the use of indigenous and 
biomedical contraceptives, that is condoms, the pill, IUDs and injectables 
(Agadjanian, 2001, Gerrits et al., 1999, Upton, 2001). Gerrits (1997) reports that in 
Mozambique,  incompatibility of blood of a particular man and woman is thought to 
be a cause of infertility.  
 Some causes have been categorised as 'personalistic explanations’ (Foster & 
Anderson, 1978), according to  which a health problem is caused by people or 
supernatural beings and forces, like spirits or witches. Personalistic explanations of 
infertility in the developing world pertain especially to ancestral spirits (Gerrits et al., 
1997; Sundby et al., 1998; Sundby, 1997, Mariano, 2004) and witches (Dyer et al., 
2004; Feldman-Savelsberg, 1994; Gerrits et al., 1997; Sundby 1997). Spirits are 
usually seen as able to cause infertility when disturbed due to problematic social 
relationships (Neff, 1994) or bad behaviour (Mariano, 2004). Witches’ help is 
thought to be evoked by jealous people, especially co-wives, mothers in law and 
neighbours (Dyer et al, 2004; Feldman-Savelsberg, 1994; Sundby 1997). In addition, 
the idea that infertility is due to God's will has been reported (Sundby, 1997; Gerrits 
et al., 1999), at times seen as a punishment for sins people committed (Meera 
Guntupalli & Chenchelgudem, 2004, Neff, 1997).  
   Another personalistic explanation found is that infertility is attributed to 
people’s transgression of certain behavioural norms. Examples of such transgressions 
are women’s neglect of ancestors, disrespectful treatment of parents and husbands, 




2001), widows not observing a period of sexual abstinence (Upton, 2001). Sundby 
(1997, p. 6) remarks that in many West-African countries infertility is regularly 
related to 'misuse of the body', which includes promiscuity or other undesirable 
sexual behaviour and abortion.  Note that thus, especially women's violations are 
reported; men’s violations of taboos as cause of infertility are referred to much more 
rarely. Upton (2001) however, mentions that in Botswana, fertility problems can be 
attributed to transgressions of sexual norms by men. For instance, sleeping with 
another woman when one’s wife is pregnant is seen as a risk factor for miscarriages.    
 Some authors point out that people may consider various causes relevant for 
their fertility problem, and may believe in both biomedical and indigenous causes 
(Inhorn, 1994; Sundby, 1997). In addition, Inhorn (1994) points out that ideas about 
causes are likely to vary over time, and that there is not necessarily a cultural 
consensus about causes.  
  Although a wide range of indigenous causes is reported, authors also note the 
limited knowledge of people regarding causes of infertility (Meera Guntupalli & 
Chechelgudem, 2004; Sundby, 1997). This judgement is based on the observation 
that people’s knowledge is not in agreement with biomedical knowledge, or that 
respondents themselves say that they do not know the causes of infertility, in general, 
or regarding their own condition (Dyer et al., 2004; Papreen et al., 2000).  
Several authors note that infertility is often considered a problem residing in 
the woman. This is often seen as support for the argument that women are seen as to 
blame for infertility, something which virtually all authors note (e.g. Gerrits et al., 
1994; Riessman, 2000; Inhorn, 1994, 2004).  For instance, Riessman (2000) reports 
that Jindal and Gupta (1989) found ‘considerable self-blame’ in women visiting a 
fertility clinic in India, as a common statement by the women was ‘there is 
something wrong with me’.  Inhorn (2004, p.245) explains how indigenous ideas 
about procreation in Egypt imply that it is always the woman who is seen as the 
infertile partner, and talks about this in the context of ‘procreative blame’. It should 
be noted however that the two issues, of ideas about which partner is seen as infertile 
and who is seen as to blame,  do not map onto each other in a straightforward way. 
For example, Meera Guntupalli and Chechelgudem (2004, p. 253) state ‘even though 




the problem (…)’.  Likewise, Sundby (1997, p. 31) mentions that ‘most women 
know that infertility can be a man’s fault but say that the women are often blamed’. 
Thus, drawing conclusions about who is blamed for infertility based on statements 
about who is considered to have the problem, and vice versa, seems problematic.   
 
2.3.2 Health seeking behaviour  
A second theme commonly addressed in ethnographic studies of infertility in the 
developing world, concerns people’s health seeking behaviour.  
  Like epidemiological and demographic studies, ethnographic studies report 
that the use of biomedical services for infertility is common. Sundby et al. (1998) for 
instance, found that 16% of the gynaecology cases in a hospital in the Gambia were 
infertility clients, and higher rates, of up to 33% have been reported in Zimbabwe, 
South Africa and Nigeria (Rowes, 2000). Okonofua (1996) even argues that in 
Nigeria, infertility is the main reason for gynaecological consultations.  
   It appears that usually women consult western health practitioners, on their 
own or accompanied by relatives. This even if they know their husbands may be the 
cause of the infertility problem (Gerrits et al., 1999, Inhorn, 2003; Sundby, Mboge & 
Sonko, 1998; Sundby, 1997). Sundby (1997) found in her study in the Gambia that 
doctors may contribute to this gender pattern as they hardly ever requested to see the 
male spouses.   
 As reported in epidemiological and demographic studies, some ethnographic 
studies report that people wait relatively long before seeking help in western health 
centres. Sundby et al. (1998) found a seemingly long period of between 2 and 3 
years, between onset of the infertility problem and consulting a doctor.  Gerrits 
(1997) reports a large variety in the time during which women had had an infertility 
problem before they sought help: 6 months to 10 years. In addition, some studies 
(Gerrits, 1997; Sundby et al., 1998) report that many people with a fertility problem, 
between 40 and 60 percent, did not seek help from biomedical health services. 
  People appear to use indigenous health care more often than biomedical care 
(Gerrits, 1997; Sundby, 2002). As was found in epidemiological studies, people 
consult healers frequently: Gerrits (1997) reports that some Mozambiquan women 




indigenous healers before attending western health services for an infertility problem 
(Gerrits, 1997, Sundby, 1997; Sundby et al., 1998). According to Sundby (1997, p. 
36), biomedical health care often comes ‘as the last resort after indigenous care has 
failed.'  This could explain the relatively long time that people sometimes wait before 
they consult biomedical practitioners. However, Inhorn (1994) notes that in Egypt, 
people with a fertility problem also often consult indigenous healers after having 
been to biomedical practitioners. ‘Doctor shopping’ appears to be common, in that 
people often consult large numbers of physicians, and both indigenous and 
biomedical practitioners (Inhorn, 1994; Sundby, 1997, Unisa, 1999).     
   Ethnographic studies also describe solutions sought outside indigenous or 
biomedical health care. Several authors mention how especially men frequently 
engage in extramarital relationships in an attempt to produce offspring with another 
partner (Gerrits, 1997; Mariano, 2004; Meera Guntupalli & Chechelgudem, 2004; 
van Balen & Bos, 2004). This practice is coined by van Balen and Bos (2004, p. 246) 
as ‘the poor man’s Artificial Insemination by Donor’. Fostering other people's 
children, either orphans or children of relatives, is considered a solution by some 
couples in sub-Saharan Africa (Gerrits, 1997; Sundby, 1997). Furthermore, 
sometimes special rituals are performed to solve fertility problems (Sundby et al, 
1998; Neff, 1997). Sundby et al. (1998) describe the existence of a special ‘fertility 
group’ in the Gambia, in which rituals are performed which are aimed at child 
survival and advice is given regarding infertility treatment.    
  A few authors note that some people do not seek help, in general (Unisa, 
1999) or from western health care specifically (Sundby et al., 1998), and list reasons 
which people give for their inactivity. Reasons mentioned are costs involved 
(Sundby et al., 1998; Unisa, 1999, p. 895), lack of information (Unisa, 1999), or ‘not 
knowing where to seek help' (Sundby et al., 1998, p. 985). For the women in Unisa’s 
(1999, p.56) study of infertility in India, one major reason for not seeking treatment 
was that ‘it was not necessary’.  Sundby et al. (1998, p. 985) report that in the 
Gambia, ‘some related it to the husband's unwillingness to seek help'.    
 Overall, it appears that in developing countries, people with a fertility 
problem seek solutions relentlessly, whether from biomedical or indigenous sources 




they make large financial (Inhorn, 1994; 2003; Unisa, 1999), and sometimes even 
physical (Inhorn, 1994; 2003; van Balen & Gerrits, 2001) sacrifices (see section 
2.3.3). 
 
2.3.3 (Medical) Solutions offered 
A few ethnographic studies describe the biomedical and, to a lesser extent, 
indigenous treatment offered to infertility patients. Inhorn’s (1994) study provides an 
exceptionally detailed description of biomedical and indigenous methods of 
treatment.  Especially in sub-Saharan Africa, means to diagnose infertility are limited 
(Gerrits et al., 1999; Sundby et al., 1998). Sundby et al. (1998) list the diagnostic 
means available in the Gambia:  STD tests, sperm count, and hystero-salpingograms, 
a technique whereby dye is injected in the fallopian tubes to render blockages visible. 
However, these diagnostic tests are only carried out in Gambia's main referral 
hospital or in a few private clinics. In addition, Sundby et al (1998) found that many 
patients in hospitals and clinics were seen only once. This suggests that many clients 
did not get their test results, and that they were thus of little use.  
   The treatment available for infertility is often limited as well. For instance, 
surgery to open blocked fallopian tubes, one of the most common causes of 
infertility, is a rare procedure in sub Saharan African countries (Sundby et al. ,1998). 
Even rarer is in vitro fertilisation (IVF), which would be another possibility to 
achieve pregnancy when tubes are blocked (cf. Vekemans, 1994). STDs are amongst 
the main causes of infertility in sub-Saharan Africa, but treatment for them is not 
always available. Gerrits (1997) for instance found that in the district capital 
Montepuez in Mozambique antibiotics were often not available. Nor was the 
contraceptive pill, which is sometimes used in order to treat irregular menstrual 
cycles. When no medicines are available, women are referred to a hospital in a 
bigger town, 200 km away, but Gerrits (1997) notes that women often do not go.  
  In addition to problems with availability of diagnostic procedures and 
treatment, problems with the quality of infertility care have been observed (Sundby, 
2002). Sundby (2002) mentions that in the Gambia and Zimbabwe, clinics are 
overburdened and lack skilled workers. Both Inhorn (1998) and Sundby (2002) 




regularly carry out medical interventions which are ineffective and potentially 
harmful. Examples are electrocauterization of the cervix, in which tissue of the 
cervix is destroyed, which can lead to permanent damage of the cervix (Inhorn, 1994; 
Inhorn & Buss, 1994), and dilatation and curettage (D& C). This is a procedure in 
which tissue from the uterus is removed, and which can lead to infections if not 
carried out in sufficiently hygienic circumstances (Inhorn, 1994; Sundby, 2002). 
Inhorn (1994) notes that in Egypt, biomedical practitioners at times prescribe 
treatment without having derived a diagnosis, or do not discuss their diagnosis with 
their patients. She also argues that practitioners’ base their diagnoses often on 
contingent factors, such as which factors are seen as easiest to diagnose or as most 
common. Furthermore, Sundby (2002) found that in the rural areas of the Gambia, 
few nurses have a special interest in infertility, and that expatriate doctors did not see 
infertility as a priority for which they should offer specialized treatment.  At the same 
time, Sundby (2002, p. 252) notes that consultations for infertility can be difficult 
and require special skills and patience as infertility clients often do not directly reveal 
their problem to medical personnel, and instead provide vague reasons like ‘pain in 
the body’ or ‘something wrong in the pelvis’.  This may decrease practitioners’ 
motivation to help these clients even further. It thus seems likely that also attitudes 
and motivation of practitioners working in developing countries contribute to the 
limited quality of care for infertile clients. 
    There is little information available about care provided by indigenous 
healers in sub Saharan Africa, although Gerrits (1997) reports several indigenous 
treatments, offered to infertile women in Mozambique: herbal teas, balms, baths and 
exorcism rituals in case of spirit possession. In addition, both Gerrits (1997) and 
Sundby (1997) mention how, in respectively Mozambique and the Gambia, 
indigenous healers provide medicine in the form of texts of the Koran, enclosed in 
amulets or washed in water which should be drunk.  
 
2.3.4 Consequences of infertility  
Ethnographic studies describe infertility as a serious health problem with many 
negative consequences (Dyer et al., 2002; Gerrits et al., 1999, Inhorn, 2003; Sundby, 




to the social importance of childbearing and strong social norms to reproduce (Dyer 
et al., 2002, Inhorn 1994, 2003; McDonald Evens, 2004; Riessmann, 2002, 2005). 
Women especially are said to suffer and to bear the brunt of infertility problems 
(Dyer et al., 2002; Dyer et al., 2004; Inhorn, 1994; Inhorn & van Balen, 2000). This 
claim appears to be based mainly on the idea that women are usually blamed for 
infertility (Inhorn, 1994, 2003, Gerrits et al. 1997; Papreen, Sharma, Sabin, Begum, 
Ahsan, Baqui, 2000). In addition, some authors note that having children is essential 
for especially women’s adult and gender identity (Riessman, 2002; Harrison & 
Montgomery, 2001; Walraven et al., 2001). 
  Similar to studies of psychological correlates of infertility, ethnographic 
studies report that infertility leads to psychological distress.  They do so on the basis 
of observations such as infertile respondents crying during interviews (Dyer et al., 
2002), stating that they feel sad (Gerrits, 1997; Sundby, 1997) and reporting that they 
are worried, for instance about family continuation, support in old age, and about 
who would mourn them when they die and take care of their funeral (Gerrits, 1997). 
It appears that infertility can at times lead to extreme psychological distress: Dyer et 
al. (2002) mention that some respondents reported suicidal thoughts. Papreen et al. 
(2000), report as well that several community members said that infertility can push 
a woman to commit suicide, although none of the infertile respondents themselves 
mentioned this. 
 In addition to psychological consequences, many social consequences of 
infertility have been noted, at a community, family and conjugal level (Gerrits et al., 
1998). Studies report that in communities, people with a fertility problem are 
stigmatised (Dyer et al., 2002; Gerrits, 1997; Inhorn, 2004; Mariano, 2004; Neff, 
1994; Riesman, 2002, 2000; Sundby, 1997), and socially excluded from various 
activities like deliveries (Gerrits, 1997), (birth and burial) rituals (Gerrits, 1997), or 
weddings (Neff, 1994). People with a fertility problem are reported to be verbally 
abused by community members (Dyer et al, 2002; Papreen, 2000; Riesman, 2002; 
Upton, 2001). For instance, infertile women are bothered by gossip (Sundby, 1997), 
and ridiculed (Riesman, 2002). Upton (2001) mentions how infertile women in 




   Infertility appears to be a problem at the level of family relationships, in that 
infertile women feel pressurised to get pregnant, and are blamed for failing to bear 
children by their family (Gerrits, 1997) and especially family-in-law (Dyer et al., 
2002; Pashigian, 2002). Several authors mention that infertile women are taunted by 
their family and family-in-law. Papreen et al. (2000, p. 38) describe how an infertile 
woman was told by her mother-in-law ‘it is better to see the face of a dog than to see 
your face this early in the morning’. A respondent in the study by Dyer et al. (2002, 
p. 1665) was accused of causing their own infertility by her mother, who told her: 
'Where's all the children? Every time you are pregnant you drink them away... (you) 
flushed them down the toilet. '    
 An issue which may underlie problematic behaviour towards infertile 
relatives is that a couple’s infertility can be problematic for the whole family and 
kinship group (Gerrits, 1997; Neff, 1994; Onah, 1992). Onah (1992) mentions that in 
Nigeria, unmarried relatives of an infertile couple are not considered eligible for 
marriage. Neff (1994) explains that among the matrilineal Nayar in south India, the 
whole kinship group is held responsible for a woman’s infertility as they are 
expected to protect a woman from harmful forces like Gods or demons, which can 
affect fertility, and from disharmony in the matrilineal kin group, which might 
disturb the family fertility spirit. Therefore, a couple’s infertility can problematize 
relationships of a kinship group with others in the community.  
 Considering the impact which infertility can have on families, it seems not 
surprising that family members are often involved in seeking solutions. Gerrits 
(2002) mentions that during hospital consultations, women are more often 
accompanied by relatives than by their husbands. In addition, family members have 
been found to pressurize male relatives to divorce their wives if they are thought to 
be infertile (Gerrits et al., 1999; Papreen et al., 2000; Pashigian, 2000).   
  This suggests that infertility is a potential source of trouble for spousal 
relationships.  Indeed, several studies found that when a marriage remains childless, 
men at times abuse their wives, verbally and even physically (Dyer et al., 2002; 
Papreen, 2000; Riessman, 2005; Unisa, 1999). In addition, it appears common that 
men divorce their wives, take another wife, or engage in extramarital affairs (Gerrits 




Macua in Mozambique, women themselves also engage in extramarital relationships. 
However, this is seen as an exception due to the matriarchal organisation of this 
ethnic group.  
 It should be mentioned though, that the extent to which infertility leads to 
actual marriage breakdown, remains unclear. This is so, first because most authors 
report women’s worries about abandonment by their husbands (Gerrits, 1997; 
Papreen et al, 2000; Sundby, Mboge & Sonko, 1998; Sundby, 1997; Dyer et al., 
2002). Reports of actual divorce and abandonment are more rare, and seem usually 
based on reports by community members (Papreen et al., 2000). Second, several 
authors note that spousal relationships do not always become problematic, and may 
even become better (Dyer et al., 2002; Gerrits et al., 1999; Inhorn, 2003; Pashigian, 
2000; Riessman, 2005). Third, many of the infertile research participants in 
epidemiological and ethnographic studies are married, although some have had 
previous marriages, which may have broken down due to their fertility problems.  
 Nevertheless, overall, it can be concluded that infertility is found to be 
serious problem in developing countries, including sub Saharan Africa. This is so 
especially in terms of its social consequences, as reflected in authors’ classifications 
of infertility as a 'disease of social relations' (Neff, 1994, p.477),  ‘a central 
existential intrapersonal and relational conflict’ (Sundby, 1997, p. 30) and  ‘a 
question of social balance’ (Mariano, 2004, p. 268). 
 
2.3.5 Management of stigma and identity 
A final theme in some ethnographic infertility studies, is how individuals manage the 
stigma of infertility, and its effect on their (gender) identities.  Several authors hint at 
the relevance of causal attributions in the management of the stigma of infertility. 
Upton (2001) for instance, points out that if people attribute a woman’s infertility to 
a violation of social norms, this makes her liable for her own (health) problem. On 
the other hand, by attributing infertility to external factors like witchcraft or God's 
will, people can place the blame for infertility outside themselves (op cit.). 
Moreover, Upton (2001) argues that causal attribution can be used in the negotiation 
of one’s fertility status and identity. Attributing infertility to witchcraft, for example, 




producing children (anymore). Feldman-Savelsberg (1999, p.467-468) describes the 
case of a queen of a kingdom in Cameroon, who had several imaginary pregnancies. 
When one of her co-wives made sarcastic remarks about her motherhood, the queen 
accused her of stealing her child. This suggests as well that witchcraft accounts can 
have a function in the negotiation of one's (in)fertile status, or one’s responsibility for 
it. In addition, the case of the queen which  Feldman-Savelsberg (1999, p.467-468) 
describes suggests that imaginary pregnancies can have a function in the negotiation 
of one's (in)fertile status. Papreen et al. (2000) note as well the occurrence of 
imaginary pregnancies; women claim to have been pregnant but to have lost the 
pregnancy. The authors argue that this ameliorates their childless status. 
  Whereas some studies discuss people’s management of stigma and identity in 
passing, this theme is central in Riessman 's (2002, 2005) work on infertility in India.  
Riessman (2002) discusses how women can manage their infertility in relation to 
their (gender) identity by means of causal attribution. The extract below is part of an 
extract which Riessman (2002, p.154) discusses: 
 
L:   What do you think is the reason why you do not have children? 
A:   I think that it must be because I am so old. 
 That is my opinion. 
Other than that, no other problem 
There is this [name] hospital in Alleppey 
There- I had gone there for treatment 
Then the doctor said that- after doing a scan 
The way through which the sperm goes 
There is some block 
 
In her analysis of this narrative, Riessman (2002) explains how the woman positions 
herself as a 'the knowing subject', who knows that she is infertile due to her age, 
rather than an internal flaw, or ‘some block’. Riessman (2002) refers to another 
respondent who mentions that the doctor told her 'you are perfectly- no defect at all’. 
Both women, according to Riessman (2002, p. 166), reject blame and responsibility 
for their infertility and ‘perform positive identities (…) which transcended stigma 




 In another paper, Riessman (2000a), inspired by Goffman (1963), discusses in 
detail strategies to manage the stigma of infertility. Examples of strategies which she 
inferred from in-depth interviews with childless Indian women are ‘resistant 
thinking’ (not taking insulting remarks seriously), ‘strategic avoidance’ (avoiding 
neighbours and, thereby, potentially hurtful remarks), and ‘speaking out and acting 
up’ (rejecting blame for infertility and telling the husband that he is or might be to 
blame for the infertility).  
 
2.3.6 Conclusion 
Ethnographic studies of infertility in developing countries provide insight into the 
wide range of local perceptions of causes of infertility, and how these can be both 
similar and different to a biomedical perspective on causes. In addition, the studies 
show that people commonly seek help for fertility problems, especially from 
indigenous healers. They demonstrate as well that the quality and range of 
biomedical solutions offered is limited, due to a lack of resources, and possibly also 
due to a lack of interest on behalf of medical staff. Furthermore, ethnographic studies 
have shown overwhelmingly that infertility is a serious problem, especially in terms 
of its social consequences. These problems are seen as related to socio-cultural 
norms, which mandate parenthood. Infertility is seen as a serious problem, especially 
for women. At the same time, some studies draw attention to how people can 
actively manage the stigma of infertility and its effect on (gender) identities.  
Riessman for instance (2000a, b) states explicitly that (Indian) infertile women 
should not be seen as passive victims of their culture. 
 Unlike psychological studies, ethnographic studies connect infertility and the 
issues involved to local socio-cultural contexts. This is reflected in (sub) titles such 
as 'The exceptional case of the Macua in Mozambique.' (Gerrits, 2002) or 
‘Perceptions, causes and consequences of infertility among the Chenchu tribe of 
India’ (Meera Guntupalli & Chechelgudem, 2004). In addition, ethnographic studies 
pay attention to social, normative and moral issues involved in infertility. They have 
identified how, from local perspectives, infertility can be attributed to various social 
factors, like problematic relationships or violation of behavioural norms. The 




mandate parenthood and make infertility into a morally problematic, deviant state. 
Moreover, causes are linked to moral issues in discussions about who is considered 
to be ‘at fault’, and thus blamed for infertility problems.   
  Considering the attention given to the social nature of the problem of 
infertility, it is remarkable that several social actors tend to be excluded in infertility 
studies in the developing world. Usually, research participants are community 
members, or infertile women. Men are noticeably absent in infertility studies. 
Exceptions are the studies of Agadjanian (2001), Dyer et al. (2004), and Inhorn 
(2003). Inhorn (2003) however discusses male infertility in terms of its influences on 
women’s experiences of infertility.  Others have noted this omission in the literature 
regarding men’s views as well (Gerrits et al., 1999; Mbizvo & Basett, 1994), but the 
issue has seldomly been addressed. As in psychological studies, arguments for the 
focus on women are missing or pertain to the idea that women bear the brunt of 
infertility problems. As mentioned, this conclusion is problematic, as it requires a 
comparison of women’s and men’s experiences. In addition, the few studies in which 
men did take part, report serious negative consequences for men as well (Dyer et al., 
2004; Inhorn, 2003). For instance, Mbzivo and Basett (1996) and Upton (2001) state 
that men's fertility is more or less taken for granted, and therefore being infertile 
leads to more psychological problems for them. 
 Besides men, significant others of people with a fertility problem, such as 
relatives and friends, are seldom part of studies of infertility in the developing world. 
When studies include biomedical and indigenous practitioners, their views are 
usually not discussed in detail. Data obtained from these participants tends to serve 
as factual information about what medical care is offered. There are however medical 
sociological studies, which have analysed in detail biomedical practices regarding 
infertility, and have revealed their social, normative and moral bases and 
consequences. I will discuss some of these in the next section. 
2.4 Social aspects of biomedical practice in relation to 
infertility  
Some studies of infertility, usually carried out by medical sociologists, have 




to infertility, as medical sociologists have done regarding biomedicine in general 
(Brandt & Rozin, 1997; Lupton, 1994). These studies normally use qualitative 
methodologies, relying on interview data, documents, or to a lesser extent, surveys 
(see table 5 in the appendix). Several of these studies are of a historical nature. For 
instance, both Pfeffer (1993) and Sandelowksi (1999) have carried out a historical 
analysis of mainly medical papers and case studies published on infertility in the 19th 
and 20th century. Most studies of the social, normative and moral nature of 
biomedical practice in relation to infertility focus on the west14. An exception is 
Inhorn’s 15(1994) study. In her discussion of infertility in Egypt, she pays 
considerable attention to indigenous and biomedical medical practices, including 
their social bases.    
 Three themes can be discerned in these studies:  the social, interested nature 
of medical practice; the normative and moral bases of diagnoses; and how moral 
categorisations affect patients’ access to care. 
 
2.4.1 The interested, normative and moral nature of medical practice  
Inhorn (1994) draws attention to the social nature of biomedical practice in Egypt, in 
that she points out how it is informed by practitioners’ interests. To begin with, she 
notes how practitioners’ lack of communication about their diagnoses to their 
patients is in their interest, in that it is a way to maintain power differences and 
professional boundaries. 
In addition, Inhorn (1994) notes that in Egypt, invasive medical procedures 
are common, such as tubal insufflation (involving passing dye through the cervix, 
uterus and fallopian tubes) and dilatation and curettage of the uterus. She argues that 
although the benefits of these procedures are doubtful, they are performed in part 
because practitioners have an economic interest in doing so. They are an important 
source of income for practitioners, certainly for those working in the private sector, 
and these procedures are popular with people in search for a cure for their fertility 
problem, making them a way to attract clients (Inhorn, 1994). 
                                                 
14 As said (footnote 7) there is a growing body of literature on assisted reproductive technologies 
(ART) in developing countries. These examine as well the political and thus social nature of these 
technologies. However, as ART is rare in sub Saharan Africa and absent in Malawi, I do not include 
these studies in this literature review. 
15 I have discussed Inhorn’s (1994) work as well in the previous section on ethnographic studies. 




Some authors have paid attention to the normative bases and moral 
consequences of diagnoses. Pfeffer (1993) explains how, in the 19th and 20th 
centuries, diagnoses of infertility were based on normative expectations and on a 
notion of infertility as deviation from the norm. For instance, doctors relied on norms 
regarding women's physical appearance in their diagnoses, in that masculine bodily 
features in women were seen as an outward sign of reproductive health problems. 
Behavioural norms were regarded as relevant, in that leading idle lives or being 
particularly sexually active were seen as signs of decreased fertility.  
Both Pfeffer (1993) and Sandelowski (1990) point out how such attributions 
of infertility to behaviour make people, in particular women, to blame for their 
infertility. This goes as well for attributions of infertility to women’s volition 
(Sandelowski, 1990), such as psychoanalytic explanations which attribute infertility 
to an ambivalence towards maternity, and absence of a true desire for children 
(Sandelowski, 1990; van Balen, 2002). Attributions of infertility to decisions to delay 
childbearing, which emerged towards the end of the 19th century, make women 
responsible for their own infertility as well. In addition, it makes women morally 
suspect by portraying them as egocentric because they forego ‘duties’, such as being 
a mother, housewife and contributing to the continued existence of society, for 
selfish reasons like wanting to pursue careers (Sandelowksi, 1990). 
 Medical sociologists have also drawn attention to how practitioners’ creation 
of moral categories of patients, for instance based on diagnoses, can affect access to 
infertility services. Pfeffer (1993) notes that in the 19th century, some hospitals would 
not treat men or women who were seen as infertile due to self-inflicted STDs.  Malin 
(2003) shows how also nowadays, physicians do moral categorisation work. She 
found in her interview study of Finnish physicians who provide assisted reproductive 
technology (ART), that they defined categories of infertility patients as (more and 
less) ‘troublesome’, ‘good’ and ‘bad’16. For instance, career oriented women and 
women with psychosocial and health problems were constructed as troublesome 
patients, less good ‘mothers to be’ and inappropriate candidates for ART. Access to 
                                                 
16 Health practitioners’ moral categorisations of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ patients has been described 
in studies of practitioners in other biomedical fields as well, like practitioners working in 




ART for these women could be delayed or denied. Steinberg (1997) examined 
criteria for patient screening in British IVF clinics.  She found that some selection 
criteria were based on sexuality and lifestyle: many physicians argued that couples 
who were not heterosexual, and not married or in marriage-like relationships, should 
not be assisted to reproduce.  Thus, as others have done (Davis, 1990; Fried, 1990; 
Malin, 2003; Mort, 1987), Steinberg (1997), argues that the practitioners restrict the 
reproductive choice of women, and that biomedicine is an institution of social 
control, immersed with ideas about who can legitimately reproduce. 
  
2.4.2 Conclusion 
Some studies have drawn attention to the social, normative and moral nature of 
biomedical practice in relation of infertility. Thus, they show that this biomedical 
practice is not a neutral practice based on objective scientific ‘facts’. Biomedical 
practices appear to be informed by interests and power, medical explanations are 
based on normative ideas, and can result in blaming people, especially women, for 
fertility problems. In addition, practitioners construct different moral categories of 
infertility patients, which affect access to infertility services.  
  However, with the exception of Inhorn’s (1994) work, these studies of 
medical practice and practitioners’ categorisation work tend to focus on the west, and 
on assisted reproductive technologies. Hence, little is known about the social, 
normative and moral nature of less ‘high tech’ biomedical and indigenous practice in 
non-western countries.  
2.5 Conclusions and exposition of the lacunae in the 
literature  
The literature on infertility then, shows that infertility in sub Saharan Africa is a 
serious public health problem, given its considerable secondary infertility rates, its 
relation to STDs, and its many negative psychological and social consequences. 
Hence, infertility is not only a medical problem but also a problem of a fundamental 
social, normative and moral nature. There are limited possibilities to solve fertility 




health care for infertility is common, and infertility clients can place a considerable 
demand on health care systems.  
 There are several omissions in the infertility literature (section 2.5.2). As they are 
related to methodological features of the studies, I will review these first (section 
2.5.1). 
 
2.5.1 Review of methodological features 
The literature review shows that both quantitative and qualitative methods of data 
collection are used in infertility studies. Quantitative methodologies are used in 
epidemiological and demographic studies, which rely on large scale surveys, 
sometimes combined with medical investigations. Studies of psychological correlates 
of infertility also use quantitative methodologies: questionnaires, and, more 
frequently, psychometric assessments. Qualitative methodologies are used in 
ethnographic studies, which draw mainly on interviews and observations.  
  Studies tend to analyse data at the level of the individual or the collective.  
In studies of psychological correlates of infertility, the level of analysis is the 
individual. Responses to questionnaires or psychometric tests are used to make 
inferences about individuals’ psychological states and cognitive processes.  
  In epidemiological and demographic studies, the level of analysis is the 
collective, that is aggregates like nations or geographical regions. Thus, individuals’ 
responses to survey questions and outcomes of their medical assessments are 
aggregated and, through calculation of averages and correlations, inferences are 
made about the profile of certain infertile populations. In ethnographic studies, the 
level of analysis is usually the collective as well; observed patterns in statements in 
interviews are seen as indicators of perceptions and experiences characteristic for a 
cultural or ethnic group. In some ethnographic studies, like Riessman’s (2002, 2005), 
the level of analysis can be best described as individuals-in-context, as they focus on 
how individuals can ‘work on’ and modify socio-cultural circumstances and 
meanings. 
 Overall then, infertility studies consider responses to questionnaires, 
psychometric tests or interviews as pathway to either an underlying, internal reality 




for instance regarding behavioural and demographic characteristics of certain 
infertile populations, or cultural meanings, experiences and perceptions of infertility.  
In epistemological terms, overall, data are examined from a realist perspective17. 
Ethnographic studies acknowledge that the perceptions and experiences of infertility 
are culturally specific, and therefore acknowledge that there is a multitude of realities 
of infertility, which are thus socially constructed. However, the construction work is 
considered to take place outside the interviews, as interview statements are treated as 
rather straightforwardly representing the cultural realities.  Some ethnographic 
studies, like Riessman’s (2000a, 2000b, 2002), move away from a realist perspective, 
by considering interview statements as a site where people do work. Riessman (op 
cit.) for instance examines how women with fertility problems establish a positive 
gender identity for themselves in interviews.  
 
2.5.2 Lacunae in the literature 
The review of the infertility literature and methodological features of infertility 
studies, shows that there are certain gaps in the literature, which my study addresses. 
   First of all, no study has yet examined views of people in Malawi on 
infertility, its causes, consequences and solutions. Nevertheless, Malawi’s infertility 
rates are considerable, and as explained in the introduction, infertility can be 
expected to be a significant public health issue in this country. Thus, my study will 
address this gap in the literature by examining local views, or more specifically, 
constructions, of infertility in Malawi.   
  Second, infertility studies tend to exclude certain social actors, such as men 
and significant others, that is people who have a close relationship with people with a 
fertility problem, like relatives or friends. In addition, whereas some studies describe 
biomedical and indigenous healing practices in relation to infertility, an in-depth 
examination of practitioners’ views is missing. The lack of attention to the views of 
certain social actors in studies of infertility seems problematic because of the 
fundamentally social nature of infertility and its management. This highlights the 
need for examining the views of all social actors involved. My study addresses this 
                                                 
17 I consider epistemological perspectives as positions on a continuum rather than absolute distinctive 




shortcoming as it includes a wide range of social actors: women and men with a 
fertility problem, significant others of people with a fertility problem, biomedical 
practitioners and indigenous healers. I discuss in detail data from interviews with all 
of these categories of respondents.  
  Third, in general, infertility studies have treated talk as a resource for gaining 
access to an underlying reality concerning issues related to infertility, but not as a 
topic in itself. Overall, studies have not examined in detail how people talk about 
infertility. As discourse analysts have shown, such detailed examination brings out 
variability in talk. Variability in people’s statements is to be expected, as any 
phenomenon can be described in a multitude of ways (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; 
Schegloff, 1973). Potter and Wetherell (1987) point out that social scientists are able 
to ignore variability in their data because they use various methodological strategies 
which suppress it. These strategies can be identified in infertility studies as well. A 
first strategy is restriction (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Participants in quantitative 
studies which use surveys or psychological assessments, have to answer in terms of a 
limited, fixed set of predefined categories. They cannot change the opinions which 
they express, and any contradictions in answers are ironed out by allocating 
responses to one particular category only or by discarding these as ‘invalid’ 
responses (Wooffitt & Widdicombe, 1996). Second, qualitative studies use ‘gross 
categorisation’ (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Ethnographic studies tend to use a form 
of thematic analysis, in which responses are clustered together in broad analytic 
themes. This clustering tends to be based on broad commonalities in content between 
responses, and responses which differ from the ‘average’ response are likely to be 
excluded. As a result, variability between responses is suppressed. 
  Acknowledging the natural variability in talk problematizes treating it as a 
resource to access underlying realities (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). It becomes 
difficult to see what ‘reality’ statements represent, in part because this requires that 
one decides which statements are truthful, accurate representations, and which are 
misguided (op cit.). Potter and Wetherell (1987), and many other discourse analysts 
drawing upon their work, have shown that if one examines variability in language 
use, in particular how variability in content and form of statements relates to the 




However, the context in which statements occur has not been given sufficient 
attention. Studies of psychological correlates of infertility ignore context, treating 
statements as resulting from, and representations of, an individual’s mind and mental 
state. Epidemiological, demographic and especially ethnographic studies take into 
account context, but only in terms of the macro, cultural context; statements are seen 
as, in some way, reflecting cultural realities. With the exception of Riessman’s 
(2002), studies have not examined statements about infertility at the level of the 
interaction, and looked at how statements about infertility relate to, and depend on 
the local, interactional context. Nevertheless, as I will discuss in the next chapter, a 
multitude of discourse and conversation analytic studies have shown that the 
interactional context is highly relevant for what people say and how these sayings 
should be interpreted. 
  Thus, the omission to treat talk about infertility as a topic in itself, means that 
in infertility studies not enough attention is paid to variability in statements, the 
context in which statements occur, and the function which they fulfil. These are 
significant shortcomings also because it has been argued that verbal interactions are a 
central site for the management of social, normative and moral issues (Bergman & 
Linell, 1998), which appear pertinent to infertility in the developing countries like 
Malawi. 
  Riessman’s (2000a, 2000b, 2002) work is an exception, in that she pays more 
attention to the details of interview talk than other researchers of infertility have 
done.  She uses narrative analysis, which treats stories as ways in which people 
impose order on, and make sense of, experiences and events in their lives (Riessman, 
1993).  Narrative analysts have a particular interest in gaining insight into how 
people use narratives to construct their identities (Riessman, 1993, 2002). Thereby 
they examine content and, to some extent, form of the stories which people tell about 
certain events. Riessman (2000) also pays attention to the interactional context in 
which interview statements and stories are provided. However, she does not examine 
talk and its interactional context at the same level of detail as conversation analysts 
and discourse analysts inspired by it. For instance, she does not always quote the 
questions respondents are asked in her interviews, making it impossible to discern 




  A final, fourth gap in the literature is that analyses tend to be based on pre-
conceived analytical categories and interests rather than on participants’ own 
understandings and orientations, as displayed in their statements.  I have explained 
how epidemiological and demographic studies work from an etic perspective, 
amongst other reasons due to the use of definitions of infertility which are not 
grounded in meanings and concerns of the people they study.  In addition, the use of 
survey data, which requires categorisation of responses in pre-established analytic 
categories, leaves little or no room for analysis of the concerns which participants 
bring to bear (cf. Wooffitt & Widdicombe, 2006). Studies of psychological correlates 
impose perhaps even more strongly analytic categories, by using psychometric tests 
to assess responses in terms of psychological concepts such as ‘denial’, or ‘state 
anxiety’.  
  Ethnographic studies of infertility in the developing world are usually of a 
qualitative nature. It is normally seen as characteristic for qualitative methodologies 
that they are ‘bottom up’, of an open nature, and able to bring to the light people’s 
own perspectives (Willig, 2001). However, the extent to which analysis is based on 
participants’ rather than the analysts’ concerns depends both on the kind of data 
collected and on the way data are analysed. The thematic analysis which 
ethnographic studies tend to use, employs as said earlier, a form of gross 
categorisation (Potter & Wetherell, 1987); statements are collected together in 
categories, deemed relevant by the analyst, but not necessarily by participants. This 
is illustrated by the way statements about causes are treated. As mentioned, these are 
often categorised as personalistic or naturalistic and commonly evaluated for their 
similarity to or dissimilarity from biomedical knowledge.  Such analysis then, is 
clearly based on analysts’ concerns, rather than participants’. Some studies like 
Riessman’s (2002, 2005) suggest an alternative approach to causes, which seems 
more based on participants’ orientations: statements about causes can also be 
examined for the functions which they fulfil for the respondents, for instance in the 
negotiation of identities and stigma. However, note that also Riessman’s analysis is 
led by her analytic categories. Due to narrative analysts’ special interest in 
positioning and identity work, Riessman (2002) tends to treat statements invariably 




participants. The form of discourse analysis which I use is particularly disciplined in 
basing analytic claims on orientations, observably displayed by participants. I will 
discuss this issue further in chapter 3. 
 
2.5.3 Conclusion and research questions 
In conclusion, my study addresses several lacunae in the literature by examining 
infertility in Malawi, and by including a wide range of participants; men and women 
with a fertility problem, significant others of people with a fertility problem, 
Malawian and expatriate biomedical practitioners and indigenous healers. It treats 
talk about infertility as topic in itself and examines, from a constructionist 
perspective, the variable ways in which people construct infertility, its causes, 
consequences and solutions.  The unit of analysis is accounts-in-interaction: I will 
inspect how statements and constructions respond to the interactional context.  
Thus, my doctoral research, presented in this thesis, aims to answer the 
following research questions: 
1. How do the various participants construct infertility in Malawi, its causes, 
solutions and consequences? 
2. Which interactional or interpersonal functions18 do these constructions fulfil? 
 
In addition, both the empirical literature on infertility in developing countries and 
initial analysis suggested that infertility is infused with normative and moral issues. 
Therefore, a third research question emerged: 
  
3. If any, what kind of normative and moral issues do respondents attend to and 
manage in talk about infertility? 
 
In the next chapter, I will describe the methods used to answer these questions. 
                                                 
18 ‘Interactional’ and ‘interpersonal’ functions of descriptions and constructions are intertwined, and 





Chapter 3.  Methodology 
 
In order to examine how people in Malawi construct infertility, its causes, solutions, 
and its consequences, and how they thereby deal with interactional and interpersonal 
issues, I use the analytic approach of discourse analysis (DA), informed by 
conversation analysis (CA). As I will explain (section 3.1), both DA and CA have 
their roots in ethnomethodology, and share a particular perspective on how people 
use language to collaboratively accomplish social actions, whilst drawing on shared 
cultural understandings and ways of making sense.  However, DA and CA differ as 
well. I will explain that my study diverges from CA in terms of its topic, the kind of 
social actions it focuses on and the type of data used. In addition, I will argue that 
DA and CA are particularly appropriate methods of analysis to study constructions of 
infertility, as they have proven to be useful tools to examine the interactional 
management of various normative and moral issues, which appear central to 
infertility. In section 3.3, I will discuss the process of data collection, describing first 
the pilot study which I conducted, and then the main study. Data collection resulted 
in recordings of 62 interviews, at times mediated by interpreters. I describe the 
process of analysis in section 3.4. The kind of data which I used is unusual within 
DA and especially CA, and raises certain methodological issues, which I will 
introduce in section 3.5.  I will end the chapter with a summary of the main analytic 
themes which arose from preliminary analysis.  
3.1 Analytic framework: Discourse analysis, informed by 
conversation analysis 
 
3.1.1 Ethnomethodology and conversation analysis 
Conversation analysis is normally seen as having sprung from, or as a form of, 
ethnomethodology (ten Have, 2004). Ethnomethodology (EM), initiated by the 
sociologist Garfinkel (1967a), examines how people interpret and produce social 
actions in a way that they become accountable, that is ‘nameable’ and  ‘intelligible’ 
(Garfinkel, 1967a; Heritage, 1984). Put differently, ethnomethodology is interested 




orderly and intelligible social actions (Garfinkel, 1974; ten Have, 2002). In principle, 
any social action or social ‘fact’ can be examined for how it is accomplished; 
examples are the formation of queues (Livingston, 1987), decisions made by juries 
(Garfinkel, 1967a), sex-change (Garfinkel, 1967a), or laboratory work (Lynch, 
Livingston & Garfinkel, 1983). Ethnomethodological studies use various kinds of 
data, such as observations (Lynch, 1985), recordings of naturally occurring speech 
(ten Have, 2001; Maynard, 2003), recorded interviews (Wieder, 1974), or 
audiovisual recordings (Heath, 1986).  
  Ethnomethodologists have drawn attention to various characteristics of social 
action.  First of all, as my initial description of EM indicates, social actions and 
social ‘facts’ are seen as situated concerted accomplishments, actively and 
continuously produced by cooperating social actors (Garfinkel, 1967a; Heritage, 
1984). This means that social actions should be examined in situ, that is in concrete 
(inter)actions, rather than explaining them by means of abstract general theories or 
analytic concepts.  
Second, this production of intelligible, social actions, is seen as based on 
culturally shared, taken for granted expectations and understandings, or ‘methods of 
inference’ (Garfinkel, 1967b; Heritage, 1984). For instance, ethnomethodological 
studies have shown how coroners accomplish a judgement like ‘suicide’, by 
interpreting various observations (e.g. time of death, medicine bottles, information 
about financial debts), in a reasonable or ‘accountable’ way (Garfinkel, 1967b, 
Atkinson, 1978).  Thereby they rely on culturally shared common sense expectations 
and understandings, for instance about ‘typical’ circumstances of suicide, and 
‘typical’ people who commit suicide (Garfinkel, 1967b, Atkinson, 1978).  
A third characteristic of the production of social action which 
ethnomethodologists have drawn attention to, is its normative nature. Social actors 
ought to rely on culturally shared expectancies and understandings in the 
interpretation and production of social actions, in order to be seen as normal, 
competent members of a cultural setting (ten Have, 1999; Garfinkel, 1967a). 
Garfinkel (1963, 1967a) demonstrated this in his famous ‘breaching experiments’, in 
which students were asked to behave in abnormal, unexpected ways. For instance, 




ordinary, common sense remarks.  An example of such an interaction between a 
student (S) and participant (P) in the ‘experiment’ subject, is displayed below.  
 
Example 1  
P  How are you? 
S       How am I in regard to what? My health, my finances, my   
  school work, my peace of mind, my….?  
P  (red in the face and suddenly out of control). Look! I was just trying to 
    be polite. Frankly, I don’t give a damn how you are. (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 44)  
 
Garfinkel (1967a) reports two common reactions to the breaching experiments. First, 
as in example 1, subjects often become confused and angry, and require an 
explanation for the abnormal behaviour. A second, equally common, reaction was 
that subjects normalized the students’ behaviour by treating it as instances of 
‘normal’, intelligible events. For instance, abnormal behaviour was attributed to the 
fact that the students had been working too hard, or were ill.   
 Both reactions show that social actions are treated as the result of actors’ 
accountable moral choices, which can become sanctionable, although not easily 
unexplainable, if they are not in accordance with common sense expectations and 
understandings (Garfinkel, 1967a; Heritage, 1984; Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998). 
It is important to realize that the EM perspective on social actions as 
concerted accomplishments is very different from a common approach to social 
action as governed by social rules or norms (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1992). Garfinkel 
(1967a, p.68) criticised this more traditional approach for turning people into 
‘judgemental dopes of a cultural or psychological sort, or both’, as it does not 
sufficiently acknowledge human agency and knowledgeability in the production of 
social actions (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998)  
  These ethnomethodological ideas regarding social action have been 
incorporated into conversation analysis (CA), developed in sociology by Sacks 
(1974; 1992), who worked together with Garfinkel (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970). CA 
can be described as the study of the sequential organisation of talk-in-interaction. A 




accomplished. However, unlike EM, CA focuses exclusively on social actions which 
are produced in talk and inherent to the organisation of conversations, such as 
opening and closing topics, repairing others’ speech, and agreeing or disagreeing 
with assessments. The decision to focus on talk was based on pragmatic 
considerations: talk can easily be recorded, and can therefore be subjected to detailed 
analysis (Sacks, 1992). At the same time, talk seems a particularly appropriate site 
for the study of social action, as so much of the business of social life is conducted 
through talk (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998, Wooffitt, 2005).  
A second ethnomethodological notion which CA has incorporated is that 
interaction partners rely on shared, taken for granted expectations and methods of 
inference in the production of orderly, intelligible talk. Third, these expectations and 
methods of inference are of a normative nature (Heritage, 1984; Hutchby & Wooffitt, 
1998), as is demonstrated for instance by the concept of adjacency pairs (Schegloff 
& Sacks, 1973). Conversation analysts have pointed out that certain utterances tend 
to come in pairs, and are expected to do so.  Examples are questions and answers, 
greetings and return greetings, invitations and acceptance or rejection. When the first 
part of these adjacency pairs is provided (e.g. question), the second part (answer) is 
expected and ‘due’. In addition, a second part is normally provided relatively 
quickly, without any significant gap between the two turns. Example 2 shows that 
conversation partners attend to this normative organisation, and rely on it as a 
resource for interpretation.  
 
Example 2. 
1. A  So I was wondering, would you be in 
2.     your office on Monday (.) by any chance 
3.      (2.0) 
4. A   Probably not. 
(from Levinson, 1983) 
 
As A asks a question (lines 1-2), an answer is the normatively expected next turn. In 
this case, an answer is not immediately forthcoming: there is a two second pause 
(line 3). Therefore, A infers trouble of some sort: the pause is taken to project a 




question is followed by an answer serves as source of interpretation for  a pause 
following a question.  
This example demonstrates as well the relevance of a fourth 
ethnomethodological notion regarding social actions and talk, namely their indexical 
nature.  This means that the meanings of utterances and actions are dependent on the 
specific context or situation in which they are used (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). In 
example 2, the silence, or the absence of an action –an answer- becomes meaningful 
because it occurs in the context of a question which was asked in the previous turn.   
A fifth characteristic of social actions, pointed out by ethnomethodologists 
and taken up in conversation analysis is their reflexive nature. Verbal and nonverbal 
actions continuously (re)constitute the meaning and nature of the situations in which 
they occur and of previous actions in those settings (Garfinkel, 1967; Pollner, 
1991)19. Consider the examples of two interactions displayed below. 
  
Example 3 
A    The washing up needs to be done soon 
B     I’m sorry, I was going to do it earlier 
 
Example 4 
A     The washing up needs to be done soon 
B     Okay, I’ll do it. 
(from Antaki, 2000) 
 
In example 3, B responds to A’s statement with an apology: ‘I’m sorry’. In so doing, 
B makes A’s statement into, and constitutes its meaning as, a complaint. In example 
4, however, B’s response ‘Okay, I’ll do it’, makes A’s utterance into a request.   
The acknowledgement that talk is indexical and reflexive points to CA’s 
specific interest in the sequential organisation of talk. From a CA perspective, 
sequences are essential to the accomplishment of meanings and actions in, and thus 
organisation of, talk-in-interaction. This is so because, as the examples provided 
                                                 
19 Note that in principle, the notion of reflexivity implies that all sense-making, including academics’ 
is a constitutive process, and can be analysed as such. Pollner (1991) urges analysts to consider their 
own analyses as accomplished productions, which make the world ‘seeable sayable’ (Garfinkel, 
1967a). This kind of ‘radical reflexivity’ (Pollner, 1991) got lost in more recent ethnomethodological 
work, and especially in CA. It is more present in discourse analytic work, and I acknowledge the 






show, in every turn, a speaker inevitably displays, implicitly or explicitly, his or her 
understanding of what ‘prior’ turns are about. Whether or not the original speaker 
agrees, or goes along with that interpretation, is demonstrated in the next, third turn 
(Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998; Heritage, 1984; Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). Thus, 
speakers construct the sense of a situation together on a turn-by-turn basis (Heritage, 
1984). 
Whilst the majority of CA deals with explicating the sequential organisation 
of talk,  another theme can be discerned: analysis focussed on the use of membership 
categories (Sacks, 1992; 1972). Especially in his early work, Sacks dealt with the 
EM concern of people’s shared common sense knowledge, as used in interactions. 
Sacks (1972) noted that this knowledge is organized, in part, in terms of categories of 
people, such as ‘mother’ or ‘husband’. According to common sense, these categories 
are part of sets of categories, which are called Membership Category Devices (MCD, 
Sacks, 1972). An example of a MCD is ‘family’, which contains categories such as 
father, mother, son, and daughter.  Categories are associated with category 
predicates, such as category bound activities; these are activities which members of 
categories are common sensically expected to perform. For instance, mothers are 
expected to pick up crying babies. This makes categories inference-rich: mentioning 
a category invokes a range of expectancies about the attributes of that category, for 
instance in terms of knowledge, rights and normal activities. Whilst attention for 
membership categories has receded into the background in ‘mainstream’ CA, it has 
been picked up by others and developed into ‘Membership Category Analysis’ 
(Hester & Eglin, 1997). In my study, I pay attention to the use of membership 
categories as well as to the sequential organisation of talk. However, like Schegloff 
(2007), I consider ‘MCA’ as integral part of CA, albeit a part which deserves more 
attention (Watson, 1997; Silverman, 1985).  The analysis of culturally shared 
common sense knowledge, for instance regarding membership categories, needs to 





3.1.2. Discourse analysis, informed by conversation analysis 
There are many different kinds of discourse analysis (DA) (Wetherell, Taylor & 
Yates, 2001)20. The form of DA which I use in my doctoral research originated in the 
sociology of scientific knowledge (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984), and was developed in 
social psychology (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). More recently, it has grown into what 
has been called discursive psychology (DP, Edwards & Potter, 1992, 2003; Edwards, 
2005; Wiggins & Potter, 2007). Although my approach can be seen as one form of 
DP, I find it more useful to describe it as ‘discourse analysis informed by 
conversation analysis’. I will outline the reasons for my choice of this descriptor 
below.  
The kind of DA which I use has various sources of inspiration;  
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (1953), Austin’s (1962) speech act 
theory, and in particular ethnomethodology and conversation analysis (Edwards, 
1995, Potter, 2005; Wooffitt, 2005). 21 It relies on two main conversation analytic 
and ethnomethodological principles. First, DA informed by CA treats talk as social 
action (Wooffitt, 2005). Descriptions are seen as reflexively constructing realities 
and versions of events, rather than as passive pathways to reality, whether of an 
external (e.g. situations and events), or internal (e.g. attitudes, beliefs, or cognitive 
processes) kind (Edwards & Potter, 2003). In addition, talk is seen as action, in that 
descriptions are seen as fulfilling certain interactional and interpersonal functions, 
like disclaiming responsibility or justifying.   
Second, this form of DA pays increasing attention to the sequential 
organisation of talk, and how this organisation is infused with expectations about 
what turn should come next (Edwards & Potter, 2003; Potter, 2005). It thus treats 
talk and the actions it performs as a concerted accomplishment, rather than as a 
product of isolated, single minds. 
The emphasis on talk as social action, and the treatment of statements as 
constructive rather than as pathways to an internal or external reality, has been used 
                                                 
20 See footnote 22 for a description of another form of DA, inspired by Foucault’s work. 
21 Commonalities can be identified as well between Austin’s and especially Wittgenstein’s work, and 
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, for instance with regard to a focus on language use, 
language use as social action, and meanings being dependent on the context of their use. However, in 
literature on CA few references to Wittgenstein and Austin can be found, and Sacks’ approach to 




to develop a discursive psychology, in reaction to the dominance of ‘cognitivism’ in 
psychology (Potter, 2000; Willig, 2001). Psychology is dominated by approaches 
which study cognitive processes and mental, individualistic concepts like ‘attitudes’, 
and treat them as causes of social action (Willig, 2001;  Potter & Wetherell, 1987; 
Potter, 2000). Discursive psychology aims to shift the focus from individualistic 
cognitions and processes to social interaction (Hepburn & Wiggins, 2005).  
This particular DA tradition deals with several, overlapping, themes 
(Edwards & Potter, 2003b; Hepburn & Wiggins, 2005). First, authors have dealt with 
respecification and critique of traditional, cognitive psychological concepts, such as 
attitudes or beliefs (Potter & Wetherell, 1987), causal attribution (Edwards, 1991; 
Edwards & Potter, 1993) and cognitive scripts (Edwards, 1994; 1997). These 
psychological notions are respecified as situated, discursive practices (Edwards & 
Potter, 2003; Hepburn & Wiggins, 2005), by means of examination of how they are 
constructed and addressed in talk and text, and the interactional, interpersonal 
functions which they thereby fulfil. Second, studies have focussed on common 
sensical, everyday usage of terms from the ‘psychological thesaurus’, such as ‘anger’ 
or ‘upset’ (Edwards, 1999, 2005). A third main theme is the, often implicit, 
management of ‘psychological business’ (Edwards, 2005, p. 259) such as motives, 
intentions and agency. This strand of research focuses on how descriptions are used 
to implicate psychological states (Edwards, 2005). Particular attention has been paid 
to the relationship between the construction of facts and reality, and management of 
accountability, stake and interest (Potter & Edwards, 1992; Potter, 1996; 2004). Fact 
construction is also examined for how it is used in the management of other issues, 
which are often of an ideological or political kind, such as racism and prejudice 
(Tileaga, 2005; Whetherell & Potter, 1992), sexism (Speer & Potter, 2000) or gender 
and sexuality (Speer & Potter, 2000).  
DP’s concentration on reworking the subject matter of psychology (see e.g. 
Edwards, 2005; Wiggins & Potter, 1997; Wooffitt, 2005) is one reason why I adopt a 
different term for the analytic framework of my doctoral research. Although my 
analysis is related to various classic psychological topics, such as attributions and 
(health) beliefs, it is of relevance to traditional sociological topics as well. For 




worked up by respondents. In chapter 6,  I discuss how respondents attend to 
normative expectations as specified in Parson’s classic (sociological) concept of the 
sick role. Categorizing one’s approach as discursive psychology implies a 
commitment to study phenomena traditionally studied by psychologists, and this 
leads in my opinion to an overly restricted analytic focus. In addition, it seems at 
odds with the CA maxim that analysis ought to be based on concerns and categories 
as made relevant by participants in the data (Schegloff, 1992, 1997), and should not 
be stipulated by analysts’ disciplinary and theoretical interests and concepts. 
Second, I prefer to use the term ‘DA, informed by CA’ for my approach 
because it is more methodologically informative; it makes explicit that this is an 
approach which uses a combination of discourse analysis and conversation analysis. 
‘Discursive psychology’ suggests a focus on discursive and psychological 
phenomena, but does not delineate the methodology used to study them. This cannot 
readily be inferred from the existing body of DP studies either. Whilst the more 
recent DP studies draw heavily on CA findings and principles, older work in this area 
(Edwards & Potter, 1992) pays notably less attention to fundamental CA interests, 
such as the sequential organisation of descriptions. One reason for this is that some 
older DP work uses textual data, or conversations which are not transcribed at the 
CA level of detail.  
 Third, key authors in DP have increasingly adopted CA’s dispreference for 
interview data (Potter, 2004; Wiggins & Potter, 2007). As Wiggins and Potter (2007) 
state: ‘discursive psychology is distinct from the earlier tradition of discourse 
analysis in almost completely abandoning open ended interviews as a research 
method’.  My own PhD study however is based on interview data, and I adopt a more 
favourable stance towards this kind of data, whilst acknowledging that there are 
certain issues involved (see section 3.4.1) 
 
3.1.3 Differences between discourse analysis and conversation analysis 
In addition to commonalities between CA and DA, differences between the two 
traditions can be identified, and this is where my analytic approach diverges from 
conversation analysis. It should be noted however, that most of these differences are 




First, CA and DA tend to differ in terms of their research topics (ten Have, 
2005; Widdicombe & Wooffitt, 1995; Wooffitt, 2005). CA focuses on the 
organisation of talk-in-interaction. This is often done by examining (telephone) 
conversations about mundane topics (ten Have, 2005; Wooffitt, 2005), like selling 
fruitcakes, although attention has been paid as well to talk in institutional settings, 
such as courtrooms (Atkinson & Drew, 1979) or medical consultations (Frankel, 
1984; ten Have, 2001). Discourse analysts have dealt more often with topics which 
seem, at least at first sight, of greater social or political relevance, such as racism 
(Wetherell & Potter, 1992), politics (Potter & Edwards, 1990), and controversial 
chronic illness, like chronic fatigue syndrome (Horton-Salway, 1998; Guise, 2004).  
Thus, in terms of its topic, my study is more in line with DA than CA, as I focus on 
an issue of great social, and public health, relevance: infertility in Malawi. 
A second difference is related to this difference in topics studied: DA focuses 
on other sorts of social action than CA (Wooffitt, 2005). Overall, CA is more 
interested in actions inherent to the management of conversations, such as turn 
taking, opening or closing down of a topic, repairing speech.  Discourse analytic 
studies like mine, look at broader interpersonal functions (Wooffitt, 2005), such as 
justifying, blaming and forestalling accountability or problematic identity 
attributions.  
Third, whilst CA is focussed on the analysis of sequences and turn 
organisation, DA is more interested in accounts and descriptions, although it 
examines these within their sequential context (Wooffitt, 2005). In other words, in 
much CA work, explicating the sequential organisation and management of 
conversations is an end in itself. However, in DA studies, like mine, examination of 
the sequential organisation and the interactional context is a means to an end: it is 
necessary in order to gain insight into the construction of versions of events, actions 
and situations, and the kinds of inferential and interactional issues people thereby 
manage.  
  Fourth, DA differs from CA in that it is interested in both the sequential and 
rhetorical organisation of talk (Edwards & Potter, 2003; Potter, 2004). DA has an 




persuasive and to counter actual or potential alternatives, as well as forestall being 
undermined as partial, biased and interested (Potter, 2004).                                                                   
 Fifth, there are differences regarding the type of data used. CA relies 
exclusively on naturally occurring speech, whereas DA is more eclectic and uses for 
instance interview data or policy documents. I have conducted interviews for my 
doctoral research, and will discuss this choice further in section 3.3. 
 Hence, my approach diverges from CA because of its use of interview data, a 
focus on accounts in their interactional context, rather than on the sequential 
organisation per se, and an interest in social actions which go beyond those 
pertaining to the organisation of conversations. This has certain methodological 
implications. Although I pay attention to the sequential positioning of statements, my 
analysis does not lead to a systematic explication of in which position certain actions 
tend to be performed, as CA studies typically do. In addition, I have not transcribed 
my data in as much detail as would be required for CA, or contemporary forms of DP 
As a result, I have paid less attention to paralinguistic details such as pauses and 
overlap than conversation analysts normally do. My decision to use a less detailed 
form of transcription was largely based on pragmatic considerations; the quality of 
my recordings is sub-optimal, largely because many interviews took place outside or 
in buildings, which were all but sound proof. In addition, detailed transcription of the 
exchanges in local languages, and of their translations, was not feasible. 
Furthermore, that analysis at a higher level of detail was not essential due to my 
interest in accounts and their interpersonal functions rather than in the mechanisms 
of conversation.  
Having described my analytic approach, I will explain in the next section why 
this approach is particularly apt for the study of constructions of infertility.  
 
3.1.4 Normativity and morality in discourse and conversation analysis  
As discussed in the literature review (chapter 2), ethnographic studies of infertility 
show that the problems which infertility involves for people in developing countries 
are of a fundamental interpersonal, moral and normative nature. Infertility leads to 
various interpersonal issues such as blaming, social exclusion and other relational 




about what ‘ought’ to be (e.g. married men and especially women ought to bear a 
significant number of children) and what is good and bad (e.g. not bearing children is 
bad). CA, and DA informed by CA, are particularly useful tools for gaining insight 
into such issues.   
Various scholars have argued that normativity, morality and social 
(inter)action are deeply interrelated (Bergmann, 1998; Garfinkel, 1967; Goffman, 
1959; Heritage, 1984; Shotter, 1991, 1993). Two levels can be identified at which 
they are intertwined (Bergmann, 1998, Heritage & Lindstrom, 1998). First of all, at a 
fundamental, basic level, there is the moral and normative nature of interaction itself. 
I have discussed how a central ethnomethodological notion, picked up by 
conversation analysis and discourse analysis, is that orderly, intelligible social action 
is dependent on people’s orientation to normative understandings and expectations. 
Interaction is infused with obligations and rights, such as those regarding who can 
speak next and regarding what next turn is appropriate (Heritage & Lindstrom, 1998)   
A second ‘level’ at which morality and normativity are intertwined is what 
Heritage and Lindstrom (1998) call morality in interaction: moral activities are often 
‘done’ in talk-in-interaction, either explicitly or implicitly. Drew (1998) even argues 
that descriptions may always be understood as doing moral work, in that they 
provide a basis for the rightness or wrongness of conduct. There is a large body of 
CA studies, and DA studies which draw upon CA, which discuss in detail the 
management in talk of various normative and moral issues, such as attributions of 
responsibility and blame (Pomerantz, 1978; Watson, 1978; Sneijder & te Molder, 
2005), accusations (Drew, 1984), justifications (Pomerantz, 1986), and complaints 
(Drew & Holt, 1988; Pomerantz, 1986). Some studies focus more specifically on 
normativity, in that they examine and discuss how people accomplish deviance 
(Hester, 1998) or normality (Pomerantz, 1986; Sacks, 1984; McKinlay & Dunnett, 
1998).  
These studies provide various insights into the management of normative and 
moral issues in talk. To begin with, they have identified various discursive devices, 
or conversational ‘building blocks’ , which are used in the production and 
management of moral and normative activities. For instance, in their study of internet 




constructions can be used to allocate responsibility and blame for (ill) health. They 
argue that discursive constructions like ‘if you do x, then problem y will not arise’ 
suggest that problems can be avoided by people’s own actions, and thus make people 
themselves to blame for health problems.  
Drew (1998) examined complaints of misconduct. He found that the 
misconduct which is complained about, is often what the other said to the 
complainant, who reports this through quoting speech. In addition, Drew (1998) 
notes certain prosodic features of this reported speech which convey a ‘deprecating, 
insulting tone’ or a ‘mock innocent tone’. Such prosody, Drew (1998) argues, plays a 
role in displaying the untoward moral character of what was said.  Drew (1998) finds 
that reported speech is rarely followed by an explicit evaluation,  and argues that the 
reported speech enables the recipient to appreciate how rude, unjust and thoughtless 
the other was, without the complainant needing to categorize the offence. 
Pomerantz (1986) notes that when people are engaged in moral activities, like 
complaining, blaming and justifying, ‘extreme case formulations’ (ECFs) are 
common. These are formulations which evoke the maximal or minimal properties of 
an event or action (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998). Examples are ‘never’, ‘every time’, 
‘everyone’.  Pomerantz (1986) suggests that these ECFs are particularly useful when 
engaging in moral activities such as making complaints. ECFs can be used to offer 
the strongest case of the ‘offence’ complained about and thereby forestall that an 
offence committed is dismissed as minor (op cit.). In addition, ECFs can be used in 
the justification of actions and their actors, as they can display an action or situation 
as omnipresent and thereby used to propose the rightness of a practice. To illustrate 
this, Pomerantz (1986, p. 225) reproduces an example which Sacks gave in one of his 
lectures, which concerns a call to a suicide prevention centre. The caller has just 
confirmed that she has a loaded gun at home. 
 
Desk  What is it doing there, hh Whose is it. 
Caller It’s sitting there. 
Desk  Is it yours? 
(1) 
Caller  Its Da:ve’s 
Desk  It’s your husband’s huh?= 
Caller =I know how to shoot it, 
(0.4) 





Desk      He just ha:s one 
Caller Mm hm, It- u- everyone doe:s don’t they? 
 
Pomerantz points out that, by saying ‘everybody does’, the speaker proposes that 
having a gun is a normal and accepted practice.  The speaker thereby relies on a 
shared assumption that how other people behave is the ‘right’ way to behave and not 
accountable.  Buttny (1994) also notes how couples in relationship therapy can 
display themselves as behaving like other people do, and thereby normalize their 
behaviour and forestall the inference that their behaviour is cast as blameworthy. 
McKinlay and Dunnett (1998) too, discuss how gun-owners establish 
normality, and identify contrast structures as a discursive device. McKinlay and 
Dunnett (1998) note how a member of the National Rifle Association of America 
contrasts members of the association with criminals and vigilantes. In so doing, 
members of the rifle association are portrayed in a favourable light, that is as 
average, law-abiding citizens, and being a gun-owner is normalised. However, Smith 
(1978) has shown how contrasts can also be used to establish deviance rather than 
normality. In her study of ‘K is mentally ill’, Smith (1978) shows how by presenting 
K’s activities as a contrast to an implied norm of behaviour, K’s behaviour is 
established as anomalous, and as an instance of pathological behaviour.  
In addition to bringing to the light the various building blocks of moral 
activities, CA (informed) studies have provided insights into the sequential 
organisation of normative and moral activities. They have shown in what position in 
a sequence of turns and activities a moral activity is done, or certain elements are 
used.  For instance, Pomerantz (1978) notes that blamings are often done in the turn 
after a turn in which a speaker reported an ‘unhappy incident’. These reports of 
‘unhappy incidents’ can be characterised by the absence of an actor, and do not 
indicate what or who is responsible for the event. This enables recipients of the 
reports of ‘unhappy incidents’ to initiate the attribution of responsibility. Pomerantz 
(1986) tentatively suggests that this sequential organisation may fulfil a function of 
enabling a speaker – the reporter of the unhappy incident- to avoid attributing blame 
to a co-participant who appears implicated in the event. Drew and Holt (1988) 




complaints have declined the opportunity to affiliate with the complaint. This 
suggests a non-sympathetic response or reception by the recipient. Hence, Drew and 
Holt (1988) suggest that idioms are ways in which complainers seek affiliation (op 
cit). 
Furthermore, studies have provided insight into the nature of moral activities 
as negotiated and sensitive. The moral nature of activities and utterances needs to be 
worked up, rather than being pre-determined and pre-given (Linell, 1998; Drew, 
1998; Watson, 1978).  Again, attention is drawn to the reflexive nature of accounts 
and their action-potential: they do not passively re-present events and activities, but 
construct what was reported as right or wrong (Drew, 1998; cf. Buttny, 1998). CA 
and DA studies show that moral activities like blaming and justifying are sensitive 
activities, in that they are often done implicitly. This is partly because, as Linell 
(1998) points out, social actors engaging in moral activities risk becoming objects of 
moral judgements themselves. It is not surprising then, that various authors 
(Bergmann, 1998; Drew, 1998; Pomerantz, 1978) show that these activities are often 
done implicitly. Hence, a detailed form of discourse analysis, informed by 
conversation analysis, appears particularly appropriate for the study of a topic like 
infertility, which appears infused with sensitive, interpersonal, normative and moral 
issues.22 
In the next section, I will describe what kind of data I obtained in order to 
examine constructions of infertility in Malawi, as well as the process of data 
collection. 
 
                                                 
22 Another form of discourse analysis which is common in psychology is Foucauldian discourse 
analysis (Willig, 2001). Foucauldian DA is concerned with the identification of wider discourses in 
societies, such as a ‘biomedical discourse’, or ‘romantic discourse’. It examines the subjects positions 
made available in these discourses and how they enable or obstruct practices. This type of analysis is 
less detailled than DA informed by CA, and does not focus on the sequential organisation of actions 
and meanings and how they are co-produced in situ.Therefore, this approach was not suitable for my 
study of the management of interpersonal, normative and moral issues in talk about infertility. 
Moreover, advantages of DA informed by CA are that it offers a tool for validating claims by means 
of participants’ interpretations as displayed in their responses to previous turns, and it avoids problems 





3.2 Data collection 
3.2.1  Pilot study 
Data collection consisted of two stages: a pilot study and main study. I carried out a 
six week pilot study in Malawi from May to June 2002, with as main aim to explore 
the relevance of infertility in Malawi, and to assess the feasibility of the recruitment 
of participants. 
In this pilot study, I conducted and recorded seven semi-structured interviews 
with Malawian health practitioners (5), an indigenous healer (1), and an indigenous 
birth attendant (1). In addition, I conducted nine unstructured interviews, with 
expatriate (4) and Malawian (4) biomedical practitioners and an indigenous healer 
(1). These interviews were not recorded, but I took detailed notes which I wrote up as 
soon as possible after the interview. All semi-structured interviews were recorded. 
Furthermore, I had many informal conversations about infertility with various 
informants (e.g. academics, community members, missionaries).   
  The pilot study showed that infertility is indeed a highly relevant and 
problematic issue for both lay people and practitioners in Malawi, confirmed the 
feasibility of the study, and led to valuable advice to recruit respondents through 
health surveillance assistants (HSAs). However, it became clear that I had to broaden 
the scope of my study. Initially, I had planned to focus on women with a fertility 
problem, as well as significant others and health practitioners. This was based on the 
assumption, widely reported in the literature, that women bear the brunt of the 
problems which infertility involves. However, this assumption was questioned by 
many informants. Therefore, and because my on-going literature research showed 
that so far scant attention has been paid to men with a fertility problem, I decided to 
include men in the main study.  
 
3.2.2 Main study  
From June to August 2003 I conducted the main study, which lasted 12 weeks. I  will 
discuss the main study in terms of sampling and recruitment strategies, participants, 






The sampling strategy which I used in the main study can be best described as 
purposive sampling, as participants were recruited with the purpose of ensuring 
diversity in mind (Trochim, 2000), although convenience or ‘accidental’ sampling 
was used at times as well. I recruited participants from all three regions (North, 
Central, and South) of Malawi, belonging to various ethnic groups and living in both 
rural and urban areas. I interviewed both Muslims and Christians, and both people 
who speak English and those who do not. 
As mentioned in the introduction (chapter 1), selection of respondents with a 
fertility problem was based on whether people see themselves, or are seen by others, 
as having a fertility problem, regardless of number of children and duration of their 
fertility problem. Consequentially, men and women were recruited who suffered 
from primary infertility, meaning that they were childless, or from secondary 
infertility, that is they had one or more children but wanted to have more. The 
duration of fertility problems experienced varied as well, but most participants had 
had fertility problems for several years. 
 The biomedical practitioners who participated worked in different types of 
rural and urban health services, such as government and mission hospitals, rural 
health centres, or clinics of Banja LaMtsogolo, a NGO which provides family 
planning and other reproductive health care. In addition, I recruited practitioners 
working in various capacities; HSAs, nurses, medical assistants, clinical officers, 
medical doctors and gynaecologists. Furthermore, I recruited Malawian practitioners, 
and expatriate doctors, working in Malawi but born and trained in western countries.  
 I recruited both indigenous healers and indigenous, or traditional birth 
attendants (TBAs). TBAs provide mainly care for pregnant women, but are also 
approached for fertility problems. A list of the abbreviations used to indicate the 
different kinds of participants in the extracts presented in the analytic chapters can be 
found in Appendix D. 
 
Recruitment strategies 
Participants with fertility problems were predominantly recruited in communities, 




provide basic health care services to communities, like immunizations and growth 
monitoring of children under five years old. They were deemed appropriate for 
recruitment as they are familiar with the people in the communities in which they 
work, and often live. Other intermediaries were English speaking Malawians whom I 
encountered during my 12 week stay in Malawi, and who were interested in helping 
me in my study, like people working in guesthouses and museums.  A few 
respondents (4), were recruited and interviewed whilst they were waiting for their 
consultation in an infertility clinic. In addition, some of the respondents with a 
fertility problem were colleagues of practitioners whom I had interviewed.   
 Because of the recruitment through intermediaries, selection of respondents was 
inevitably based on others’ perceptions of people as having a fertility problem. 
Indeed, two respondents explained in the interview that they did not consider 
themselves as having a fertility problem.  One respondent used to find the fact that he 
had three children problematic, but not anymore. I included these respondents 
nevertheless, as they were seen by others as having a problem: by the intermediaries 
who recruited them, as well as by family and community members who pressurized 
them to reproduce.  
Indigenous healers and traditional birth attendants were also recruited through 
health surveillance assistants and other intermediaries. Biomedical practitioners were 
mainly recruited in hospitals and health clinics, after I had obtained permission from 
the hospital management, on the basis of a letter of approval from the Malawian 
Ministry of Health and Population. Expatriate doctors were also recruited through 
personal contacts I had made in Malawi. 
Most significant others were recruited ‘accidentally’. They were often 
English speaking Malawians with whom I got to talk about my study, and who 
appeared to have a relative or, in one case, a friend with a fertility problem.  In 
addition, in several interviews with both biomedical and indigenous practitioners, the 
respondent appeared to have a relative with fertility problems. In these cases, 
respondents were treated as both professional and significant other, and interviews 





Originally, I intended to record doctor-patient interactions in infertility 
consultations as well. However, this proved to be not feasible. It was too time 
consuming, as doctors did not normally know in advance when they would see an 
infertility client, and recordings would have to be made ‘at random’.  Another 
obstacle was a certain professional sensitivity, which has been noted as problem for 
obtaining professional interactions by others as well (Hepburn & Potter, 2004). For 
instance, one doctor did not consent to have his interactions with patients recorded as 
he thought they would not be a representative sample: that day was particularly busy, 
because of which consultations would be more rushed than normally.  
Overall, people were not paid for participation. Instead, they were given 
small tokens of appreciation; a soft drink, if available, during the interview, and bars 
of soap afterwards. Two indigenous healers asked to be paid, which I did, as this was 
one of the more difficult groups of respondents to reach.  Interpreters were offered 
payment for their interpretation, but all HSAs declined a monetary reward. In return 
for their help, I worked therefore a few times as a volunteer in their under five and 
antenatal clinics.  
 
Participants 
Recruitment resulted in interviews with 66 participants in the main study: 8 men and 
14 women with a fertility problem, 7 significant others of people with a fertility 
problem, 6 indigenous healers, 26 Malawian and 5 expatriate biomedical 
practitioners working in various functions (see Appendix B). Of this set of 
interviews, 6 were not recorded. In the case of one nurse and two women with a 
fertility problem this was because they did not give permission, in one case there was 
a technical problem. I did not record two interviews with biomedical practitioners, 
because they indicated to have only time for a very brief 15-minute interview, which 
suggested to me that I could only get some limited background information from 
them. In practice however, the interviews took both roughly 40 minutes. In total then, 
I obtained recordings with 60 participants in the main study.  
As the interviews obtained in the pilot study were sufficiently similar to the 




In total, therefore, I used a set of interviews with 67 participants. Note 
however that the total number of interviews is smaller than this, since some 
respondents were interviewed together. Details of numbers of respondents per 
category of respondents are presented in Appendix B.  
 
Ethics 
I designed my study according to the BPS and APA code of conduct, and obtained 
ethical approval from the Psychology (UoE) ethics committee, as well as from the 
Ministry of Health and Population of Malawi. 
  At the start of the interviews, I told respondents what the aim of the study 
was, and that their anonymity was guaranteed, although expatriate practitioners were 
explained that as there is a limited number of them in Malawi, there was a small 
chance that they could be identified.  In addition, I told all participants that, since I 
wanted them to feel comfortable, they should feel free not to answer questions. I also 
asked for permission to record the interviews, whilst making clear that respondents 
could ask for the tape recorder to be switched off at any moment. Oral consent was 
obtained before and after the interview, and respondents were encouraged to ask 
questions about myself, the interview and the project.  
Other ethical issues had to be dealt with as well. These were especially 
pertinent to the interviews with men and women with fertility problems, due to the 
sensitivity of the topic, participants’ unfamiliarity with social science research, and 
power differentials between white researchers and participants.    
  Considering the sensitivity of the topic, I did not interview significant others 
of the ‘infertile’ respondents in my study, as this could make people more 
uncomfortable and could lead to tensions between respondents. For the same reason, 
I avoided interviewing both the man and woman of a couple experiencing infertility 
problems. In one case however, a couple insisted to be interviewed together. In 
another case, both the man and woman were interviewed as the interpreter advised 
that not doing so would be offensive for the husband.    
In general, people were unfamiliar with research interviews, and appeared 




creating false expectations regarding the help which I could offer. Therefore, I 
avoided recruitment of men and women with a fertility problem in hospitals, in order 
to diminish the chance that I was seen as a type of health practitioner. In addition, I 
asked the intermediaries who approached potential respondents to make clear that I 
am not a doctor and would not be able to solve their problem. I emphasized this at 
the beginning of all interviews as well, and explained that rather than providing 
immediate practical help, I would write a report for the government about the 
experiences and views of people with a fertility problem in Malawi, so that 
policymakers and medical practitioners could take these into account. Respondents 
were promised a summary of the report. Regardless of my emphasis on the fact that I 
was not a health expert, several respondents asked for medical advice. In those cases, 
I repeated my lack of medical knowledge and referred them to the HSA, who was 
usually present at the interview, or to the health centre or hospital. 
 
Interview process 
The interviews were guided by an interview-schedule (see appendix C), designed on 
the basis of the infertility literature, and the interviews which I conducted in the pilot 
study. Care was taken that the questions were open-ended, and as non-directive as 
possible, in order to enable respondents to bring up new, unexpected issues which 
they themselves saw related to infertility. For this purpose I also included as a final 
question in the interviews ‘is there anything else you would like to tell me, which we 
haven’t talked about yet?’. 
The main themes covered by the interview-schedule for people with a fertility 
problem were their desire and need for (more) children, changes in their relationships 
with others, ideas about causes of infertility, solutions sought, and expectations and 
experiences of health services used. 
The interview-schedule for significant others covered the following topics: 
the importance of bearing children for their relative or friend; causes of infertility (in 
general and regarding their relative’s or friend’s fertility problem);  ideas about 
solutions sought by their relative or friend; changes in their relationship with their 
relative or friend; and perceptions of and treatment by community members of their 




Biomedical and indigenous practitioners were asked about their experiences 
of consultations with infertility clients, the main causes of infertility, and about 
differences in opinion regarding causes with their patients. Practitioners were also 
asked about how they try to help infertility clients and clients’ response to their help, 
in terms of  whether they are satisfied and whether they accept advice. Furthermore, 
questions address their ideas and opinions about help sought from other sources, and 
ideas about the importance of bearing children.  
 I adapted the interview schedule for men and women with a fertility problem 
after the first few interviews, as some more open and abstract questions tended to 
result in confusion, or in very brief responses. This was for example the case with the 
question ‘were your relationships with others affected by your fertility problem?’. I 
made this question more concrete by including examples of specific relationships, 
with for instance husband or wife, family members or neighbours, and by giving 
more concrete examples about ways in which a relationship could change, such as 
‘did people start to treat you differently’, or ‘do people ever make fun of you’.  Note 
that therefore, questions became at times less open than would be ideal.  
In about one-third of the interviews, I used an interpreter; in twelve 
interviews with men and women with a fertility problem, two interviews with 
significant others and in all eight interviews with indigenous healers and traditional 
birth attendants. In most cases, interpreters were the HSAs who helped me recruit the 
respondents. Before the interviews took place, I discussed the interview-schedule 
with the interpreters, and checked that they understood the questions. I stressed that I 
would like the interpreters to translate as literally as possible, that leading questions 
should be avoided and that everything said in the interviews should be treated as 
confidential.  However, as will become clear when I discuss the analysis, interpreters 
regularly introduced their own questions, and often made my questions less open in 
their translations, for instance by giving respondents examples of what the answer 
could be. I will discuss this active contribution of the interpreters in section 3.4, as 
well as in the discussion chapter. 
 Interviews were semi-structured, in that I allowed for the possibility to 




This depended on the issues brought to bear, and the time available.  Interviews took 
between 30 minutes and 1.5 hours, with most lasting for slightly over an hour. 
 All recorded interviews were transcribed; some by myself, others by 
professional transcribers in order to speed up the process of transcription. I checked 
all transcripts and refined them according to a somewhat simplified version of the 
standard CA form of transcription as developed by Jefferson (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 
1998, see Appendix D). This means that the transcripts included various 
paralinguistic details, such as laughter, pauses and overlap between utterances.  
As mentioned, for some interviews I used interpreters.  For 8 of these 
interviews with people with a fertility problem and 3 of the interviews with 
indigenous healers, I obtained translations of the interactions between interpreters 
and respondents. In addition, I got several additional extracts translated from 8 more 
interviews, when it appeared that they were candidates for inclusion in the thesis.  
These translations were necessary, considering that from a CA perspective, meanings 
and actions in talk are concerted achievements. Translation would thus enable me to 
analyse essential interactions between interpreters and respondents. Unfortunately 
however, translations are expensive and therefore the amount of data which I could 
get translated was somewhat limited.  
Data was translated by linguistics students of the University of Malawi and 
professional translators of the African Language Institute in Leiden. Translators were 
asked to translate as precisely and literally as possible, paying attention to 
grammatical forms.  They were asked to adjust the word order in order to make the 
translations more readable. I discuss the methodological issues raised by the use of 
translation in section 3.3 and in chapter 10. 
 In section 3.3, I will discuss how I analyzed the interview data which I 
collected in Malawi. 
3.3 Process of data analysis  
It has been argued that the process of discourse analysis evades descriptions in terms 
of steps to take, as it is more a practical skill, comparable to sexing chickens or 




possible to discern several steps in the process of analysis (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; 
Potter 2004a; Willig, 2001). 
Analysis started with the listening to the tapes during the transcription. As 
Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998) point out, transcription requires repeated, close 
listening and detailed attention to the data, and is therefore an integral part of the 
analysis.  A second stage was the reading and re-reading of the transcripts, whilst 
carrying out provisional coding of the data, which can be seen as a third stage of the 
analysis.  This coding was based on a combination of the content and form of 
accounts, or the actions which they seemed to perform. I grouped together these 
codes in data sets,  based on the content of the themes addressed in the extracts, such 
as ‘causes’, ‘consequences’ and ‘solutions’. For instance, codes such as ‘denying 
disappointment patients’ and ‘doing being competent practitioner’ were kept together 
in a data set on ‘talk about solutions by practitioners’. I choose for grouping together 
codes in this way as it appeared to form the best basis for a coherent analytic story.  
Note that my main analytic focus was on actions performed by respondents, but as 
certain actions tended to occur when cetrain topics were discussed, content became a 
major organizational principle in the analysis. 
In a fourth and central stage, I conducted a more detailed analysis on these 
sets. Selection of extracts for further analysis was informed by my theoretical 
interests, and by my impression that some particularly interesting or striking 
interactional or interpersonal business was being performed.  For instance, it struck 
me that a strong denial of knowledge (i.e. ‘I would not know’) was a recurrent 
response to a question about causes of people’s fertility problem. This seemed a 
theoretically interesting topic to explore as it has not been discussed much in studies 
of infertility or other health problems, which do pay much attention to people’s 
illness beliefs.  
 The more detailed analysis involved a gradual change away from a focus on 
content to an explication of the design and sequences of utterances and the actions 
performed. However, the content of responses remained important. Whilst analysing 
data, I usually dealt first with one set of participants, for instance biomedical 
practitioners, and then compared and contrasted this data with data from another set 




discussed. This was useful for identifying both similarities and differences across 
types of participants, although I avoided the assumption that belonging to a particular 
category, for instance indigenous healer, would necessarily be relevant for the 
production of talk.  
  In the analysis of the data, I adhered to several discourse analytic and 
conversation analytic principles. First, DA, informed by CA, is data-driven, and 
based on participants’ understandings and orientations rather than those of the 
analyst. This is so because of the ethnomethodological principle that participants’ 
own understandings are central to the production and meaning of their actions 
(Schutz, 1972). Hence, I have refrained as much as possible from making a priori 
assumptions about the relevance of analytical theories and categories, such as for 
instance participants’ motivations, demographic variables (e.g. class or age), or other 
theoretical concepts and contextual information (Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998; 
Heritage, 1984, Ten Have, 1999; Potter, 2004).  
 Second, I focussed on sequences of utterances, rather than isolated utterances. 
This is necessary because the meaning of utterances and the actions they perform is 
considered dependent on their sequential context. In addition, participants 
continuously and inevitably display their understandings of previous turns in their 
utterances (Heritage, 2001, Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998). Hence, a focus on 
sequences and understandings displayed in them, is a useful tool for the validation of 
analytic claims regarding the meaning and function of statements (Hutchby & 
Wooffitt, 1998; Potter, 2004; Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974). It is what 
Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998, p. 729) call the ‘next-turn proof procedure’, 
Third, I took into account that in principle, all details of talk can be 
meaningful for the production of actions (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998), such as 
laughter, emphasis or pauses (see example 2 in section 3.1).  
    In addition to these principles, I can identify several ‘tools’ which I used in 
the analysis. First of all, in addition to noting patterns, I looked for variability in 
content and design of statements, between (kinds of) respondents, and within 
individual interviews. As Potter and Wetherell (1987) argue, the selection of one 




can fulfil at a particular point in the conversation. Therefore, variability is a valuable 
tool to gain insight into the functions of descriptions (Potter, 2004a). 
 Second, I found it helpful to continuously ask questions of the data (cf. 
Madill, Widdicombe & Barkham, 2001), such as ‘what is this participant doing in 
this turn?’ (Pomerants & Fehr, 1998)  ‘why this (utterance/phrase/action) now?’ (cf. 
Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998; Wong & Olsher, 2000) and ‘to what interactional, 
interpersonal problem is this statement a solution?’ (cf. Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998).  
A third ‘tool’ was the DA and CA literature; I made use of findings regarding 
discursive devices and their functions in previous studies. Particularly useful were 
devices identified in the management of moral and normative activities, as discussed 
above. However, considering the situated nature of language use and the actions it 
performs, I always examined how particular discursive devices were used and what 
they accomplished in situ, in particular stretches of talk-in-interaction. This seemed 
all the more pertinent to my analysis, as I was dealing with talk obtained in a 
‘foreign’, non-western culture, between non-native speakers (see section 2.3).  
  A fourth ‘tool’ for analysis were deviant cases. As several authors have 
pointed out, if one or a couple of cases do not fit in with an analytic claim, the claim 
needs to be adjusted in such a way that it can include these anomalies as well (Potter, 
2004; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Willig, 2001). On the other hand, if one can show 
that certain features of the extracts make that they are recognizably different from the 
‘average’ extract, this strengthens the analytic claim (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). This 
is especially so if one can show that the participants orient to the anomalous nature of 
the interaction (cf. Potter, 2004). 
 A fifth tool, used to refine my analysis, was to discuss analysis with 
colleagues and supervisors, to ‘test’ the credibility of my claims and modify where 
necessary. 
 In a sense, the analysis continued in the writing up of this thesis (cf. Willig, 
2001). Selection of extracts occurred hand in hand with the formation of a story line. 
As ongoing analysis showed increasingly the relevance of normative and moral 
issues in constructions of infertility, I decided to build the thesis around these issues. 
This informed further selection of extracts for discussion in the thesis. In addition, I 




examples of a certain utterance design, pattern or action which I had identified in a 
collection of instances.  
 The kind of data which I use in my study raises certain methodological 
issues, which some may consider to affect the validity of my analytic claims. I will 
address these issues in the next section.   
 
3.4 Methodological issues 
CA studies, and to a lesser extent DA studies, normally analyse naturally occurring 
speech between native speakers, who belong to the same or similar socio-cultural 
community as the analyst. In this section, I will explain why they tend to focus on 
this kind of data, and what sorts of methodological issues need to be addressed when 
relying on the kind of interview-data which I used in my doctoral research. However, 
a full discussion of these methodological issues will have to wait until I have 
presented the analysis.  
 
3.4.1 Interview data 
This study is based on interview data. Conversation analysts have a ‘dispreference’ 
(ten Have, 2002) for this kind of pre-arranged, set up and contrived data (Speer, 
2002, ten Have, 2002b). Instead, CA relies on naturally occurring data, to the extent 
that it is at times even built into definitions of CA (Speer, 2002). Hutchby and 
Wooffitt (1998, p.14) for instance, describe CA as ‘the study of recorded, naturally 
occurring talk-in-interaction’ (italics in original). DA is more ecclectic in its use of 
data, but over the years, discourse analysts, who make use of conversation analysis, 
have increasingly adopted CA’s dispreference for contrived data (Potter, 2002; 
2004).  
Naturally occurring data are considered preferable for several reasons. First, 
interview data are considered an inadequate surrogate for actual practices (Atkinson 
& Heritage, 1994; Potter, 2004). A second, related reason is that the researcher’s 
agenda and analytic ideas would make interview data contaminated and biased 
(Potter, 2004a; ten Have, 1999, 2002). Hepburn and Potter (2003, p.183) for 
instance, argue that interview data, ‘flood’ the research interaction with the 




because the researcher’s agenda is built into the interview questions. Therefore, 
Potter (2004a) argues that naturally occurring talk ‘has the enormous virtue of 
starting with what is there rather than theoretical derived assumptions about what 
should be there, or the researcher wishes was there’.      
 Nevertheless, I consider my reliance on interview data justifiable and, 
moreover, useful.  This is so for both pragmatic and more substantive reasons. First 
of all, as Potter (2004a) acknowledges, at times, use of interview data is necessary as 
it can be difficult to obtain naturalistic recordings. In my study, various practical 
problems obstructed recording naturally occurring conversations about infertility. For 
a start, spontaneous discussions of a sensitive topic like infertility are difficult to 
capture, as they will be rare. In addition, as mentioned before, recording doctor-
patient interactions in infertility consultations was not feasible.  
Second, the desire to avoid an undesirable bias due to the presence of the 
researcher by collecting naturalistic data, appears to reflect a problematic empiricist 
ideal of ‘direct access’ (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984, p. 2-3) to phenomena23. Note 
Potter’s (2004a, p. 612) claim that naturalistic data enable the analyst to start with 
‘what is there’. This ideal of unbiased, direct access to ‘what is there’ seems 
unattainable, amongst other reasons because of the selective nature of recording and 
transcriptions24, as is acknowledged by conversation analysts themselves (Hutchby & 
Wooffitt, 1998). In addition, as Speer (2002) points out, the desire to obtain 
‘unbiased’ data seems to clash with ethnomethodologists’ and conversation analysts’ 
fundamental interests in how social actors actively contribute to the concerted 
production of meanings. One could argue that ‘bias’, in the sense that interview 
                                                 
23 The ideal of direct access to data seems indicative of a tension, noted by several authors,  between 
the empiricist and positivist slant to CA and CA’s reflexive ethnomethodological foundation 
(Atkinson, 1988; Lynch & Bogen, 1994, Pollner, 1992).  Appeals to ‘what is there’ seem certainly 
problematic for discourse analysts, like Potter, who have adopted and defended a relativistic 
epistemological stance in many academic publications (Edwards & Potter, 2003; Edwards, Ashmore 
& Potter, 1995; Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996). 
 
24 Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998) point out that it is impossible to capture all the details of 
conversations in transcripts. This would, for a start, make transcriptions impossible to read. Decisions 
about which features are to be included are made, in part, on the basis of theoretical ideas about what 
features of talk are relevant for the organisation of conversations (Kendon, 1982; Ochs, 1979). Hence, 






responses are ‘influenced’ by the presence of other interactants, is not only 
unavoidable but also a theoretically interesting object of analysis for those interested 
in social interaction (Speer, 2002). Moreover, the focus on the sequential 
organisation of talk  makes the influence of the interviewer’s turns analysable.  
Third, Potter (2002) considers use of interview data to be problematic as 
interviews encourage participants to provide normatively appropriate descriptions. 
This seems problematic only if respondents attend to normative expectations , and 
use communicative competencies, specific to the interview situation (cf. 
Widdicombe & Wooffitt, 1995). However, this seems unlikely (Widdicombe & 
Wooffitt, 1995), especially in a study like mine, where most, if not all, participants 
had never been interviewed before.25 Therefore, as I will show in the analytic 
chapters, people’s orientation to what is normatively appropriate can lead to 
interesting insights (cf. Coelho, 2005), for example into how normative notions are 
used by participants to warrant certain practices. 
Fourth, the use of interview data seems justified as several scholars, including 
conversation analysts, have argued that there is no black and white distinction 
between natural and non-natural or contrived data (Potter, 2002; Speer, 2002, ten 
Have, 1999a, 2002b). For instance, ‘naturally occurring’ speech can be seen as 
contrived in that participants will usually have been asked for their informed consent 
and will thus be aware that recordings are made (Speer, 2002). On the other hand, it 
can be argued that interviews are (at times) ‘natural’ interactions in that the interview 
setting is not necessarily consequential for accounts provided in interactions 
(Widdicombe & Wooffitt, 1995; Speer, 2002). One of the central conversation 
analytic principles is procedural consequentiality (Schegloff, 1991; 1992): contextual 
features should only be taken into account when it is observable that, and in what 
way, conversation partners design their talk according to certain contextual features. 
Thus, as Widdicombe and Wooffitt (1995) propose, interview data should be treated 
as ‘ordinary’ informal conversations, unless it is observable that and how 
respondents attend to the situation as ‘being in an interview’.    
                                                 
25 Several observations attest to participants’ unfamiliarity with interviews. For instance, some 
participants started to provide accounts before I had finished the introduction to the interview, 
suggesting that they were not aware that I had prepared a list of questions. The issues of anonymity 
was not always understood as, after I had guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality, some participants 




Hence, in my study, I adopt Widdicombe and Wooffitt’s (1995) approach to 
interviews (cf. Potter & Mulkay, 1985). They suggest that interviews should be seen 
as a useful way to elicit people’s accounting practices, in which they exhibit their 
culturally shared, reasoning practices, as people always, inevitably do in talk (cf. 
Silverman, 1985). 
  It should be borne in mind that a discourse analytic approach to interview 
data is very different from the default approach in the social sciences. Normally, 
respondents’ statements are categorised on the basis of broad similarities in their 
content and seen as representations of sociological (e.g. marital status) or 
psychological (e.g. locus of control) variables, and in which the interviewer’s 
questions are ignored (Wooffitt & Widdicombe, 2006). To reiterate some points 
made before; from the perspective of DA, informed by CA, interviews are social 
interactions (Wooffitt & Widdicombe, 2006). Attention needs to be paid to the 
interactional basis of statements, that is, to how statements can be ‘touched off’ by 
previous turns. Therefore, analysis should be based on detailed examination of the 
respondent’s and the interviewer’s turns, and if an interview is mediated by 
interpreters, his or her turns ought to be analysed as well.  In addition, statements 
should be treated as actions: people do things in their utterances. Furthermore, no 
detail, including silences, false starts, repairs, should be dismissed as irrelevant. 
In conclusion, I argue that interviews, treated as social interactions, can 
become insightful exhibits of local ways of making sense, and provide useful insights 
into the interactional and inferential business which participants address in their 
accounts. Nevertheless, I acknowledge that the generalizability of findings from 
interviews to situations outside the interview context is not a straightforward and 
self-evident matter. This is so, in part because, to some extent, the interviewer’s 
questions will restrict and steer respondents’ constructions. I dealt with this by asking 
as open questions as possible (but see section 3.2.2), and to a certain degree, by 
analysing both questions and responses.  I will discuss the issue of generalizability in 





3.4.2 Cultural context 
The respondents and interpreters in my interviews are Malawians, and the interviews 
were conducted in Malawi. As this is a culturally foreign context for me as analyst 
and presumably for most of the readers of my work, this raises the issue of whether, 
and to what extent, my analysis should be informed by additional (ethnographic) 
information about the cultural context.  
  It seems generally acknowledged that a certain cultural competence, informed 
by cultural knowledge is essential for adequate analysis of interactions (Arminen 
2000; Bilmes, 1996; Firth, 1996; Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998; Pomerantz & Fehr, 
1997, Schegloff, 1992). Cultural knowledge is said to be needed for instance for 
recognizing conversation partners’ actions (Arminen, 2000; Turner, 1971), and for 
access to the inferential resources, or ways of making sense, which are available to 
interactants (Hutchby & Wooffit, 1998).  
  When conversation partners and analysts belong to a same or similar socio-
cultural community, as is normally the case in CA studies, cultural competence can 
be taken for granted. However, in a study like mine, the question arises how to 
remedy a likely lack of cultural competence and knowledge on behalf of the analyst. 
Conversation analysts normally refrain from using contextual information, 
derived from sources external to the conversations themselves.  This is mainly on the 
basis of the aforementioned  principle of procedural consequentiality: contextual 
features should only be taken into account if it is observable that, and in what way, 
conversation partners design their talk according to certain contextual features 
(Schegloff, 1991, 1992; ten Have, 1999b). This criterion of procedural relevance is 
meant to deal with the problem that in principle, there is an infinite number of 
contextual features which could be deemed relevant for the explanation of certain 
interactions. The criterion of procedural consequentiality  prevents analysts from 
arbitrarily invoking contexts as being relevant for interactions, just because they and 
the academic community happen to see them as ‘logically’ related to the 
conversation interactions taking place (Schegloff, 1992; Arminen, 1996).26 
                                                 
26 Another reason why conversation analysts do not look at the extra conversational context is because 
they take issue with the most common means of gathering information about this context: 
ethnographic fieldwork, in which  observations and interviews are ‘recorded’ in fieldnotes (see 




   Therefore, in order to avoid external information which is not in line with 
conversation partners’ concerns, and irrelevant to the production of their interactions, 
I have adopted the conversation analytic principle of procedural consequentiality 
(Schegloff, 1991). I thus avoid referring to the cultural context unless this is 
demonstrably relevant to the participants and the unfolding of the interaction under 
investigation. However, as the analysis will show, and as I will discuss later, it seems 
that I am able to refrain from using external information exactly, and perhaps only, 
because I used interview data, in which the interviewer belonged to a different 
cultural community than the respondents and interpreters (de Kok, 2004).   
 My collection of interview data has other methodological implications as 
well: participants were non-native speakers of English, or did not speak English. I 
will address issues of language in the next section. 
 
3.4.3 Language issues: Non-native speakers, interpreters and 
translations 
My study raises various language issues. First of all, all participants, including 
myself as interviewer and analyst, are non-native speakers of English.  
Second, roughly one third of the interviews was mediated by an interpreter. Third, 
some of the interpreter-mediated interviews were translated into English. 
Conversation analysts and discourse analysts have largely worked with 
materials from native speakers (Wong & Olsher, 2000).  The question is whether, 
and in what way, the fact that participants are non-native speakers matters for the 
analysis. In an interview with Wong and Olsher (2000) about non-native speaker 
talk, Schegloff warns against assuming that certain conversation analytic principles 
will not apply, or apply differently when dealing with speech between non-native 
speakers, although he acknowledges that for instance pauses and grammatical forms 
may have different meanings and functions in this kind of interaction. Thus, 
Schegloff suggests that the criterion of procedural consequentiality should be applied 
again: if an analyst claims that some features of an interaction arise from the fact that 
participants are non-native speakers, he or she has to show that and how exactly 




 In my analysis, I partially follow Schegloff’s (in Wong & Olsher, 2000) 
recommendations. Thus, I have analysed my data largely as I would have analysed 
data between native speakers. However, I would argue that abiding by the principle 
of procedural consequentiality in itself is not a sufficiently adequate way to deal with 
the potential influence of limited fluency on people’s speech. Thus, I have been more 
careful than I would normally be in making analytic claims, especially when using 
certain design features like grammatical forms, pauses, and word choice and when 
respondents’  fluency was obviously limited.  
Nevertheless, although at times analytic claims will have to be more tentative, 
as Schegloff (in Wong & Olsher, 2000) argues, and as I will show in the analytic 
chapters, analysing non-native speakers’ talk is by no means impossible. Analytic 
claims are never based on one feature of an utterance, but always on a combination 
of content, sequential placement and various design features.  In addition, I base my 
analytic claims on collections of instances within and across interviews, rather than 
single cases. These are forms of corroboration which diminish the problem of 
making claims on the basis of non-native speakers’ utterances.  
 Interpretation and translation raise very similar methodological issues. In the 
process of translation, it is inevitable that choices have to be made between words 
and meanings (Riessman, 2000b; Venuti, 1998). This is in part because it is often, if 
not always, impossible for translators to select a word which has exactly the same 
meaning as the word which is being translated (Birbili, 2000). Thus, Temple (1997, 
p. 144) points out that the use of interpreters and translators is ‘not merely a technical 
matter’, but ‘of epistemological consequence as it influences what is ‘found’. Others 
have emphasized as well that translation and interpretation, are active processes of 
re-construction rather than a neutral ‘passing on’ of the message (Wadensjö, 1994; 
Riessman, 2000b; Temple et al., 2004; Temple, 1997; Pitchforth & van Teijlingen, 
2005; Venuti, 1998). Another reason why this is the case is the potential influence of 
the interpreter on the respondents and the communicative process (Philips, 1960).  
  Issues of interpretation have been widely discussed, commonly in terms of 
the validity and correctness of translations (Wadensjö, 1998).  Strategies have been 
proposed to assess the accuracy and validity of translations, like the back-translation 




attention to interpreter’s statements and I obtained translations of their interactions 
with the respondents in the local language. However, this is not based on a desire to 
verify whether what they say is correct. Rather, I treat interpreters as active 
contributors to the concerted accomplishment of meanings and actions (cf. 
Wadensjö, 1998), and therefore interactions in which they are involved are integral 
part of the analysis. I will illustrate this approach throughout the chapters, and will 
discuss further the issues of interpretation and translation in the discussion chapter. 
In conclusion, language related methodological issues mean that my analytic 
claims have to be somewhat more tentative, as my analysis is, more than normally, 
not based on the ‘thing-in-itself’. Nevertheless, I would argue that translated, 
interpreter-mediated interviews can still form a fruitful basis for the analysis of 
constructions, the devices thereby used and the interpersonal and interactional 
business thereby served. However, the usability of interviews, mediated by 
interpreters and translated afterwards, seems largely an empirical question, which 
requires a demonstration of analysis of such interviews. In the next 6 chapters I will 
present and discuss such analysis.  
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have made a case for the use of discourse analysis, informed by 
conversation analysis, for the examination of constructions of infertility in Malawi, 
in relation to the management of interpersonal, normative and moral issues. DA, 
informed by CA enables close examination of constructions in talk, and the actions 
which they perform as concerted accomplishments. It has proven to be a useful tool 
to examine the interactional management of morality and normativity and the 
discursive devices thereby used.  I have argued that the use of interpreter-mediated 
and translated interviews complicates, but does not invalidate the analytic process. I 
will demonstrate this in the following analytic chapters. To begin with, I discuss in 
chapter 4 how men and women with a fertility problem construct bearing children as 
cultural, normative requirement and the functions which this construction performs. 
In chapter 5, I present analysis of how they talk about causes of infertility, and the 
interactional and interpersonal issues this appears to raise. In chapter 6, I discuss how 




account for not taking action (anymore). Chapter 7 pertains to constructions of 
relationships in relation to the management of (moral) issues of blame. In chapter 8 
and 9, I focus on indigenous and biomedical practitioners’ constructions: of causes, 
and of success, failures and problems in helping infertility patients.  I will show how 






Chapter 4.  Constructing childbearing as 
cultural, normative requirement  
 
 
As mentioned in the literature review (chapter 2), studies of infertility in the 
developing world stress the many negative social and psychological consequences 
which infertility has, in particular for women. They are usually related to socio-
cultural norms, which mandate that people bear children and which are said to be 
especially strong in non-western societies (Inhorn, 2003; Riessman, 2002), and 
African societies in particular (Dyer et al., 2002). For instance, Dyer et al. (2004, p. 
964) attribute social consequences to cultural, pronatalist norms when they state that 
‘in a few cases, the reactions of other family members to infertility seemed to be 
based on perceived violations of social norms.’27 Gerrits (1997, p.47) appears to 
attribute social exclusion to ‘culture’, and therefore arguably to cultural norms, when 
she states about the infertile women in her study 'the culture was also hard on them: 
they are excluded from important social events and ceremonies’.  
However, attributing the negative consequences of infertility, such as social 
exclusion, stigmatisation, and various forms of marriage breakdown, to socio-
cultural norms appears problematic. This first of all, because this implies that 
people’s behaviour, such as ostracising people with a fertility problem or engaging in 
extramarital affairs, is seen as governed by cultural rules or plans. Several scholars 
have pointed out that the idea of rule-governed behaviour is problematic (Garfinkel, 
1967; Heritage, 1984; Shotter, 1980; Suchman, 1987; Wittgenstein, 1953). 
Prescriptive rules seem unable to deal with contingent and unpredictable 
circumstances of action which are bound to emerge, as the rules would have to 
specify in advance under which circumstances they should be followed (Heritage, 
1984; Suchman, 1987; Wittgenstein, 1953). In addition, treating social action as 
governed by cultural norms, fails to acknowledge people’s knowledgeability and 
human agency in the creation of social actions (Garfinkel, 1967; Heritage, 1984; 
                                                 
27 However, in another paper, Dyer et al. (2002) argue that ‘African culture’ cannot account for the 
many negative social consequences of infertility, as these are observed in developing countries in 
other parts of the world as well. They suggest that instead, the implications of infertility are secondary 





Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998). Garfinkel’s (1967) famous criticism is that it makes 
people into ‘cultural dopes’ (Garfinkel, 1967), or puppets of social norms (Garfinkel 
& Sacks, 1970), who behave in accordance with ready-made options provided by 
their culture. 
Second, the  basis for authors’ claims regarding the existence of pronatalist 
norms is often unclear, or rests on problematic circular reasoning. Some authors 
appear to infer a socio-cultural norm which prescribes childbearing from informants’ 
statements about social consequences of infertility and experienced social pressure to 
give birth. They then use this norm to explain the same consequences.   
In this chapter, I adopt an alternative approach to ‘norms of procreation’, which 
acknowledges that treating such cultural norms as explanation for behaviour is 
problematic. As is typical for approaches drawing upon ethnomethodology, I make 
people’s orientation to the normative nature of procreation into a topic of enquiry, 
rather than using it as a resource for analysis to explain phenomena such as the 
negative social consequences of infertility.  
The analysis presented in this chapter is developed from initial analyses of 
two data sets; one set of extracts in which respondents answer questions about why 
people want to bear (more) children, and another set of extracts in which respondents 
talk about consequences of not bearing (more) children. Initial analysis made 
apparent that in both data sets, respondents refer to the cultural context in their 
explanations and attend to certain culturally shared, normative expectations.  The 
analysis presented in this chapter will focus on how men and women with a fertility 
problem,  significant others, biomedical practitioners and indigenous healers and 
actively construct cultural ‘norms’ regarding childbearing in situ, that is in particular 
interactions. As I will show, this leads to novel insights into the interactional, 
rhetorical functions which constructions of childbearing can fulfil.  
4.1 Constructing bearing children as normative requirement  
Respondents can be seen to attend to bearing children as something which people are 
expected, and ought, to do. Consider extracts 1 and 2, both from interviews with 





Extract 4: 1 Int. 47 inf.w / inf.m28 ((two people, husband and wife are interviewed. The husband 
has just explained that, and why, he would like to have children.)) 
347. I    And for you, is it would you want to have children for similar reasons? 
348. Rw Yes, or maybe I could say: three to four. 
349. I Uhu hhuhuhu 
350. Rw To have the children in the family it is eh (blissful)  
351. I uhu 
352. Rw  (blessing), from God.  
353. I Uhu 
354. Rw It means that family has now changed. 
355. Rh Transformed it. 
356. Rw Transformed. 
357. I  uhu 
358. Rw  As of now we are I can I cannot say that we are grown up,  
359. I uhu 
360. Rw we are still young because we don’t have a child, but if we can have a child, it 
361.    means we have grown up now. 
362. I Uhu, that’s when you really feel that you’re an adult, or? 
363. Rw Yes, yes. Because we know that now, we are going to to support another, we are 
364.    the parents, 
365. I Uhu 
366. Rh but now we are not the parents. 
367. Rw We are still kids. 
368. Rh We are still [kids 
369. I   [uhu 
370. Rh Hhuhu 
371. I Okay, yah 
 
 
Extract 4:2 Int. 53 inf.w ((respondent has 2 children, but has indicated that she would like to have 
six or seven children)) 
429. I      Aha. Okay.(1) A:nd, (.5)  
430.        ehm I was wondering, can 
431.  you tell me something   
432.  more about what is 
433.  better about a big family 
434.  of six or seven children 
435.  rather than  a family of 












Hhehehe, she says, because
29
 
these friends of ours have two 
or three children, but she says, 
now for you, the happiness (.) 
she doesn’t (.) she really 
wants to understand your 
happiness (.) where is it 
exactly, that you would be 
happy with seven or six, and 
not just two? 
Hhehehe, akuti, poti 
anzathuwa amakhala ndi 
ana awiri kapena atatu, 
koma kuti tsono, inuyo, 
chimwemwe (.) saakufuna 
(.) kumvetsetsa,chimwemwe 
chanu, (.) chili pati penipe- 
ni, kuti mudakakondwera 
seveni kapena sikisi, osati 
awiri basi? 
((several lines omitted in which the respondent mentions that having children would stop her 
menstruation and that children would help them in their home ))   
                                                 
28 For a list of codes used to indicate the different types of respondents, see Appendix D 







Is it not because I admire my 
friends who have given birth 
to five, four children, 
Nanga sindimatsilira  
anzanga abereka-bereka ana 
faifi, folo,  
 
[Me, I have given birth to  two 
 
[Ine ndidango bereka awiri 
470.T    And she desires very 
471.      much when [she sees her 
472.      old age mate, 
473. I     Uhu 
474. T    They have always a  baby 
475.       on the back, 
476. I Oh[o 
477. T      [and she here like an 
478.       old woman, she is 
479.       moving alone,  
480. I Okay: 
481. T without any baby.  
482. I I see:= 
483. T =Psychologically she is  
484.       affected with that. 
 
Both respondents are asked about why they would want to have (more) children. In 
the first part of their response, the respondents attend to bearing (more) children as 
desirable. In extract 1, the wife describes having three to four children as ‘blissful’ 
(line 350) and as a ‘(blessing) from God’ (line 352). In so doing, she portrays bearing 
children as something positive and thus desirable.  In extract 2, the respondent 
attends to bearing children as desirable by making clear that she admires her friends, 
‘who have given birth to five, four children’ (lines 467-469). Hence, the respondent 
construct bearing four or five children as admirable, and by implication, desirable. 
She provides a basis for her admiration and desire by pointing at a contrast between 
her and her friends ‘Me, I have given birth to two’ (line 471). Note that the 
respondent starts her claim of admiration with a rhetorical question: ‘is it not’ (line 
467). Rhetorical questions are not asked in order to obtain an answer, but to make a 
point (cf. Billig, 1987). The interpreter indeed treats the question as rhetorical by not 
responding to it, nor including it in her translation (lines 470-484). ‘Is it not’ 
emphasises the respondent’s admiration for her friends who bear four or five 
children, unlike herself. 
In the second part of their response, the respondents (extract 1) and 
interpreter (extract 2) account for the desire to have (more) children. In their 
accounts, they draw upon various ‘membership categories’ (Sacks, 1974; 1992): 
culturally available categories which are used to classify people, such as ‘mother’, or 




(line 360) and ‘we are still kids’ (line 365 and 366). In extract 2, the interpreter 
describes the respondent as ‘like an old woman’ (line 478). The respondents and 
interpreter make clear that their typification is based on the absence of children. In 
extract 1, the wife states ‘we are still young because we don’t have a child’ (line 
360). In extract 2, the interpreter implies that her categorisation of the respondent as 
‘like an old woman’ is based on the observation that ‘she is moving alone, without 
any baby’ (line 478-481).  
The categories used to describe the respondents are contrasted with other 
categories of people who do bear children. In extract 1, the categories of ‘still young’ 
and ‘still kids’ are contrasted with the category ‘grown up’: ‘I can cannot say that we 
are grown up’ (line 358). The wife constructs the category ‘grown ups’ as dependent 
on having children by saying ‘but if we can have a child, it means we have grown up 
now.’ (line 360). The respondent uses an ‘if-then’ construction which, in this case, 
makes having a child into a logical, necessary and sufficient condition for belonging 
to the category ‘grown ups’ (cf. Potter & Edwards, 1992). In extract 2, the 
membership category ‘old woman’ who is ‘moving alone’ (line 478), ‘without any 
baby’ (lines 480) forms a contrast with the category ‘old age mate’ (line 472), who 
‘have always a baby on the back’ (line 473-474). ‘Always’ functions here as a 
scripting device (Edwards, 1994; 1995) which makes bearing children into a 
recurrent, predictable feature of ‘old age mate’. Note that it is reasonable to infer that 
‘old age mate’ refer to the respondent’s peers, or ‘old pals’ of the same age, rather 
than to old people. This is so in part because this description is the translation of ‘my 
friends’ (line 467-468), who can, according to common sense, be expected to be of 
an age, similar to the respondent’s.  In addition, ‘old age mate’ (line 472) is hearable 
as referring to people who are (relatively) young due to the contrast invoked between 
an old woman moving along and the old age mates.  
In more technical terms, in extracts 1 and 2 bearing children is made relevant 
as a ‘category attribute’ (Sacks, 1992) of certain categories of people. Category 
attributes are features, which are conventionally associated with certain membership 
categories (Sacks, 1992; Watson & Weinberg, 1992). Sacks (1974, 1992) and others 
(Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998; Turner, 1974; Watson & Weinberg, 1992) have 




expectations regarding various attributes of categories of people, including their 
knowledge, rights or typical, category bound activities (CBA). For instance, an 
expected activity of mothers is that they pick up their baby when it cries (cf. Sacks, 
1992). In extracts 1 and 2, bearing children is made relevant as a category attribute of 
grown ups (extract 1) and (relatively) young people (extract 2), and not bearing 
children or having ‘a baby on the back’ as category attribute of those who are still 
young, in the sense of still kids (extract 1), and old women (extract 2).   
  There is a normative dimension to category attributes. As Hester (1998) 
points out, they are proper features of members of the relevant category, and not 
exhibiting a certain category attribute can have certain consequences. For instance, a 
child’s failure to display attributes deemed proper for their stage of development can 
form the basis for labelling the child as ‘deviant’, or ‘having a problem’ (op cit.). 
Watson (1978, p. 106) too, draws attention to the consequences of absence of 
category attributes: if a member of a certain category does not display a relevant 
category attribute, this becomes ‘noticeably absent’ and ‘specially accountable’. 
Thus, category predicates are of a normative nature in that members from a certain 
category usually display the relevant category predicates and ought to do so; 
otherwise some sort of interactional or interpersonal trouble is to be expected.  
Mothers ought to pick up their crying baby. If they do not, it is likely that they will 
be held accountable and this may have implications for their status as a ‘proper’ 
mother.  
The respondents and interpreter attend to the normative nature of the CBA 
‘bearing children’, by making clear that not bearing children has certain 
consequences. First, they point out that not bearing children leads to the allocation to 
alternative categories of ‘still young’, ‘still kids’ and ‘old woman’ instead of to 
‘grown ups’ and ‘age mates’. These alternative categories are recognizably 
inappropriate, in part because they represent stages of life, which can be arranged in 
sequences of higher and lower positions (cf. Hester, 1998; cf. Sacks, 1974). For 
example, one possible sequence is ‘baby’, ‘toddler’, ‘adolescent’, ‘adult’, ‘elderly 
person’. The stages of life to which the respondents are allocated are recognizably 




because they make clear that they are trying to achieve a pregnancy, which is highly 
unusual for kids and old women.  Second, in extract 2, the interpreter states 
‘psychologically she is affected with that’ (line 493). Thereby she makes clear that 
not bearing children has significant negative implications, and thus confirms the 
status of bearing children as a requirement.  
Thus, in extracts 1 and 2 the respondents can be seen to draw upon culturally 
shared, normative expectations regarding membership categories and their attributes: 
they attend to the notion that certain categories normally bear children, and ought to 
do so. Respondents also construct bearing children explicitly as a cultural normative 
expectation and requirement. Consider extracts 3 to 5.  
 
Extract 4:3 Int.36  HSAs/S.O ((a female and male (Rm) HAS were interviewed at the same time. 
Only the male respondent speaks in this extract)). 
95. I Okay yah. And what would you say? Is it important to have children? 
96. Rm Eh, you know it’s in Malawi, culturally  
97. I Uhu 
98. R Eeh if you marry, (let’s/they) say I married eh a woman.  
99. I Uhu 
100. Rm E:h the main emphasis of of parents they say you have to have children. 
101.            And if at all you don’t have children, they have (.) questions, Why? (1.5) Why? 
102. I  And w- why what? 
103. Rm Why have no children? 
104. I  Uhu 
105. Rm Eeh that’s  the question that those parents raise if at all married, you actually stay for 
106.   several years having (no) children. 
107. I Uhu, yah. 
108. Rm  So it’s culturally, culturally.  
 
Extract 4:4 Int. 44 inf.w 
146. I Ehm, can you explain to me, you said when you got married you really wanted to 
147.    have children, from the start of (your/the) marriage. Why did you want to have 
148.    children? 
149. R  (.) Hhu[hu. 
150. I       [[Hhuhu 
151. R It’s nature! This is my, our, this is our culture. 
152. I  Uhu 
153. R Yes, if you (are/feel) married, you must have the children.  
154. I uhu 
155. R If you don’t have (.) so my parents, our parents say that ah, she’s barren she’s 
156.    barren, 
157. I uhu 
158. R go away, go away. 
159. I  Hm:: 
160. R Hm: 
161. I Go away? 





Extract 4:5 Int. 58 c.o. 
529. I  Hm. Okay. A:nd ehm w- what do you think the: the- the solutions what 
530.   kind of solutions will women seek if they see that their marriage, their 
531.   marriage remains childless. What what will they tend to do first about 
532.   it for example ºor, do you have any idea about that?º 
((some lines omitted in which respondent states to have no idea)) 
535. R  But I have already stated that they have inferiority in the 
536.    community, they become depressed.  
537. I hmhm  
538. R They are not happy. Because they, the community they recognise that 
539.   if someone has been married he has to have a child and with our 
540.   culture we say even in the (both parties) the parents (of/what) the husband 
541.   and the parents of the woman they need to have to see a child. 
 
In extract 3, the interviewer asks the respondent whether it is important to have 
children (line 95), in extract 4 she asks why the respondent herself wanted to have 
children (line 147-148).  In extract 5, the interviewer asks about the solutions which 
people seek when no children are born, but the respondent answers in terms of 
consequences which people who do not bear children experience (line 529-532).  
A first observation which I would like to make is that there are several 
references to the local, cultural context in the three extracts, mostly occurring at the 
start of the responses. In extract 3, the respondent states in line 96 ‘in Malawi, 
culturally’. He repeats, and thereby stresses, at the end of the extract that ‘it’s 
culturally, culturally.’ (line 106). In extract 4, the respondent refers to ‘our culture’ 
(line 151). In extract 5, the respondent refers to ‘the community’ (line 536; 538), and 
‘with our culture’ (line 539-540).  
Second, respondents make bearing children into an imperative.  They do this 
to begin with by using verbs like ‘have to’, ‘must’ and ‘need to’.  In extract 3, the 
respondent describes parents as saying ‘you have to have children’ (line 100). In 
extract 4, the respondent states ‘you must have the children’ (line 153). In extract 5, 
the respondent states that the community recognises that ‘he has to have a child’ (line 
539). Note that by saying that the community recognises the need for a child (line 
539), the respondent attends to this need as an objective fact, rather than for instance 
an opinion. In addition, the respondents make clear that bearing children is required 
by pointing out that not doing so has certain consequences. In extract 3, the 
respondent says that if you do not have children, parents ‘have (.) questions. Why? 




respondent explains that her parents were saying ‘she’s barren she’s barren’, and told 
her to ‘go away, go away’ (line 158), and told her husband to ‘marry another woman’ 
(line 162). In extract 5, the respondent points out that people who do not bear 
children suffer from ‘inferiority in the community’ (line 522) and ‘become 
depressed’ (line 523).  
 Third, respondents construct the imperative of bearing children as generally 
valid. They do this by their aforementioned references to the cultural context, which 
precede references to the need to bear children. Consequently, the requirement of 
bearing children is located within the particular cultural setting. Therefore, the need 
for children can be inferred to be widespread, pertaining to any ‘proper’ member of 
the cultural group. Interestingly, the respondent in extract 3 constructs bearing 
children as both cultural and natural. In line 151, at the start of her response to the 
question why she wanted to have children, the respondent exclaims ‘it’s nature!’ 
(line 151). However, this can be seen as sustaining her construction of bearing 
children as generally valid norm. For, constructing bearing children as ‘nature’, 
implies that it is what ‘naturally’, and thus normally happens. In addition, it suggests 
that it is what should happen, as doing what is not natural is normally seen as 
undesirable.  
In addition, the respondents make the requirement of bearing children into a 
general norm by means of if-then constructions (Potter & Edwards, 1992), in which 
‘then’ is implied. In extract 3, the respondent states ‘’if you marry’ (line 98), 
followed in line 100 by ‘[then] you have to have the children’ (line 100). In extract 4, 
the respondent says ‘If you (are/feel) married, [then] you must have the children’ 
(line 153). In extract 5, the respondent says in line 539: ‘if someone has been 
married, [then] he has to have a child’. These if-then constructions make bearing 
children into a law-like corollary of marriage. In other words, respondents make 
relevant a ‘law’, or ‘norm’, framed as a cultural norm by the references to the 
cultural context, which prescribes that married people bear children. In extracts 3 and 
4, the respondents use if-then constructions in their descriptions of the consequences 
of not bearing children as well. In extract 3, the respondent states ‘if at all you don’t 




have (…) [then] ah my parents say (…) go away, go away’ (lines 155-158). By 
constructing a law-like connection between not having children and the occurrence 
of certain consequences, respondents confirm the general validity of the norm that 
‘one’ should bear children.  
  Furthermore, the respondents construct the requirement to bear children as a 
generally valid ‘law’ or ‘norm’, by using general pronouns like ‘you’ (ex. 3 line 98, 
100, 105) and ‘someone’ (ex. 5 line 526), and other general references like ‘parents’ 
(ex. 1, line 100), ‘the parents’ (ex. 4, line 527, 528), ‘the husband’ (ex. 5 line 527), 
and ‘the woman’ (ex. 5, line 527). By means of these generic referents, the 
respondents establish the need for children as something which is generally valid, 
rather than, for example, an individual characteristic of the particular men involved.  
Thus, I have shown how respondents construct bearing children as normative 
expectation and requirement. In so doing, respondents attend, implicitly or explicitly, 
to cultural, common sense expectations that certain kinds of people bear children. In 
the next section, I will focus on how explicitly invoking the cultural context and 
attending to bearing children as cultural requirement can fulfil certain interpersonal 
and interactional tasks.  
 
4.2 Justifying practices by invoking cultural needs and 
expectations 
In extract 4, the respondent identifies marriage breakdown as a consequence of 
fertility problems. As said (chapter 2), practices such as divorce, polygamy and 
extramarital relationships are mentioned in the literature as a consequence of 
infertility as well. In this section, I will examine how respondents construct, and 
account for, such practices, and how they thereby draw upon the notion of bearing 
children as something which is culturally expected and required.   
Extract 4:6 Int.48 s.o.  
54. R And if African doctors fail then it is up to the man, if he feels it is not his fault –  
55. I Uhu 
56. R then you look for an alternative. 
57. I Like, (1)what kind of alternative might he look for? 
58. R (.) You need children. In our context, in our eh cultural beliefs, if you marry have no 
59.    children then you are unfortunate, very unfortunate. 
((respondent mentions several problems of not having children)) 
67. R  So, if I’ve a alternative, what alternative can you have, if you love your wife you cannot 




69. I Uhu 
70. R automatically you will marry another wife.  
71. I Uhu 
72. R So you automatically become a polygamist. 
 
Extract 4:7 Int. 10 c.o. ((respondent has mentioned just before that ‘before a year’ a man has 
 already gone somewhere to test his fertility, and stated that ‘people prefer a man in the family (if)  
fertility can be proved.)) 
541. R Normally in a tradition, they give you maybe up to e:h three months. 
542. I (1) Hmhm: 
543. R Suppose [eh people  
544. I             [Three months! 
545. R People are married today 
546. I Hmhm haha 
547. R They expect by three months ((smiley voice)) the woman hehehe he [she] 
548.   has to be impregnated. 
549. I Yah, yah  
550. R Yeah. 
551. I Hmhm 
552. R ↑Well, ↑this couple stays for three months, nothing happens. 
553. I Hmhm 
554. R Then it goes maybe to what age, ↓nothing happens. ·h Now. (.5) When 
555.   it comes to three years. This time, a man must go to another woman. 
 
 
Extract 4:8 Int. 50 ind.h/inf.m ((R has mentioned at the start of the interview that he used to have a 
fertility problem himself, because fo which he married a 2nd wife))  
1640. I Okay. So do you think it’s 
1641. a good solution that if a 
1642. man thinks that a lady is 
1643. having  a problem that he 



















She says do you think about 
it as= 
=Yes! 
a good thing if it is the man 
that goes out to find that er, 
then a woma- (.)  I get 
another woman to bear me 
a child even if you have 
another woman if the 
woman is the one that 
finds out that the man has 





me ndiyo akufumanga ku-
walo kukapenjanga kuti ah, 
ipo, mwanak (.).nitore mwa 
nakazi munyakhe anibabire 
mwana, napara uli namwa- 
nakazi munyakhe para 
mwanakazi ndiyo wasanga 
kuti mwanalumi alina (.) 





In our thoughts, according 
to our way of living, 
because a child is needed 
isn’t it? 
Mumaghanaghaniro gha 








It’s good. Raising the 
father’s name. Problem 
noth- Yes. 
Hm 
Nchiwemi. Kukwezga zina 





1668. T     He says is it 
1668.        the child, I can say 
1669.        what, is it the child 
1670.        who makes the 
1671.        father’s name to be 
1672.        great. 
1673. I Uhu 
1674. T who (    ) the father’s 
1675.        name. A father can get fame 
1676.        just because of the son. 
1677. I     Uhu 
1678. T So, to a man according 
1679. to our tradition it’s quite 
1680. normal for a man to go 
1681. searching for another 
1682. lady if that lady inside 
1683. the house isn’t fertile. 
  
 
Extract 4:9 Int.16 m.d. (expat.) 
858. I Yah, okay hmhm. Yah and ehm about the other solution you mentioned that 
859.    they may go to another man or to another (.) woman what do you think about 
860.     that as a solution  
861. R Eh well it’s not- I mean if you really want to get pregnant you have to have 
862.    unprotected sex. So in this country it’s really not, it’s not very smart to have 
863.    sex with somebody else just to get pregnant. 
864. I Hmhm 
865. R But on the other hand if they can’t get pregnant because their husband is HIV 
866.   positive.  
867. I hmhm 
868. R Ehm.(2) So: yah, t-, I can’t blame them. Because it is important here.  
869. I Hmhm 
870. R And ehm if they don’t get, even if it’s caused by the husband, if the woman 
871.   can’t get pregnant, it’s a high chance that the man is going to run  away from 
872.   the woman 
873. I Hmhm 
874. R but sometimes if the woman already has children another partner, if she can’t 
875.   get children from this partner, many times they just want more children. It’s 
876.   also possible that the woman is just going to run away.  
877. I Uhu 
878. R So. I can’t blame them but I don’t think it’s good. 
879. I You understand that they will seek that solution but that’s again it’s (           ) 
880. R Yah, no in this culture, in hm- it’s very logic that they will, that they will do it 
881.    that way but it’s just risky behaviour 
 
 
In extracts 6 and 8, the respondents talk about polygamy. In extract 6, the respondent 
states ‘you will marry another wife’ (line 70) and ‘become a polygamist’ (line 72). In 
extract 8, the interviewer asks whether the respondent thinks that it is ‘a good 
solution’ (line 1641) that a man ‘goes and find another wife’ (line 1644-1645). The 
interpreter translates this as whether he thinks it is ‘a good thing’ if a man gets 




respondents address the issue of extramarital affairs. The respondent in extract 7 has 
mentioned just before that ‘before a year a man has already gone somewhere’, ‘to 
test his fertility to to a certain woman’.  In the extract itself, he refers to a situation in 
which ‘a man must go to another woman’ (line 555). In extract 9, the respondent is 
asked, and provides an opinion, about the situation that people ‘go to another man or 
to another (.) woman’ (lines 858-859).  
 In all four of these extracts, the respondents account for the practices of 
polygamy and extramarital affairs. In their accounts, they all attend to bearing 
children as a cultural expectation or need. In extract 7, the respondent constructs 
bearing children when married as expected when he states ‘they give you maybe up 
to e:h three months’ (line 556), and explains that when ‘people are married today’ 
(line 545), ‘they expect by three months ((smiley voice)) the woman hhehehe he has 
to be impregnated.’ (line 562-563).  In extracts 6, 8, and 9, the respondents make 
relevant a need for children. They do so first, by means of the explicit references. In 
extract 6, the respondent states ‘you need children’ (line 58). In extract 8, the 
respondent says ‘because a child is needed isn’t it’ (line 1662-1663).  Second, in 
extract 9 the respondent attends to a need for children by stating that ‘it’s important’ 
(line 868) to have children. Third, in extracts 6 and 9, the respondents attend to a 
need for children by pointing out that not bearing children has negative 
consequences. In extract 6, the respondent states ‘if you marry have no children, then 
you are unfortunate, very unfortunate’ (line 53). By the repetition of ‘you are 
unfortunate’ (line 59) and the word ‘very’ (line 59), the respondent emphasises that 
not having children is a problem.  In extract 9, the respondent addresses negative 
consequences of being childless as well. He explains that ‘it’s a high chance that the 
man is going to run away’ (line 871) and that also the woman may leave (line 876). 
By pointing out that not bearing children is problematic, the respondents make clear 
that there is a need to bear children. Fourth, in extract 8, the respondent points out the 
benefits of having a child, for instance having children helps ‘raising the father’s 
name’ (line 1665-1666). The interpreter makes clear that having a child is beneficial 
as well: ‘is it the child who makes the father’s name to be great’ (lines 1669-1672) 




 The respondents construct the expectation of, or need for, children as a 
cultural expectation or need, because references to the cultural context co-occur with 
references to the necessity of children. In extract 6, the respondent states ‘in our 
context’ and ‘in our cultural beliefs’ (line 58), immediately after he has claimed ‘you 
need children’. In extract 7, the expectation of pregnancy within three months is 
preceded by the statement ‘Normally in a: tradition’ (line 556). In extract 8, the 
respondent starts his response with implicit references to the cultural context: ‘in our 
thoughts’ (line 1660) and ’according to our way of living’ (line 1661). The 
interpreter subsequently refers to the cultural setting when he states ‘according to our 
tradition’ (line 1678-1679). Note also that by means of the tag question ‘isn’t it?’ 
(line 1663), the respondent invites a confirmation from the interpreter. He can 
therefore be seen to orient to the idea that ‘a child is needed’ as shared, culturally 
available knowledge (cf. Edwards, 1997). In extract 9, the importance and need 
becomes cultural by the references to ‘here’ (line 868) and ‘this culture’ (line 880).  
The construction of a cultural expectation or need for bearing children forms 
a justification for polygamy and extramarital affairs. It does this first of all by 
providing a rationale. A cultural, normative requirement to bear children makes 
understandable that members of the relevant cultural setting will attempt to solve this 
problem, for instance by engaging in polygamy or extramarital affairs. Hence, the 
construction of bearing children as cultural need justifies practices like polygamy and 
extramarital affairs by making them into reasonable, practical solutions to the 
problem of failing to meet a requirement. This claim is supported by respondents’ 
orientations. In extract 10, the respondent attends to the idea that the cultural 
importance of children forms a justificatory rationale when he states: ‘in this culture, 
in hm- it’s very logic that they will, that they will do it’ (line 880). In extracts 6 and 
9, polygamy and going to another man or woman are attended to as solutions for 
infertility. In extract 6, this is the case when the respondent puts forward polygamy 
as an ‘alternative’ (line 56) to ‘African doctors’ (line 54), and thus allocates the 
practice of polygamy to the same category as a practice like seeking help from 
indigenous healers. In extract 9, the interviewer talks about going to another man or 




to, and confirms, the respondent’s previous classification of extramarital affairs as 
solution for fertility problems.  
By framing the practices of polygamy and extramarital affairs as practical 
solutions, respondents take away their potential dubious, immoral connotations. Note 
that the respondent in extract 6 achieves this effect as well by making clear that not 
divorcing one’s wife is based on love for her: ‘if you love your wife you cannot 
divorce’ (line 67-68). Hence, the respondent imbues not divorcing, and its 
implication, starting a polygamous marriage, with a righteous motivation: love for 
one’s wife. Thereby he takes away its blameworthy, immoral character. 
Second, respondents’ orientation to a cultural expectation of, or need for, 
bearing children justifies practices of polygamy and extramarital affairs by playing 
down people’s agency, and thereby, their responsibility. McHoul (2004, p.438) has 
noted how references to culture can be used to displace personal responsibility; 
‘imbrication in ‘a culture’ can become a defence in its own right’, by making 
someone into a ‘mere member of a larger constituency of wrong-doers’.  The 
respondents in extracts 6 and 7 appear to attend to the notion that the cultural 
requirement of bearing children mitigates their agency and responsibility. In extract 
6, the respondent states that ‘automatically’ (line 70) you will marry another wife 
and ‘automatically’ (lines 72) you become a polygamist, thus suggesting that the 
practice of polygamy is independent from men’s volition or agency. In extract 7, the 
respondent does this when he states that ‘a man must go to another woman’ (line 
555).  
  Extract 10, displayed below, is a particularly clear case in which the reference 
to the cultural context serves the function of justifying a practice by mitigating 
actors’ agency. In this extract, the respondent comments on the practice that if a man 
is infertile, his brother has sex with his wife.  
 
Extract 4:10 Int.35 s.o.  
120. I I see. And you say eh previous- previously it used to be common that then the brother 
121.      would for example sleep with the wife. 
122. R Yes, it’s the culture.  
123. I Uhu 
124. R In some places, I understand, they might still be doing it. 
125. I      Uhu 




127.         may misbehave. 
128. I Uhu 
129. R So they ask the young brother. But these days because of this deadly disease, 
130. I uhu 
131. R AIDS, they are avoiding it now.  
132. I Okay, I see. And you say they are afraid that the wife may misbehave? In in what sense? 
133. R Promiscuity. They end up having external affairs. 
134. I Okay, I see. So then people would think like it’s better to arrange it ourselves 
135. R Yes 
136. I than that she, chooses someone else or,  
137. R Yes. 
138. I Okay, I see. 
139. R So it’s the culture, there’s nothing wrong with that.  
140. I Yah. 
 
The respondent, asked about the practice of someone sleeping with his brother’s 
wife, provides initially ‘culture’ as a self-sufficient explanation: ‘yes, it’s the culture’ 
(line 122). He repeats this claim as upshot of his explanatory account (lines 124 -
133): ‘So it’s the culture’ (line 139). Consequently, responsibility for sleeping with 
one’s brothers’ wife is diverted away from the man to ‘the culture’. 
A fourth way in which the construction of a cultural expectation, or need, to 
bear children fulfils its justificatory function, is by making relevant the routine and 
recurrent nature of practices like polygamy and extramarital affairs. Because 
respondents make clear that these practices are based on a cultural notion that 
children are necessary, the practices themselves are constructed as cultural as well. 
By implication, they are portrayed as shared by members of the cultural tradition, 
and therefore as widespread, recurrent, and routine.   
  Edwards (1994; 1995) has called descriptions, which establish events or 
actions as routine, recurrent and predictable, ‘script formulations’.  Several other 
script formulations can be observed in the extracts. For instance, respondents use 
plural and generic pronouns and indeterminate nouns.  In extract 6, the respondent 
refers to the generic ‘you’ who needs children (line 58), cannot divorce and 
automatically becomes a polygamist (line 70). In extract 7, the respondent talks 
about ‘people’ in general  (line 543 and 545), ‘a man’ and ‘woman’ (line 555), in 
extract 9, there are references to  ‘the husband’ (line 870) and ‘the woman’ (line 870, 
874, 876). By means of these generic descriptors, respondents construct the need for 





  Another scripting device can be observed in extracts 7 and 9, in which the 
respondents introduce a hypothetical case: ‘suppose people are married’ (extract 7 
line 543) and ‘let’s say (.) a husband is out of the country’’ (extract 9 line 125). 
Widdicombe and Wooffitt (1995) point out that hypothetical cases can bring together 
recurrent features of a phenomenon in one (hypothetical) instance. Thus, by 
describing a man having an affair with another woman and someone sleeping with 
his brothers’ wife in terms of a hypothetical case, the respondents make available the 
inference that these practices are instances of a general, recurrent, routine pattern or 
‘script’.  
Furthermore, in extract 9, use of the verb ‘will’ in ‘it’s very logical that they 
will, they will do it’ (line 880-881) makes relevant the recurrent, predictable 
‘scripted’ nature of having sex with another man or woman when no children are 
born.  
According to Edwards (1994), one function of script formulations is that they 
normalise practices or events and establish them as not requiring any special account. 
This indeed appears to be the function of the script formulations in the extracts 
discussed. By establishing bearing children when married, and taking certain actions 
when pregnancy is not achieved, like having an extramarital affair or taking another 
wife, as (cultural) script, these practices become routine, normal and not in need of 
any additional accounts anymore. The normalising work done by the scripting 
formulations is sustained by explicit references to the normality of the expectation of 
pregnancy and forms of marriage breakdown. In extract 7, the respondent states 
‘normally in a tradition’ (line 556) people give you three months. In extract 8, the 
interpreter explains that ‘it’s quite normal’ for a man to look for another woman (line 
1679-1683). 
  My claims regarding the justificatory function of respondents’ accounts are 
grounded in respondents’ orientations to the potentially blameworthy nature of the 
practices and those engaging in them. In extract 9, the respondent states twice ‘I 
can’t blame them’ (line 868, 878). In extract 10, the respondent states in his upshot 
of his account ‘there’s nothing wrong with that’ (line 139). Although both 
respondents reject the blameworthiness of the practices and those performing them, 




The interviewer’s and interpreter’s questions suggest as well that justification is the 
relevant interactional business at hand. In extract 7, line 544, the interviewer repeats, 
with an exclaiming intonation, the time period within which women are supposed to 
get pregnant: ‘three months!’. Thereby she portrays surprise or lack of understanding 
at best, and disapproval at worst. In extract 9, the interviewer returns to a topic the 
respondent has addressed before, which she indicates by stating ‘about the other 
solution you mentioned’ (line 858). This request for elaboration can be seen as 
indicating that the interviewer finds the practices addressed not self evident, and thus 
in need of an account.  In addition, in both extracts 10 and 11, the interviewer 
specifically asks for the respondent’s opinion about respectively men going to other 
women, and a younger brother sleeping with someone’s wife. This is another way in 
which she treats these practices as not self-evident and arguably, as potentially 
problematic. This is especially the case in extract 11, where the interviewer asks ‘do 
you think it’s a good solution’, translated as ‘do you think about it as a good thing’ 
(line 1650). The interviewer and interpreter indicate that the ‘goodness’ or morality 
of the practice is, literally, questionable, by asking about it.   
 
4.3 Criticizing forms of marriage breakdown  
So far, I have focussed on several ways in which respondents justify various forms of 
marriage breakdown. However, this does not forestall the possibility that respondents 
criticise these practices as well. This happens for instance in extract 9, partly 
displayed again below, and in extract 11. 
 
Extract 4:9 Int. 16 m.d. (expatriate) 
858. I Yah, okay hmhm. Yah and ehm about the other solution you mentioned that 
859.    they may go to another man or to another (.) woman what do you think about 
860.     that as a solution  
861. R Eh well it’s not- I mean if you really want to get pregnant you have to have 
862.    unprotected sex. So in this country it’s really not, it’s not very smart to have 
863.    sex with somebody else just to get pregnant. 
((some lines omitted)) 
878. R So. I can’t blame them but I don’t think it’s good. 
879. I You understand that they will seek that solution but that’s again it’s (           ) 
880. R Yah, no in this culture, in hm- it’s very logic that they will, that they will do it 





Extract 4:11 Int. 18 gyn. (expatriate) ((respondent has mentioned just before that ‘another 
problem’ is that a wife notices that she can’t get children from a man, takes another man and gets 
pregnant from him and that ‘that’s why Africans always say, don’t tell the man that he’s infertile’))  
73. I Hm and why is that exactly then that you shouldn’t tell the man he’s infertile? 
74. R yah because he disappears and- or the woman will take maybe another one 
75. I Which is is considered not to be a good thing then or 
76. R Well, fo- maybe for the society it doesn’t matter but eh of course yah we 
77.    probably with our western eyes it’s not very good, I don’t know,  I I have no 
78.    idea, but.  
 
In extract 9, the respondent criticises ‘having sex just to get pregnant’ (line 862-863) 
by saying that ‘it’s not very smart’ (line 862), ‘I don’t think it’s good’ (line 878) and 
by describing it as ‘it’s just risky behaviour’ (line 881).  In extract 11, the respondent 
is asked why you should not tell the man that he is infertile (line 73). He states that 
one reason is that ‘the woman will take maybe another one’ (line 74). The 
interviewer infers that this ‘is considered not to be a good thing’ (line 75). When the 
respondent states ‘it’s not very good’ (line 77), he produces a negative assessment.  
However, whilst it thus appears possible for respondents to criticise practices 
like having sexual affairs or taking another ‘one’, several observations suggest that 
the provision of a negative judgement is a sensitive issue. First, in both extracts 9 and 
11, the responses are delayed. In extract 9, this is because of delays like ‘eh’ and 
‘well’ (line 861), in extract 11 because of ‘well’, the cut off ‘fo-‘, ‘eh’ and ‘yah’ (line 
76). Second, in both extracts the negative judgement is qualified and played down. In 
extract 9, there is a repair of ‘it’s really not’ into ‘it’s not very’ (line 862) which 
tones down the negative judgement. In addition, in line 878, the respondent 
constructs his judgement as personal opinion rather than as a fact: ‘I don’t think it’s 
good’ (Latour & Woolgar, 1986). In extract 11, the respondent plays down his 
criticism by saying ‘it’s not very good’ (line 77), and by qualifying it as ethnocentric: 
‘with our western eyes’ (line 77). In addition, the respondent plays down the 
significance of his judgement by providing a ‘disclaimer’ (Hewitt & Stokes, 1975)30 
regarding his own knowledge ‘I don’t know, I I have no idea’ (line 77-78). In so 
doing, he minimizes the import of his (negative) assessment. Third, in extract 10 the 
respondent treats his critical assessment as accountable. The beginning of the 
respondent’s negative assessment is cut off: ‘it’s not-’ (line 861), and followed by an 
                                                 
30 I put ‘disclaimer’ between quotation marks as Hewitt and Stokes (1975) talk about disclaimers as 
prospective accounts, occurring before the statement they are meant to disclaim or discount. Thus, in a 




insertion of additional information: ‘if you really want to get pregnant you have to 
have unprotected sex’ (line 861-862).  This information makes relevant the health 
risks of having an extramarital affair in order to get pregnant, and can therefore be 
seen as forming an account for the respondent’s critical judgement. 
  Both respondents in extracts 9 and 11 are western, expatriate practitioners. 
This identity is observable for the interviewer, and made relevant by the respondent 
in extract 11 when he states ‘with our western eyes’ (line 77).  More tentatively, it 
can be argued that in extract 9, the respondent’s use of the pronoun ‘they’ in ‘they 
want’ (line 875) and ‘they will’ (line 880) makes relevant his alternative cultural 
background. The pronoun ‘they’ evokes a distance which for instance ‘you’ or 
‘people’ would not.  One of the reasons why providing a critical assessment could be 
sensitive for these particular respondents is that, being western practitioners, they 
risk being judged as being ethnocentric. I have discussed how the respondent in 
extract 9, attends to a cultural rationale which makes the practice ‘logic[al]’ (line 
880) and thereby justifies the practice as well as criticizing it. In extract 11 too, the 
respondent makes relevant the cultural context: ‘maybe for the society it doesn’t 
matter’(line 76). This forms a mild justification for extramarital affairs, as it makes 
relevant that from a local perspective, this is not necessarily a problem. Potter and 
Wetherell (1992), in their study of the language of racism in New Zealand, have 
discussed the rhetorical function of ‘culture discourse’, which in my opinion can be 
seen as comparable to categorizing practices and perspectives in terms of culture, as 
seen in the extracts discussed.  Potter and Wetherell (1992, p.134) state that ‘culture 
discourse’ is ‘user friendly’: ‘it’s about being ‘sensitive’, ‘tolerant’ and being 
sufficiently magnanimous and enlightened to ‘respect difference’ and  ‘appreciate’ 
others.’ It can be argued therefore, that for the western respondents in extracts 9 and 
11, attending to the cultural context of extramarital relationships has two functions. 
In addition to justifying forms of marriage breakdown, it makes available the 
inference of a certain cultural awareness and openness, and thereby enables them to 




4.4 Summary and Discussion  
In this chapter, I have shown how respondents construct bearing children as law-like, 
normative expectation and requirement. They do this by making bearing children 
into a category bound attribute of certain categories of people, like grown ups and 
young people, by using verbs like ‘must’ and ‘have to’ in relation to childbearing, by 
pointing out that not bearing children has negative consequences, and employing if-
then constructions combined with generic referents. Furthermore, respondents make 
relevant the cultural context, by means of which they explicitly construct bearing 
children as a cultural normative requirement.  
The construction of childbearing as normative expectation and requirement 
can be observed in data from interviews with all categories of respondents: 
indigenous and biomedical practitioners, significant others and people with a fertility 
problem. However, only one respondent belonging to the category ‘people with a 
fertility problem’ referred explicitly to the cultural context in her account. I have 
shown however, how respondents in this category can draw upon implicit culturally 
shared understandings regarding the imperative of bearing children (see extract 1).  
I have also shown how respondents can criticise practices like engaging in 
extramarital affairs or ‘taking another one’, but thereby attend to this as a delicate 
matter. This can be seen as support for my claims regarding the culturally shared 
understandings according to which such practices are justifiable, especially because 
respondents attend to differences in cultural perspectives in their criticism. Both 
respondents in extracts 9 and 11 are western practitioners, that is, they were born and 
grew up in western countries and received their medical training there. I would like 
to point out however that in my opinion it can be assumed that these respondents 
have, at least to some extent, ‘access’ to local cultural understandings as they have 
worked and lived in Malawi for years, and are as such part of the cultural setting.  
 At one level, my data corroborate some of the findings of the literature on 
infertility in developing countries. As said, several authors have reported that bearing 
children is culturally and normatively expected and required in developing countries 
(Dyer et al., 2002, 2004; Inhorn & van Balen, 2002; Riessman, 2004), and that not 
bearing children has interpersonal consequences, including marriage breakdown 




have shown that respondents identify the cultural norm of bearing children as a 
rationale which informs practices like extramarital affairs or polygamy. In the 
literature, consequences of infertility are frequently, implicitly or explicitly, 
attributed to pronatalist cultural norms of African societies as well. 
  However, my analysis goes beyond reproducing the findings of other studies 
on infertility, and provides additional insights. I have diverted from the normal 
practice of treating participants’ references to the cultural normativity of bearing 
children as representations of a pre-existing cultural norm, which prescribes 
reproduction and makes people behave in certain ways.  Instead, I have examined 
how respondents actively construct a cultural norm of childbearing in situated 
interactions, in order to achieve certain interpersonal goals, made pertinent by the 
interactional situation. This approach ties in with Kitzinger’s (2006) plea that the 
way forward for discursive psychology and conversation analysis is to pay more 
attention to, amongst other aspects, the production of culture in interaction. My 
analysis shows that references to the cultural setting can justify forms of marriage 
breakdown like polygamy and extramarital affairs by providing a rationale, casting 
the practices as practical solutions, taking away people’s agency and turning them 
into routine, normal scripts. These claims are grounded in empirical observations 
regarding participants’ utterances and the interviewer’s and interpreters’ questions, 
which attend to issues of blame and justification as the relevant business at hand.  
In a paper based on my PhD data (de Kok, 2005), and in another study on 
Malawian Christians’ accounts about their involvement in their indigenous religion 
(de Kok, 2004), I have noted as well that respondents attribute certain practices, like 
women faking pregnancy, or Christians consulting indigenous healers, to the cultural 
context. In these cases too, justifying and mitigating blame appeared to be the 
relevant interactional issues. Thus, it appears that constructing practices as based on 
cultural expectations and requirements is, for Malawian respondents, a culturally 
available discursive resource to do justificatory work.   
  Fragments of interviews shown in papers on infertility in developing 
countries, suggest that also in other studies respondents make relevant the cultural 
context in order to do similar justificatory work. For instance, Gerrits (1997, p. 46) 




women realise that the infertile women feel bad about their exclusion, they say that 
these cultural taboos have to be respected. If the infertile women do not follow the 
cultural rules, they or their relatives will get serious (health) problems.'  This 
suggests that these participants attribute their excluding behaviour to cultural 
‘taboos’ and ‘rules’. However, to sustain such an analytic idea about the function of 
this statement, more details are needed about the interactions in which they occur. 
These are missing, as Gerrits (1997) paraphrases rather than cites the fertile women, 
and does not display the questions to which the women were responding.  In other 
infertility studies, an understanding of statements as fulfilling interpersonal, 
interactional functions rather than representing cultural norms is prevented as well by 
a lack of detail, in particular regarding the interactional context in which responses 
are provided.  
 At a more theoretical level, the analysis presented ties in with Parsons’ (1951) 
classic notion of the ‘sick role’.  According to Parsons (1951), illness is a 
conditionally legitimate state of deviance, which brings along certain rights 
dependent on the ill person’s adherence to certain duties. One of the duties of sick 
people is that they ought to attempt to get better. It can be argued that the 
respondents in my study attend to a ‘duty’ to remedy their fertility problem when 
they construct engaging in extramarital affairs, or polygamy or marrying someone 
else as reasonable, justifiable practical solution.  Other studies (Guise, 2005; Parry, 
2004), which draw upon conversation analysis or discourse analysis have also 
noticed how people with health problems attend to duties as set out by Parsons 
(1951). For instance, Parry (2004) found, in a conversation analytic study of 
interactions between stroke patients and physiotherapists, that patients forestall that 
‘failures’ to execute certain tasks given are seen as indicative of lack of effort to get 
better.  Similarly, Guise (2005) notes that in interviews, sufferers from stroke and 
ME inoculate suspicions that they are not motivated, or not trying, to get better. The 
resonance between analytic observations made in this and other studies, and Parsons’ 
(1951) theory regarding the sick role, can be seen as indication that Parsons 
identified culturally shared, common sense expectations and understandings 
regarding ‘proper’ ways of behaving when ‘ill’.  These expectations and 




interpersonal business at hand, like justifying their engagement in practices which 
are open to allegations of being immoral or otherwise improper. Considering that 
Parsons’ (1951) work focuses on western societies, it is interesting to see that the 
common sense rationale he identifies appears to be widespread and shared across 
cultural settings. It should be noted though, that according to Parsons (1951), people 
are seen as obliged to seek the help of technical experts, usually physicians, for 
health problems.  In the data shown in this chapter, respondents address solutions 
which do not involve seeking help of such experts. However, in chapter 6, I will 
show that respondents also attend to consulting indigenous or biomedical healers as 
something which is preferable. 
It can be argued that the constructions of the cultural normativity of bearing 
children are evoked by my identity as non-Malawian, western interviewer. 
Participants can be expected to provide cultural information specifically in an 
interview with a foreign interviewer because of the principle of ‘recipient design’ 
(Sacks & Schegloff, 1979). According to this principle, interactants will design their 
utterances in such a way that they are understandable for a particular speaker with a 
certain presupposed knowledge (Sacks & Schegloff, 1979; Ten Have, 1999b). The 
participants in my interviews can reasonably assume that I, as foreign interviewer, 
lack certain cultural information, and this can be seen as informing the provision of 
additional cultural explanations. It seems less likely that respondents will make 
explicit the cultural context and rationales to justify practices when talking to fellow 
Malawians: other cultural members can be presupposed to know about cultural 
expectations and requirements. Second, the references to the cultural context can be 
seen as evoked by the interviewer because arguably, the interviews function like 
Garfinkel’s (1967) ‘breaching’ experiments (see chapter 3). As in Garfinkel’s 
experiments, the interviewer breaches taken for granted assumptions and sense 
making practices by means of her questions.  As a result, normally taken for granted 
cultural rationales and justifications are made visible and available for analysis.  
 However, whilst it seems likely that in interactions in which there is no 
foreigner present, cultural understandings will be made less explicit, or less 
frequently so, this does not mean that they are irrelevant. It seems improbable to me 




specifically for the foreign interviewer. I will return to this methodological issue in 
the discussion of this thesis.  
  Practices such as extramarital affairs, divorce and polygamy may have 
problematic personal and health implications, considering the high rates of STDs and 
HIV/AIDS in Malawi. Therefore, it seems desirable to discourage such practices. 
Insights into how respondents can normalise and justify forms of marriage 
breakdown can thereby be of help, and also have theoretical implications for health 
promotion approaches. I will discuss such theoretical and practical implications in 
the chapter 10. 
In this chapter, I have shown how people construct failure to bear (enough) 
children as a problematic deviation from normative expectations, which ought to be 
solved.  People’s perceptions of causes of health problems are often deemed 
important for the actions which they take to solve them. Therefore, in the next 
chapter, I will examine how men and women with a fertility problem construct 





Chapter 5. Explaining infertility: An 
interpersonal affair 
 
Many scholars, including those studying infertility, have studied people’s illness 
beliefs, such as those regarding causes. Two main reasons can be discerned for the 
interest in beliefs about causes, or illness attributions, regarding infertility or other 
health issues. First, attributions are considered to have implications for how people 
react to health problems, that is how they cope with and adjust to illness (see chapter 
2), and the health seeking behaviour they engage in. This makes knowledge of illness 
attributions useful for health promotion.  For instance, Meera Guntupalli and 
Chenchelgudem (2004, p.256) note that the Chenchus, an ethnic group in India, rely 
on indigenous healers for infertility treatment. They relate this to their observations 
that respondents attribute infertility mainly to the ‘curse of God’, ‘evil spirits’ and 
‘heat of the body’, and that ‘none of the respondents had knowledge regarding 
infertility as a biomedical condition’. Therefore, they propose that health education 
will ‘definitely’ change people’s perceptions and will therefore promote better health 
seeking behaviour (op cit.).    
   Second, scholars are interested in people’s beliefs about causes because since 
the 1980s, there has been a growing concern that people’s everyday understandings 
of illness are silenced by the ‘voice of medicine’, or the biomedical perspective 
(Mishler, 1984; Lawton, 2003; Prior, 2003; Riessman, 2002). Acknowledging 
people’s own understandings is considered to make health care more client centered 
and, in non-western countries, culturally sensitive (UNFPA, 1994; Dyer et al., 2002; 
Gerrits et al., 1999, Upton, 2001), and therefore more satisfactory (Helman, 1985; 
Clark & Mishler, 1992).  
 Two approaches to, or conceptualisations of, illness attributions can be 
discerned. They feature in both the literature on infertility and literature on other 
health problems. Hence, the following discussion pertains to both bodies of 
literature. One approach is usually adopted by studies informed by psychological 
theories, the other by ethnographic studies.  In many psychological studies, illness 
attributions are seen as a first step in a cognitive problem solving approach (Ogden, 




about its causes, as well as about other aspects of the illness (Leventhal, Meyer & 
Nerenz, 1980; 1984). The second approach, often adopted by ethnographers, 
considers illness attributions as provided by people’s culture; illness attributions are 
collective, cultural interpretations of a socio-cultural group (Bibeau, 1997; Stainton 
Rogers, 1991).  This means that individual members of a cultural group are seen as 
having, by and large, the same beliefs regarding causes of illness. The following 
quote exemplifies this stance: ‘The Zande people of West Africa have a dual theory 
of causality, where common-sense proximal causes operate within the context of 
witchcraft as a distal cause.’ (Hogg & Vaughan, 2005, p. 109)  
Both approaches have in common that they treat illness attributions as mental 
templates of behaviour (Bibeau, 1997; Hunt, Jordan, Irwin, 1989; Yoder, 1997). In 
addition, in both psychological and ethnographic studies, people’s illness attributions 
are normally clustered together in categories, based on similarities in content, as 
perceived by the analyst. For instance, in infertility studies based on psychological 
theories, attention is often paid to whether causal attributions can be allocated to 
categories pertaining to ‘self’ or ‘own actions’ or ‘chance’. This reflects an interest in 
people’s internal or external health locus of control (Rotter, 1966; Wallston, 
Wallston, & DeVellis, 1978), which is considered to be related to more and less 
adaptive coping styles (see chapter 2). Ethnographic studies of infertility commonly 
focus on categories such as ‘God’, ‘spirits’ and ‘diseases’, at times clustered together 
in broader categories such as ‘personalistic’ and ‘naturalistic’ (Foster & Anderson, 
1978), or ‘indigenous’ and ‘biomedical’ (see for instance Gerrits et al., 1998).    
 These common approaches to illness attributions regarding infertility, and 
health problems in general, have certain shortcomings. First, the idea that attributions 
are mental templates for, or determinants of, illness behaviours suggests that people 
believe in one cause (Stainton Rogers, 1991) and that this belief is relatively stable 
(Bibeau, 1997; Hunt, Jordan, Irwin, 1989; Yoder, 1997). This notion is challenged by 
empirical findings that people’s causal attributions change, and that people can have 
several, contradictory, beliefs at the same time (Inhorn, 1994; Herzlich, 1973; 
Williams & Healy, 2001; Stainton Rogers, 1991; Sundby, 1997).  
Second, the notion of attributions as informing health behaviours implies that 




propose that explanations should be seen as resources which people can strategically 
and flexibly employ to achieve certain interpersonal goals, such as rejecting 
responsibility (Hilton, 1990; Hunt et al., 1989; Stainton Rogers, 1991; Willig, 2000). 
For instance, regarding infertility, authors have argued that certain explanations, such 
as the idea that one’s infertility is due to witchcraft, can be used to mitigate 
(responsibility for) fertility problems and the stigma attached to it (Feldman-
Savelsberg, 1999; Riessman, 2002; Upton, 2001). If causal explanations are designed 
to fulfil a social function, they will be, at least partly, created in practices and 
interactions, rather than pre-existing (Bibeau, 1997; Edwards & Potter, 1992, 1993; 
Yoder, 1997).  
The notion of explanations of health problems as serving interpersonal goals 
points up a third weakness of common approaches: they tend to be overly 
rationalistic (Bibeau, 1997; Stainton Rogers, 1991; Yoder, 1997). This is particularly 
apparent in psychological studies of illness attributions, which are often inspired by 
attribution theory (Heider, 1958; Kelly, 1967, 1973). Central to attribution theory is 
the notion that people are ‘naïve’, lay scientists, who arrive at attributions by 
carrying out lay versions of statistical analyses of covariance. That is, in order to 
explain a phenomenon, people analyse which factors co-vary, or co-occur, with the 
phenomenon. Many ethnographic studies on illness attributions assume as well that 
they are the outcome of a rational evaluation of information (Yoder, 1997).  They 
commonly assess, explicitly or implicitly31, beliefs about causes for whether they are, 
from biomedical perspective, correct. If not, health education is seen as remedy. This 
means that beliefs regarding causes are seen as dependent on people’s factual 
knowledge and information. However, as said before, the explanations which people 
provide may be informed more by their social function (Edwards & Potter, 1992, 
1993; Hunt et al., 1989) than by people’s biomedical knowledge, or the lack thereof.  
A fourth shortcoming concerns the role attributed to the social context of 
attributions. This context is virtually ignored, as in psychological infertility studies, 
or taken into account in terms of the macro cultural context, as in ethnographic 
studies of infertility (see chapter 2). These studies tend to attribute too much 
                                                 





explanatory power to the socio-cultural context, as they often treat ‘culture’ as a 
reified autonomous entity, which imposes meanings on its members (Singer, 
Davidson & Gerdes, 1988). As a result, heterogeneity in illness attributions is 
ignored (Stainton Rogers, 1991; Inhorn, 1994). Overall, scholars have paid little 
attention to the interactional context in which explanations of illnesses, including 
infertility, are offered. Nevertheless, this has been proven to be a particularly 
appropriate site to examine the interpersonal functions of explanations (Antaki, 1994; 
Edwards & Potter, 1992, 1993; Horton-Salway, 2001; Gill, 1998).  
 In this chapter, I will adopt a discursive approach to people’s views on causes 
of infertility. This approach addresses aforementioned shortcomings by examining 
how people actively and flexibly construct causes in interactions, and thereby deal 
with the interpersonal and interactional business at hand. It has been fruitfully 
applied before to causal attributions (Antaki, 1994, 1996; Edwards & Potter, 1992; 
1993; Faulkner & Finlay, 2005), and illness attributions (Gill, 2001; Horton-Salway, 
2001), but not to attributions regarding infertility. I will focus on the constructions of 
causes by men and women with a fertility problem, in response to questions about 
causes of infertility in general, and regarding respondents’ own fertility problem. 
When appropriate, I will draw upon extracts from interviews with other types of 
respondents as well, such as significant others and practitioners.  As initial analysis 
showed that design of responses to personal and general questions is very similar, I 
will present analyses of responses to both questions together.  In the preliminary 
analysis, I was struck by re-occurring claims that respondents did not know what the 
causes are, of their own fertility problem, or of infertility in general. As this is a 
phenomenon rarely described in the literature, it seemed worth pursuing.  Hence, the 
analysis presented in this chapter, aims to provide novel insights into how both 
claims regarding causes of infertility and claims that one does not know about 
causes, deal with the interpersonal and inferential business at hand.  
 
5.1. Talk about causes: Ambiguity and lack of commitment  
The respondent of the first extract which I want to discuss was told that she has a 




medical examinations suggested that there was no foetus. Hence, this respondent’s 
fertility problem differs from other respondents’ fertility problems. However, her 
response to a question about what she thinks is the cause of her problem exhibits a 
combination of several features, which can be observed in other extracts. Therefore, I 
want to focus on this extract first. 
 
Extract 5: 1. Int. 22 inf.w ((The respondent had a phantom pregnancy)) 
556. I  Okay, good. Yah. 
557.       Ehm:, do you have 
558.       any idea what the 
559.       reason is why you (.) 
560.       thought that you had 
561.       a child, that you 
562.       were pregnant and 
563.       had these signs, but 
564.       now there's no 
565.       foetus, do you have 
566.       an idea what  might 
567.       be the reason for 
568.       that what might 









((cough)) So you think that is 
was what that caused that 
here you lost the pregnancy 
there is none? Do you think 
that there is another reason 
that caused it? What is it that 
you think? 
((cough))Ati inuyo 
mukuganiza kuti ndi chiyani 
chimene chapamgitsa kuti 
panopamuzipeza kuti mimba 
palibe? Mukuganiza kuti china 
chake chachitika ndi chiyani? 
Chimene mukuganizira inuyo? 
577.   R 
578. 
579.   T 
580. 














595. T She's just thinking of 
596.        (.) other people, 
597. R Hmhm 
598. I hmhm  
599. T that maybe they 
600.        have done this. 
Hhuhu, but the way I think,  
no, nothing. [(     ) 
                   [ what has 
happened? 
I am not sure. I would not be 
able to know. Whether it’s 
witchcraft that is what they 
told me at the witch doctor. 
Ye:s ,therefore, I cannot give 
an answer because because I 
am a patient. I would say that 
this is a disease. To say, all of 
a sudden the pregnancy is 
gone, this should be(.)  human 
beings’ (.) deeds (witchcraft). 
Maybe it’s some jealousy that 
the pregnancy disappears. 
Hhuhu, koma choganizira, ayi, 
palibe, Nanga si [(   ) 
                         [Chachitika 
ndi chiyani? 
Kaya, pamenepo sindingathe 
kudziwa. Kaya zamuwanthu 
mmene anandiudzira kuman-
khwalako kuti kapena ndi 
zamuanthu anachita kukutche-
rani. Eehhetu, diye pamenepa 
sindingayankhe siine munthu 
odwala. Pamenepa nanga si 
matenda amenewo. Nanga mi-
mba osaoneka  si matenda 
amenewo akupweteka mwina 
anthu kapena kuja(.) anthu ku 
(.)  chiwembu bayo (mamba-





601. I Hmhm 
602. T It's people. 
603. I Okay. 
604. T Through witchcraft 
605. I Hmhm 
606. T Yes 
607. I okay 
608. T She's thinking so. 
 
The interviewer asks whether the respondent has ‘any idea what might be the reason’ 
(lines 565-567) for her phantom pregnancy, which is translated as ‘Do you think that 
there is another reason that caused it? What is it that you think? (lines 573-575). 
There are three features of the respondent’s reply, which I would like to note. First, 
the respondent denies twice that she has an idea about ‘why the pregnancy is gone’. 
In line 577, she states ‘the way I think, no, nothing’, and in lines 581 to 582, ‘I would 
not be able to know’ (line 567). Second, the denials of knowledge co-occur with 
several descriptors of potential causes: ‘whether it’s witchcraft’ (lines 582-583), ‘I 
would say that this is a disease’ (line 587-588), ‘this should be (.) human beings’ (.) 
deeds’ (lines 590-591), and ‘maybe it’s some jealousy’ (line 592). Thus, the 
respondent’s response regarding what has made ‘that the pregnancy has gone’ is 
ambiguous, in that she both claims not to know what the cause is and identifies 
potential causes.  Third, the respondent’s descriptions are marked as uncertain by her 
statement ‘I am not sure’ (line 567) and by ‘maybe’ (line 576).  
Both the ambiguity and uncertainty make clear that it would be difficult to 
assess the ‘illness attributions’ for the extent to which they are in line with 
biomedical facts, to allocate them to one specific category of illness beliefs, or to see 






Extract 5:2. Int. 5 inf. m 
453. I     What do you 
454.        think is in you and 
455.        your wife’s case the 
456.        cause of failure, the 
457.        cause of the failure, 
458.        of your failure, to 
459.        have children. 
  
460.   T 
461. 
462.   R 
463. 
464.   T 
She says, what caused all 
the problems with you? 
That we should not have 
children? 
Hm 
Akunena kuti inuyo chimene 
chinapangitsa zonsezi ndi 
chiyani? 
Kuti tisakhale ndi ana? 
Hm 








U:h I do not know the 
real reason but maybe I 
think that maybe I have 
sex with my wife maybe 
maybe before she finished 
her menstruation.  
I just think so. 
U:h panopa sindimachidziwa 
koma kuti mwina 
ndamangoganiza kuti mwina 
kapena ndi ndimagona ndi 
mkazi uja mwina mwina 
asanathe kumene ku mwezi 
kapena kuti. Ndimangoganiza 
choncho. 
473. T    He’s trying to say 
474.        that, maybe, he 
475.        sleeps with the 
476.        woman, wi- that is 
477.        not quite clea- 
478.        clean, due to 
479.        menstruation period. 
480. I      hmhm 
481. T Maybe, nearer to 
482.        menstruation period 
483.        or just after, soon 
484.        after menstruation he 
485.        sleeps with the- her. 
486. I hmhm 
487. T Maybe, he’s 
488.        thinking that is the 
489.        cause.  
  
 
Extract 5:3 Int. 42 inf w 
612. I Yah. Yah, okay, thank you, ehm: ((cough)), so: (2) yeah ·hh (1.5) w- 
613.    why do you know in general, in general, why do you think that people 
614.    sometimes fail to bear children, do you have any idea about possible 
615.    causes of that? 
616. R (2.5) Uh- hh there are some causes, but e:h I don’t know. Ehm. 
617.    Because, some people are, they’re just, they are barren like that. For 
618.    them not to have children, they are barren. 
619. I They are born like that. 
620. R Eeh ((yes)) like that. Some people can be: failing to have children 
621.    because of: maybe: they were (1) they suffered from some diseases, 
622. I Hmhm 






Extract 5:4 Int 2 inf m ((respondent spoke some English, but the interpreter was present in order to 
translate when necessary)) 
147. I  Hmhm. Ehm, 
148.         ((cough)) why do 
149.         you think that that 
150.         people sometimes 
151.         fail to have children. 
152.         Do you- what do 
153.         you think can be the 
154.         causes of that.  





What are the causes that 
perhaps people do not bear 
children? 
Chimachititsa ndichani kuti 
mwina munthu asakhale ndi 
mwana? 
159.    R     Maybe,   
160.    T    
161.    R     It’s  problem of 
162.           nature (the other 
163.            hand ) 
164.    I Hmhm.  
165.    R ya:h, and it can be 
166.           also that our 
167.           problem maybe we 
168.           have a disease,  
169.    I Hmhm 
170.    R Which can make, 
171.            not which can not 
172.            cause us to to have 
173.            a child. 
Maybe because of sickness? Mwina ndi matenda? 
 
 
In extract 2, the interviewer’s question concerns causes of the respondents’ own 
infertility problem, as in extract 1. In extracts 3 and 4, the respondents are asked 
about causes of infertility in general.  A first observation which I want to make is that 
the responses are delayed. This is most clearly the case in extract 3, where there is a 
long pause of 2.5 seconds before the respondent starts her response to the 
interviewer’s question (line 616). Furthermore, there are three uh-like utterances in 
line 616: ‘Uh-‘, ‘e:h’ and ‘(ehm)’, and an out breath which delay the response. In 
extract 4, the response is delayed because of ‘yah’ (line 155) and ‘maybe’ (line 159), 
which form false starts, in that they are not immediately followed by identification of 
a cause. Also the elongated ‘Ya:h’ (line 165) forms a delay.  
  The respondents were non-native speakers of English, which could at least 
partly account for the delays. However, as delays do not always occur, it can be 
argued that when they occur in responses to particular questions, this suggests that 
the question is in some way sensitive or problematic.  This argument is sustained by 




the question forms a problem for the respondent. After the respondent’s ‘yah’ (line 
155), he translates the question into Chichewa, thus attending to the possibility that 
the respondent cannot answer due to a language problem. Then, after the 
respondent’s ‘maybe’ (line 159), the interpreter suggests ‘sickness’ as a possible 
cause. Again, the interpreter attends to the possibility that the respondent needs help 
in answering the question. 
  The responses in extracts 2 to 4 exhibit three features which I have noted in 
extract 1 as well. First, the explanations of infertility offered are marked as uncertain 
by ‘maybe’. This occurs in extract 2 four times, in lines 466 to 469, in extract 3, in 
line 621, and in extract 4, in lines 159 and 167.  Second, the respondents in extract 2 
and 3 deny knowledge of causes, before identifying potential causes. In extract 3, the 
respondent states at the beginning of her response ‘I don’t know’ (line 616). In 
extract 2, the respondent states ‘I do not know the real reason’ before identifying a 
potential cause. These claims can be seen as a disclaimer, of the kind which Hewitt 
and Stokes (1975) have called ‘hedging’. Hedging signals a minimal commitment to 
a forthcoming statement and openness to receive discrepant information (op cit.). A 
classic example of hedging is ‘I am not an expert, but [claim]’. Thus, the hedging in 
extracts 1, 2 and 3 signal a certain lack of commitment to the explanations of 
infertility which the respondents put forward.  
Note that also by the aforementioned constructions of uncertainty, 
respondents establish of a lack of commitment to their explanation. This goes as well 
for a third feature of the response of extract 2. The respondent constructs his 
response as a personal opinion by saying: ‘I think’ (line 466-467), and ‘I just think 
so’ (line 471). Thereby he makes his claim contingent on his thoughts, rather than 
constructing it as fact (cf. Latour & Woolgar, 1986).  
 It appears then, considering the ambiguous and non-committal nature of 
respondents’ explanations, that making claims about causes of infertility is in some 
way problematic. Hewitt and Stokes (1975) argue that disclaimers like hedging have 
as function to ward off negative typifications which may result from a forthcoming 
verbal action.  This suggests that the function of the various displays of a lack of 




inferences which claims about causes of infertility may make available. I will return 
to this issue in a later section. 
5.2 Doing ‘not knowing’, treated as reluctance to tell 
I have noted respondents’ claims of not knowing in extracts 1 to 3. In this section, I 
will examine ‘not knowing’ responses in more detail. I will re-examine extract 1, in 
addition to the following extracts 6 and 7.  





Do you think that there is 
another reason that caused it? 
What is it that 
you think? 
Mukuganiza kuti china chake 
chachitika ndi chiyani? 








Hhuhu, but the way I think,  
no,  nothing. [(     ) 
                   [ what has 
happened? 
I am not sure. I would not be 
able to know.  
Hhuhu, koma choganizira, ayi, 
palibe, Nanga si [(   ) 
                         [Chachitika 
ndi chiyani? 
Kaya, pamenepo sindingathe 
kudziwa.  
 
Extract 5:6 Int. 12 inf.w 
886.  I   So why people 
887.        become infertile, why 
888.        they, 
  













851.  T 
852.  R 
853.  T Okay, (they’re) 
854.       saying that when 
855.       they go to traditional 
856.       healers they say that 
857.       you  have got a 
858.       problem, maybe just 
859.       because- in African 
860.       countries, people- 
861.       especially girls, are  
862.       taken to go somewhere 
863.       else and be advised.  
864. I Hmhm 
865. T Yes. In so many 
Okay. She is saying, what 
causes a person infertile, the 
causes that make people not to 
have children like you. 
A::  but the problem in my 
body I cannot know, one can 
go to the traditional healer 
who can tell you that they 
made you infertile during  the 
girls initiation, when you go to 
the hospital they can tell you 
that you have a 
 problem here. 
Hm 
Yes. 
Okay. Akunena zoti chipangitsa ndi 
chiani kuti munthu usabereke 
zifukwa zake zimene zimapangitsa 
anthu ena asabereke ngati inuyo. 
A:: koma zimene zimavuta kuthupi 
iwe sumathanse kuziziwa iyayi 
umathanso kupita kwa sing'anga 
achikuda akhonza kukuuza kuti 
anakuononga kovinidwa kupita 
kuchipatala akhonza kukuuza kuti 
uli ndi vuto apa monga ndinapita 








866.       cases they do some 
867.       thing, I don’t know it 
868.       properly but they do 
869.       something maybe 
870.       that they can affect  
871.       them in the stomach. 
872.       And when they, 
873.       when she went to 
874.       ehm doctor, he told 
875.       her that, ehm you 
876.       have got a problem 
877.       inside the stomach.  
878. I Okay. 
879. T Meaning that, there 
880.       are two different 
881.       issues, 
882. I oh  
883. T  the traditional 
884.        healer and the 
885.        doctor.  
886. I [Okay 
887. T [yah 
 
Extract 5:7 Int 3. inf.w ((respondent has just answered ‘at first I was suffering from asthma’ 
in response to the question ‘What do you think can cause that problem, the problems that you 
people face’))   












Not you, she says here in the 
village,  maybe you hear or 
you know what makes a 
person to fail to have 
children  either yourself or  
somebody  else what people 
actually know  that when 
one does  such and such can 
make somebody fail to have 
a child. Yes, that is what she 
is asking ahhehe. 
Osati inuyo. Ngawa wawojo. 
Akuno ata akunokuno eti, kumu-
sikuno mwine pasawaga yasapi- 
kanaga kapena yasamanyira-ga 
mundu kuti alepele kuti akole 
mwanache. Kanga wawojo kanga 
wane wakwe myoyo yasa yasama-
nyika wandu kuti aa kutenda yanti 
yanti mpakana ilepeleche kuti mun-
dui atende chichi aa atame nimwa-




Hhuhu, about that I cannot 
know. 














The ones that you just hear,  
not that you know them but 
you just hear may be. Be 





Feel free . 
Yes (     ) 
hhuhu 
Yes: 
Yasagambaga kuyipikana basi. 
Ngawa yakuti yakuyimanyilira, 
yakusapikanaga mwine mwakwe. 
Agopochetu ngawa yakuti 
chichichi. Pana kuti une amu, 










It is just a matter of 
chatting. There are no other 
reasons. Just chatting. 
Aku kungulukape. Ngawa kuti pana 
chifukwa chine chakwe. 
Kungocheza chabe. 





Like the respondent in extract 1, the respondents in extracts 6 and 7 deny knowledge 
of causes. In extract 1, the respondent claims ‘Hhuhu what I think, nothing’ (line 
577) and ‘I would not be able to know’ (line 562).  The respondent in extract 6 states 
‘A::h but the problem in my body I cannot know’ (line 842)’. The respondent in 
extract 7, when asked specifically about fertility problems of ‘not you’ but people 
‘here in the village’, states ‘about that I cannot know’ (306-307). 
 The denials come across as emphatic. This first of all because the respondents 
in extracts 1, 6 and 7 point at the impossibility of knowing about the cause of their 
fertility problem: ‘I would not be able to know’ (extract 1, line 581-582), ‘the 
problem in my body I cannot know’ (extract 6, line 842) and ‘About that I cannot 
know’ (extract 7, line 306-307).32 This makes the denials stronger than a phrase like 
for instance ‘I don’t know’ would. 
 Second, the respondent in extract 6 accounts for her not knowing. She states 
that the traditional healer can tell you that ‘they made you infertile during the girls 
initiation’, whereas ‘when you go to the hospital they can tell you that you have a 
problem here’ (lines 843-850). Thus, the respondent attributes her not knowing to the 
lack of agreement between two health practitioners. This is reflected in the 
interpreter’s upshot: ‘meaning that, there are two different issues’, namely ‘the 
traditional healer and the doctor’ (lines 880-886). The account warrants the 
respondent’s claim regarding her lack of knowledge, making it more persuasive. 
  Third, in extract 1, line 578, the respondent uses an extreme case formulation 
(ECF) (Pomerantz, 1986), which is a reference to an event or object which invokes 
its maximal or minimal properties. The respondent uses the ECF ‘nothing’: ‘what I 
think, nothing’ (line 562). This makes the denial emphatic. As Pomerantz (1986) 
points out, one function of ECFs is to provide the strongest version of a claim in case 
of a sceptical audience. Arguably, the respondent has reason to suspect that the 
interviewer may doubt her denial of knowledge, as her question about causes of 
infertility implies an assumption that the respondent may know about causes. 
                                                 
32 Some may take issue with this claim based on detailed grammatical features of translated data. 
However, I asked professional translators to verify the relevant translations. They confirmed that 
respondents use in their denials forms of the verb ‘can’. Hence, ‘I cannot know’ or ‘would not be able 
to know’, rather than ‘ I don’t know’, appears to be the most adequate translation. I will address 




Therefore, the ECFs appear to bolster the denial against scepticism regarding the 
respondents’ lack of knowledge.  
  Edwards (2000), drawing upon Pomerantz’ work, has pointed out that ECFs 
make claims hearably extreme and nonliteral, that is, they are offered and received as 
performative descriptions which fulfil a certain function, rather than as accurate 
descriptions of a state of affairs. Therefore, it seems more fruitful to examine a 
statement like ‘I know nothing’ for its rhetorical and interactional function, rather 
than taking it literally. This is suggested as well by the reactions of the interpreters in 
extracts 1 and 7 to the respondents’ claims. Significantly, both pursue a response 
after the respondents’ claims of not knowing. In extract 1, the interpreter repeats her 
question after the respondent’s denial, asking about ‘what has happened’ (line 563), 
that the pregnancy is gone. In so doing, she treats the respondent’s denial as a 
reluctance to tell, rather than as a literal, straightforward display of lack of 
knowledge. In extract 7, the interpreter attends to a reluctance to identify causes of 
infertility on behalf of the respondent as well. More specifically, he orients to this 
reluctance as being based on issues of accountability, as he pursues a response by 
minimizing the respondents’ accountability for her claims. He does this first of all by 
enabling the respondent to use a form of ‘distanced footing’ (Potter, 1996, p.148). 
The notion of footing (Goffman, 1981) refers to the different possible relationships 
between a speaker and that which he or she reports.  For instance, a speaker can be 
the composer and origin of a story, or merely an animator who reports someone 
else’s story (Goffman, 1981). In extract 7, the interpreter’s phrase ‘The ones that you 
just hear, not that you know them but you just hear maybe’ (line 308-310) makes the 
respondent merely the animator of others’ claims rather than the source of any 
forthcoming claims. As Potter (1996) points out, distanced footing diminishes 
people’s accountability for their claims: people are normally not held accountable for 
claims that are merely reported.  
 Second, the interpreter plays down the respondent’s accountability by 
constructing the setting as inconsequential. He does this by using phrases as ‘it is just 
a matter of chatting’ (line 318-319) and ‘Just chatting’ (line 320), as ‘chatting’ is a 
word with playful connotations, and ‘chats’ do normally not have problematic 




respondent denies that the question is based on a special reason or interest of any of 
the participants to the conversation. By implication, the respondent suggests that 
there are no consequences attached to the respondent’s claim. Moreover, also by 
means of the probe ‘be free to say it’ (lines 311 - 312, 314), the interpreter orients to, 
and rejects the relevance of, any concerns for potential implications on behalf of the 
respondent, which would make her not ‘feel free’. Note that the interpreter is 
successful; after several probes the respondent identifies a potential cause. 
   Thus, the emphatic design of respondent’s denials and interpreters’ probes 
suggest that the respondents have an interest (cf. Edwards & Potter, 1992, Edwards, 
2000) in not being seen as knowledgeable about the causes of their fertility problem, 
and that respondents’ ‘doing not knowing’ deals with some interactional and 
inferential business at hand.33 Considering the non-committal nature of the 
respondents’  claims and the hedging, this ‘business’ appears to be related to issues 
of accountability and certain potential consequences attached to making claims about 
causes.  
 
5.3 Interpersonal issues at stake 
The question remains what sorts of issues of accountability and what kind of 
potential consequences respondents have to deal with when talking about causes. In 
this section, I will discuss two issues which appear to form a problem which 
respondents, when talking about causes, have to deal with. 
 
5.3.1 Lack of entitlement to know  
The next three extracts, together with extract 1, provide some more insight into one 
of the issues at stake.  For ease of reference, the relevant parts of extract 1 are 
reproduced below. 
 





I am not sure. I would not be 
able to know. Whether it’s 
witchcraft that is what they told 
me at the witch doctor. Ye:s 
kaya, pamenepo sindingathe 
kudziwa. Kaya zamuwanthu 
mmene anandiudzira 
kumankhwalako kuti kapena 
                                                 
33 I use the phrase ‘doing not knowing’ to highlight the performative function of the respondents’ 
claims that they do not know about causes. I do not mean to suggest that respondents ‘merely’ pretend 








,therefore, I cannot give an 
answer because because I 
am a patient. I would say that 
this is a disease.  
ndi zamuanthu anachita 
kukutcherani. Eehhetu, diye 
pamenepa sindingayankhe 
siine munthu odwala.  
 
Extract 5:8 Int 12 inf. w 
850. I     Okay. Yah. ·Hh and 
851.      what sorts of diseases 
852.      are those, which can 
853.      make people not bear 






She is saying what kind of 
disease is it which can cause a 
person not to have a child? 
Akunena kuti ndi nthenda yanji 
imene ingapangitse munthu kuti 











When we go to the hospital they 
tell us of sexually transmitted 





billharzia (2) eh, and other 
diseases 
Titapita kuchipatala amatiuza 
kuti kutenga matenda odzera 





likodzo (2) eh ndi matenda ena. 
868.T     Okay. 
869. R  
870. T    What she knows is 
871.       that when they go to 
872.       the hospital, they tell 
873.       her that (well), the 
874.       problem that when 
875.       somebody doesn’t 
876.       have a child is that 
877.       maybe because of the 
878.       SID, STD diseases 
879.       [like 
880. I      [hmhmn 
881. T     gonnorhea, syphilis  
882. I      Okay  
883. T     Hm which [causes 
884. I          [yah 
885. T     some people not to 
886.        having a child.  
887. I      Okay yah yah. Uhu.  






Extract 5:9 Int. 39 Inf. m 
486. I Hm, okay. Yah. Ehm, do you have any idea in general why 
487.    people fail to bear children sometimes? Do you have any idea 
488.    about possible causes? 
489. R Ehm (3) yes, now just by experience, eh (I mean) education and 
490.    just because I went to school,  
491. I Hm 
492. R we just, we were just told (by) our teacher that maybe, (when one) is miscarried, 




494. R Ehm, eh having I mean abortions,  
495. I uhu 
496. R that’s one. Many. Many is abortions 
497. I Okay 
498. R  for: women.  
499. I I see 
500. R And for men, eh STDs. 
501. I uhu 
502. R Eh, sexually transmitted diseases 
503. I Yah 
 
As discussed, the respondent in extract 1 puts forward several potential causes of her 
fertility problem. The respondents in extracts 8 and 9 identify causes for infertility in 
general: ‘sexually transmitted diseases like gonorrhoea, syphilis, bilharzia and other 
diseases’ (extract 8, lines 862-863), ‘abortions’ (extract 9, line 494) and ‘STDs’ (line 
500). 
   Noticeable is that all respondents identify the source of their knowledge, ‘that 
is what they told me at the witchdoctor.’(extract 1, line 568, 569); ‘when we go to the 
hospital, they tell us’ (extract 8, line 859-860) ‘education and just because I went to 
school’ (line 489 -490) and ‘our teacher’ (extract 9, line 492). Note the repair of 
‘experience’ into education and school (line 489-490). This suggests that identifying 
one’s education as source of knowledge does some interactional work, which making 
relevant personal experience does not. 
 The idea of ‘category entitlement’ (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996; 
Sacks, 1979) sheds some light on the function which identifying an external source 
of knowledge fulfils. Several authors have pointed out that people have shared, 
cultural, normative understandings regarding the knowledge which categories of 
people can be expected to have (Drew, 1991; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Sharrock, 
1974). People in hospitals and witchdoctors can be expected to have such an 
entitlement to knowledge about illnesses and their causes. Teachers too, can be 
expected to be granted such an entitlement by virtue of a category attribute of being 
knowledgeable in general. It appears that by identifying ‘authorized’ others as the 
source of their knowledge, respondents take into account that they, unlike these 
(witch)doctors and teachers, do not have an entitlement to put forward knowledge 
about causes of infertility (cf. Drew, 1991). This claim is supported by the 
observation that the respondent in extract 1 states in lines 585 to 587: ‘therefore, I 




lack of entitlement to (display) knowledge about causes. 
 Additional support for my claim that lack of entitlement to knowledge about 
causes can be an issue for respondents comes from interviews with two significant 
others, who are both not working as a health practitioner. They can be seen to be 
dealing with this entitlement issue as well. Consider the extracts below. 
 
Extract 5:10 Int.35 s.o  
882. I Yeah. Yah I see. Okay. Ehm, what do you think in general the main causes of 
883.    this issue of infertility here, of failure to bear children? 
884. R Hm:, eh since I’m not good in eh e:h medical manners, but eh= 
885. I =It doesn’t matter (   ). 
886. R You are just ask, me about my opinion. 
887. I Yah, yah. 
((respondent lists three causes: ‘just created like that’, diseases ‘like these STDs’ and witchcraft)) 
 
Extract 5:11 Int.13 s.o 
 
862. I Okay, yah. Do you 
863.        yourself happen to 
864.        know in general, not 
865.        specifically for your 
866.        daughter, but do you 
867.        know of any  diseases 
868.        maybe  which make 
869.        people fail to have 

















Are there (.) maybe other 
diseases, that you know of, that 
may (.) it (.) it may be possible, 
that may be, were the cause for 
that child of yours not to have 
children?   
Ah (1) those diseases I cannot  










Pali (.) mwina matenda ena, amene 
mukuwadziwa, amene angaa (.)  zi 
(.) zikhoza kutheka, kuti mwina, 
ankachitisa mwana wanuyo kuti 
asakhale ndi  
ana? 
Ah (1) matendawo sinditha 
kuwadziwa, iyayi. 
879. T   Okay, she’s saying 
880.      that she doesn’t 
881.      know the diseases. 
882. I    And what do you 
883.      think about certain 
884.      more spiritual or 
885.      traditional reasons? 






892. T She’s saying that 
893.       maybe they can with 
894.       people at the hospital, 
895.       they can maybe know, 









[But maybe, perhaps if she goes 
to the Hospital there, they can 
be able to examine her that 












[Koma mwina kapena atapita ku 
Chipatala uko, akhoza kuwayeza  






Before the respondent in extract 10 identifies several potential causes of infertility, 
he provides a disclaimer (Hewitt & Stokes, 1975), by means of which he minimizes 
his commitment to the truth status of his claims about causes of infertility. In line 
884, the respondent states ‘since I’m not good in eh e:h medical manners’, by means 
of which he makes relevant that he is not an expert in medical issues. Hence, the 
respondent can be seen to orient to a certain lack of expert entitlement to make 
factual claims about causes. By means of the phrase ‘you are just ask, me about my 
opinion’ (line 886), the respondent minimizes commitment to his claims as well, by 
constructing them as ‘merely’ an opinion (Latour & Woolgar, 1986).  
   In extract 11, the respondent emphatically denies that she ‘cannot’ know 
about diseases which cause infertility. She adds to this denial ‘But may be perhaps if 
she goes to the hospital there, they can be able to examine her that what makes her 
fail, is this and this!’ (line 887 to 890). She thereby makes relevant a contrast, 
marked by ‘but’, between herself and people at the hospital, who are able to know 
about the causes of her daughter’s fertility problem.  
    Thus, extracts 10 and 11 are two additional examples of extracts in which 
respondents appear to take into account that they lack a certain common sense 
authority to make claims about causes.   
 
5.3.2 Sensitivities in talk about STDs and abortions  
Whilst claiming knowledge about causes of infertility appears to be problematic in 
general, there may be additional problems with identifying specific causes, like STDs 
or abortions. Consider extracts 12 to 14. 
 
Extract 5: 12 Int. 12 inf.w  
876.    I Okay, yah. Ehm, do 
877.          you know in general, 
878.          when people fail to 
879.          have children, do 
880.          you have any idea  
881.          about why that might 
882.          be, what might be the 
883.          causes of this issue. 
  





And other people whom you 
know, what would be the causes 
of  infertility, not you but other 
people, are there any causes 
you know? 
Ndipo anthu ena mungathe 










Some causes they say sexually 
transmitted diseases (infections) 
which spoil the womb/uterus 
but I never had such diseases, 
no.  
Zifukwa zina amati kutenga 
matenda mwina chiberekero 
chinaongeka koma ine 
sinatengepo matenda iayi. 
894.  T She’s saying that, sa: 
895.          there can be: some,  
896.          diseases that they can 
897.          cause somebody to: 
898.          not bear a child but. 
899.          She has never had 
900.          such diseases. 
901. I       Hmhm  
902. T    Hm. 
  
 
Extract 5: 13 Int.2 inf.m 
199. I  Hm I see, yah okay. Ehm ((cough)) do you have any idea whether: (.) 
200.    abortion for example (.) here, in Malawi, sometimes also cause [it. 
201. R                [Yah yah. 
202. I Hm.  
203. R But eh my my wife didn’t have abortions. 
 
Extract  5: 14 Int 39 inf.m ((respondent has mentioned before abortions as a main cause for 
women’s infertility)) 
537. I Okay, uhu, I see. Yah. And do you have any idea – you already said that in 
538.   your case you think that it might be, that it’s your wife who has the problem 
539.   of (.) ehm infertility, that she is the one who has some kind of problem. 
540. R Ehm, about that I do eh I talked to my wife, 
541. I uHu 
542. R and she said that she has never done that. 
543. I Uhu, done what? 
544. R About the abortion, something like that. But eh maybe there should be just a 
545.   problem somewhere. But as for her, I will try to (   ) we had a negotiation, 
546.   and we already negotiated. We had the negotiation whereby she said ah I 
547.   have never done that in my life. 
 
In extracts 12 and 13, the respondents acknowledge that respectively sexually 
transmitted diseases and abortion are potential causes of infertility. The respondent in 
extract 14 mentioned just before the extract that abortions are the main cause for 
women’s infertility. All three respondents point out, spontaneously, that these causes 
are not the reason for their own or their wives’ fertility problem. In extract 12, the 
respondent states ‘but I never had such diseases’ (lines 892-893), in extract 13, the 
respondent adds ‘my wife didn’t have abortions’ (line 203). In extract 14, the 
interviewer refers to the respondents’ claim that his failure to have children is due to 
his wife having ‘some kind of problem' (line 539). In response, the respondent points 
out that his wife ‘has never done that’. Asked for clarification (line 543), the 




The respondents make their rejection of abortions or (sexually transmitted) 
diseases as cause of their infertility persuasive, and they do so in several ways. First 
of all, the respondent in extract 15, makes clear that his claim is grounded in a 
discussion about the abortion issue with his wife: ‘about that I do eh I talked to my 
wife’ (line 540); ‘we had a negotiation’; ‘we already negotiated’; ‘we had the 
negotiation whereby she said’ (lines 545-547).  By making clear the basis of his 
claim, the respondent makes it more convincing.  Second, the respondent uses active 
voicing: ‘she said ‘I have never done that in my life’ (lines 547). As Wooffitt (1992) 
has shown, active voicing can be used to warrant the factual status of a claim, and 
thereby forestalls sceptical responses. Third, the respondents in extracts 12 and 14 
use the extreme case formulation ‘never’: ‘but I never had such disease’ (extract 12, 
line 892), ‘she has never done that’ (extract 14, line 542) and ‘I have never done that’ 
(extract 14, line 547). In extract 14, the addition ‘in my life’ (line 547) strengthens 
the ECF ‘never’ by making clear that the claim is based on the whole life span rather 
than a particular time period. The ECFs give maximum strength to the claims that the 
respondents’ fertility problems are not due to diseases or due to the wife’s abortions, 
and make them thereby more persuasive (Pomerantz, 1986). 
   As mentioned before, Pomerantz (1986) pointed out that ECFs are used 
especially when faced with a sceptical audience. In these extracts, it is conceivable 
that the interviewer is sceptical regarding the truth of the respondents’ claims. For, 
all three the respondents claim that either STDs or abortions can, in principle, be a 
cause of infertility. This logically implies that their own fertility problem may be due 
to these causes. This is especially the case in extract 14, where the respondent has 
mentioned before that abortions are the main cause of infertility in women, and that 
his wife is the reason for their own childlessness.   
The rhetorically strong claims that one has not contracted STDs, or that one’s 
wife has not had an abortion, can be seen as a way of dealing with a potential 
problem: displaying knowledge about causes of infertility can make available the 
inference that one has personal ‘experience’ with these causes. This appears 
problematic, first of all because respondents’ persuasive denials. As Edwards (2000) 
has pointed out, ECFs are used to highlight a point, and in so doing, can be taken to 




not have personal experience with STDs or abortions,  the respondents display an 
investment in coming across as such. In other words, they attend to being seen as 
having personal experience with these causes of infertility as undesirable. 
Second, it seems conceivable that STDs and abortions have problematic 
connotations, for instance because they are associated with problematic activities, 
such as promiscuity.   
 
5.4 Summary and Discussion 
I have shown that claims about causes of infertility, in general or regarding 
respondents’ own fertility problem, can be ambiguous, delayed, marked as uncertain 
and non committal.  This indicates that talking about causes can be problematic, 
which is suggested as well by respondents’ emphatic denials of knowledge about 
causes of infertility, and interpreters’ treatment of these denials as reluctance to tell.  
I have pointed at two interactional and inferential issues which respondents appear to 
take into account. First, respondents attend to a lack of entitlement to know about 
causes. Second, respondents appear to take into account that displaying knowledge of 
particular causes, like STDs or abortions, makes available the inference that they 
have personal experience with these causes. Respondents treat such an inference as 
undesirable, and deal with it, by means of their persuasive denials. 
   My analytic findings shed light on the observation, reported in several other 
studies, that people indicate that they do not know about causes of infertility (Dyer et 
al., 2004; Dyer et al., 2004) or other health problems in developing countries, such as 
tuberculosis (Steen & Mazonde, 1999) and diabetes (Joshi, 1995). In addition, 
Gerrits (1997) mentions that many respondents expressed doubts about the causes 
mentioned. Normally, such findings are either given no attention (but see Last, 
1986), or it leads to conclusions that people need health education. For instance, 
Dyer et al. (2004: 962) note that ‘several participants’ said that they did not know the 
causes of infertility, that ‘lack of adequate knowledge was a central finding’,  and 
that as ‘men were poorly informed’ they have a need for, and attach importance to, 
medical information (Dyer et al., 2004, p. 964). However, it appears that denials of 




inferential issues such as lack of entitlement to know about causes. In several 
conversation analytic studies of doctor-patient interactions in the west, it has been 
noted as well that patients’ orient to a lack of entitlement by attributing explanations 
to third parties, or displaying a lack of commitment or uncertainty about causes 
(Drew, 1991;  Gill, 1998; Silverman, 1987, see also Kleinman, 198034). Lack of 
entitlement appears to be of relevance for respondents in Dyer et al.’s (2004) study, 
considering that some respondents  added to their denial of knowledge ‘that that they 
had come to the clinic in order to find out’ (Dyer et al., 2004, p. 962). Thus, as Drew 
(1991) argues, it is important to separate issues regarding asymmetries (e.g. between 
doctors and patients) in entitlement to knowledge from actual states of knowledge or 
ignorance. In other words, conversational phenomena, informed by differences in 
entitlements between doctors and lay people, should not be assumed to reflect an 
absence of knowledge. 
 The second interpersonal issue which I have discussed, that claims about 
causes may make available problematic inferences about oneself, also appears to 
contribute to an understanding of observations made by other authors. For instance, 
Gerrits (1997) mentions that although many of her Mozambiquan respondents 
identified STDs as cause of infertility, and had had a STD themselves, none of them 
related it to their own infertility.  Also in Bangladesh it was found that respondents 
did not relate their STD, of which they were aware, to their fertility problems 
(Gerrits et al., 1998). The authors themselves do not attempt to explain these 
observations. I suggest that they may be understood as being part of a strategy to 
avoid being seen as infertility due to STDs and related problematic inferences.   
The observations regarding the interpersonal functions of claims about causes 
bring out the problems of rational approaches to claims about causes and to claims of 
not knowing about causes. It should be taken into account that answering questions, 
and talking, about causes of infertility, in general or regarding one’s own fertility 
problem, is not a neutral, cognitive affair (cf. French, Maissie & Marteau, 2005). 
Therefore, questions about causes may have different meanings and relevancies for 
                                                 
34 Kleinman is not a discourse or conversation analysts, and does not talk about category entitlement. 
Yet, he appears to hint at the same issue when he states that laymen are ‘embarrassed about revealing 
their beliefs’ as ‘they fear being ridiculed, criticized or intimidated because their beliefs appear 




research participants than for the researchers.  French et al. (2005, p. 1419) rightly 
point out that researchers’ and research participants’ ‘cross purposes have perhaps 
resulted in the attributions of patients being explained in terms of ignorance or 
‘biases’ in motivation or processing.’ 
It should be mentioned that, as discussed in the literature review (chapter 2, 
section 1.3), other authors have paid attention to the interpersonal function of causal 
attributions for infertility. Overall, this function is seen as dealing with issues of 
blame and responsibility and management of the stigma of infertility.  The question 
can be raised whether these claims are sufficiently grounded in the concerns which 
participants themselves orient to in situated interactions. By examining in more detail 
content and design of explanations (cf. Antaki, 1988), and paying attention to the 
interactional context of people’s explanations, I have provided additional insights 
into concerns which participants themselves make relevant. This is important as after 
all, insight into people’s own understandings is one of the main motivations for 
scholars to study illness beliefs, such as those concerning causes, and essential for 
the development of culturally sensitive services. 
There are further methodological, theoretical and practical implications 
related to the analysis presented in this chapter. I will discuss these in chapter 10.  
 In conclusion, I have shown in this chapter that the interactional context is 
relevant for the claims which people make about causes of infertility. My approach 
thus differs significantly from those which treat attributions as individualistic 
cognitive entities, or as overly determined by the cultural context. My demonstration 
of the ambiguity, variability and hesitancy in people’s explanations, their non-
committal nature, and their interpersonal and interactional function, calls into 
question the idea of illness beliefs as pre-existing mental templates for behaviour. In 
the next chapter, I will examine how people themselves explain the actions they take 










Chapter 6. Accounting for (not) taking action   
 
Many authors have studied the solutions which people seek for their fertility 
problem, especially solutions sought from medical sources. In so doing, they have 
often examined which factors correlate with health seeking behaviour, in an attempt 
to explain what makes people seek help (see chapter 2). Various individual 
characteristics have been found to be associated with people’s health seeking 
behaviour, in particular demographic characteristics such as gender and education, 
and psychological factors, such as beliefs about causes, motivations, and locus of 
control.  Whilst in the west, several studies have examined psychological factors 
(e.g. anxiety, depression, stress, see chapter 2) which make people stop infertility 
treatment, in particular IVF, only a few studies of infertility in the developing world 
discuss why people do not seek help for fertility problems. When they do, they focus 
on practical reasons reported by research participants, such as costs involved 
(Sundby et al., 1998; Unisa, 1999), treatment not being necessary (Unisa, 1999), or 
lack of information (Sundby et al., 1998). Sundby et al. (1998) also mention that 
some of their respondents in their study of infertility in the Gambia relate not seeking 
(biomedical) care to husband's unwillingness to seek help.  
Overall then, studies which examine health seeking behaviour for infertility 
focus on individual decision makers, whose decisions are dependent on, and caused 
by a combination of individual demographic, psychological or cognitive 
characteristics, and practical inhibitors. This is a common approach to health seeking 
behaviour in general (MacKian, 2003), and can be criticised for several 
shortcomings. These are similar to those discussed in the previous chapter in relation 
to common approaches to illness cognitions (see chapter 5).  First of all, the focus on 
individualistic features leads to a neglect of the relevance of the social context for the 
actions which people take (Crossley, 1998; Marks, Murray, Evans, Willig, Woodall 
& Sykes, 2005; McKian, 2003; Obermeyer, 2002, Ogden, 1996, Willig, 2000). 
Second, health seeking behaviour is examined from an overly rational perspective. In 
these approaches, health seeking behaviour is normally seen as the outcome of a 




available information (Crossley, 1998; McKay, 2003; Obermeyer, 2002; Ogden, 
1996, Yoder, 1997). Thereby it is assumed that avoiding health risks is a priority for 
people (Crossley, 1998; Obermeyer, 2002).  Hence, health education is thought to be 
an appropriate method to change people’s health behaviour, the idea being that if 
people have correct information, for instance about the seriousness or causes of a 
health problem, they will choose to engage in healthy behaviours (Crossley, 1998; 
Marks et al., 2005). However, as scholars like Crossley (1998) and Obermeyer 
(2002) have argued, there are various non-rational, interpersonal issues which seem 
of relevance for people’s health related behaviours, such as a search for pleasure or 
peer pressure (Obermeyer, 2002; Bajos, 1997), or the moral identities which are 
related to and evoked by certain behaviours (Crossley, 1998; Obermeyer, 2002). As 
Crossley (1998, p.39) points out, people’s ‘decisions to act in certain ways do not 
conform to rational, logical, value-free ways of thinking, but have their own 
alternative logic and validity that is related in a complex fashion to the cultural and 
moral environment in which they live’.  
It therefore seems desirable to gain insight into people’s own rationales and 
understandings of their actions (Crossley, 1998; Stainton Rogers, 1999), which are 
likely to inform the actions which they take. According to Crossley (1998), one way 
to obtain such insights is careful examination of how people talk about their 
activities. In this chapter, I will present analysis of how people talk about the actions 
which they have taken in order to solve their fertility problem, often, but not always, 
in response to questions about their actions (e.g. ‘what did you do to solve your 
problem?’). In the initial stages of analysis, it became apparent that in addition to 
describing the actions they had taken, respondents address and account for not taking 
action, or for their discontinuation of action. Since little attention has been paid to 
this in the infertility literature, I will focus in this chapter in particular on these 
accounts for inaction. I will show how respondents attend to not taking action as a 
problematic breach of normative expectations, and account for it in ways which play 
down their culpability. Hence, the analysis points to the relevance of interpersonal, 
normative and moral issues in accounts for actions taken and not taken in order to 




according to which various reasons for (not) seeking help are part, or the outcome, of 
rational cost benefit analyses.   
6.1 Inaction attended to as problematic  
In the first two extracts which I want to discuss, the respondents answer a question 
about their own (extract 1) or their wife’s (extract 2) actions. Note that in extract 2, 
the interviewer asks the respondent about his wife’s view of the cause of their 
fertility problem. However, in the interpreter’s translation this becomes a question 
about his wife’s actions: ‘what does your wife do after she has realized that there is 
no child in the family?’ (lines 406-409). As I will show, the responses in both 
extracts indicate that there is something problematic about not taking action. 
Extract 6:1 Int. 2 inf.m 
434. I  Okay yah I see. Ehm have you sought for: any solutions for your 
435.    failure, and your wife’s failure to have babies. 
436. R Ehm, yes. I I have (one) solution. 
437. I Hmhm 
438. R I just maybe think of going, maybe to some clinic, to help us to have 
439.   children.  
440. I Okay.  
441. R Yah. 
442. I Yah. You’re thinking about doing that. 
443. R Yah. 
444. I Y- you haven’t been going there yet. 
445. R  I haven’t. 
446. I Okay. Yah. 
447. R Yah.   
448. I Hmhm. 
449. T (       ) 
450. R [But (has to) take maybe. It’s the problem of financial (which will be)     
451.   (charged by that clinic). 
452. I Okay,  
453. T   (If they make something to do) 
454. I yah. 
455. T yah. 
 
 
Extract 6:2 Int. 5 inf.m. 
401. I  Okay, I see and what 
402.       is your wife’s view 
403.       of the cause of your 
404.       failure to have 






She says, what does your 
wife do after she has 
realized that there is no 
child in the family? 
Akuti nanga mkaziyo 
amapanga zotani panopo 






Uh, at the moment she does 
not do anything because 
since we failed to get money 
to pay at Banja La 
U:h panopa, palibe chimene 
chilichonse chimene amapa-
nga kunena kuti sinanga 











 where we were 
getting the medicine, we just 
stopped. 
kuti tipeze ndalama kuti 
tikalipile kuti ku Banja La 
Mtsogolo kumenen tinapeza 
mankhwalako tinangosiya. 
419. T    He was taking medicine to 
420.      Banja La Mtsogolo. 
421. I     hmhm 
422. T    So, he: failed to continue. 
423. I     Hmhm 
424. T    Because of shortage of 
425.      money. He thinks if he 
426.      could have continued, 
427.      maybe he would have a 
428.       child. 
429. I     Okay 
430. T    Yah.  
431. I      Is that what (.) your wife 
432.       thinks. 
433. T    Yah. 
434. I     Okay. Hmhm 
435. T    They said if they could 
436.       have money, they could 
437.       have continued to take 
438.       medical (.) drugs, as they 
439.       was doing. 
440. I     Okay 
441. T    Yah 
442. I     But is is- 
443. T    but e- they are now, they 
444.      don’t have money to [pay    
445. I                                       [uhu     
446. T    for [the (.)Banja  
447. I      [okay  
448. T    LaMtsogolo  
449. I     Uhu, yah. 
     
 
In extract 1, the respondent starts his response to the question whether he has sought 
for any solutions with a confirmation: ‘Yes, I I have (one) solution’ (line 436). In the 
next line, he adds information about the kind of solution: going ‘to some clinic’ (line 
438). However, as the respondent precedes this information with ‘I just maybe think 
of going’ (line 438), he implies that going to a clinic is merely a potential future 
solution. The interviewer picks up on this: ‘you’re thinking about doing that’ (line 
442) and ‘Y- you haven’t been going there yet’ (line 444), and the respondent 
subsequently confirms: ‘I haven’t’ (line 445). Hence, from the response in extract 1 it 
can be inferred that the respondent has not yet taken action to solve his fertility 
problem, but the reference to inaction is not immediate and implicit. 
In extract 2, the respondent refers to inaction as well, as he states that his wife 
‘does not do anything’ (line 410-411) and that ‘we just stopped’ (line 415-416). The 
                                                 
35 Banja Lamtsogolo is a Malawian NGO which provides reproductive health services (mainly family 




reference to inaction is embedded in references to previous action. By saying that ‘at 
the moment’ his wife does not do anything (line 410), and that he and his wife ‘were 
getting the medicine’ (line 413-415) at the clinic Banja LaMtsogolo, the respondent 
makes clear that they have taken action in the past. He does this as well by saying 
‘we just stopped’ (line 416-417). The interpreter refers to the respondent’s previous 
action by mentioning that ‘he was taking medicine to Banja La Mtsogolo’ (line 419-
420) and points out, several times, that the respondent did not continue: ‘he failed to 
continue’ (line 422), ‘if he could have continued’ (line 425-426) and ‘they could 
have continued to take medical (.) drugs’ (lines 436-438). Thereby the interpreter 
makes clear that the respondent was taking action at some point, which he does as 
well when the interpreter says ‘as they was doing’ (line 438-439). 
 Both respondents account for their inaction; they explain that they could not 
take action due to lack of money. In extract 1, the respondent states: ‘It’s the problem 
of financial (which will be charged by that clinic)’ (line 450-451).  In extract 2, the 
respondent makes clear that ‘she does not do anything because since we failed to get 
money to pay at Banja La Mtsogolo’ (line 411).  
  The observations, that a reference to inaction is not immediate and implicit 
(extract 1), embedded in descriptions of previous actions (extract 2), and treated as 
accountable, imply that there is a problem with claiming not to take action. This 
applies perhaps most to the respondents’ provision of accounts for their inaction. In 
seminal publications, Garfinkel (1967) and Scott and Lyman (1968) have argued that 
a central function of accounts is to mend a ‘problematic’, related to a breach of social 
norms and what is taken for granted (cf. Buttny, 1993). Thus, in accounting for their 
inaction, respondents can be seen to attend to, and remedy, a breach in normative 
expectations that they take action in order to solve their fertility problem.  Such 
expectations can be inferred from the interviewer’s and interpreter’s questions. The 
question whether the respondent has sought for any solutions (extract 1), displays an 
assumption that the respondent at least may have sought for solutions; otherwise 
there would be no point asking about it.  In extract 2, the assumption that the 
respondent’s wife has taken action is embedded in the interpreter’s question, as he 




I should mention that not all respondents treat their inaction as accountable. 
However, these cases are relatively rare; only 3 out of the 1136 respondents who state 
not to be taking action do not account for their inaction. All three of these 
respondents have one or more children, and make this relevant in the extracts in 
which they mention that they have not taken action. Hence, dealing with expectations 
regarding taking action appears less relevant to those who have at least one child.   
 
6.2 Playing down culpability for not taking action 
Examination of respondents’ descriptions of their actions and inaction brings out 
several features, which appear to fulfil a function of playing down respondents’ 
culpability for not taking action. In what follows I will focus on extract 2 as well as 
on two new extracts. 
 
6.2.1  ‘Trying’ and doing being motivated 
As in extract 2, the respondents in extracts 3 and 4 refer to previous actions, as well 
as making clear that they are not taking action anymore. In extract 3, the respondent 
is asked what she did to solve her problem. In extract 4, the interviewer asks the 
respondent about her relationship with her husband, but in her response, the 
respondent addresses their attempts to solve their problem. 
 
Extract 6:3 Int 12 inf w.  
 
                                                 
36 I acknowledge that there are problems in providing counts like this one, as pointed out especially by  
Schegloff (1993). I will discuss issues of quantification in chapter 10.  
1136. I      Okay, yah, so what did you 
1137.        do to solve your problem? 
1139.  T 
1140. 















And what did you do to 
solve the problem? 
We got the medicine and 
while I was still taking the 
medicine, then I found the 
money to take up to the 
hospital because we had 
intended to go to the private 
hospital because the 
government hospital did not 
give me much attention.  
When we went for the first 
time, to the government 
hospital, they examined my 
husband's sperms only 
 
 
Ndiye munapanga chiani 
mutafuna kuti vutolo lithe? 
Ineyo tinakafuna 
mankhwala, tiri pakati 
pakudya mankhwala 
ajandimmene ndinapeza 
ndalama kuti tipite 
kuchipatalako timafuna 




Titapita  ulendo  oyamba 
anangotenga mphamvu ya 








Extract 6:4. Int 14. Inf.w  
106. I Okay. How would you 
107.       describe your  
108.       relationship with your 





How would you describe your  
relationship with your  
husband? 
Mungalongosole bwanji ulongo 


















1170. T Hmhm she’s saying that 
1171. they went to the 
1172. traditional healers and 
1173. they gave some 
1174. medicine, and when 
1175. they nothing happened. 
1176. And they went to the 
1177. hospital and the doctor 
1178. told them that to, he she 
1179. told 
((end of tape, part missing)) 
1181. I  And they should 
1182.    collect sperm 
1183. T yah, yah, so when they 
1184.     went to the hospital 
1185.     they they they checked 
1186.     the sperm at government 
1187.     hospital.  
1188. I  Hmhm 
1189. T So, they chased him [her] 
1190.     away, saying that ah 
1191.     you’re old, you can’t 
1192.     even manage to have 
1193.     a kid. 
1194. I   The husband, or; they 
1195.      they they chased the 
1196.      husband away? 
1197. T  Yeah, both of them, so 
1198.      they wanted to go to a  
1199.      private hospital, so that 
1200.      they can help them. 
1201. I  Oho, oh. 
And when I went for 
examination to find out the 
real problem  of my not giving 
birth but the doctor sent me 
away, saying saying go, go go, 
you are old don't come back. 
Then we just returned home. 
When we came back that is 
when we decided to go to the 
private hospital and we had to 
find money, when we got them 
then there was another 
problem came in and we used 
that money but we intended to 
go to the private hospital 
within the next month.   
tsopano anandiuza kuti inunso 
ndiofunika mupote akakuyeze- 
ni kuti tione kuti vuto lanu 
likulepheretsa kubereka ndi 
chiani ndiye kupita kuja 
adokotala ali iyayi tiyeni 
pitani mwakalamba 
musabwerere pitani basi 
tinangobwerako, kubwera 
kuno tiri iayi kuli bwino tipeze 
ndalama tipite chipatala 
cholipira ndi mmene ndalama 
tinazipeza kugwanso vuto lina 
ndalama zija tinaononga koma 











118. T She's saying that they 
119.         have tried their best to 
120.         solve the problem, 
121.         but just because 
122.         nothing has been 
123.         happening so, they 
124.         just decided just to 
125.         settle down.  
126. I Hm:. Okay, aha. 
127.       And if you say that 
128.       you just decided to 
129.       settle down in which 
130.       way? 
Uh, since we, uh since we have  
been trying long enough we  
then decided to give up because  
(           ) we were tired of 
trying. 
Ndiye nanga si nanga si iwo  
nde zimayesesa. Kenaka aa basi  
(   ) malingana ndi kutopa            
ati aa (basi tingokhala  







Now that you have said that 
after having tried for so long, 
you decided to give up. What do 
you mean by ‘we decided to 
give up’? Hhuhu. 
Pamene mwanena zoti basi 
tinangoganiza kuti 
mutayendayenda, kuyesayesa 
basi munangoganiza kuti 
tingokhala, mukutanthauza 









145. T She is saying that aa 
146.     taking medicine for  
147.     quite a long time,  since 
148.     the problem is not  
149.     solved they just    
150.    decided to give up 
 
hhuhu, since eh, since uh, it 
means, it means that after I had 
failed, we had failed, taking 
medicine but did not help, 
taking medicine but did not 
help, then we decided to stop 
and do nothing. 
Hhuhu, Nanga si kuti, ah, 
ndikutanthauza kuti nanga 
sikuti malinga ndikupanga 
 ndikulephera ndine (   ) 
kunalephera ifezo … ndiye eya 
kudya mankhwala osathaniza, 
eya kudya mankhwala 
osathandiza  (   ) ndiye basi 
kumangokhala. 
A first feature of the respondents’ descriptions which I would like to note is that, 
both respondents in extracts 3 and 4 make clear that they were taking action, but 
stopped at some point. Hence, as in extract 2, the respondents’ references to inaction 
are embedded in descriptions of previous action. In extract 3, the respondent refers to 
her actions when she states that she was ‘taking the medicine’ (line 1142-1143), that 
she and her husband went ‘to the government hospital’ (lines 1148, 1151-1152), 
where they examined her husband’s sperms only, after which the respondent herself 
‘went for examination’ (line 1154-1155). The interpreter refers to the respondent’s 
actions when she says ‘they went to the traditional healers’ (line 1171-1172), ‘and 




taking action when she points out that the doctor in the government hospital sent her 
away (line 1157-1158), upon which she and her husband went home (line 1160), and 
that after they got money to go to a private hospital, they had to use it when ‘another 
problem came in’ (lines 1165-1167). In extract 4, the respondent points out she was 
taking action by stating ‘we have been trying long enough’ (line 114) and ‘taking 
medicine’ (lines 139-141). She makes clear that she stopped her actions when she 
states: ‘we then decided to give up because we were tired of trying’ (lines 115-116), 
and ‘we decided to stop and do nothing’ (line 142-143). 
   A second feature worth noting is that the respondents in extracts 2 and 3 
make their claims that they have taken action convincing. The respondents provide 
details about their previous actions, specifically about where they went for help 
(‘Banja LaMtsogolo’ in extract 2, the government hospital in extract 3), and what 
was examined (‘they examined my husband’s sperms only’, extract 3, line 1153). As 
Potter and Edwards (1992) have pointed out, providing details can be a way to work 
up the factuality of one’s claims.  In addition, the respondent in extract 3 uses 
reported speech in her description of what the doctor said to her: ‘the doctor sent me 
away saying ‘go, go go you are old, don’t come back’ ’ (lines 1157-1159). As 
Wooffitt (1992) and Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998) have argued, reported speech also 
fulfills a rhetorical function of making claims factual.  
 By making clear that they have taken action in the past, the respondents make 
clear that they tried to seek for a solution. They do this in other ways as well. In 
extract 4, the respondent states explicitly that ‘we have been trying’ (line 113-114) 
and ‘we were tired of trying’ (line 116-117).  The interpreter attends to the 
respondent’s attempts in lines 118 to 119: ‘they tried their best to solve the problem’, 
and in line 132: ‘after having tried’. In addition, in extracts 2 and 4, the respondents 
and interpreter speak about ‘failure’. In extract 2, the respondent states that they 
‘failed to get money’, because of which they stopped (line 412). The interpreter 
subsequently points out that he ‘failed to continue’ (line 416). In extract 4, the 
respondent states ‘after I had failed, we had failed’ (line 138-139). By saying ‘failed’ 
to get money or continue, instead of for instance ‘did not’ (get money/continue), the 




action, although they did not succeed. For, one cannot ‘fail’ in something, without 
having made an attempt.  
 Noteworthy is that in extract 4, the respondent characterizes her attempts as 
enduring by saying ‘long enough’ (lines 114), and ‘we were tired of trying’ (line 
116-117), which makes available the inference that the attempts were long enough to 
get tired. The repetition of ‘taking medicine’ in lines 139 to 142 also makes clear that 
the respondent’s attempts went on for a while.  By constructing her attempts as 
(sufficiently) enduring, the respondent attends to and forestalls assumptions that she 
has not tried enough. The interpreter picks up on this performative function of the 
respondent’s references to her enduring trying, when she states that the respondent 
and husband tried ‘their best’ (line 119). Thereby she makes explicit that the 
respondent and her husband tried as much as they could, and thus that they tried 
enough.  
 The respondents offer their (enduring) attempts as an explanation, or account, 
for the discontinuation of action by preceding it with ‘since’ and ‘because’: ‘since we 
failed (….) we just stopped, (extract 2, lines 412-413), ‘since we have been trying 
long enough’ we gave up (extract 4, line 113-114), and ‘because we were tired of 
trying’ (extract 4, line 115-117).  Hence, the respondents use their references to their 
attempts to make their discontinuation understandable and thus (more) justified. 
  As said before, respondents attend to claiming not to take action as a 
dispreferred breach of expectations. By claiming to have taken action in the past, and 
(thus) to have tried taking action, the respondents can be seen to mitigate any 
culpability for not taking action anymore.  This in part because references to their 
previous actions and attempts forestall the assumption that respondents’ are not 
motivated to take action. In extract 3, the respondent makes relevant her motivation, 
when she makes explicit her intention to go to the private hospital: ‘we (had) 
intended to go to the private hospital’ (lines 1145 to 1147 and line 1167-1168). In 
addition, the claim ‘we decided to go to the private hospital’ (1162) conveys a 
commitment, and thus intention, to take action. Hence, the respondent provides 
several references to her intention and decision to go to the hospital, and thereby 
emphasizes her motivation to take action. Moreover, the respondent’s intention is 




action would be taken, namely ‘within the next month’ (line 1169), and to the 
specific moment at which the decision was made: ‘when we came back, that is when 
we decided’ (line 1161-1162). Note that the interpreter too, makes relevant the 
respondents’ intention and motivation to take action when she states ‘so they wanted 
to go to a private hospital’ (lines 1197-1199).  
 In the next section, I will examine in more detail how respondents explain 
their inaction, and how these explanations play a role in mitigating respondents’ 
culpability.  
   
6.2.2 Explaining inaction: Identifying external obstacles  
In all the extracts which I have shown so far, respondents  account for and explain 
their inaction or discontinuation of action. I have mentioned that the respondents in 
extracts 1 and 2 explain that they do not take action (anymore) due to lack of money. 
Also in extract 3, the respondent explains that she points out that she could not go to 
the private hospital because ‘we used that money’ (line 1166-1167). Note that the 
interpreter in extract 2, emphasizes that lack of money was why the respondent 
stopped taking action, by referring three times to it: ‘because of shortage of money’ 
(line 418), ‘if they could have money’ (line 425), and ‘they don’t have money to pay 
for the Banja La Mtsogolo’ (line 430-431).  
 In extract 3, the respondent identifies another reason for her discontinuation 
of action. She states that ‘the government hospital did not give me much attention’ 
(line 1148-1149), explains that people in the hospital examined ‘only’ her husband’s 
sperms (lines 1152-1153), and that ‘the doctor sent me away’ (line 1157-1158). 
Hence, the respondent attributes her discontinuation of action to others, namely 
people at the hospital and specifically the doctor whom she consulted. 
 By means of these explanations, respondents make their inaction 
understandable and hence more justified. The explanations appear to fulfil this 
justificatory function especially because they identify practical obstacles to taking 
action, which are unrelated or ‘external’ to respondents’ motivation to take action. 
By identifying money or the doctors’ dismissal as a reason for not taking action 
(anymore), respondents can be seen to imply that they would take action, if they 




in extract 2 makes this implication explicit by using an ‘if-then’ construction 
(Edwards & Potter, 1992): ‘if they could have money’ (then) ‘they could have 
continued to take medical (.) drugs’ (lines 425 to 426).  Thereby he suggests that 
money is a condition for taking action, that is he suggests that the respondent would 
have taken drugs, if only he had had the money for it.  
  Thus, like making clear to have tried to take action, identifying reasons for 
inaction which are external to oneself portrays inaction as not due to a lack of 
motivation, and thereby plays down respondents’ culpability for it.  There appears to 
be a second way in which identifying external obstacles enables respondents to play 
down their culpability, which can be observed in extract 5, displayed below.  
 
Extract 6:5 Int. 44 inf.w   
407.   R  But to people say that ‘just try  to traditional drugs that’ so I answer them that ah, my 
408.              husband is refusing. He is a medical assistant, he is a doctor, so he can’t (2) he 
409.    can’t (2) hhu she is refusing that you can’t you you drunk, ujeni [what] 
410.    traditional drug is not eh good. 
411. I uhu 
412. R Just stay without anything, God will provide. 
413. I  Okay. That’s what your husband was saying. 
414. R Yah.  
415. I  But how, you yourself, how did you think about [traditional  
416. R           [hhu 
417. I medicines? 
418. R Ah, I just stay that, ah if my husband is refusing, so: what can I do. 
419. I uhu 
420. R yah. I am: in your hands, so, I don’t have any power. 
421. I  You couldn’t take medicines if your husband didn’t want you to take 
422.     [them. 
423. R [Yes. 
424. I Uhu 
425. R Hm. I just stay, no any drugs. 
 
In extract 5, the respondent makes clear that she does not take action to solve her 
fertility problem when she states ‘just stay, no any drugs’ (line 425). She provides an 
explanation for her inaction: ‘ah, my husband is refusing.’(lines 408-409, see also 
410 and 424). Hence, like the respondent in extract 3, she identifies someone else as 
obstacle to seeking a solution, namely her husband.  The respondent accounts for her 
husband’s refusal by making relevant the membership categories ‘medical assistant’ 
and ‘doctor’(lines 409), and by making clear that taking traditional medicine is at 
odds with the normatively expected, category bound activities (Sacks, 1992) of 




doctor, so he can’t (2) he can’t (2)’ (line 408-409) and ‘traditional drug is not eh 
good’ (line 410). This account makes the respondent’s claim that her husband refuses 
to let her take traditional drugs understandable, and thereby it makes its factuality 
more convincing. Note that by stating that when people advise her to try traditional 
drugs, ‘I answer them that ah, my husband is refusing’ (line 407-408), the respondent 
explicitly attends to not taking action as in need of an ‘answer’ and thus as 
accountable. 
   By referring to her husband’s refusal as reason for not taking medicine, the 
respondent portrays her inaction as outwith her own control. She attends to her lack 
of control when she states ‘so: what can I do’ (line 418). This question is made into a 
rhetorical question because it is treated as not requiring an answer. The interviewer 
produces after the question only a continuer ‘uhu’ (line 419), rather than an answer. 
Nevertheless, the respondent subsequently continues in a next turn (line 420). 
Because of its rhetorical nature, the question ‘what can I do?’ makes the point that 
there is nothing that the respondent can do, considering her husband’s refusal. Hence, 
the respondent constructs herself as powerless. She does this as well by explicitly 
stating ‘I don’t have any power.’ (line 420) and ‘I am in your hands’ (line  420). The 
respondent emphasizes her lack of power by means of the extreme case formulation 
(ECF) ‘[not] any power’ in line 420.  In addition, the expression ‘I am in your hands’ 
(line 420) evokes a relatively extreme image of someone whose actions are 
controlled by someone else.  
  By making clear that their inaction is outwith their own control by identifying 
reasons for their inaction external to themselves, respondents play down their 
responsibility and thus culpability for not taking action. Identifying others as 
obstacles enables respondents to can play down their culpability in a third way. This 
can be observed in extract 3, and extract 6, displayed below.  For ease of reference, 









Extract 6:3 Int. 12 inf.w 
 












At the Hospital they told me to 
bring (.) I really tried, so that 
there is even a book there at the 
hospital. After giving me the 
book, they told me to bring my 
husband, I told my husband, he 
refused. I told him, he refused! 
Ah (.) ah (.)me, to the hospital,  
I we[:nt. 
       [oho: 
Nditapita ku chipatala kuja  
adandiwuza kuti mukabwere.(.) 
ine ndidayesetsa ndithu, moti 
buku liliko kuchipatalako. 
Adandipatsa ndithu kuti 
mukabwere ndi banja lanu, 
kuwawuza banja lathuli kukana. 
Kuwawuza kukana! Ah. (.) ah 
(.) ine ku chipatala, ndinapi[taa.   
                                          [oho:                                      
206. T   =so he [she] went to 
207.      the hospital to 
208.      explain 
209. I     H:mhm 
210. T And they asked her  
211.       to br- to take- to go 
212.        with the husband. 
213. I Yah. 
214. T So when she came 
215.       back she told the 
216.       husband, the 
217.       husband didn’t take 
218.  it seriously. 
219. I Hmhm. 
220. T She told she never 
221.       went back to the 
222.       hospital. 









((some lines omitted)) 
1189. T So, they chased him 
1190.    [her]  away, saying that 
1191.    ah you’re old, you can’t 
1192.    even manage to have a 
1193.    kid. 
And when I went for 
examination to find out the 
real problem  of my not 
giving birth but the doctor 
sent me away, saying saying 
go, you are old,  don't come 
back, go, that’s it.  
ndikuyeza tsopano anandiuza 
kuti inunso ndiofunika mupote 
akakuyezeni kuti tione kuti vuto 
lanu likulepheretsa kubereka  ndi 
chiani ndiye kupita kuja adokota 
-la ali iyayi tiyeni pitani mwaka- 

















236. T    So until now, he has 
237.       not accepted to go to 
238.       the hospital [to see the 
239.I      [hmhm 
240.T doctor, so it happens 
241.       that sometimes she has 
242.       abdominal pain 
243.  intensively, 
244. I Hmhm 
245.T Eh but ehhh it 
246.       continues (     ) 
Upon telling him, he has 
refused to go. That time there 
was Mr.Banda
37
, he refused to 
go to the Hospital, this husband 
refusing to go for a test for them 
to see what is happening in our 
bodies. Sometimes, I have sharp 
pains in my stomach, sharp 
pain, the strength of           
what? Wanting to give birth. So 
I do not know what is 
happening. 
Kuwawuza kuti tipite kukana. 
Nthawi ija kunali a Banda kuti 
tipite ku chipatala, ai ndithu 
abambowa kumakana kuti 
akatiyese akawone chikuchitika 
ndi chiyani m’nthupimu. 
Mwina pena pake ine 
m’mimbamu mmandipota, 
kupota, mphamvu yofuna 
kutani?  Kubereka. Ndiye 
sindidziwa kuti chimatika 
ndichiyani. 
 
As said before, the respondent in extract 3 points out that a doctor in the government 
hospital sent her away.  In extract 6, the respondent makes clear that her husband 
prevents her from further pursuit of a solution when she points out that she was told 
at the hospital to bring her husband, but that he refused to go (lines 202, 225,226, 
228). In lines 228 to 230, the respondent identifies more specifically what her 
husband refuses: ‘to go for a test for them to see what is happening in our bodies’ , so 
she does not know ‘what is happening’ (line 232-234). The respondent implies that 
her husband’s refusal prevents doctors from diagnosing their problem, and thus by 
implication, taking action to solve it.   
  Both respondents describe the other’s (respectively the doctor’s and 
husband’s) behaviour in such a way that it is portrayed as blameworthy. As 
mentioned before, the respondent in extract 3 uses reported speech (Hutchby & 
Wooffitt, 1998) when she describes the doctors’ reaction: ‘the doctor sent me away, 
saying go, you are old, don’t come back, go’ (line 1157-1160). Drew (1998) has 
noted that reported speech is commonly used in complaints, which pertain to what 
someone said. In addition, he points out that design features of the reported speech 
tend to provide for the blameworthy character of the reported conduct (op cit.). In 
                                                 




line 1159, the respondent repeats the short imperative ‘go’, in addition to using the 
command ‘don’t come back’. Widdicombe and Wooffitt’s (1995, p. 122) note about 
a similar command, namely ‘get out’, that it ‘formulates in the harshest possible 
terms what could otherwise be described as a request to leave’. Similarly, ‘go, you 
are old, don’t come back, go’ (line 1159-1160) portrays the doctor’s ‘request to 
leave’ as harsh and dismissive. The interpreter picks up on the dismissive, harsh 
quality of the doctors’ behaviour, when she states ‘they chased him [her] away’ (line 
1189-1190). ‘Chasing away’ has negative, callous connotations. By constructing the 
doctors’ behaviour as harsh and dismissive, the respondent makes it blameworthy.  
 In extract 6, the respondent constructs her husband’s behaviour as 
blameworthy by making clear that not being able to know ‘what is happening’ is 
problematic. She does this by pointing out the seriousness of the fertility problems 
she is suffering, when she refers to the ‘sharp pains in my stomach, sharp pain’ (lines 
230-232), made relevant in the interpreter’s translation as well:  ‘sometimes she has 
abdominal pain intensively’ (lines 241-243). In addition, the respondent relates these 
pains to ‘the strength’ of ‘wanting to give birth’ (lines 232-233). Thereby she makes 
clear that she has a strong desire to give birth, considering that it has a physical 
correlate, namely the sharp pains. By thus bringing out the seriousness of her fertility 
problem, the respondent points to the need to solve it, and provides for the husband’s 
refusal to be seen as problematic and blameworthy.  
  In both extracts, the respondents make respectively the doctors’ and their 
husbands’ behaviour particularly complainable and blameworthy by making relevant 
their membership categories. In extract 3, the respondent states explicitly that ‘the 
doctor sent me away, saying’ (line 1157-1158). As Sacks (1992) has pointed out, 
membership categories are associated with certain category bound activities (CBAs). 
One such category bound activity of doctors is assisting patients; they are expected, 
and seen as having, a duty to help patients (cf. Parsons, 1951). As sending and 
certainly ‘chasing’ patients away is at odds with this duty, it is recognizably 
complainable and culpable. In extract 6, the respondent explicitly states that ‘this 
husband’ (line 227) refuses to go for a test. This makes relevant  membership 
attributes of the category ‘husband’, such as being in partnership with, and 




not in line with these membership attributes, bringing out its inappropriateness and 
culpability.     
By constructing others’, rather than their own behaviour as blameworthy, 
respondents can be seen to direct blame for not taking action away from themselves 
to the others’ who are obstructing them. The respondent in extract 6 accomplishes 
this diverting of blame as well by establishing a contrast (cf. Widdicombe & 
Wooffitt, 1995) between her own and her husband’s behaviour, in particular, 
between her own effort to seek a solution and her husband’s inaction, that is, his 
refusal to go to the hospital. The respondent makes clear that ‘I really tried’ (line 
197) and ‘me to the hospital, I went’ (line 202-203), whereas, as mentioned before, 
she refers several times to her husband’s refusal to go to the hospital. The respondent 
brings out the contrast in their behaviour by stating that she herself went to the 
hospital (line 202-203) directly after she has mentioned ‘he refused’ (line 202).  By 
using the pronoun ‘me’, in addition to ‘I’, the respondent underlines the difference 
between her own, and her husband’s actions.   Thus, the respondent portrays her 
husband’s, unlike her own behaviour, as blameworthy, thereby diverting blame away 
form herself to her husband.   
I would like to note that respondents who identify others as obstacles do not 
necessarily blame them for it. For instance, I have shown how in extract 5 the 
respondent constructs her husband’s refusal and prevention of her taking medicine as 
understandable. She does this by attending to common sense understandings that not 
using traditional medicine is a membership category attribute of medical 
practitioners (line 408). In so doing , she constructs her husband’s refusal as 
reasonable, justifiable and thus not blameworthy. 
It appears then, that by constructing their inaction as being due to reasons 
external to themselves, respondents can play down their culpability in various ways: 
by forestalling the inference that they are not motivated to seek for solutions, playing 
down their responsibility for their inaction, and diverting blame away from 





6.3 Inaction as deliberate, reasonable decision  
However, respondents do not always construct their inaction as due to external 
obstacles; as the extracts below show, respondents can also attend to their inaction as 
deliberately chosen. Note that extract 7, has largely been displayed before as extract 
4.  
Extract 6:7 Int. 14 inf.w 
106. I Okay. How would you 
107.       describe your 
108.       relationship with your 
109.      husband? 
  
110.T  
111.   
112. 
How would you describe your 
relationship with your 
husband? 
Mungalongosole bwanji 







118   T   She's saying that 
119.       they have tried their 
120.       best to solve the 
121.       problem, but just 
122.       because nothing 
123.       has been happening so, 
124.       they just decided just 
125.       to settle down.  
126. I Mmm. Okay, aha. 
127.        And if you say that 
128.        you just decided to 
129.        settle down in which 
130.        way? 
Uh, since we, uh since we have  
been trying long enough we  
then decided to give up because  
(                          ) we were tired 
of trying. 
Ndiye nanga si nanga si iwo  
nde zimayesesa. Kenaka aa basi  
(   ) malingana ndi kutopa            
ati aa (basi tingokhala  







Now that you have said that 
after having tried for so long, 
you decided to give up. What do 
you mean by ‘we decided to 
give up’? Hhuhu. 
Pamene mwanena zoti basi 
tinangoganiza kuti 
mutayendayenda, kuyesayesa 
basi munangoganiza kuti 
tingokhala, mukutanthauza 










hhuhu, since eh, since uh, it 
means, it means that after I had 
failed, we had failed, taking 
medicine but did not help, 
taking medicine but did not 
help, then we decided to stop 
and do nothing. 
Hhuhu, Nanga si kuti, ah, 
ndikutanthauza kuti nanga 
sikuti malinga ndikupanga 
ndikulephera ndine (   ) 
kunalephera ifezo … ndiye eya 
kudya mankhwala osathaniza, 
eya kudya mankhwala 
osathandiza  (   ) ndiye basi 
kumangokhala. 
146. T    She is saying that aa 
147.       taking medicine for 
148.       quite a long time, but 





150.      not solved they just 
151.      decided to give up. 
152. I     Okay, mmhm so do 
153. you mean that you 
154. are not really seeking 
155. for solutions anymore 






So now you mean that you are 
not going to continue the 
struggle and that you are going 
to stop? 
Panopa ndiye kuti 
mukutanthauza kuti basinso 






Hhuhu  it is still possible, it is 
wanted, it is still wanted that 
maybe you could then have it a 
child yes.  
Hhuhu zimapangabe zimafu 
nika, zimafunikabe kuti mwina 
ukakhale naye mwana ee. 
165. T  She saying that 
166.     there is a possibility that 
167.     they want to have the 
168.     kid, but because things 
169.     are not working they 
170.     just leaving it like that. 
 
Extract 6:8 Int.27 inf.w (( The respondent mentioned before that she had several miscarriages, the 
last one of which was an ectopic pregnancy.)) 
184. I Hm. Okay (3) Ehm, and when you spoke to the doctors at the hospital did they tell you 
185.    anything or explain you anything or? Advise you anything? 
186. R.  Yes. They just called us together with my husband and they were saying that if we want 
187.    another child it’s it’s possible. But the way I was, we just decided that maybe, I can just 
188.    stay.  
189. I uhu 
190. R Because we are thinking (back/that), maybe it will happen again. 
191. I Okay, yah 
192. R  Because when I was there in hospital, 
193. I hm 
194. R  I think the same day one had a very like problem with me, and he died there at the 
195.    theatre. 
196. I uhu 
197. T  Maybe the: the fallopian tube bursted before the operation.  
198. I uhu 
199. T because once it burst 
200. I okay 
201. T there is no help. 
202. I  You said you s- there was someone with a similar problem like you. 
203. R  Yes, yes. 
204. I  Okay. So was it then that you actually decided with your husband that you would stop 
205.    trying to have more children? 
206. R  Yes. Because we were just thought that no, at least one which is enough, 
207. I Hm 
208. R  rather than maybe one can just to die.  
209. I  Yeah, yeah. Yah, I can imagine that you made that decision at that point. Uhu. Did you 
210.    find it difficult to decide that like no, we’ll give up trying to have more children? 
211. R  No.  
212. I Hm 
213. T After all the pains, it won’t be difficult. 
214. I  Hm, yeah Yeah. Because I guess you both thought that your life was really more 
215.    [important. 





In extract 7 the respondent indicates that she is not taking action when she states ‘we 
then decided to give up’ (lines 114-115) and ‘then we decided to stop and do 
nothing’ (lines 142-143). In extract 8, it can be inferred that the respondent is not 
taking action anymore in order to have another baby when she explains that ‘we just 
decided that maybe, I can just stay’ (line 187-188).  
As in all other extracts seen so far, the respondents account for their inaction. 
However, the accounts differ from the ones discussed before. This first of all because 
the respondents portray their inaction as deliberately choosen for. They explicitly 
refer to their decision: ‘we then decided to give up’ (extract 7, line 115), ‘then we 
decided to stop and do nothing’ (extract 7, line 142-143) and ‘we just decided that 
maybe, I can just stay’ (extract 8, line 187-188).  
Making one’s inaction into something chosen for appears to be at odds with 
respondent’s orientation to inaction as a problematic breach from expectations that 
one takes action. However, the respondents construct their decisions not to take 
action anymore as understandable, and thereby arguably as justifiable. The 
respondent in extract 7 does this by making relevant the ineffectiveness of the actions 
she took: ‘taking medicine but did not help’ (lines 139-142). The interpreter attends 
to the ineffectiveness of the respondent’s actions as reason for her decision to stop 
taking action when she states: ‘just because nothing has been happening, so, they just 
decided just to settle down’ (line 121-125) and ‘but because things are not working 
they just leaving it like that’ (lines 162-164). The extreme case formulation ‘nothing’ 
(line 122) emphasizes the medication’s ineffectiveness, making it into a stronger 
argument for the respondent’s discontinuation of taking the medicines.  
Note that the respondent’s claim regarding the ineffectiveness is sustained by 
her aforementioned references to previous, enduring attempts to seek a solution. 
These references make her claim regarding the medicine’s ineffectiveness based on 
long term empirical observations, rather than on a priori belief. As a result, the 
respondent makes her decision to discontinue more warranted.  
  In extract 8, the respondent makes her decision reasonable by making 
relevant the health risks involved. Before the extract, the respondent has made clear 




pregnancy. The respondent makes relevant its serious, potentially lethal health risks 
when she describes how someone who ‘had a very like problem with me’ , ‘died 
there at the theatre’ (lines 194-195) and states that ‘we were just thought that no, at 
least one is enough, rather than maybe one can just to die’ (lines 206-208). 
Moreover, the respondent here makes explicit that her and her husband’s decision to 
not pursue a pregnancy is dependent on their awareness of these risks. Both 
respondent and interpreter stress the reality of the health risks involved. By pointing 
out that the other patient died ‘there at the theatre’ (line 194), the respondent makes 
clear that even when immediate medical interventions are available, an ectopic 
pregnancy can result in death. Similarly, the interpreter stresses the viability of the 
risks of ectopic pregnancy, when she points out that ‘once it burst’ there is no help 
(line 201). In addition, the interpreter proposes a mechanism for how ectopic 
pregnancy may lead to death: ‘maybe: the fallopian tube bursted before the 
operation’ (line 197). Thereby she brings out the potential of ectopic pregnancies to 
be a deadly, and thus serious, health threat. 
By making relevant serious potential health risks as warrant for the 
respondent’s and her husband’s decision to ‘just stay’, this decision is made 
understandable, reasonable and thus justified. Both the interviewer and interpreter 
attend to the account provided as acceptable. The interviewer does this in line 209 
when she states ‘I can imagine  that you made that decision at that point’.  In lines 
209 to 210, the interviewer asks whether the respondent found it difficult to decide to 
give up trying to have children. After the respondent provides a minimal, negative 
response of ‘no’ (line 211), the interpreter provides an additional account: ‘after all 
the pains, it won’t be difficult’ (line 213). By thus constructing the decision as 
something which ‘won’t be difficult’, the interpreter attends to it as logical, 
understandable and thus acceptable.  
    Thus, the respondents of extract 7 and 8 construct their discontinuation of 
action as their own, deliberate but reasonable decision, and thereby appear to 
mitigate their culpability for not adhering to the normative course of action. 
Nevertheless, it appears that this construction of in-action can evoke certain 
problematic interactional issues. When respondents identify external obstacles as 




seek for solutions, once the obstacles are removed. However, the construction that 
one has wilfully chosen not to take action (anymore), makes available the inference 
that one has permanently stopped trying to solve one’s fertility problem. In extract 7, 
the interpreter shows that she infers this when she translates the interviewer’s gist 
(line 141-150) as ‘so now you mean that you are not going to continue the struggle 
and that you are going to stop?’ (lines 151-154). Heritage and Watson (1978) have 
pointed out that gists select and propose the main meaning of a preceding account. 
The interpreter’s gist selects the respondent’s permanent decision to not continue ‘the 
struggle’ as the ‘essence’ of the respondent’s account. This appears to make available 
problematic inferences. Although confirmations are the interactionally preferred 
response to gists, ‘fixing’ the proposed meaning of the previous exchange (Heritage 
& Watson, 1978), the respondent does not provide a confirmation in response to the 
gist.  Instead, she avows the possibility of, and desire for, having a child: ‘it is still 
possible, it is wanted, it is still wanted that maybe you could then have it, a child yes’ 
(lines 155-158). Thereby she can be seen to attend to and forestall the inference that 
she and her husband do not want to have a child anymore. Hence, it appears that 
being seen as having permanently given up to take action in order to solve a fertility 
problem, can make available the inference that one does not want to bear children 
anymore.  Considering the respondent’s avowal of her child-wish, this inference is 
treated as undesirable.  
   
6.4 Summary and Discussion 
In this chapter, I have shown how respondents treat not taking action as an 
accountable issue and problematic deviation from the normatively expected and  
preferred course of action. When accounting for their inaction, respondents appear to 
mitigate their culpability, in several ways. First of all, respondents point out that they 
have tried to take action and attribute their inaction to external obstacles which are 
difficult to control, like money or other people. Thereby they suggest that their 
inaction is not due to a lack of motivation. Second, by identifying external obstacles 
as reason for their inaction, respondents can play down their responsibility and 




attribution of inaction to others to divert blame away from themselves to these 
obstructing others. Fourth, some respondents construct their inaction as reasonable 
decision, based on pragmatic reasons, thereby making it justifiable. Nevertheless, 
this construction can lead to problematic inferences that one does not want to bear 
children. I have shown how this inference can be treated as problematic, something 
one would expect considering respondents’ constructions of childbearing as 
normatively required (see chapter 4). 
Several of the analytic points made in this chapter are in keeping with work 
by other scholars. In chapter 4, I discussed Parsons’s (1951) notion of the sick role, 
and how this denotes a set of obligations which ill people ought to adhere to. 
According to Parsons, people ought to consider their illness as undesirable, to be 
motivated to get better and seek competent technical help in order to achieve this. 
Respondents can be seen to attend to these obligations by treating inaction as 
problematic, by showing to have tried to seek competent help and to be motivated to 
solve their fertility problem. Hence, there are commonalities between my analytic 
observations, Parsons’ (1951) work and others who have shown how people with 
various health problems attend to obligations of the ‘sick role’ (Guise, 2005; Parry, 
2004, see chapter 4). As mentioned as well in chapter 4, this suggests that Parsons’ 
(1951) notion of the sick role pertains to a set of common sense rights and 
obligations regarding ill people, widely available for use by people in various 
contexts. 
Second, the observation that respondents construct inaction as due to external 
factors which are relatively difficult to control, and my claim that in so doing, they 
mitigate their responsibility and thus culpability, fits in with work by McHugh 
(1975) and Taylor (1972). McHugh argues that ‘deviance’ is a negotiable judgement 
(see also Jeffery, 1979), which depends on the absence of ‘conditions of failure’, 
which are situations which justify the occurrence of certain abnormal behaviour. 
According to McHugh (1975), one of these justifying conditions is that an alternative 
way of acting is seen as impossible (cf. Jeffery, 1979). Taylor (1972)’s study of 
motives for sexual offences that ‘external’ explanations lends empirical support to 
this claim. He found that accounts  according to which the offender had no control 




by magistrates to be more likely and acceptable. In my study, respondents can be 
seen to play down their culpability by drawing upon a ‘condition of failure’. By 
identifying external obstacles as reason for their inaction, respondents make clear 
that an alternative way of acting, that is taking action, was highly problematic, if not 
impossible for them.  
 As mentioned in this chapter’s introduction, some authors (Sundby et al. , 
1998; Unisa, 1999) report reasons mentioned by research participants for not seeking 
help for their fertility problem, such as ‘no money’ (Sundby et al., 1998; Unisa, 
1999) and ‘husband's unwillingness to seek help' (Sundby et al., 1998). These 
reasons are strikingly similar to the ones provided by the respondents in the data 
discussed in this chapter. By examining how respondents use these explanations, I 
have shown how they can be seen as accounts which deal with certain interpersonal, 
normative and moral issues. Respondents appear to take into account others’ 
normative judgements of their inaction by treating it as dispreffered, and accounting 
for it, and in so doing they deal with issues of blame, that is, they mitigate their 
culpability for not taking action.  This suggests that treating reasons for taking action 
or not taking action as individual cognitions, which are variables in individuals’ cost-
benefit analyses and determinants of people’s behaviour is problematic. Researchers, 
policymakers and practitioners alike should bear in mind that when they ask people 
why they take or do not take certain actions or lack of actions, the reasons provided 
will be tailored, at least to some extent, to a specific social and interactional context 
and the issues it raises.  
 Hence, the analysis presented in this chapter has theoretical and 
methodological implications, which I will discuss in more detail in chapter 10. 
Furthermore, insights obtained into people’s accounts and constructions of their 
(in)action, and the issues they thereby attend to may be transferable to their actions 
outside the interview context. For instance, orientations to inaction as problematic 
breach of expectations may inform people’s relentless search for solutions, which is 
frequently reported in the literature. Hence, the analysis presented in this chapter 
may have practical implications. However, the transferability of findings and the 
possibility to use them as a basis for practical interventions is a complicated issue, 




Up to this point, the chapters of this thesis show that infertility and its 
management is permeated with interpersonal, normative and moral issues. 
Considering that these are fundamentally ‘relational’ issues, exploring constructions 
of relationships between people with a fertility problem and others appears relevant. I 




Chapter 7. ‘Not blaming’ in constructions of 
(troubled) relationships  
Most studies of infertility in developing countries stress the many social 
consequences of infertility and how it affects relationships at a conjugal, family and 
community level. Hence Neff’s (1994, p. 477) characterisation of infertility as a 
'disease of social relations'. However, a closer look at findings reported in qualitative 
studies of infertility in developing countries reveals a certain ambiguity. Some 
authors find that, at least at times, respondents report that marital, family or 
community relationships are not affected (Dyer et al., 2004; Meera Guntupalli, 2002; 
Unisa, 1999), or that marital relationships even improve (Dyer et al., 2002; Gerrits et 
al, 1999; Inhorn, 2003; Pashigian, 2000). In addition, as pointed out in the literature 
review, authors tend to report women’s worries about abandonment by their 
husbands (Gerrits, 1997; Papreen et al, 2000; Sundby, Mboge & Sonko, 1998; 
Sundby, 1997; Dyer et al., 2002), but research participants’ reports of actual divorce 
and abandonment are more rare, and are at least in some instances based on what 
community members say, rather than on accounts from people with a fertility 
problem themselves (Papreen et al, 2000).  
The ambiguity and variability in people’s descriptions of relationships 
between people with fertility problems and others calls for further, detailed 
investigation. Hence, in this chapter, I will examine responses to questions about 
changes in relationships.  In the preliminary analysis, I was struck by two 
observations. First, various respondents portrayed their relationships, with their 
spouse or others, as good. This was surprising considering the emphasis in the 
literature on the abandonment, stigmatisation, and exclusion of people with a fertility 
problem. Second, when respondents did describe relationship troubles, these came 
across as very neutral. This even though the content of the accounts, such as reports 
of husbands’ extramarital affairs or parents telling a respondent to ‘go away’, seemed 
to make complaints and blamings expected and justified activities. 
Hence, I decided to look in more detail at accounts of relationships and in 
particular relationship troubles. In this chapter, I will discuss how respondents 
construct relationships as good, play down the significance of relationship troubles, 




Close attention to respondents’ descriptions and the questions they are asked, brings 
out certain interpersonal, moral issues which respondents are dealing with when 
describing their relationships. In the discussion, I will address discrepancies between 
my findings and the literature, and discuss how my findings bring out the need to 
examine what people say about their relationships in detail.  
  
7. 1 Constructing relationships as good 
I will start with an examination of how men and women with a fertility problem 
construct their own marital relationships, in response to the question whether 
anything has changed in their relationship with their spouse.  
 
Extract 7:1 Int. 47 infw/m 
642. I I was wondering since you were thinking about this issue like oh we really 
643.   would like to have children, em, did anything change in any way in the 
644.   relationship between you two? 
645. Rm A:h no, it’s the usual situation, 
646. I Uhu 
647. Rm Yah. the usual. No any change, no any transformation of any kind.  
648. I Okay 
649. R Yes. No any shaken.  
650. I Uhu 
651. Rm We are just discussing friendly, politely, that doesn’t do this doesn’t do this 
652.   now, let us go (          ) 
653. I yah 
654. Rm Uhuhu. 
655. I Okay 
 
Extract 7:2 Int.24 inf.m 
173. I Hmhm, okay, when  
174.       you were noticing that 
175.       no children no more 
176.       children came, did that 
177.       change anything in the 
178.       relationship between 










She says, when you noticed 
 that between ’79 and ’87 
 there are no more children 
 coming, was there a change  
 in the relationship between  
 you and your wife or not? 
Akuti, pawayiweni kuti kutandila  
ndawi jele ’79 mpaka ’87,  
pachilikati papamwangali soni  
mwanache mnyumbamo ana  
ndawi jelejo pali chine chili  
chose chakuti kapena  
chinonyelano pajati pakwele ni  







191.T     Ah he says there's 
192.       no change up to 
193.       this time.  
194.I Okay.  
195.T Yah, loving and 
196.        another. 
197.I Okay. 
198.T     Since they  know that 
199.       time has come. 
200.I      Hmhm. Okay 
201.T    So there's no need to 
202.       disturb about their 
203.       love. 
No, our love for one another is 
still the same up to this 
moment 
iayi, chinonyelano chachiwela  
mpaka pakali pano. 
 
 
Extract 7:3 Int.39 inf.m 
285. I Ehm I was wondering since you noticed if you have this problem with, of 
286.    having children with her, has anything changed in the relationship between 
287.    you and your wife? 
288. R Ah, as of now, not yet.  
289. I And ‘not yet’, do you think that it might in the future? 
290. R Ah not yet, I don’t know, maybe in the near future.  
291. I uhu 
292. R But as a woman, ah there’s no change. There is cooperation,  
293. I uhu 
294. R Yah, that’s why we are travelling (   ) together let us  search for this way, 
295.    and that way 
296. I yah 
297. R then okay. So that’s why we are [end of tape, part missing] I say for example, maybe 
298.    she can say ah, then maybe we are not in e:h  didn’t make child (   ) maybe 
299.    let me try somewhere else. Maybe. The change can be there. 
300. I Uhu 
301. R Yah 
302. I Yah 
303. R Just, I’m just eh (.) supposing, rather than [(.) (   ) 
304. I                                                                     [ya:h 
305. R hhuhu. 
306. I Ya:h, yah of course.  
307. R Hhuhu 
 
There are three features of the responses in extracts 1 to 3 which I want to point out. 
First, respondents deny that anything changed in their relationship. They do this by 
means of direct denials, ‘a:h no’ (extract 1, line 645) and ‘no’ (extract 2, line 188), 
‘not yet’ (extract 3, line 288), and a description of their relationship which indicates 
that no change took place: ‘it’s the usual situation’, ‘the usual’, and ‘no any change 
(…) no any transformation of any kind’ (extract 1, line 645-647), ‘our love for one 
another is still the same up to this moment’ (extract 2, line 188-190) and ‘there’s no 




Second, in extract 3, the respondent attends to, but rejects, the possibility that 
his relationship changes. The respondent starts his response to the question whether 
anything has changed in the relationship between him and his wife with ‘as of now, 
not yet’ (line 288). Thereby he implies that a change may take place in the future, an 
inference picked up by the interviewer (line 289), and confirmed by the respondent 
(line 290). In line 299 the respondent states explicitly: ‘Maybe. The change can be 
there’ in that his wife says ‘maybe let me try somewhere else’ (line 298-299), and 
thus decides to try to make a child with someone else. However, the respondent 
makes clear that his wife’s decision to try somewhere else is merely a hypothetical 
possibility, rather than a reality, in part by aforementioned denials of change and by 
saying ‘I’m just eh (.) supposing, rather than (.)’ (line 303).   
   By attending to the possibility that his wife ‘tries’ with someone else, the 
respondent appears to take into account the assumption that his relationship may 
change. Such an assumption can reasonably be expected to be ‘live’ to the 
conversation, first of all due to the interviewer’s question. By asking about changes 
in the respondent’s marital relationship, the interviewer suggests that she considers it 
at least possible that the respondent’s relationship changed. In addition, assumptions 
that relationships change, for instance due to polygamy or extramarital affairs, can be 
expected to be relevant considering respondents’ orientation to forms or marriage 
breakdown as culturally required response to fertility problems (see chapter 4). For, 
this suggests that the idea that infertility normally leads to marriage breakdown is a 
culturally shared notion, which the respondent may be attending to. The apparent 
relevance of assumptions that certain marriage ‘issues’ can occur, makes attending to 
the possibility of relationship change, but rejecting its reality, a particularly effective 
way of persuasively constructing one’s relationship as, so far, unchanged. 
A third feature which the responses have in common is that the respondents 
characterise their relationships as good. They do this to begin with by referring to 
positive aspects of their relationship. In extract 1, the respondent mentions ‘our love 
for one another’ (line 191), in extract 2 ‘we are discussing friendly, politely’ (line 
651-652), and in extract 3 the respondent points out that ‘there is cooperation’ (line 
292). The respondent warrants this claim by providing supportive evidence: ‘we are 




addition, the respondents, and in extract 2 the interpreter, deny the presence of any 
negative aspects to their relationship. In extract 1, the respondent states ‘no any 
shaken’ (line 649), which can be taken to mean that the relationship is not disturbed.  
In extract 2, the interpreter states ‘there’s no need to disturb about their love’ (line 
201-203). This statement is somewhat ambiguous, but seems to imply either that the 
respondent’s and his wife’s love has not been ‘disturbed’, or that one does not need 
to ‘be disturbed’, in the sense of worrying about it. In either case, the interpreter 
denies that the respondent is experiencing relationship troubles. These denials of 
negative aspects to their relationships make the respondents’ construction of their 
spousal relationships as good more convincing. 
 Note that also in extracts 1 and 2, the same assumption regarding the 
possibility that negative changes in spousal relationships occur appears relevant, for 
the same reasons as mentioned before. This may explain the respondents’ persuasive 
design of their claims that their relationships are good.   
  Respondents also construct relationships with other people than their spouses 
as unaffected. In extracts 4 and 5, respondents with fertility problems respond to 
questions about whether anything changed in their relationships with others. In 
extracts 6 and 7, ‘significant others’ of someone with a fertility problem were also 
asked about changes in their relationships with them. 
 
Extract 7:4 Int. 44 inf.w 
341. I  Okay. A:nd what about relationships with other people, maybe other family 
342.    members, or friends, neighbours, did anything change in your relations 
343.    with them? 
344. R  hh. No anything but, when we chatting, no anything changed. We are 
345.    just staying (.)chatting.  
346. I  uhu 
347. R Yah 
 
Extract 7: 5 Int.14 inf.w38 
151. I Mmm ok ah has 
152.       anything changed in  
153.       your relationships with 
154.       other people since you 
155.       have started problems 
156.       of not having a child  
157.       for example friends,   
158.      (         ) your parents?  
159. T Is there any change in the 
                                                 








164. T She’s saying nothing 
165.       goes wrong. 
166. I Mmm okay, ehm did 
167.       anybody start to treat 
168.       you or your husband 
169.      any differently? 
relationship with the people 
around you as regards the 
problem? 

















180. T   She is saying that 
181.      there is no problem 
182.      with outsiders 
Is there a problem because of 
this problem. are there 
problems between you and 
other people and between your 
husband and other people 
because of this problem? 
A::h but, we  are living in 
harmony, really, yes. 
With your neighbours? 
Hm 
 
Extract 7:6 Int. 35 s.o  
1308. I Yah, okay. And did your relationship change in anyway with your 
1309.    brother since he failed to have children? 
1310. R In my case no. 
1311. I No. 
1312. R (Nay) (because/ it was) not something of his own making.  
1313. I Uhu 
1314. R It’s not something which he asked for, [no. 
1315. I          [Okay 
1316. R  So: there’s nothing: that should affect our relationship between him and me.  
 
Extract 7:7 Int. 13 s.o 
670. I Hmhm, yeah that’s 
671.       fine. Ehm, has 
672.       anything changed in  
673.       the relationship 
674. between you and your 
675. daughter since she has 
676. noticed that she fails to 







Has your relationship with your 
daughter changed since you 
realized that your daughter 
cannot have a child? 
No it hasn’t changed 
Chibale chanu  chinasintha 
chinayambapo chasintha pa 
nkhani imeneyi yokuti iye alibe 
mwana? 
Ayi  sichinansinthepo. 
683. T   She’s saying no. 
684. R 
685. 
686. T   She’s saying that the 
687.      house where she’s 
688.      staying is for her 
689.      daughter. 
 
Even this house in which I stay 
belongs to her. 
 
 






The responses in extracts 4 to 8 exhibit features which are similar to those seen 
before in replies to questions about changes in marital relationships. First of all, 
respondents make clear that no changes took place. They do this by means of direct 
denials: ‘no anything (…) no anything changed’ (extract 4, line 344-345), ‘a::h 
nothing’ (extract 5, line 163). Also the respondents in extracts 6 and 7 explicitly deny 
that their relationship with their brother (extract 6) and daughter (extract 7) changed: 
‘in my case, no’ (extract 6, line 1310), ‘there’s nothing that should affect our 
relationship between him and me’ (extract 6, line 1316) and ‘no it hasn’t changed’ 
(extract 7, line 682). In addition, the respondent in extract 4 states ‘we are just 
staying’ (line 344-345), ‘Staying’ suggests that her relationships continue as they 
were, and thus did not change. ‘Just’ (line 344) appears to support the notion that 
nothing out of the ordinary is going on, by fulfilling a depreciatory function (Lee, 
1984) of playing down the importance of ‘staying’. 
Second, the respondents construe their relationship with others as good. They 
do this by making relevant positive aspects of their relationships. The respondent of 
extract 4 indicates that she and others are ‘chatting’ (line 344-345). As ‘chatting’ is a 
recognizably friendly, and moreover, ordinary activity between family, friends or 
neighbours, the respondent thereby makes relevant the good, ordinary and 
unproblematic nature of her relationships. In extract 5, the respondent does this by 
saying ‘we are living in harmony’ (line 176-177). The respondent in extract 7 makes 
relevant the good quality of her relationship with her daughter when she says ‘even 
this house in which I stay belongs to her’ (line 684-685). By making clear to be 
sharing property with her daughter, the respondent occasions the inference that there 
are no, or at least no significant, complications in their relationship. In extract 7, by 
saying that there is nothing which should affect our relationship (line 1316), the 
respondent makes clear that no negative changes have taken place and thus that his 
relationship is good.  
  The respondents in these four extracts make their claims that their 
relationships did not change, and that their relationships are good, convincing. In 
extracts 4, 5 and 6, the respondents use extreme case formulations (ECFs) in their 




‘nothing’ (extract 5, line 163; extract 6, line 1316). The ECFs make the claims that 
no changes occurred rhetorically strong, by ensuring that the strongest case of the 
argument is provided (Pomerantz, 1986). The respondent in extract 5 emphasizes the 
good quality of her relationships by means of the additional ‘really’ and ‘yes’ at the 
end of the sentence ‘we are living in harmony, really, yes’ (line 177). By means of 
‘really’, the respondent attends to and rejects the idea that her claim is not ‘really’ 
true. Furthermore, the respondent in extract 6 makes his claim that nothing changed 
in the relationship with his brother by providing an account for his claim: ‘(it was) 
not something of his own making’ and ‘it’s not something which he asked for, no’ 
(line 1312-1314). Hence, the respondent constructs his brother as not to blame for his 
fertility problem, and thereby warrants his claim that nothing has affected, or should 
affect, their relationship. In addition, the respondent makes clear not only that 
nothing has changed, but also that this is what ought to be the case when he says 
‘there’s nothing that should affect’ (line 1316). This is another way in which the 
respondent makes his claim more convincing.  
As seen before, the persuasive design of respondents’ claims, in particular the 
use of extreme case formulations, appears to be related to and deal with assumptions 
built into the interviewer’s questions,  namely that some changes may have taken 
place. Pomerantz (1986) has pointed out how extreme case formulations can pre-
empt a sceptical response to one’s claims. The potential of a sceptical response 
seems pertinent especially the case in extract 5, as by means of her probe (lines 166-
169), the interviewer pursues the issue of whether the respondent’s relationships 
have changed after she has denied (line 162) that any changes took place. As said, 
the respondent’s ‘really’ (line 177), as well as her addition of ‘yes’ to her claim that 
she is living in harmony, appear designed to inoculate her claim from doubts. In 
extract 8, the respondent can be seen to take into account assumptions that in 
principle relationships with people who have fertility problems may change. The 
respondent starts his response with ‘in my case, no’ (line 1310). By restricting the 
lack of change to his ‘own’ case or relationship, the respondent makes relevant that 
in other cases, relationships with people who have fertility problems may change. As 




this is happening in his own case, the respondent makes his denial that any change 
took place in his relationship with his brother persuasive.  
So far then, I have shown how respondents persuasively deny that their 
marital, family and community relationships changed and construct these 
relationships as good. In so doing, they appear to attend to and inoculate 
assumptions, in part built into the interviewer’s question that their relationships 
changed for the worse. These observations are unexpected and surprising. This is so 
first of all considering the literature, which emphasizes that infertility affects 
people’s relationships, and characterises infertility as ‘a disease of social relations’. 
Second, one would expect respondents to refer to changes in their marital 
relationships considering that, as discussed in chapter 4, respondents attend to forms 
of marriage breakdown as culturally required solution for fertility problems. 
7.2 Attending to relationship troubles 
At times, respondents do address changes and problems in relationships with their 
spouses, family or community members. In this section, I will focus on how 
respondents describe such changes and troubles, to begin with in marital 
relationships. 
   
7.2.1 Playing down the significance of extramarital affairs  
Extracts 8 to 10 are examples of extracts in which respondents indicate that certain 
changes in their marital relationships took place, such as extramarital affairs. 
Consider extracts 8 to 10. 
 
Extract 7:8 Int. 28 inf.w 
173. I ehm did anything change in the relationship between you and your husband?. 
174. R Ah not much. But eh I remember, some time back,  he was going at- here and 
175.   there. Hhu (maybe)hhu looking-hhu hh hha >I believe< seahhurching for 
176.   other women: 
177. I hmhm 
178. R (in order) to try maybe to try,  maybe he can have (a child) but eh ah I don’t- 
179.   that is, for me: 
180. I Uhu 
181. R I don’t believe much, because I love him and he loves me= 
182. I =Uhu 
183. R He [loves me, 
184. I       [Okay: 
185. R So that is, it’s not eh (1) ahm (2) 




191.    R hhuhuhu ·hh eeh (he) don’t like that. 
192. I Okay. Because it’s growing, what is growing? 
193. R I mean it’s getting ah, (2) he’s becoming now a real man (leaving) childish life, to 
194.   growing up of mind, ah. 
195. I So::: do you mean that  
196. R I I mean that if e a man hhuhu is eh it’s a youth , he likes going away with 
197.   other women. 
((some lines omitted))  
204. I     Okay He’s less childish he he, did he stop [doing that now? 
205. R                        [eeh he stopped doing. 
206. I  Okay= 
207. R  =Going with other women. 
208. I  Okay.  
 
Extract 7:9  Int.12 inf.w ((the respondent told the interviewer before that her current husband 
started doing ‘the same’ as a previous husband, who got a girlfriend and divorced her because they did 
not have any children.)) 
122. I Okay. Yah. 
123.      ((cough)) So ehm. Has 
124.      the husband with whom 
125.      you are now, ehm has 
126.      he already (.5) looked, 
127.      has he been looking for  
128.      another woman eh to: 









She is asking whether your 
present husband is also looking 
for another woman to have 
children with? 
 
No he did that during the past 
years. 
Ati mwamuna amene muli naye 
panopa amuna anuwa 
akupanganso kapena 
kukayangana mkazi, wina kuti 
akhale ndi ana panopa?  
ayi anangopana zaka 
zambuyomuzo 
137. T  Okay. Saying no, she 
138.     did that later years but 
139.     now she [he]’s not doing 
140.     that. 








It was a mere relationship but 
he made her pregnant and there 
is a baby-boy who is now like 
this ((indicates height with 
hand)), but now he no longer 
goes there. 
Chinangokhala chibwenzi eya 
ndiye anaperekako mimba 
kubadwa mwana wamamuna 
kumene kuja mwana wathu ali 





148.  T   Okay she said he had a 
149. girlfriend then she [he] 
150. got her pregnant and 
151. then she has a small 
152. boy, right now. The 
153. second husband. 
154.  I O:kay,  
155. T Yah. 
156. I The s- the the current 
157.       husband. 
158. T hmhm:  
159. I Okay. 
160. T yes. 
161. I Uhu. 
162. T But now (.) 


































Extract 7:10 Int.12 inf.m 
605. I Okay. Can you tell me 
606.       a bit about how you 
607.       felt about that when 
608.       you found out that he 
609.       was seeing someone 






How did you feel when you  
heard that your husband has  
found a girlfriend somewhere  
else? 
Inuyo munamva bwanji  
mutamva zoti amuna anu apeza  


















632.   
In my heart eee I felt (.)  I asked  
him because I saw that my heart 
pains me a lot that he wants to 
go away when he is the one who  
supports me, not so? Then I  
asked him what was the idea  
behind all this, what are you  
thinking of,  then he told me his  
problem that a a a the problem  
that I have is not any other  
problem but the problem that is  
troubling me is that of not   
having children eee so maybe if  
I go here and there I might get  
a  child.  So this discussion  
went to the elders who came  
and discussed  with us and gave  
a final solution.   
Mumtima mwanga eee  
ndinamva  (.)ndinawafunsa  
iwowo ndinaona mtima  
unandipweteka kwambiri  
kuti afuna ati achoke pomwe 
amandithandiza eti ndiye  
ndinafunsa maganizo awo kuti  
mukuganiza bwanji, ndiye  
anazanena mavuto awo kuti a a 
a ine vuto limene likundivuta 
ine palibe vuto liri lonse koma 
vuto limene likundivuta ine 
ndikulephera mphatso eee ndiye   
mwina ndikapita kwina kwina  
mphatso ndikayipeza ndiye  
mpaka nkhanizi zinapita kwa  
anthu. oweruza ndikubwera  
ndikuweruza. 
633. T She is saying that she 
634.       felt painful and asked 
635.       the man and the man 
636.       said that the problem is 
637.       that I don’t have kids    
638. with you so I want 






In extracts 8 and 9, the respondents indicate that their husbands were having 
extramarital affairs. The respondent in extract 8, asked whether anything has changed 
in the relationship with her husband, provides a qualified negative response: ‘ah not 
much’ (line 174). Thereby she can be seen to imply that some minor changes did 
take place. The respondent makes clear that these changes concern her husband 
going ‘here and there’, ‘seahhurching for other women:’ (line 175-176). In extract 9, 
the interpreter asks the respondent ‘whether your present husband is also looking for 
another woman?’ (line 132). The respondent replies ‘no he did that during the past 
years’ (line 135-136), thereby making clear that her husband used to look for other 
women. In extract 10, the same respondent as in extract 9 elaborates on her 
description of her husband’s affair, in response to the interviewer’s question about 
how she felt when she found out that her husband was seeing someone else. 
  Respondents’ descriptions of their partners’ affairs have several features in 
common, which as I will show, serve the function of playing down the significance 
of the relationships.  First, in extracts 8 and 9, the respondents locate their husbands’ 
extramarital relationship in the past. They do this by referring to ‘some time back’ 
(extract 8, line 161) and ‘during past years’ (extract  9, lines 135- 136), using past 
tenses, for instance in ‘he did that’ (extract 9, line 136), ‘it was a mere relationship’ 
(extract 9, line 142), ‘he was going’ (extract 8, line 174), and, in extract 8, by means 
of the respondent’s remark ‘I remember’ (line 174). Furthermore, both respondents 
make clear that their husbands’ affairs are over. The respondent in extract 9 states 
that ‘now he no longer goes there’ (line 146). In extract 8, the respondent points out 
that her husband is ‘becoming now a real man (leaving) childish life, to growing up 
of mind, ah.’ (lines 193-194). As ‘childish life’ can reasonably be assumed to refer to 
her husband’s search for women, the respondent implies that her husband ended his 
affairs. This understanding is displayed by the interviewer’s probe:  ‘did he stop 
doing that now’? (line 204), and confirmed by the respondent: ‘eeh he stopped 
going’ (line 205). By making clear that the affairs belong to the past, respondents 
make them less important for their relationships now. 
 Second, respondents construct their husbands’ affairs as impersonal. In 




(extract 8, line 174; extract 10, line 628). Thereby they suggest that their spouses 
were not having an affair with anyone in particular. In extract 8, the respondent also 
suggests that her husband was not going for a specific person by referring to her 
husband’s ‘searching’ (line 161), and describing the object of the search as ‘other 
women’ (line 161), in the plural. Furthermore, the respondents construct their 
spouses’ affairs as impersonal by making relevant an instrumental motivation as 
informing their husbands’ affairs: wanting to have a baby. This is done most clearly 
in extract 10. The respondent points out that, asked ‘what was the idea behind all 
this’ (line 620-621), her husband answered: ‘the problem that I have is not any other 
problem but the problem that is troubling me is that of not having children’ (line 623-
627).  The respondent makes relevant not having children as motivation for her 
husband’s extramarital affair also when she reports that her husband said ‘so maybe 
if I go here and there I might get a child.’(line 627-629). Likewise, the interpreter 
does this by reporting that the husband said ‘the problem is that I don’t have kids 
with you so I want to have the kid’. (line 636-639). In extract 8, the respondent 
appears to allude to their husbands’ motivation as wanting to have a baby when she 
states that her husband was searching for other women ‘(in order) to try maybe to try,  
maybe he can have (a child)‘ (line 178). Although ‘child’ is not clearly audible, it is a 
reasonable ending considering the first part of the sentence. By constructing their 
husbands’ affairs as based on instrumental motivations, respondents suggest that they 
do not necessarily reflect the quality of their current relationship. 
  A third way in which respondents play down the significance of their 
husband’s affairs’ can be observed in extract 8. The respondent provides an account 
for her husband’s affair: ‘if e a man hhuhu is eh it’s a youth, [then] he likes going 
away with other women’ (line 193). The implicit if-then construction makes going 
away with other women into law-like, and thus common and predictable behaviour 
for youthful men (Edwards, 1995). This is thus a script formulation (Edwards, 1994, 
1995), which constructs events or actions as common, routine and predictable. The 
respondent uses other scripting devices as well, such as what Edwards (1995, p. 27) 
calls ‘citing a disposition’ (Buttny, 1993), in ‘he likes going away’ (line 196). By 
making clear that young men like going away, she portrays them as generally 




‘a youth’ in a generic sense, which implies that the described behaviour applies to 
young men in general. By making her husband’s affairs instances of a common 
pattern of behaviour amongst young people, the respondent constructs them as 
normal and thus plays down their significance, in that they do not (necessarily) 
reflect the quality of their relationship. 
 A fourth, and last way of minimizing the significance of extramarital affairs I 
want to address can be seen in extract 9. In line 142, the respondent states that ‘it was 
a mere relationship’. She attends thereby to the relationship as being of relatively 
little importance, and thus as innocuous.  
Thus, the respondents describe their partner’s affairs in such a way that they 
play down their seriousness. As a result, respondents forestall the inference that their 
relationship is bad. Indeed, the respondents, and in extract 9 also the interpreter, 
construct their relationship as good. The respondent in extract 8, attends to the good 
quality of her marital relationship when she states ‘I love him and he loves me’ (line 
181). She stresses her husband’s love for her by repeating this ’he loves me’ (line 
183).  In extract 9, the interpreter describes the respondent and her husband as 
‘settled’ (lines 163). In extract 10, the respondent can be seen to attend to the good 
quality of her relationship when he points at the absence of problems: ‘not any other 
problem but’ (line 624-625).   
   
7.2.2 Not complaining about relationship troubles 
Examination of respondents’ descriptions of relationship troubles, regarding their 
marital and other relationships, suggest that there are certain interactional 
sensitivities which come into play which respondents have to deal with. 
 To begin with, returning to extracts 8 to 10, it is noticeable that the 
respondents’ descriptions of their husbands’ affairs do not include an assessment: the 
respondents do not provide their opinion or a judgement about their husbands’ 
extramarital relationships. This is somewhat surprising, as according to common 
sense understandings, husbands having an affair are troublesome, likely to be hurtful 
and thus ‘complainable matters’ (Drew & Holt, 1988). This makes negative 
assessments and complaints expected and reasonable.  In extract 10, the interviewer 




she asks how the respondent ‘felt about that’ (line 607), that is about ‘when you 
found out that he was seeing someone else’ (line 608-610). In so doing, the 
interviewer makes relevant that the respondent has so far not yet displayed her 
opinion or judgement regarding her husband’s affair. However, this explicit request 
does not result in an assessment either. The respondent describes her own feeling:  ‘I 
saw that my heart pains me a lot’ (line 616-617). The interpreter translates the 
interviewer’s question as ‘how did you feel when you heard’ that your husband has 
found a girlfriend’ (lines 611-613), and thus asks for the respondent’s feeling rather 
than an assessment of her husband’s affair. However, it should be noted that, as 
noted by Drew (1998) and Holt (2000), speakers can provide implicit assessments 
also whilst describing their feelings. For instance a statement like ‘I was angry’ 
constitutes a feeling and an assessment. Hence, it apperas that the respondent could 
reasonably have provided an assessment, but does not do so. When the respondent 
provides a reason for her ‘painful’ feeling, she evades an assessment of her 
husband’s affair as well. The respondent explains that ‘I saw it very painful that he 
wants to go away while he is the one who supports me’ (line 616-619). Here, the 
respondent identifies her husband’s leaving her, rather than his affair in itself, as 
painful and thus problematic.  
  In some instances, respondents describe changes in their relationships with 
others, and thereby make relevant other people’s problematic behaviour. Also in 
these descriptions, assessments appear remarkably absent. Consider extracts 11 to 13.  
 
Extract 7: 11 Int. 44 inf.w ((continuation of extract 13, in which respondent stated that ‘no 
anything’ changed in her relationships with others)) 
350. I Were there perhaps people who started to treat you differently when you 
351.    were not having children for a while? 
352. R. (1) Eeh, (       ) say that ‘Why you don’t have any children? What is your 
353.    problem?’ (.5)( Myself) I say that ‘Ah, I don’t know.’ So she: ask me that 
354.    (.) your husband he have a:  another  she has a, he have a he have 
355.    children. No:: he don’t have, I am the first wife!. 
356. I  Uhu 
357. R Yah 
 
Extract 7:12 Int.3 inf.m 
196. I Okay. I see, okay 
197.       Hmhm. Ehm so we’ve 
198.       talked about the 
199.       relationship with your 





201.       was wondering about 
202.       the relationship with 
203.       others you know, 
204.       either people you know 
205.       very well, or family 
206.       members or friends or 
207.       people you know not 
208.       so well, who for 
209.       example live in your 







Now she is saying. She has 
understood how you live in your 
family and how things are. But 
 now she wants to know what 
the people around the village 
say about you. 
Tsopano apa akunena kuti 
adziwa mmene mukukhalira 
mbanja mwanu, ndi pamene 
ziliri. Tsopano akufuna kuti 
inuyo kwa anthu ozungulira 







Ooh. Its like people around us 
in the village, ah, what I meet is 
that some people speak bad 
about our marriage because we 
don't have children. 
Ooh. Kungoti kwa anthu 
ozungulira kumudzi ah, zimene 
ndimakumana nazo ndizonena 
kuti anthu ena amanyoza banja 
lathuli chifukwa chakuti tilibe 
ana 
((some lines omitted in which respondent talks about ‘temptations’ like meeting women who want to 
fall in love with him. )) 
236. T He’s saying that (.5) 
237.       people. Said much 
238.       things on this, and they 
239.       (.) getting be ashamed 
240.       [because of people are 
241. T     [hm 
242. R     talking of this, you 
243.       don’t have children 




Extract 7:13 Int. 44 inf.w ((respondent has just said in response to the question why she wants to 
have children that  ‘this is our culture’ and ‘if you (are/feel) married, you must have the children))  
155. R So my parents, our parents say that ah, she’s barren she’s 
156.    barren, 
157. I Uhu 
158. R Go away, go away. 
159. I  Hm:: 
160. R Hm: 
161. I Go away? 
162. R  Yeah- go away. She’s barren. Marry another woman. 
163. I  Uho 
164. R Yah 
166. I  Okay. How did you feel about that when they were saying that? 
167. R  I was just staying. And pray.  
168. I Uhu 
169. R Yah. (.5) Maybe crying. 
170. I Uhu 
171. R Uh. So my husband said that ah, don’t cry. (2) Hm. 
172. I  Hm 






All three respondents describe behaviours of others which can be expected to be in 
some way troublesome for them.  In extract 11, the respondent is asked whether there 
were perhaps people who started to treat her differently (line 350). She confirms this 
with ‘eeh’, which is Chichewa for ‘yes’ (line 352). She then makes clear that people 
ask her ‘Why you don’t have any children? What is your problem?’ and suggest that 
‘your husband he has a another he have a he have children.’ (lines 353-354). 
Especially this suggestion is conceivably troublesome for the respondent, as by 
proposing that her husband has children, the respondent is put forward as the one 
who has the fertility problem, and is thus to blame for it. In extract 12, the interpreter 
translates the interviewer’s question as ‘now she wants to know what the people 
around the village say about you’ (line 214-216).  In response, the respondent 
indicates that ‘what I meet is that some people speak bad about our marriage because 
we don't have children.’ (line 218-221). Being spoken about in a bad way is 
recognizably problematic for the respondent, and attended to as such by the 
interpreter, when he states that the respondent and his wife are ‘getting be ashamed’ 
because of what people say (line 239). The respondent in extract 16, describes how 
‘our parents’ told her and her husband that ‘she’s barren she’s barren (…)’ (line 156),  
that she should ‘go away, go away’ (line 158, 162) and that her husband should 
‘marry another woman’ (line 162). From what the respondent said before, it can be 
inferred that she is referring to her parents in law. These comments appear hurtful for 
the respondent. As said before (chapter 6), a command like ‘go away’  formulates a 
request to leave in the harshest possible way (Widdicombe & Wooffitt, 1995). Thus, 
the respondent formulates her parents’ in law behaviour in such a way that it can be 
inferred to be harsh and dismissive, and thus problematic or hurtful, especially 
considering that this ‘request’ comes from the respondents’ parents in law.  
 The responses in these extracts 11 to 13 differ from those shown before, in 
which respondents construct their relationships with others as good (extracts 4 to 7). 
One difference between the two sets of extracts is the question asked. In extracts 4 to 
7, the respondents are asked whether there are any changes in the relationship 
between them and others. This is not the case with the questions asked in extract 11, 
‘were there perhaps people who started to treat you differently when you were not 




what the people around the village say about you’ (line 214-216).  These questions 
ask about how other people treat the respondent. The difference in respondents’ 
constructions of their relationships could be related to the differences in this 
question. This is also suggested by the observation that the respondent in extract 4 is 
the same as the respondent in extract 11, who thus at first constructs her relationships 
as unchanged and good, and then points at some change in behaviour of others 
towards her. I will return to this issue of how reports of problems may tie in with the 
question asked in the next section.    
The descriptions of others’ conceivably problematic behaviour come across 
as objective, factual reports. In extracts 11 and 13 this is so because of the use of 
reported speech (Holt, 2000; Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998), more specifically, direct 
reported speech (Holt, 2000). In direct reported speech (‘he said x’), utterances are 
reported from the perspective of the original speaker, while in indirect reported 
speech (‘he said that x’), the utterance is related from the point of view of the current 
speaker (Coulmas, 1986, Holt, 2000). Therefore, it has been argued that whereas 
indirect reported speech is relatively easily infiltrated by the reporter’s comments and 
interpretation (Holt, 2000), direct reported speech comes across as an objective 
portrayal of previous utterances (Holt, 2000; cf. Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998; cf. 
Voloshinov, 1971). In addition, Holt (2000) explains how direct reported speech, by 
suggesting to reproduce the original utterances, reproduces both the original 
speaker’s words and the action which he or she engaged in.  Therefore, by using 
direct reported speech, speakers can give recipients access to the actions performed, 
enabling recipients to judge their moral character for themselves without having to 
indicate this.   
  Regardless of this neutral quality to direct reported speech, Drew (1998) and 
Holt (2000) have pointed out that it is often used in the making of (implicit) 
complaints. Speakers can make complaints whilst using reported speech in several 
ways. First, speakers can implicitly convey their own assessment of the reported 
speech. For instance, Holt (2000) explains how using a particular gloss to introduce a 
description of behaviour, such as ‘I’m broiling about something’ provides for its 
complainable character.  In addition, prosodic features (Drew, 1998; Holt, 2000) can 




instance by adopting a ‘mock innocent tone’ (Drew, 1998, p.323). However, in 
extracts 11 to 13, the respondents make use of none of these devices to implicitly 
assess the reported behaviour. Second, both Drew and Holt (1988) and Pomerantz 
(1978) note that blamings tend to occur after neutral reports of ‘unhappy incidents’ 
(Pomerantz, 1978), which detail the grievance. Thus, a complaint tends to be a 
separate, second part of descriptions. This part is ‘missing’ in extracts 11 to 13. 
Assessments are noticeably absent, because as explained above, the reactions could 
reasonably be characterized as troubling and unpleasant for the respondents. In 
extract 13, the interviewer attends to an assessment as being noticeably lacking, as 
she explicitly asks for one in her probe (line 166): ‘How did you feel about that when 
they were saying that?’.  In response, the respondent first describes her actions, 
namely ‘just staying’ and ‘pray’ (line 167), rather than her feeling about what her 
parents were saying. Thereby she avoids meeting the interviewer’s request for an 
assessment. In line 169, the respondent adds ‘maybe crying’. She thereby makes 
relevant another activity, which implies a negative emotional state, that is it implies 
that the behaviour of her parents’ in law made her feel sad. However, it is not an 
assessment of her parents’ behaviour, that is it does not show the respondent’s 
opinion or judgment of what they said to her. 
   Hence, the extracts presented in which respondents address others’ 
conceivably problematic behaviour are of a strikingly neutral quality, and 
respondents appear to avoid providing assessments of relationship troubles which 
they describe. It has been noted that in general, moral activities such as complaining 
are sensitive issues (Linell, 1998), which has been related to observations that moral 
activities such as blaming and complaining are often done implicitly (Drew, 1998; 
Holt, 2000). Considering that in these extracts assessments are absent rather than 
implicit, complaining about others’ behaviour within the context of changes in 
relationships between people with fertility problems and others, appears to be a 
particularly sensitive issue. 
  In the next section, I will explore some interactional and interpersonal issues 
which make addressing relationship troubles and assessing them delicate matters. 




7.2.3 Moral sensitivities in addressing and assessing relationship 
troubles  
I have argued that making relevant relationship troubles and in particular 
complaining about this and others’ behaviour are dispreferred, sensitive activities. 
Linell (1998) argues that one of the reasons why engaging in moral activities, such as 
blaming, is a sensitive issue, is that one risks becoming the object of moral activities, 
that is one risks being blamed oneself. This appears to be one of the issues 
respondents in my data are dealing with as well. This is suggested first of all by the 
observation that in all extracts discussed so far, in which men and women with a 
fertility problem are asked whether their relationships with others changed, they 
construct their relationships as good, whereas when asked whether other people 
started to treat them differently, respondents do attend to relationship troubles. The 
question whether there are any changes in the relationship between respondents 
themselves and others can be characterised as ‘bidirectional’, in that any positive 
responses do not indicate whom is responsible for the relationship changes; this 
could be either the respondent or the others. Questions which ask about how other 
people treat the respondent can be characterised as ‘unidirectional’, because these 
others can be more readily be held responsible for any problems put forward than the 
respondents themselves.  Hence, it can tentatively be suggested that addressing 
relationship problems can be a delicate issue, as respondents can be held responsible 
for any problematic changes, an issue particularly pertinent to responses to 
‘bidirectional’ questions about changes in relationships. Extract 14, displayed below, 
supports the idea that one of the risks which respondents have to manage when 
addressing relationship problems is being blamed themselves. This extract deviates 
from the aforementioned pattern. The respondent addresses relationship troubles 
when asked a ‘bidirectional’ question about changes in relationships. In addition, the 
respondent can be seen to complain about others’ behaviour. However, in line with 
my previous suggestions, the respondent indeed attends to the interactional problems 
this raises, specifically the potential of being seen himself as to blame for the 
relationship troubles.  
 
Extract 7:14 Int. 47 inf.w/m 




692.   know, other family members, or friends or neighbours, are there any changes in 
693.   relationships with them? 
((some lines omitted in which the respondent makes clear that their neighbours laugh and shout at 
them sometimes))  
713. Rm They provokes us. (.5) Yah. They do provoke. 
714. I How? 
715. Rm E:h you know, whenever men they are together, I am discussing we’re 
716.   discussing something about our family affairs with my wife,  
717. I  yah 
718. Rm we are at our house, you see that they are discussing, a story concerning us, 
719.   maybe: including us in their story. 
720.  I Uhu 
721. Rm Ah you you are still young, like that.  
 
In response to the interviewer’s question whether his relationships with ‘other 
people’ he knows have changed, the respondent indicates that others laugh and shout 
at him, and ‘provoke us’ (line 713).  He thus makes relevant others’ problematic, 
blameworthy behaviour. At the same time, the respondent inoculates himself from 
being blamed for it. He does this first of all by constructing others as provoking him 
and his wife, which he underlines by referring to it twice in line 713, by saying ‘they 
do provoke’ and by the ‘yah’ with heightened intonation. Provoking others is 
behaviour which is by definition initiated by the actor, who incites others. Therefore, 
the respondent allocates an active role to his provocative neighbours, and a passive, 
victim role to himself and his wife. As a result, he blames his neighbours, and 
inoculates himself from being blamed.  
Second, the respondent uses a contrast structure (Dickerson, 2000;  McKinlay 
& Dunnett, 1998; Widdicombe & Wooffitt, 1995) to divert blame away from himself 
and his wife to others. Asked ‘how’ his neighbours provoke him and his wife (line 
714), the respondent first provides a description of their own behaviour: ‘we’re 
discussing something about our family affairs with my wife (line 716). The 
respondent makes clear that he and his wife discuss private issues, namely ‘family 
affairs’ (line 716), and contrasts this with the neighbours’ behaviour: ‘they are 
discussing a story concerning us, maybe including us in their story’ (line 718-719).  
The respondent here implies that the others’ topic of discussion is not their own 
private family affairs. In addition, the respondent appears to indicate that whereas he 
and his wife have their discussions in a private setting, namely ‘at our house’ (line 
718), the neighbours talk about them publicly. For, he points out that when ‘we are at 




problematic behaviour with his own unproblematic, innocuous behaviour, the 
respondent attributes blame to others for their behaviour and inoculates himself from 
being blamed. Other authors too, have noted that contrast structures can be used to 
make a complaint about others’ behaviour (Widdicombe & Wooffitt, 1995) and to 
cast the speaker in a favourable light (McKinlay & Dunnett, 1998; Dickinson, 1999).  
The respondent’s construction work makes sense in the light of the 
aforementioned problem that addressing relationship troubles can raise the question 
of who is responsible, or to blame for the trouble. One way of solving this is by 
constructing others’ actions as blameworthy, and one’s own behaviour as 
unproblematic. In so doing, the respondent avoids being suspected to have provoked 
other people’s negative attitudes and reactions. The aforementioned constructions of 
relationships as good, playing down the significance of relationship troubles, and not 
complaining about others behaviour can be seen as other methods in which 
respondents deal with the delicacies involved in addressing relationship troubles. In 
the next section, I will discuss another strategy which respondents use to manage 
moral issues in describing relationship problems.  
 
7.2.4 Constructing others as not blameworthy 
At times, respondents do not only not complain about others’ behaviour, but  
actively forestall the perceptions that others’ behaviour is ‘complainable’ and  
blameworthy. Consider extracts 15 to 17. In extract 14, the respondent is talking  
about his brother’s behaviour, in extract 15, about his brother’s  
relationships with others, in extract 16, the respondent addresses her own  
relationships with women in the community.  
 
Extract 7:15 Int 48. s.o ((respondent has just mentioned that his family was ‘affected’  
by his brother’s fertility problem, in part because ‘it brings jealousy’ when looking at your brother’s 
children. The respondent explains that jealousy is shown when ‘you don’t share food with friends))  
284. I yah and was that happening in your family, or? 
285. R E:::h at one time, I could just hear that ah now he’s just eating on his 
286.   own, and so on. So to me I know anyway, I knew that’s normal what 
287.   else could he have done. He doesn’t have children. Why should he 
288.   bring food to hhuhu to eat with people who bring their children? 
289. I Uhu.  
290. R Yah. So that’s one thing. 
291. I You did understand that he wasn’t sharing his food with others 
292. R Yah, yah, yah. Sometimes yes. You could share but sometimes you 





Extract 7: 16 Int. 28 inf.w 
186. I  Okay, I see. Yeah. And if you ehm walk around here in the 
187.    neighbourhood in ((name town)). Ehm how how do you feel do you 
188.    think about , does this issue bother you that you don’t have children if you deal 
189.    with others here, in  the [community] . 
190. R                      [yes some- ] sometimes I get it (bored) and I feel shy. 
191. I Hmhm 
192. R To be among, among women those who have children. 
193. I Okay 
194. R Yes, 
195. I Yah. 
196. R eh but they don’t laugh at me. But ah myself, I feel. 
197. I  Yah 
198. R ah 
199. I Okay 
200. R Yes. 
 
Extract 7:17 Int 35 s.o ((brother)) 
668. I Okay. And ehm, any other relationships which were also affected do you think by this 
669.    fact that he couldn’t produce children? 
670. R Eh, yah even friends, 
671. I uhu 
672. R  yes, even friends. Because I said we are three, (we are two) my my my child is now in 
673.    standard one or my child  now is ten years old, we started discussing. Ah but, (he) is 
674.    very clever, he has nothing to talk about. So(          ) whenever I’m in companies of 
675.    those boys or those men they always talk about their children, 
676. I Uhu 
677. R so I’m no longer going to, be in their company. >You see< 
678. I O:kay 
679. R Definitely, it means that relation has (.) been affected. 
680. I Okay, so people e- like your brother might cut themselves off a bit from their [friends 
681. R                                [yes 
682. I because they don’t really, can’t talk about the same issues. 
683. R It’s not that those people will be avoiding you, but it’s you who would be (.) avoiding 
684.    them  
685. I Okay I see. 
686. R because you don’t have much in? Common. 
687. I Yah, okay. 
688. R Yes 
 
 
Before extract 15, the respondent has just mentioned that fertility problems   
bring jealousy, for instance in the sense that ‘you don’t share food with friends’. 
Asked whether that was happening in his own family (line 284), the respondent 
acknowledges that ‘at one time, I could just hear that ah now he’s just eating on his 
own’ (lines 286-287). Not sharing food can be seen as problematic behaviour, in 
particular in this case, as the respondent has just framed it as (an instance of) jealous 
behaviour. In extract 16, the respondent is asked whether it bothers her that she does 




respondent acknowledges this and explains that ‘sometimes I feel shy’ (line 190), ‘to 
be among, among women those who have children’ (line 192). This could reasonably 
lead to the inference that other women behave in negative, problematic and thus 
complainable ways towards the respondent, thereby causing her shyness. In extract 
17, the respondent makes relevant relationship troubles which his brother 
experiences when he acknowledges that his relationships with ‘even friends’ were 
affected (lines 670 and 672). 
Thus in all three extracts, potentially problematic behaviour or relationship 
troubles are made relevant. However, the respondents construct respectively their 
brothers (extract 15), community members (extract 16) and ‘friends’ of their brother 
(extract 17) as not to blame for their behaviour or the trouble. They do this in various 
ways. First, in extract 15, the respondent explicitly classifies his brother’s behaviour 
as ‘normal’ (line 286), and in so doing, as not blameworthy. Second, the respondent 
makes clear that his brother could not have acted in any other way by pointing out, 
by means of a rhetorical question,  ‘what else could he have done’ (line 287-288) and 
that ‘sometimes you have things that you cannot share.’ (line 293). Authors like 
Watson (1978) and McHugh (1979) have argued that assessments of actions depend 
on whether people are thought to be in control of their actions and aware of their 
consequences, or in other words, whether the ‘calculable choice model’ (Watson, 
1978) is applicable. The respondent makes clear that the ‘calculable choice model’ is 
not applicable to his brothers’ behaviour, and thereby mitigates his brother’s 
responsibility, and thus culpability for his behaviour (McHugh, 1975, Watson, 1978). 
 Third, the respondent in extract 15 portrays his brother as not to blame for his  
behaviour when he says in lines 287 to 289: ‘Why should he bring food to hhuhu to  
eat with people who bring their children?’ This is a rhetorical question, as it is not  
treated as requiring an answer by the interviewer, who responds with a continuer, nor  
by the respondent, who subsequently proceeds his turn. Due to its rhetorical  
nature, the question brings out that there is no reason why his brother should share  
his food.  Consequentially, the respondent justifies his brother’s refusal to do so. 
Note that the interviewer orients to the respondent’s justification work when she  





  A fourth way of constructing others’ behaviour as not culpable can be seen in 
extracts 16 and 17. In these extracts, the respondents make clear that the troubles 
they report are not to be attributed to others, but to respectively themselves and 
(people with a fertility problem like) their brother. In extract 16, the respondent states 
that other women ‘don’t laugh at me, but ah myself, I feel’ (line 196). She thus 
makes clear that her feeling of shyness is not due to others’ behaviour, but, in some 
way, due to herself.  The respondent in extract 17 makes clear that the change in the 
relationship between his brother and friends is not due to the friends’ behaviour. He 
does this to begin with when he makes clear that his brother has ‘nothing to talk 
about’ (line 674), when in company of other boys or men, and points out the 
consequences of this: ‘so I am no longer going to be, in their company’ (line 677). In 
so doing, the respondent makes relevant his brother’s own decision to no longer be in 
his friends’ company. Hence, he portrays his brother as having brought upon himself 
the change in his relationships with friends. This is reflected in the interviewer’s 
upshot: ‘people e- like your brother might cut themselves off a bit from their friends’ 
(line 701). In addition, the respondent makes explicit that the agency does not lie 
with other people when he states: ‘It’s not that those people will be avoiding you, but 
it’s you who would be (.) avoiding them’ (line 683-684). Thus, the respondent makes 
relevant that his brother, and people like him, choose to avoid others’ company, and 
are therefore responsible for any change, rather than others. This is sustained by the 
respondent’s addition ‘because you don’t have much in? Common.’ (line 686). He 
thus makes relevant a factual state of affairs of not having much in common as 
motivation for his brother’s, and people’s, avoidance of other people, rather than for 
instance others’ problematic behaviour. Hence, the respondent forestalls that others 
are seen as to blame, for the affected relationship nor for his brothers’ avoidance. 
 Constructing others as not blameworthy can be seen as another way in which 
respondents deal with the moral sensitivity of blaming others and the risk of being 





7.3 Summary and Discussion  
In this chapter, I have shown how respondents persuasively deny that changes took 
place in their relationships with others, whether their spouse, relatives or the wider 
community, and construct their relationships as good. At times, respondents do 
address relationship troubles, with spouses, family, community member or friends. I 
have discussed how respondents can play down the significance of marital 
relationship troubles, that is extramarital affairs, do not complain about others 
behaviour and construct others as not to blame for relationship troubles. These 
observations suggest that addressing relationship troubles, and especially 
complaining about them and blaming others for them, are interactionally sensitive 
and dispreferred activities. I have suggested that one particular interactional issue 
respondents have to deal with is that they can be seen as to blame themselves for the 
troubles they address (cf. Linell, 1998). Two observations sustain this idea. First, 
relationship issues appear to be put forward more often in response to 
‘unidirectional’ questions, which indicate who is to blame for any trouble put 
forward. Second, I have shown how a respondent who does construct others’ actions 
as blameworthy in response to a ‘bidirectional’ question, inoculates himself from 
being blamed at the same time.     
  The analysis presented ties in with other authors’ claims that moral activities 
like complaining and blaming are interactionally sensitive and dispreferred 
(Heritage, 1984, Linell, 1998; Pomerantz, 1989). Heritage (1984) argues that in 
general, talk-in-interaction is organized in such a way that it promotes solidarity, and 
avoids conflict. The sensitivities involved in blaming and complaining may be a 
particularly pertinent issue in my data, in part because of the relationships between 
the respondents and the people whose potentially troublesome behaviour is 
addressed. Complaining about, and blaming one’s husband, brother, or community 
members goes against the grain of common sense expectations that marital, family, 
and community relationships are characterised by loyalty. Such activities could 
therefore lead to accusations of being a bad, unloyal spouse, sibling or community 
member. Respondents’ constructions of relationships as good, playing down the 
significance of relationship troubles, not complaining about others behaviour, 




behaviour, can be seen as ways of dealing with delicate moral and interpersonal 
issues involved in addressing relationship troubles.  
  Some discrepancies can be noted between my findings and those reported in 
other qualitative, interview-based studies of infertility. First of all, whereas I have 
shown how at least some respondents construct relationships as good, the literature 
emphasizes the detrimental impact of infertility on people’s relationships, although 
there is some variability and ambiguity in reports of the quality of relationships.  My 
analysis sheds some light on both the discrepancy and the variability in research 
findings. It could be that in studies in which more relationship troubles are reported 
by respondents, more ‘bidirectional’ questions were asked, which ask for instance 
whether others started to treat respondents differently, or abusively, rather than 
whether relationships changed. Such questions seem to minimize the moral ‘risk’ of 
addressing relationship trouble and complaining about it. 
 A second, related difference between my analytic findings and the literature 
is that my analysis shows how respondents mitigate the seriousness of extramarital 
affairs, and still construct their relationships as good. In the literature however, 
extramarital affairs and other forms of marital instability are seen as one of the main 
hardships which especially infertile women have to endure. Nevertheless, some 
authors appear to have made observations similar to mine. Pashigian (2001) reports 
that one of the Vietnamese women he interviewed considered her husband to be a 
good husband, regardless of his affair with someone else whom he impregnated, and 
that men who take second wives are portrayed ‘sympathetically’ at times (Pashigian, 
2001, p. 144). Gerrits et al (1998, p.22), mention that in Nigeria ‘a husband is 
considered ‘nice’ when he does not send his wife away when she cannot have any 
more children and instead takes another wife’ (italics in original). Gerrits (1997) 
notes that some women accept that their men engage in extramarital affairs, and at 
times even encourage them.  Such findings suggest that although from a western 
perspective, one is inclined to treat extramarital affairs, or polygamous marriages, as 
indicative of relationship troubles and moreover women’s suffering, this is 
potentially in conflict with the orientations and constructions of people themselves. 39 
                                                 
39 Whether or not it is an accurate representation of women’s feelings, I cannot say, as this falls 




Third, there is a discrepancy between my finding that respondents do not 
complain about others, or construct others as not to blame for relationship troubles, 
and the literature, in which men and especially women with fertility problems are 
portrayed as the victims of social exclusion, accusations, stigmatisation and abuse, 
inflicted upon them by others, who are thus to blame for the hardship caused. Again, 
a close inspection of the findings which authors report suggest that in other studies, 
the responses of some participants fulfil a similar function of not blaming. For 
instance, Dyer et al. (2004) mention that some respondents said that relatives might 
be unaware of the impact of their comments, and that some informants said they 
themselves tried to avoid social contacts. ‘Not blaming’ seems to be going on in 
Riessman’s (2000) study as well. Riessman (2000, p. 118) cites descriptions by 
respondents of what  she calls ‘discrediting encounters’ with others. Many of these 
come across as objective and neutral, in part due to the use of reported speech and 
absence of assessments, as is the case in extracts shown in this chapter. In addition, 
Riessman reports the following exchange between a respondent and herself: 
 
‘Neighbours, every time they ask….In Mayalam they ask, you know, ‘Vis-
hesham’ [any special news]? Every time.’ When I inquired, ‘is it an insulting 
term?’ She responded, “No not that’ and then explained it is ‘colloquial 
language’, a way that others ask about pregnancy right after marriage. After 
11 years of marriage, she finds persistent questioning ‘awkward’ and then 
she agreed with my earlier formulation: ‘You feel insulted’. (Riessman, 2000, 
p. 119, italics added)     
 
In denying it is an insulting term, and explaining that it is ‘colloquial language’, the 
respondent appears to resist blaming others, which Riessman’s (2000) paraphrase 
‘You feel insulted’ glosses over. As is normally the case in qualitative studies of 
infertility, Riessman tries to bring out the respondent’s feelings, presumably with the 
aim of showing the discrediting nature of the respondent’s encounters. However, in 
so doing, she loses sight of the actions in which the respondent engages in her 
account.  
 Overall, the discrepancies can be taken to suggest that although authors’ 
glosses may fulfil a laudable political function of giving voice to infertile men and 
especially women’s suffering, they may not be in line with people’s own 





constructions of relationships and relationship troubles (cf. Widdicombe, 1995). This 
has practical implications for attempts to address relationship troubles of people with 
a fertility problem, as one will have to work with people’s own constructions of 
troubles and the concerns they themselves thereby attend to. These may include 
moral concerns related to problems involved in complaining about or blaming others 
for relationship troubles.  
Note that I do not intend to dismiss the problems encountered by people with 
a fertility problem. On the contrary, it would seem that the discursive practices which 
I have discussed, not complaining about, and not blaming others for relationship 
troubles, contribute to the quandary in which people with a fertility problem find 
themselves in; it takes away possibilities of ‘speaking out’ and ‘acting up’ (cf. 
Riessman, 2000).  I will discuss further these practical implications in chapter 10.  
So far, I have mainly focussed on the interpersonal, normative, and moral 
issues which people who are faced with a fertility problem, or their significant others, 
deal with.  In the next two chapters, I will shift the focus to indigenous and 






Chapter 8. Issues of accountability and identity 
in professionals’ talk about causes 
 
Some studies have drawn attention to the social nature of practitioners’ views, 
knowledge, and practices in relation to infertility (see chapter 2, section 2.4). They 
have shown how medical practices are informed by certain interests, rather than 
being merely objective scientific ‘facts’. For instance, Inhorn (1998) argues that 
Egyptian physicians are keen to perform invasive technical procedures, which are of 
doubtful benefit, because it is an important source of income. In addition, she 
suggests that physicians’ limited disclosure of information to infertility patients, for 
instance regarding diagnoses, serves the interest of maintaining professional 
boundaries. Furthermore, scholars have pointed to the normative basis and moral 
consequences of physicians’ diagnoses, such as how certain diagnoses make patients 
to blame for their own infertility (Pfeffer, 1993; Sandelowski, 1990). Moreover, it 
has been argued that the provision of treatment depends on physicians’ moral 
categorisations of patients as more or less appropriate for treatment, based on for 
instance diagnoses (Pfeffer, 1993) or other features such as lifestyle or socio-
economic class (Malin, 2003; Steinberg, 1997). Cultural aspects of practitioners’ 
views and practices regarding infertility have been addressed as well. Oyebola 
(1981) for instance, in his study on indigenous healers in Nigeria, examines the 
healers’ knowledge of causes of infertility and their treatment. He concludes that 
these are ‘based on superstitions’ and ‘lack scientific basis’ (Oyebola, 1981, p. 785). 
Hence, Oyebola (1981) seems to be suggesting that their knowledge and practices are 
based on culturally specific beliefs, rather than universally valid, scientific ‘facts’.   
   In general, since the 1970s and 1980s, scholars have called for an 
acknowledgement of the social, cultural, and thus constructed, nature of medical 
practices and knowledge (Foucault, 1973; Hahn & Kleinman, 1983; Lock & Gordon, 
1988; Wright & Treacher, 1982). Hence, scholars, especially medical sociologists, 
have argued that lay and experts’ knowledge should be treated as on a par, rather 
than attributing a special ‘immaculate’ and objective quality to scientific, biomedical 




focused in particular on the social nature of medical knowledge concerning disease 
categories and causes of illnesses, and of diagnostic practices. They have shown that 
these types of medical knowledge and practices are not ‘natural’ and self-evident but 
social products, created in social activities and contingent upon the societies in which 
they are used (Nettleton, 1995). For instance, Lupton (1994, p.55) discusses how 
‘identifying’ symptoms is a socio-cultural act and construction process, in that 
novice clinicians are trained in, or acculturated into ‘ways of seeing in the clinic’. 
Furthermore, as in infertility studies, medical sociologists have pointed out how in 
general, illness and diagnoses are intertwined with moral judgments of responsibility 
and blame (Lock & Gordon, 1988; Lupton, 1994). 
 It appears that work done so far on the social dimensions of medical 
knowledge and practices in the developing world, regarding infertility but also more 
generally, could be expanded. This is first of all because most studies which discuss 
the social aspects of biomedical practitioners’ views and practices focus on the west 
(van der Geest & Finkler, 2004; Lock & Gordon, 1988). Regarding infertility, more 
recently studies have examined assisted reproductive technologies (ART) in 
developing countries (Inhorn, 1994, 2002; Bharadwaj, 2002; Handwerker, 2002). 
However, these technologies are only available in a limited number of African 
countries, and are absent in Malawi. Hence, studies of ART leave out the majority of 
medical practices. 
As Lock (1988) points out, scholars’ limited attention to biomedicine in 
developing countries contrasts sharply with a strong interest in, and a wealth of 
studies on,  indigenous healers’ knowledge, beliefs, and practices regarding various 
health issues (see for instance Chipfakacha, 1997; Courthright, 1995; Dagher & 
Ross, 2004). It appears therefore, that many scholars still treat biomedicine, unlike 
traditional healing, as an a-social,  universal framework of practice, based on 
objective scientific rationales and requiring neither examination, nor explanation 
(van der Geest & Finkler , 2004; Lock, 1988; Ogden, 2002).  
  Second, overall, studies of bio- or indigenous medicine in the developing 
world tend to treat medical practices and knowledge as formed by, and representing, 
the ‘macro’ cultural context. For instance, Finkler (2004, p.2048) concludes in her 




world in which they are embedded and open a window into the society and culture of 
which they form a part’. Certainly indigenous healers’ views and practices are 
commonly seen and displayed as ingrained in the local cultural context (cf. Lock, 
1988). For instance, in many studies, the cultural specificity of healers’ knowledge 
and practices is underlined by comparing them with biomedical notions and 
practices. In addition, authors emphasize the cultural acceptability of healers’ care 
(Chipfakacha, 1997; Courthright, 1995; Dagher & Ross, 2004). Furthermore, the 
cultural nature of indigenous healers and their treatment is sometimes built into their 
definition. For example, Oyebula (1986, p.222) defines a healer as ‘someone who is 
recognized by the community in which he lives as competent to provide health care 
by using (…) methods based on the social, cultural and religious backgrounds as 
well as the prevailing knowledge, attitudes and beliefs (…) in the community’ (italics 
added).  However, a growing body of conversation analytic studies of doctor-patient 
interactions in the west has shown how the more local, ‘micro’, interactional context 
also informs the construction of professionals’ views and practices (Frankel, 1984; 
Heritage & Maynard, 2005; Silverman, 1987; West, 1984). For instance, Peräkylä 
(1998) shows how doctors attend to their accountability for their diagnoses, 
especially when their expertise appears challenged. Pomerantz, Fehr and Ende 
(1997) have shown how supervisors correct interns’ errors in ways which avoid 
exposure of the error. It thus appears that insight into the social nature of 
practitioners’ views and practices in developing countries could be increased by 
examining their interactional and interpersonal functions, rather than restricting 
analysis to the culturally specific content of beliefs and practices.  
In chapter 5, I have shown how ‘illness attributions’ by people with a fertility 
problem, and significant others, can be usefully treated as constructions which fulfil 
certain interactional and interpersonal functions. In this chapter, I will examine 
indigenous and biomedical practitioners’ responses to questions about causes of 
infertility. In the initial stages of the analysis, I was struck by the work which 
practitioners appear to do to make their claims persuasive. I therefore examined 
practitioners’ persuasive design in more detail, which made apparent that 
practitioners attend their professional accountability and identity in their claims. 




constructions of causes also appear to deal with interpersonal and interactional 
issues.  
8.1 Making claims persuasive  
In my interviews, I asked practitioners what they considered to be the main causes of 
infertility, in the patients they see or in Malawi in general. Extracts 1 to 3 are 
examples of responses to this question.  
 
Extract 8:1 Int. 36 2HSAs ((Rf = female respondent Rm =male respondent)) 
518. I Yah. An- any other reasons why people can fail to bear children? 
519. Rm Abortions. 
520. I  Abortions. 
521. Rm (hm:) 
522. I Uhu,  how [does that happen? 
523. Rf            [hh Because of several abortions, that’s why some are barren. 
524. I Okay 
525. Rf Because if they have taken eh: strong drugs,  
526. I Uhu 
527. Rf that is strong- the drugs go to: eh uterus.  
528. I Uhu 
529. Rf So: that uterus can eh come to pieces,  
530. I Uhu 
531. Rf yah, that’s why they are barren. 
 
Extract 8:2 Int. 16 m.d, expat. 
579. I Okay, ehm, what are the main causes of the infertility patients you’ve seen. 
580. R Well the two most common ones are myomas and HIV. 
581. I Okay, yah. And 
582. R Sexually transmitted diseases is number three because I mean that’s still 
583.    very common here and it causes adhesions that tubes get closed, and 
584.    that’s why people can’t (               ). I think that are the main three. 
585. I Yah, okay and then I mean the myoma’s that of course only for the 
586.   women ehm, is there HIV and sexually transmitted diseases is that (both) in 
587.     men and women or 
588. R  Yah. Well I’m not sure I I haven’t read say recent scientific articles, but in 
589.     men it’s just known that if they got eh well any kind of disease even a simple 
590.     flu, it reduces the fertility straight away.  
591. I  yah 
592. R  temporarily. And HIV so far cannot be cured, so, I’m not sure if it has ever 
593.     been written down, but it’s, it can’t be it it must be the case that when a 
594.     husband, when a man is HIV positive in a bit of an advanced stadium that he 
595.     has reduced fertility 
596. I  yah 
597. R  And we have got the impression, it’s the same in women. Because I’m su- 
598.     I’ve we’ve I’ve got the impression. That if you would test all women that are 
599.     HIV negative, that are that are infertile you would get a higher percentage of 
600.     HIV positivity than the women in general. 
601. I  Yah, yah 





Extract 8:3 Int. 7 m.d, expat. ((in response to the question ‘what are the main causes from your 
perspective in the infertility patients you see’, the respondent mentioned several causes, amongst 
others that ‘sometimes you find a very low sperm count in the man’)) 
389. I        And ehm, low sperm count is there any underlying reason behind that or 
390. R       Yeah many, hhuhu, also, it can be more or less congenital thing, ehm eh 
391.   basically something they’ve always had. It can also be caused by 
392.    infection  ehm,  what you can sometimes see here for instance. I don’t 
393.   know if this  causes low sperm count but I have sometimes seen 
394.   testicular TB eh yeah  which obviously (destructs) the the test destroys 
395.   the testes ehm but then we  didn’t even do a  sperm count I think but 
396.   ehm. 
397. I yah 
398. R yah and you see all the same things as in ((name home country)) he that you 
399.   can never test here, but which you can suspect , people changing partners and 
400.   then there’s the there’s the, there’s the, mechanism where eh where eh there 
401.   are antibodies formed against sperm. 
402. I hmhm okay. 
403. R        Ehm and-you often see that when there’s a change of partner. Ehm yah 
404.   you also sometimes see that here as well, husband has children, wife 
405.   children, they come together, as new partners and they can’t get children 
406.   and yeah that suggests that something like that might playing a role, but. 
407.   (.) Obviously there’s no laboratory or anything in Malawi that can test 
408.   that.  
409. I no, so that’s a bit- of a guess then. 
410. R yeah  
411. I  Yah 
412. R Yeah 
 
In extracts 1 and 2, respondents are asked what the main causes of infertility are. In 
response, they identify abortions (extract 1, line 519), myomas, HIV and sexually 
transmitted diseases (extract 2, lines 580-582).  The respondent in extract 3 was 
asked about the main causes of infertility just before the extract. One of the causes 
which he mentioned was ‘a very low sperm count’. 
In all these extracts, the interviewer probes for the respondents’ identification 
of causes. As I will show, the interviewer’s probes form a mild challenge to the 
veracity of the respondents’ claims. In extract 1, the interviewer asks ‘how does that 
happen’, (line 522), in extract 3 whether there is ‘any underlying reason behind low 
sperm count’ (line 389). These probes constitute a request for clarification regarding 
the mechanisms through which the proposed cause leads to infertility. They can 
therefore be seen as indicating that the interviewer does not understand why, or is not 
convinced that, the proposed causes lead to infertility. In extract 2, the interviewer 
qualifies the proposed cause of myomas as holding true ‘of course only for the 




(line 586 to 587). Hence, the interviewer’s probe suggests that she is not convinced 
that HIV is a relevant cause for both men and women. 
 In their responses to the interviewer’s probe, respondents indeed identify a 
mechanism through which the proposed cause leads to infertility. In extract 1, the 
female respondent explains that ‘several abortions’ (line 523) can lead to infertility 
because ‘if they have taken eh: strong drugs’ (line 525), these go to the uterus (line 
527), which can ‘come to pieces’ (line 529). In extract 2, the respondent explains 
why HIV is a cause of infertility in both men and women: in men, ‘any kind of 
disease’ reduces fertility (line 589-590) and ‘we have got the impression, it’s the 
same in women (line 597). In extract 3, the respondent proposes several mechanisms 
for how someone can get a low sperm count: ‘it can be more or less (a) congenital 
thing’ (line 390), ‘it can also be caused by infection’ (line 391-392), for instance by 
‘testicular TB’ ‘which obviously (destructs) the the test destroys the testes’ (line 394-
395). In addition, the respondent points out that when people change partners, 
‘there’s the mechanism where eh where eh there are antibodies formed against 
sperm’ (line 400-401).   
Several interesting observations can be made regarding the way in which 
respondents respond to the interviewer’s probe and explain the mechanism 
underlying the proposed causes. First, respondents construct the relation between the 
proposed cause and infertility as strong and certain. They do so especially by means 
of (implicit) if-then constructions, which, as Edwards and Potter (1992) have noted, 
can be used to establish logical and thus firm and inevitable connections. In extract 1, 
the respondent mentions ‘if they have taken eh: strong drugs’ (line 525), ‘So: [then] 
that uterus can eh come to pieces’ (line 529). In extract 3, the respondent states that 
‘if they got eh well any kind of disease (…) [then] it reduces the (in)fertility straight 
away’ (line 590) and ‘when a man is HIV positive (…) that [then] he as reduced 
fertility’(line 594). In addition, the respondent in extract 3 brings out the necessary 
connection between HIV and reduced fertility also by stating that this ‘must be the 
case’ (line 593). Furthermore, he attends to a strong connection to diseases and 
infertility by saying that they reduce fertility ‘straight away’ (line 590). 
Second, by using the strong expressions ‘come to pieces’ (extract 1, line 529) 




respectively abortions and testicular TB, and make it convincing that they corrupt the 
organs necessary for reproduction, namely the uterus (extract 1, line 529), and testes 
(extract 3, line 394).  
Third, the respondents attend to their claims as common knowledge. In 
extract 2, the respondent does this when he claims that ‘it is just known’ (line 589) 
that diseases reduce fertility, in extract 3 when he claims that testicular TB 
‘obviously’ (line 394) destroys the testes. By means of these appeals to common, 
taken for granted knowledge, respondents attend to and forestall sceptical reactions 
regarding their claims.   
  Fourth, in extract 3, the respondent makes his claim regarding HIV as a cause 
of infertility persuasive by pointing out that ‘any disease, even a simple flu’ (line 
589) can reduce fertility in men. This makes it conceivable that HIV leads to 
infertility, as it is a recognizably more serious disease than flu; HIV, certainly when 
‘in a bit of an advanced stadium’ (line 594) it is not just ‘any disease’. Note that 
presumably, the respondent uses mistakenly the word ‘stadium’ instead of ‘stage’. 
The respondent constructs a contrast between HIV and flu by classifying flu as 
‘simple’ (line 5989) and HIV as an illness which ‘so far cannot be cured’ (line 592). 
By making it convincing that HIV leads to reduced fertility in men, the respondent 
makes his ‘impression’ (line 589, 598) that women with HIV will have a reduced 
fertility as well more warranted.  
  Fifth, the respondent in extract 3 refers to empirical observations, which 
makes his claims regarding causes of infertility convincing. The respondent describes 
testicular TB as something ‘what you can sometimes see here’ (line 392) and as what 
he has seen himself: ‘I have sometimes seen testicular TB’ (line 393). The 
respondent portrays also partner change (line 398, 403, 405), leading to the formation 
of antibodies (line 401) as based on observations: ‘you see all the same things as in 
((name home country)) (line 398), ‘and- you often see that’ (line 403) and ‘you also 
sometimes see that here as well’ (line 404). As Pomerantz (1984) points out, direct 
experiences, and thus observations, are an important resource for establishing the 
certainty of a state of affairs. Peräkylä (1998) found as well that Finnish doctors 
account for their diagnoses by using verbs which construct them as based on 




physicians make relevant such sensory evidence especially when their expertise 
appears challenged (op cit.), as appears to be the case in extract 3.  
  Hence, I have shown several ways in which respondents make their claims 
persuasive. However, respondents can also be seen to attend to their claims as 
tentative, for instance in the aforementioned reference to an ‘impression’ that women 
with HIV have a reduced fertility (extract 2). In the next section, I will examine such 
instances in more detail. 
   
8.2  Attending to the basis of knowledge claims: ‘Doing being 
medical expert’ 
In extracts 2 and 3, as well as in extracts 4 and 5, displayed below, respondents can 
be seen to characterise their knowledge as uncertain. 
 
Extract 8:4 Int. 7 m.d, expat. 
323. I      Ehm what are the main causes from your perspective in the infertility 
324.   patients you see. 
325.  R    Ehm: (.5) well I would think, well yah that that’s also difficult to answer 
326.       because I would like to answer that exact and I don’t know , ehm because 
327.   the main causes we find here are either infection eh 
328. I Hmhm 
329. R  or eh yah you get sometimes women with large fibroids or whatever, 
330. I Hmhm 
331. R which can be a cause you also don’t know for sure but. 
((some lines omitted)) 
353. R  Yah, yah then it’s mostly STDs and (.) apparently bilharzia but so I find 
354.    bilharzia sometimes, and then I treat it but I don’t I have not yet seen it that 
355.    it then helps. 
356. I Yah 
357. R Ehm but yeah that’s just what I’ve read and  
358. I Yah  
359. R Hhu hu yah. 
360. I Yah you can, always give it a try hhaha (  ) 
 
Extract 8:5 Int. 43 nurse ((respondent has mentioned before some causes of infertility when talking 
about her sister, whose husband had sexually transmitted infections, and a couple who were failing to 
conceive because they were very young)) 
870. I Ehm  can you mention any other causes which are quite common in the 
871.    patients that you see here? 
872. R In the patients I see. Ehm I haven’t the (correct) details. I don’t know what is 
873.    the cause of low motility. 
874. I hm 
875. R Could it be the infection itself of course. Infection itself. 
 
I would like to note first of all that in extracts 2 to 5, the respondents attend to the 




that the basis of their claims is uncertain. They do this to begin with by making clear 
that they lack certain information. In extract 4, the respondent states at the start of his 
response to the interviewer’s question about causes ‘that’s also difficult to answer’ 
(line 325), and explains that this is so because ‘I would like to answer that exact and 
I don’t know’ (extract 4, line 326). Hence, the respondent implies that he lacks 
certain ‘exact’ details to base his claims on.  Likewise, the respondent in extract 5 
states ‘I haven’t the (correct) details’ (line 872), and ‘I don’t know what is the cause 
of low motility’ (line 872). The respondents in extracts 2, 3, and 4 also point at a lack 
of information, of a particular kind. In extract 4, the respondent makes clear that his 
claims are not based on personal observations. He states ‘apparently bilharzia’ (line 
354), thereby implying that his claim regarding bilharzia as cause of infertility is not 
based on his own experience. He makes this explicit when he points out that when he 
treats people for bilharzia, ‘I don’t I have not yet seen it that it then helps’ (line 354-
355), and by pointing out that his claim is based on ‘ what I’ve read’ (line 357). By 
pointing to the lack of personal observations, the respondent constructs the basis of 
his claim as (relatively) tentative.  In extracts 2 and 3, the respondents point at the 
absence of (quantative) empirical proof, namely calculations and test results. The 
respondent in extract 2 states  ‘I’ve never calculated that’ (line 602). The respondent 
in extract 3 makes clear that they did not do a sperm count (line 395), and that 
whether a change in partner results in antibodies against the sperm (line 399) is 
something which ‘you can never test here’ (line 399), as ‘obviously there’s no 
laboratory or anything in Malawi that can test that’ (line 407-408). Furthermore, the 
respondent in extract 2 states ‘I haven’t read say recent scientific articles’ (line 588) 
and ‘I’m not sure if it has ever been written down’ (line 644).  By pointing out that 
his claim, in this case about the role of HIV in infertility, is not based on an 
authorative source, such as scientific publications, the respondent attends to the basis 
of his claim as (more) tentative.    
 Noteworthy is the use of the word ‘just’ in the extracts 2 and 4: ‘but that’s 
just my impression’ (extract 2, line 602) and ‘but yeah that’s just what I’ve read’ 
(extract 4, line 357). ‘Just’ appears to be used in a depreciatory sense (Lee, 1984), in 
which it plays down the relevance of one situation in comparison to another. In 




calculations, in extract 4, the value of reading about a cause in comparison to making 
observations about it yourself. As a result, ‘just’ plays down the force of 
respondents’ claims, and supports respondents’ orientation to the basis of their 
claims as tentative.  
 Respondents’ orientation to the absence of a firm basis for their knowledge, 
implies that they are uncertain about their claims. Indeed, respondents make this 
explicit in several ways. First of all, they use expressions which convey a notion of 
uncertainty. In extracts 2 and 4, the respondents state explicitly that they are 
uncertain with respect to  their claims about respectively HIV and fibroids as causes 
of infertility: ‘well I’m not sure’ (extract 2, line 588), and ‘you also don’t know for 
sure’ (extract 4, line 331). Note that the word ‘also’ (line 331), implies that the 
respondent’s previous claim, that infections can cause infertility (line 327), is 
tentative as well; ‘also’ implies an equality in uncertainty regarding the two causes. 
In addition, in extract 2, the respondent conveys a notion of uncertainty when he 
states ‘we have got the impression’ (line 597). Note the repair of ‘I’m su-’ into ‘I’ve 
got the impression’ (lines 597-598). As ‘I’m su-‘can be assumed to be the start of 
‘I’m sure’, the respondent here construes himself as less certain than ‘sure’. His 
repair of ‘we’ve’ into ‘I’ve’ (line 597) constructs the ‘impression’ as more personal, 
and thus less certain. In extract 3, the respondent states that antibodies being formed 
as a result of partner change is something which ‘you can suspect’ (line 399) and 
which is suggested (line 406). Both terms frame the respondent’s state of knowledge 
as indefinite, as does the identification of factors as something which ‘might be’ 
(extract 3, line 406) or ‘can (also) be’ a cause (extract 3, line 390, 391; extract 4, line 
331). Furthermore, in extract 4, by saying ‘I would think’ (line 325) the respondent 
constructs his claims regarding causes as a personal opinion, and thus less certain, an 
established fact (Latour & Woolgar, 1986). Moreover, in extract 5, the respondent 
makes her suggestion tentative by using the format of a question to propose infection 
as cause of low motility: ‘could it be the infection itself’ (line 875).  
  In extracts 3 and 4, the interviewer picks up and attends to the uncertainty 
displayed in the responses. In extract 3, she provides the upshot ‘so that’s a bit- of a 




360). Thereby she can be seen to attend to treating bilharzia as a potential but 
uncertain solution for a fertility problem, and thus to bilharzia as uncertain cause.  
 Both the persuasive and tentative design of claims regarding causes appears 
to tie in with identity issues which the respondents attend to.  I have shown that 
respondents make clear that their claims about causes of infertility are not informed 
by empirical observations (extract 4, lines 353, 354), by performing calculations 
(extract 2, line 602), counts (extract 3, line 395) or tests (extract 2, line 598; extract 
3, lines 399, 407). In addition, in extract 2 the respondent points out that his claim is 
not based on his reading scientific papers, the respondent in extract 4 makes clear 
that his claim is only based on the literature which he read (extract 4, line 357). 
  These are all activities which are recognizable as category bound activities 
(CBAs, Sacks, 1992; Watson & Weinberg, 1982) of biomedical experts. CBAs are 
activities which, according to common sense, are associated with certain identity 
categories. For instance, mothers are expected to pick up babies when they cry and 
soothe them. Likewise, biomedical experts are expected to perform calculations and 
tests, and read scientific literature. Sacks (1972, 1992) has pointed out that due to the 
association between CBAs and identity categories, CBAs are ‘inference rich’; by 
describing a CBA, a speaker can evoke an identity category. In most of the extracts 
displayed above respondents make clear that they have not performed certain 
activities, they have for instance not tested and calculated their claims about causes. 
Nevertheless,  the respondents attend to these activities as relevant, and thereby 
orient to their, in principle, desirability.  Therefore, it can be argued that by referring 
to activities like making observations, testing, counting calculating and reading 
scientific literature, the respondents invoke the identity category ‘biomedical expert’. 
  Having correct knowledge about causes of diseases can be seen to be another 
CBA of biomedical experts (cf. Gill, 1998; cf. Maynard, 1991). Therefore, whilst 
people are in general accountable for portraying a state of affairs correctly when 
making declarative, factual statements (Pomerantz, 1984), this is all the more so for 
biomedical practitioners who make claims about causes of health problems, like 
infertility. Hence, such claims can place one’s identity of biomedical expert at risk, if 
they are doubted or challenged. As mentioned in section 8.1, in various extracts, the 




always remains a possibility when knowledge claims are made. Therefore, both 
constructing one’s claims as factual and convincing, and attending to their tentative 
basis, appears to fit in with respondents’ orientation to their identity of biomedical 
expert. On the one hand, making one’s claims factual and convincing can be seen to 
be an ‘offensive’ strategy to protect one’s expert identity from scepticism. On the 
other hand, constructing the basis of one’s knowledge claims as uncertain is a more 
defensive strategy.  It is a form of ‘hedging’, one of the types of ‘disclaimers’ 
described by Hewitt and Stokes (1975), as discursive devices which define 
forthcoming claims as not relevant to (negative) typifications which they would 
normally form a basis for. Examples of hedging, as discussed by these authors, are 
‘I’m no expert of course, but…’ and ‘I could be wrong on my facts, but I think’ 
(Hewitt & Stokes, 1975, p. 4). According to Hewitt and Stokes (1975), ‘hedging’ 
wards off negative identity attributions by signalling minimal commitment to a 
claim. It can be argued then, that in the extracts discussed, respondents display a 
minimal commitment to the truth status of their claims by ‘hedging’, that is, by 
constructing their claims as tentative. Thereby they forestall that (potential) 
challenges regarding their claims put their identity of biomedical expert at risk. 
   
8.3 Indigenous healers defending their expertise     
So far, I have focussed on biomedical practitioners’ constructions. As I will show, 
indigenous healers also appear to construct their claims as persuasive in the light of 
challenges. Consider extract 6   
Extract 8: 6 Int. 60 pilot ind.h40 
274. I And what about I heard people say 
275.        here in Malawi as well that it can be 
276.        due to witchcraft that people cannot 
277.        get a child. What do you think 










She says I have heard that people can bewitch 
each other so that someone should not be able to  
give birth. What do you know about this? 
Huhu. A::h! It happens. 
                                                 
40 Transliteration of Chitumbuka is not available; as translations are expensive I could only afford a 











It really happens. 
↑Okay. 
They pick her up in the spirit
41
 and tie her at the 
back to make the eggs invisible. 
↑Okay 
289. R 





Yaah! Sometimes they can even tie the 
pregnancy like that. A baby can be in the womb 
for 2 years like this woman sleeping here they 
chased her from the hospital because they 
thought she was not pregnant but she is 
pregnant. 
((some lines omitted in which the respondent claims, amongst other issues, that people can 
remain pregnant for 5 years)) 
298. T     She says yes, there is that (you 
299.       can  really) she says it's true, (that) 
300.       at times the (.)  the witchcraft 
301.       happens.(       )Sometimes the 
302.       woman cannot even have a (oil) of 
303.       the [(ovum/ova)]  
304. R    [             ] 
305. T     that there could be infertility. (And 
306.       even) there couldn't be fertilisation 
307.       of the ova. And at times you will 
308.       find that eh wo- a pregnant woman 
309.       stays five years without delivery. 
310.       And the: people at the hospitals may 
311.       say she's not pregnant and yet she is 
312.       pregnant. 
313. I     O:kay= 
314. T     =That's what's she (is saying) 
 
 
Asked what she knows about ‘people who can bewitch each other so that someone 
should not be able to give birth’ (line 281), the respondent points out that this 
happens: ‘A::h! It happens’ (line 282). The interpreter subsequently probes ‘it 
happens?’ (line 238). This can be seen as a display of surprise, and of potential 
scepticism regarding the respondent’s claim. As seen before, the respondent makes 
her claim that witchcraft leads to infertility convincing in response to this mild 
challenge. She does this in several ways. First of all, she confirms that ‘it really 
happens’ (line 284). By ‘really’, the respondent emphasizes the truth of her claim.  
   Second, the respondent subsequently provides more detailed information 
about how someone can become bewitched: ‘they pick her up in the spirit and tie her 
at the back to make the eggs invisible’ (line 286-287). As Edwards and Potter (1992) 
have argued, detailed accounting, or ‘vivid description’ can make claims come across 
as factual and hence persuasive. In this case, this is also because the details point at a 
                                                 




mechanism by means of which witchcraft can lead to infertility; ‘tying’ someone at 
the back so that eggs become invisible. Explaining the mechanism through which a 
proposed cause leads to infertility is a method of making the claim regarding the 
cause convincing. Third, the respondent gives an empirical example of a witchcraft 
induced fertility problem: ‘A baby can be in the womb for 2 years’ (line 290-291), 
‘like this woman sleeping here’ (line 291). She provides empirical proof, which 
supports her claims regarding witchcraft as cause of fertility problems, in particular, 
remaining pregnant for a number of years. The interpreter also makes relevant 
empirical observations which sustain the respondent’s claim: ‘at times you will find’ 
(line 307-308). Fourth, the respondent attends to, and rejects a sceptical response 
regarding her claim that the woman is pregnant. She describes how ‘they chased her 
away from the hospital because they thought she was not pregnant’ (line 291-294). 
By pointing out that they thought she was not pregnant, she constructs this as a 
personal opinion rather than a fact (Latour & Woolgar, 1986). In addition, she 
contrasts the hospital’s opinion, by means of the contrast marker ‘but’, with a factual 
state of affairs: ‘she is pregnant’ (line 293-294).  Furthermore, the interpreter makes 
clear that sceptic reactions are refuted by constructing them as something what 
people ‘may say’ (line 310-311), and contrasting this by means of ‘and yet’ with a 
factual state of affairs: ‘she is pregnant’ (line 311-312).  
 Note that the respondent’s construction of her claims as persuasive and 
convincing can be seen as informed also by the interpreter’s turns in lines 285 and 
288. The heightened intonation in ‘↑Okay’ (lines 285 and 288) can be seen to 
indicate surprise, and therefore occasions the inference that the interpreter may not 
be convinced by the respondent’s claims. 
In extract 7 below, a traditional healer defends her knowledge about causes 
when faced with a potential challenge as well 
 
Extract 8: 7
42 Int. 38 ind.h 
477. I And you told me, some things now 
478.       what you think the causes are of 
479.       this failure to bear children. What 
480.       do your patients think is  the cause of 
481.       their problem? 
 
482. T She says when these patients come and you have 
                                                 




















told them, do others speak out their views 
regarding what they feel is the problem?  
That the problem is (                 )? 
Or perhaps you have told them they have a 
disease but they are saying their grandparents 
might have bewitched them. She wants to know 
whether such things happen. 
I refute that, I tell them they are liars (.) Its not 
possible to cast a spell inside the abdomen so 
that someone should be  infertile, no. She can go 
to the witchdoctors and they can tell her that 
 maybe it’s your mother-in-law or father-in-law 
or your grandmother but  it may not be true. But 
here (I) am able to know the real cause why she 
is not able to have children. I tell her the problem 
I have found with you is this this. 
 
The interviewer asks the healer what her patients think is the cause of their fertility 
problem (line 478). After his first translation, the interpreter rephrases his question 
and makes relevant a potential difference in opinion between patients and the healer 
regarding the cause of the fertility problem: ‘perhaps you have told them they have a 
disease but they are saying their grandparents might have bewitched them’ (line 486-
489). This hypothetical situation implies that the veracity of the respondent’s 
knowledge claims is challenged. In her response, the respondent inoculates this 
challenge. She does this first of all by rejecting the hypothetical, alternative cause, by 
stating ‘I refute that’ (line 490), and also by constructing it as a lie: ‘I tell them they 
are liars’ (line 490), and as impossible: ‘it is not possible to cast a spell inside the 
abdomen.’(line 490-491). Second, the respondent attends to, and discards, a source 
which supports patients’ ideas that they may have been bewitched: ‘the witchdoctors 
(…) can tell her that maybe it’s your mother-in-law or father-in-law or grandmother, 
but it may not be true’ (line 495).  Third, the respondent points to her capacity to 
know the truth about causes of infertility: ‘But here (I) am able to know the real 
cause why she is not able to have children.’ (line 495-497). Fourth, the respondent 
states ‘the problem I have found’ (line 497-498). ‘Found’ implies that the respondent 
is able to make empirical observations, which form supportive evidence for her 
capacity of knowing the facts about causes of infertility, whether in particular cases 
or in general.   
  Thus, it appears that, like biomedical practitioners, indigenous healers also 




making them persuasive and rejecting alterntaive explanations. It is to be expected 
that for indigenous healers too, knowing about causes is a category bound attribute, 
making challenges to the veracity of their claims regarding causes a threat to their 
identity of illness expert.  
 
8.4 Sensitivities in biomedical practitioners’ talk about non-
biomedical causes 
I have shown two extracts in which indigenous healers discuss the possibility of 
witchcraft as cause of infertility. Biomedical practitioners too address such non-
biomedical causes, although normally only when asked about them. As I will 
demonstrate in this section, examination of the way in which biomedical 
practitioners talk about non-biomedical causes  points to certain additional 
interpersonal and interactional issues for biomedical practitioners.  
 
8.4.1. Sensitivities related to respondents’ biomedical expert identity 
One issue, which respondents appear to deal with when addressing non-biomedical 
causes of infertility, is related to their biomedical expert identity. Consider extracts 8 
and 9.  
 
Extract 8:8 Int. 37 nurse 
611. I Okay. And what about for example, possession by ancestral spirits or 
612.   witchcraft, do you think that plays a role as well in in infertility? 
613. R No, I don’t think I believe in those. No.  
614. I  In in neither or 
615. R  I don’t believe one could not produce a child because the spirits have held one, 
616.    no I don’t believe in those. Because after my nursing training, after learning 
617.    about the biology of the reproductive system, 
618. I Uhu 
619. R  I don’t believe any person can hold another into child bearing, it’s only God, 
620.    not a human being. 
((some lines omitted)) 
626. R  But maybe abortions, if someone was having pregnancies and aborting, 
627. I  Uhu 
628. R  some people believe witchcraft people can remove pregnancies from 
629.    someone. 
630. I  Uhu. Yah. I see.  
631. R Uh 
632. I And- what do you think about that? 
633. R  A:h I really don’t know, I don’t knowhhuhu. 
  
Extract 8: 9 Int.58 c.o  




184.   witchcraft might be a cause of the infertility. What do you think 
185.   about that? 
186. R Hmhahahehe eh (.) you know we are people of sciences, there’s no 
187.   witchcraft but.   
188. I Hm 
189. R ↑ It can (work) maybe but eh witchcraft don’t (cause infertile) 
190.    hahaha > what do you think<? 
 
Several features of the responses in the extracts above, suggest that addressing non-
biomedical causes is in some way problematic for the respondents. 
  First, the responses are ambiguous. Both respondents start off denying belief 
in the reality of non-biomedical causes: ‘No I don’t think I believe in those’ (extract 
8, lines 613, 615, 616, 619) and ‘there’s no witchcraft’ (extract 9, line 186-187). 
However, after the denials, the respondents appear to make a concession regarding 
the reality of non-biomedical causes. In extract 8, the respondent states ‘but maybe 
abortions’ ( line 626), and appears to imply that abortions may be caused by 
witchcraft. In extract 9, the respondent states ‘but (..) ↑it can (work) maybe’ (line 
189). ‘It’ can be assumed to refer to witchcraft. This makes the responses ambiguous, 
especially in extract 9, where the respondent subsequently backtracks his concession: 
‘but eh witchcraft don’t (cause infertile)’ (line 189).  
  Second, the denials, and especially the concessions regarding the reality of  
witchcraft, come across as non-committal. This is so to begin with because  
respondents construct their responses as uncertain, by means of expressions like ‘I  
don’t think’ (extract 8, line 613, cf. Latour & Woolgar, 1986) and ‘maybe’ (extract 9,  
line 626, extract 9, line 189). In addition, in extract 8, the respondent only implicitly  
suggests that ‘maybe abortions’ (line 626) can be caused by witchcraft . Furthermore,  
her concession appears non committal because she frames it as other people’s  
belief, rather than her own: ‘some people believe witchcraft people can remove  
pregnancies from someone’ (lines 628-629).  
  In so doing, the respondent can be seen to avoid expressing her own opinion.  
She does this as well in response to the interviewer’s probe, ‘what do you think about  
that?’: ‘A:h I  really don’t know, I don’t know’ (line 633). In extract 9, the 
respondent avoids providing his opinion by asking for the interviewer’s: >‘what do 
you think?< (line 190). Withholding a personal opinion is a third feature which 




  Fourth, when the respondent in extract 9 asks for the interviewer’s  
opinion and thus attends to this as relevant (line 190), he can be seen to take into  
account potential (negative) judgements, which suggests as well that non- 
biomedical causes is a sensitive topic. 
 Fifth, the respondent in extract 9 starts his response with laughter, which as 
Jefferson (1984) and Hakaana (2002) have found, commonly accompanies talk about 
topics which are, for some reason, troublesome.  
 Sixth, the respondents treat their disbelief and rejection of the reality of  
witchcraft as accountable (extract 8, lines 616-619, extract 9, line 186). Thereby  
they attend to it as at best not self-evident, at worst dispreferred. Both respondents  
make relevant a biomedical, or scientific, expert identity in their accounts. The  
respondent in extract 9 does this explicitly, by stating ‘we are people of sciences’  
(line 186). In extract 8, the respondent makes relevant category attributes (Sacks,  
1992) associated with the membership category of biomedical expert, namely  
having received ‘nursing training’ (line 616) and having learnt ‘about the biology of  
the reproductive system’ (line 616-617). In so doing, she evokes an identity  
of biomedical expert. By attending to a biomedical, scientific expert identity in  
their accounts for disbelief, the respondents attend to believing in the reality of  
supernatural causes as irreconcilable with being a ‘trained nurse’ or ‘people of  
science’. This suggests that claims regarding non-biomedical causes can form a  
threat for respondent’s identity of biomedical expert. Denying belief in  
witchcraft, or providing ambiguous, non committal responses in terms of other  
people’s beliefs, can be seen as ways in which the respondents deal with and  
inoculate this threat. 
  It is noteworthy however, that the respondents do not straightforwardly  
reject the idea that witchcraft can lead to infertility; there is some ambiguity in their  
responses, which I will address in the next section.  
 
8.4.2 Not dismissing non-biomedical causes 
I have mentioned how the respondent of extract 9 makes relevant other people’s 
beliefs in non-biomedical causes. Other respondents do this as well. Consider 





Extract 8:10  Int. 8 m.a 
354. I Okay I see hmhm. Ehm, are there also any more spiritual or traditional reasons 
355.   why (.) your patients can become infertile. 
356. R Yah other, I don’t know again call it whether spiritual or [whatsoever. 
357. I             [Hm: 
358. R Most of them they just say ah maybe, my wife has been bewitched.  
359. I Uhu.  
360. R You are telling me that, she is able to produce, everything is is quite alright 
361.    and I’m alright and we’re not producing, ·h maybe we have been bewitched. 
 
Extract 8:11 Int. 7 m.d (expat). 
439. I I see. Hm. Ehm and do you yourself think that anymore eh spiritual reasons 
440.    for example like witchcraft or God eh that they can have any influence on 
441.   ehm people’s infertility. 
442. R ·Hh well I cannot relate to infertility as such, but considering the big part that 
443.    it obviously plays in other parts of people’s lives here I would think so, yeah. 
444. I Uhu 
445. R It’s probably the biggest the biggest eh cause that they think (their)selves 
446.    anyway. 
 
Extract 8:12 Int 57 m.a 
117. I  Okay, I see. Yah. (.5) Are there any other main causes you know for 
118.   for infertility? 
119. R Ah there are other ones eh but I am not so sure (what/but) they say eh 
120.   eh it’s traditional.  
121. I Hmhm= 
122. R = (you know/in our) tradition there are some people they believe that 
123.   there are some spells, witchcraft [in which] they do that. But eh (.) in 
124. I          [hmhm]  
125. R  my sense ehm I am not have a concrete thing. But it might be that 
126.   some patients they come, they say it might be I’ve been bewitched 
127.   that’s why I am not have my a children. 
 
In extracts 10 and 11, the respondents are asked about spiritual and traditional  
causes. In extract 12, the respondent is asked an open question about  
other causes of infertility. In response, he addresses witchcraft as a cause. 43  
 A first observation I want to make is that all three respondents answer in terms 
of others’ rather than their own beliefs about witchcraft as cause of infertility. In 
extract 10, the respondent states ‘Most of them they just say ah maybe, my wife has 
been bewitched.’ (lines 358). In extract 11, the respondent refers to ‘the big part’ that 
‘it’ plays in ‘people’s lives here’ (line 442-443). He adds to this: ‘It’s probably the 
biggest the biggest eh cause that they think (their)selves anyway.’ (lines 445). In 
extract 12, the respondent states: ‘they say (…) there are some people they believe 
                                                 
43 This is the only instance in my data in which a biomedical practitioner spontaneously mentions 
witchcraft as a potential cause. It seems of at least potential relevance that this respondent was a 
medical assistant; giving non-biomedical explanations may be less problematic for people working in 




that there are to me spells, witchcraft in which they do that.’ (lines 122-123). The 
focus on other people’s beliefs is noteworthy, especially in extract 11, as the 
interviewer explicitly directs her question at the respondent: ‘do you yourself think 
that’ (line 439). 
  Second, respondents make clear that they are uncertain about the non-
biomedical causes. The respondent in extract 12 explicitly states ‘I am not so sure’ 
(line 119). In addition, by saying ‘in my sense ehm I am not have a concrete thing.’ 
(lines 123-125), he suggests that witchcraft is not a firm fact and thus implies that he 
is uncertain about it as a cause of infertility. In extract 11, the respondent constructs 
his response as uncertain also by the use of the modal ‘would’ and verb ‘think’, in ‘I 
would think’ (line 443, Latour & Woolgar, 1996), and ‘probably’ (line 445). 
Furthermore, it can be argued that the respondents construct the reality of witchcraft 
as a cause of infertility as indeterminate by attending to their patients as uncertain 
themselves. The respondent in extract 10 states that people tell him ‘maybe we have 
been bewitched’ (line 361), the respondent in extract 12 that people say ‘it might be 
I’ve been bewitched’ (line 126).  
 As seen before, the references to others’ beliefs and the characterisation of their 
claims as uncertain make the responses non-committal, that is, the respondents come 
across as not committed to the reality of supernatural causes like witchcraft. 
 Third, the respondents make clear that they lack knowledge about the non-
biomedical causes: ‘I don’t know again’ (extract 10, lines 356), ‘I cannot relate to 
infertility as such’ (extract 11, line 442). These expressions resemble, and appear to 
function as ‘I dunno’ formulations, discussed by Potter (1997) and Wooffitt and 
Widdicombe (2006).  These authors argue that ‘I dunnos’ are a resource for dealing 
with delicate issues. This is so in part because they formulate what follows as 
provisional (Wooffitt & Widdicombe, 2006), and enable speakers to display a 
distance from claims, in particular those which can form the basis for a negative 
assessment (Potter, 1997). As said in section 8.4.1, acknowledging this reality 
appears problematic in the light of respondents’ orientation to their biomedical expert 
identity. 
 Nevertheless, respondents do not explicitly deny the reality of causes like 




extracts 10 to 12, two ways can be identified in which respondents avoid dismissing 
the notion that non-biomedical factors can lead to infertility. First, respondents attend 
to their cultural relevance. They do this by pointing out other people’s beliefs in 
factors such as witchcraft.  In addition, the respondent in extract 12 constructs the 
belief as ‘traditional’ (line 120), and therefore as cultural. Furthermore, the 
respondent in extract 11 attends to the cultural relevance of beliefs by making clear 
that it plays a ‘big part’ (line 442) in ‘people’s lives here’ (line 443). By saying that 
this is ‘obviously’ (line 443) the case, the respondent attends to the significance of 
witchcraft as common knowledge, and emphasizes its relevance.   
 Second, the respondent in extract 10 avoids dismissing the belief in 
supernatural causes by constructing it as reasonable. He does this by providing an 
account for why people can have the idea that they are bewitched: ‘You are telling 
me that, she is able to produce, everything is quite alright and I’m alright and we’re 
not producing’ (lines 360-361). Here, the respondent attends to the situation that no 
biomedical problem has been found in a couple without children, which warrants the 
conclusion that there must be an alternative non-biomedical cause for their fertility 
problem. 
  In extracts 13 and 14, a third way in which practitioners avoid dismissing 
beliefs in non-biomedical causes can be seen. 
 
Extract 8:13 Int. 7 m.d (expat) 
476. I and and you yourself do you think that something like witchcraft or 
477.     infer- eh or God [(    ) 
478. R              [we:ll I do believe, I mean I do believe in that there’s  a 
479.     big stress or psychological factor in in in  eh I mean even, like- I I  know it 
480.     better from a ((home country)) situation, eh where people are just trying trying trying 
481.     trying to get children, they never get children and they try everything and they 
482.    [ try whatever, 
483. I   [yah 
484. R  and they don’t get pregnant, they give up, 
485. I  Uhu 
486. R   they give up trying to get children, and boom they get pregnant. 
487. I  Yah 
488. R  You see that a lot. 
 
Extract 8:14 Int. 9 gyn. (expat). 
572. I  And do you think yourself that there are any more either spiritual or 
573.    traditional factors why people can become infertile sometimes. 
574. R Yah, I I think there are eh I think there’s a strong psychological component in 
575.    infertility. 
576. I Uhu yah. 




578.   either fertile or not fertile. Because a lot of women in the (western home 
579.   country) who tried for a number of years to get pregnant eh adopt, they decide 
580.    to adopt. And then they get pregnant! 
 
The respondents are asked about their opinion about ‘witchcraft’, ‘God’ (extract 13, 
line 476-477) or ‘spiritual or traditional factors’ (extract 14, lines 572-573) as causes 
of infertility.  Both respondents provide an affirmative response: ‘I do believe’ 
(extract 13, line 478) and ‘Yah’ (extract 14, line 574). However, they subsequently 
both re-frame spiritual or traditional causes as stress and psychological factors. In 
extract 13, the respondent states that ‘I do believe in that there’s a big stress or 
psychological factor’ (lines 478-479). In extract 14, the respondent states: ‘I think 
there’s a strong psychological component in infertility.’ (line  574-575). This strategy 
of acknowledging spiritual or traditional causes in terms of stress or psychological 
factors can be seen as another way in which respondents avoid discarding beliefs in 
witchcraft and other non-biomedical causes.  
In this way, the respondents avoid dismissing beliefs in non-biomedical 
causes, in a manner which is reconcilable with their identity of biomedical expert. 
They manage their identity of biomedical expert also by making their claims 
regarding stress and psychological factors as causes of infertility reasonable and 
warranted.  The respondents do this first of all by describing observations which 
sustain their claims, namely of people who try hard to get children, give up and then 
suddenly fall pregnant (extract 13, lines 480-486, extract 14, lines 578 to 580). 
Second, respondents warrant their claims by making clear that their observations 
which sustain them are recurrent: ‘you see that a lot’ (extract 13, line 486) and ‘a lot 
of women’ (extract 14, line 578). Third, in their descriptions, the respondents stress 
the sudden unexpected nature of the pregnancies they observed. In extract 14, the 
respondent does this by her exclaiming intonation when she states ‘and then they get 
pregnant!’ (line 580). In extract 13, the respondent attends to the enduring effort put 
in by people to get children, made relevant by repetition of ‘trying’ (lines 480 and 
486), use of the extreme case formulations in ‘they never get children’ (line 481) and 
‘they try everything’ (line 481), and by pointing out ‘they try whatever’ (line 482). 
This makes the pregnancy all the more unexpected, as does the respondent’s 




respondent refers to the pregnancy as an ‘explosive’ event. By highlighting the 
unexpected nature of the pregnancies, the respondents make it conceivable that an 
alternative, non-physical factor contributed to the fertility problem. Fourth, the 
respondents make clear that their observations are based in their own western home 
country (extract 13, line 480, extract 14, line 578-579). As a result, the respondents 
imply that they have a certain authority to know about these matters, as the 
respondent in extract 14 makes explicit: ‘I know it better from a (name home 
country) situation (line 480).  
The observation that respondents avoid dismissing beliefs in supernatural 
causes, suggests that rejecting these beliefs is problematic. The next extract suggests 
why this could be the case. 
 
Extract 8: 15 Int. 7 m.d, expat ((the respondent has been talking before about witchcraft as cause 
of infertility, and stated that ‘it’s almost impossible for me to (.) even get involved in that’)) 
489. I Get involved in in in what, in-? 
490. R WELL, it’s already difficult to find out because, eh well many people do think 
491.    that that we all think it’s rubbish anyway, 
492. I uhu 
493. R  he, we white doctors here, practicing (.) western medicine.  
494. I Yah 
495. R So they they don’t even tell, or if they tell they start [laughing themselves. 
496. I        [hm: 
497. R Whereas [(.) I do take it seriously, and find it interesting especially, 
498. I  [okay    
 
Before extract 15, the respondent has talked about witchcraft as cause of infertility, 
and has pointed out that it is ‘impossible’ for him ‘to get involved in that’. In his 
explanation for why this is the case, the respondent attends to, and forestalls the 
possibility of being seen as an ethnocentric doctor. The respondent evokes the 
identity category ‘we white doctors practicing western medicine’ (lines 493), and 
argues that ‘many people do think that that we all think it’s rubbish anyway’ (line 
490-491), because of which people ‘don’t even tell’ or ‘start laughing themselves’ 
(line 495). He thus attends to a shared notion that white doctors, like himself, think 
witchcraft is ‘rubbish’, which implies that white doctors are seen as ethnocentric.  
The respondent rejects this assumption as not applying to himself by pointing out ‘I 
do take it seriously, and find it interesting especially’ (line 502). Thereby, it can be 
argued, the respondent portrays himself as culturally ‘open’ and avoids being seen as 




dismissing the idea that non-biomedical factors affect people’s fertility is a strategy 
for western, expatriate doctors to forestall being typified as an ethnocentric doctor, 
without placing their biomedical expertise at risk.  
However, Malawian biomedical practitioners also avoid dismissing non-
biomedical causes. I have shown how respondents attend to beliefs about 
supernatural causes as culturally relevant. It seems reasonable to expect that this 
makes dismissing such beliefs problematic for respondents who are recognizably 
members of the same cultural community. The last extract I want to discuss in this 
chapter, supports this idea.  
 
Extract 8:16 Int. 43 nurse (Malawian) 
894. I H- how do you yourself think about that, can people be bewitched and 
895.    therefore not able to produce. 
896. R For myself?  
897. I uHu 
898. R Hhhuhu ah yes, they can.  
899. I uhu 
900. R You  know, I have been brought up in the village, so (.) I hear those (type), I 
901.    believe also that there also people being bewitched. 
902. I Yah. 
 
The respondent is asked whether she thinks that witchcraft can make people  
unable to produce. The question appears to raise difficulties, considering the  
respondent’s laughter (line 898, Jefferson, 1984; Haakana, 2002) and considering  
that the respondent treats her confirmation that people can be become infertile due to  
witchcraft ( ‘yes, they can’, line 898), as accountable. In her account,  the respondent  
attends to her witchcraft belief as something which she shares with others, and thus  
as something which is common: ‘I believe also’ (line 901). In addition, in her  
explanation for her belief, the respondent makes relevant her village background and  
identity: ‘I have been brought up in the village’ (line 900). This suggests that  
respondents take into account an identity of ‘villager’, or in a wider sense, ‘cultural  
member’, and its accompanying expected and proper attributes when discussing  
witchcraft or other non-biomedical causes of infertility. In other words, it appears  
that at least in some instances, Malawian biomedical practitioners juggle their  
identities of biomedical expert and cultural member when proffering their views on  




   
8.5 Summary and Discussion 
In this chapter, I have shown how both biomedical practitioners and indigenous 
healers make their claims regarding causes of infertility persuasive, often in response 
to mild challenges to their claims. Biomedical practitioners also attend to the basis of 
their knowledge claims. In so doing, they make relevant various CBAs and, thereby, 
work up their identity of medical expert. Hence, the relevance of this identity, and 
expectations that medical experts ought to know about causes, appears to inform the 
rhetorically strong design of the responses. Respondents’ ‘hedging’ can be seen as 
another, more defensive strategy by means of which respondents defend their 
medical expert identity. By signalling minimal commitment to their claims regarding 
causes, respondents can forestall that challenges of their claims lead to negative 
typifications of improper, misinformed medical ‘expert’. I have shown that also 
indigenous healers make their claims about causes persuasive. As it is to be expected 
that also indigenous healers are seen as people who know, and ought to know, about 
causes of infertility, I have argued that also healers’ persuasive design appears 
informed by an identity project of ‘illness expert’. 
 Furthermore, I have shown that biomedical practitioners’ claims about non-
biomedical causes are ambiguous and non-committal. They attend to accepting the 
reality of supernatural causes as being in conflict with being a biomedical expert. At 
the same time, it appears that rejecting non-biomedical causes can problematic as 
well. For expatriate practitioners, this is so because of the risk of being seen as 
ethnocentric, for Malawian practitioners, because of their membership of the culture, 
to which these beliefs are constructed as germane. 
  I have shown then, how both biomedical practitioners and indigenous 
healers’ claims about causes are informed by the interpersonal and interactional 
issues of accountability for claims about causes, in relation to the identity categories 
made relevant by the respondents and accompanying normative expectations. The 
analysis presented contributes to an understanding of the social nature of indigenous 
and biomedical practitioners’ views, as it diverges from treating physicians’ views as 




cosmologies. The analysis also provides new insights into the social nature of 
practitioners’ views and practices regarding infertility. With the exception of Inhorn 
(1994), so far, studies have examined practitioners’ views and practices for their 
normative and moral consequences for the patients.  In this chapter however, I have 
drawn attention to the interpersonal issues at stake for practitioners themselves.   
 The analysis corroborates findings from other conversation analytic (CA) 
studies which have used data from doctor patient interactions. I have already 
described Peräkylä’s (1998) work, which shows how doctors attend to their 
accountability, amongst others ways by making relevant empirical evidence, 
especially when their expertise is challenged. In addition, several of these CA studies 
have shown how expertise is co-constructed and established in doctor-patient 
interactions (Gill, 1998; Maynard, 1991, Pomerantz & Rintel, 2004). Like these 
studies, my analysis shows how medical expertise and expert identities are worked 
up and negotiated in interaction.  
There are also studies, which have not used CA, which have pointed at the 
relevance of medical practitioners’ professional identity for their practices. For 
instance, as mentioned in the introduction, Inhorn (1994) argues that physicians’ 
limited disclosure of information to patients is related to the maintenance of 
professional boundaries. Pinder (1992) points out how for doctors, diagnosing is a 
prestige-enhancing accomplishment, or in other words, a way to demonstrate and 
bolster their professional expertise.  
These findings form other studies suggests that my analytic findings may be 
of relevance for interactions and practices taking place in consultations between 
practitioners in Malawi and people with a fertility problem. I will return to this issue 
which in the discussion of this thesis, when I address potential practical implications 
of the findings of this thesis. 
In my analysis, I treat biomedical and traditional practitioners’ claims as on a 
par, in that they are both social in nature and informed by interpersonal and 
interactional concerns. At the same time, I have also pointed at differences in 
biomedical practitioners’ and indigenous healers’ constructions of causes. For 
instance, addressing non-biomedical causes appears to evoke additional inferential 




instances of indigenous healers hedging their claims. Both the literature on 
indigenous healers and my interview data suggest that healers are monitored by, and 
receive training from hospitals, and are expected to refer their patients to the hospital. 
However, biomedical practitioners are not monitored by healers, do normally not 
receive training from them, nor do they refer their patients to them. This suggests 
that healers face more scrutiny and scepticism regarding their competence than 
biomedical practitioners. This may prevent healers’ from attending to their 
knowledge claims as uncertain, like biomedical practitioners do. I will return to this 
issue in the next chapter.  
Considering that respondents make relevant their expert identities, I will 
examine in the next chapter data in which it seems particularly likely that issues of 
medical expertise and competence are at stake, namely interview extracts in which 







Chapter 9. Establishing professional 
competence  
 
The importance of effective, high quality health-care is widely acknowledged. This 
can be inferred for instance from efforts put in the development of adequate 
assessments of clinical competence and performance (Hays et al., 2002; Norcini, 
2003; Parboosingh, 1998), and the central role of audits and evaluations in 
biomedical practice (Teasdale, 1996). Langer et al. (1998) point out that the quality 
of care is also increasingly being scrutinized in developing countries, in which there 
is a growing call for auditing of care (Maher, 1996; Wagaarachchi, Graham, Penney, 
McCaw-Binns, Antwi & Hall, 2001). 
 Considering the emphasis on the need for high quality, effective care, it is not 
surprising that problems in health care, such as medical errors, non-adherence of 
patients to treatment, patients’ dissatisfaction or problems in doctor-patient 
communication have been widely studied. So far, studies have predominantly 
focussed on the identification of factors which can explain and predict the quality of, 
and problems occurring in, health care (Lutfey, 2005), based on (statistical) analyses 
of clinical records, or data regarding providers’ and users’ views collected in 
interviews or surveys. In addition, in order to assess the quality and style of 
communication between doctors and patients, their interactions have been analysed 
as well, most commonly by means of forms of content analysis, in particular 
‘Interaction Analysis Systems’ (Marks et al., 2000). 
 Explanatory factors put forward for the different problems in health care 
overlap significantly. They can be clustered together into characteristics of doctors 
(e.g. attention or motivation) and patients (e.g. personality, health beliefs); treatment 
factors (e.g. side effects); organisational factors (e.g. waiting time, equipment failure) 
and interactional factors (e.g. patient- or doctor centred communication style) 
(Crossley, 2000; Marks et al., 2000; Department of Health, 2004; Vincent, Taylor-
Adams & Stanhope, 1998; Smith, 2004).  
 The search for objective factors which predict medical failures and problems 
has, largely, precluded attention to providers’ views (D’Ambruoso, Abbey & 




to biomedical practices. The quality of traditional healing has received much 
attention as well, in particular in terms of its effectiveness, including any potential 
harmful effects (Courtright, 1995; Homsey, 1999; Peltzer, Mngqundaniso, Petros, 
2006; Waldram, 2000). However, as Waldram (2000) points out, assessments of the 
efficacy of traditional medicine are normally carried out from a scientific, biomedical 
perspective. Occasionally, patients’ views of efficacy are taken into account, but 
attention to the views of indigenous healers on their successes and failures is lacking 
(op cit.). Nevertheless, it has been argued that (biomedical) practitioners’ views will 
matter for the care they provide (see also chapter 2, section 2.4; Belizan, Villar & 
Belizan, 1979; Lutfey & Ketcham, 2005),  the prevention of problems such as non-
adherence (Lutfey, 2005), and accomplishing changes in the provision of care 
(Langer et al., 2002). Hence, it has been argued that ultimately, biomedical 
practitioners’ views will affect the quality of care (D’Ambruoso et al., 2005; cf. 
Langer et al., 2002;  Langer et al. 1998), and presumably this would hold true for 
indigenous healers’ views as well. It therefore seems useful to examine both 
biomedical and indigenous practitioners’ views of the care they provide, and the way 
they thereby construct problems and successes encountered.  
 There is a second reason why this is of interest. I have shown in the previous 
chapter how traditional and biomedical practitioners attend to, and work up, their 
expert identity when talking about causes of infertility. Questions about successes, 
and in particular failures and problems, appear to bring issues of expertise and 
competence into sharp relief. Whilst successes are in keeping with expected category 
bound attributes of competent practitioners, failures and problems at odds with them, 
and may have highly problematic consequences such as loss of clientele or 
disciplinary actions. The pertinence of such issues is indicated by the reluctance of 
practitioners’, at least those working in the west, to report medical errors (DoH,  
2004; IOM, 2000; Marks et al., 2005), which has been attributed to practitioners’ fear 
of disciplinary actions, litigation and loss of self-esteem (DoH, 2004). Hence, it 
seems worthwhile to examine how professionals manage their competence, when 
talking about quality issues in the care they provide.   
 The analysis presented in this chapter is based on an analysis of practitioners’ 




patients. As the literature reports that biomedical means of treating infertility are 
highly limited in sub Saharan Africa, I was struck in the initial phases of analysis by 
indigenous healers’ recurrent avowals of success in helping infertility clients, and 
their denials that they faced problems in helping these patients. This suggested to me 
that practitioners’ claims could be usefully treated as serving an interpersonal 
function, namely of bolstering their (perceived) competence. Therefore, I decided to 
examine in more detail how both indigenousl healer and biomedical practitioners can 
establish themselves as successful, competent practitioners in talk about successes, as 
well as failures or problems. This chapter will contribute to the argument that 
traditional and biomedical practitioners’ views regarding success, failures and 
problems are of a fundamentally social nature, in that they serve particular 
interpersonal functions. This insight is important because, as is suggested by the 
literature, it is likely that practitioners’ accounts and constructions will have practical 
implications for the quality of care.    
 
9.1 Constructing oneself as successful and competent 
In the first three extracts which I want to discuss, the respondents make relevant their 
success in helping infertility patients. 
 
Extract 9: 1 Int. 38 ind.h 
108. I Cause do you also 
109.       have medicines to help 
110.       the man if he has a 






She is saying do you have 
medicine if a man is, has this 
problem? 
Hm::  
Wakuti kasi muli nayoso 
mankhwala ya mwanalume kuti 
usange wawe wanaproblem iyo 
 
116. T Yes, she has the such 
117.       (medicines). 
118. R 






125.   
126.  
127. T Okay. She says, 
128. she takes two or three 
 
 
I use pounded herbs, they are 
usually 3, after pounding this 
tree, then I sieve very well 
and tell him to put in tea, to put 
in tea, as he goes to sleep he is 
supposed to eat a little roasted 
maize. One week, that’s it, he 
will be on the road. Yes! 
 
 
Nkhuyesa wakupula makuni ya-
kuwapo yalinga yatatu sopara 
napula makuni yala mbwenu 
nkhusefa makola nkhuti waka- 
thire mu tea para wakuthira mu 
tea para wagonenge wakwenera 
kurya tuvingoma twakukazinga 





129. herbs the she pounds 
130. those into flower like 
131. then she advises that 
132. man to take a little 
133. flower and put it into 
134. tea so that whenever 
135. she tastes that tea it 
136. goes  straight and  
137. possibly within a  
138. week or two then he’s  
139. assisted. 
140. I Okay. Oh, that’s quite 
141.       quickly. Yah. 
142. T Hhuhu 
143. I Okay. 
((respondent gets up and walks to a pile of dried roots in the room)) 
146.R Here are the herbs44 Munkhwala wake ni uwu. 
 
Extract 9:2  Int. 5 ind.h  ((Just before the extract, the respondent has discussed how  
she refers people sometimes to the hospital when she fails to help them.)) 
888. I  Yeah. Okay. Good, 
889.         thank you very much 
890.         those were my 




She has finished what she  came 
here for 








So let’s tell her more. If 
someone does not have a 
passage for the baby, we 
can put some medicine in a 
plastic  and blow to make the 
passage straight 
So timphalire vinyake, para 
nthowa walije tikutola 
mankhwala tikuwika mukati 





What kind of plastic? 
Small tubes like the small 
hosepipe 
Plastic yamtundu wuli?  
Tumachubu ngati tumahosipaipi 
tuchoko. 
453.T She says at times when 
454.       the: when there' s  
455.       (imperforation) of the  
456.       vagina she gets the 
457.       drug and puts it in a 
458.       tube which is (passing) 
459.       than then she (.) I mean 
460.       blows of (sort of )  
461.       blowing the drug 
462.       through the (.) the 
463.      vagina so that it can be 
464.       (.) perforated. 
465. I      O::kay. I see= 
466. T     =(           )=   
467. I      =Uhu. Okay. Good. 






[If we do this twice then we stop 
and tell her to continue taking 
the oral medicine when she 
completes this course she 
[Para tapanga kawiri basi 
tuimika tasi kuti amwe waka 
para amala wula akusanga aima 
ananthumbo.  
                                                 




473. discovers that she is pregnant.  
474.T She mostly (does it 
475.     right). Thereafter she 
476.     will send them (observe) 
477.     so she  finds that most 
478.     of the times (that lady 
479.     becomes pregnant ) 
480. I  Okay. I see.  
  
 
Extract 9:3 Int. 43 nurse 
((respondent has just been asked whether patients follow her advice, and answered that she does not 
 know as patients ‘don’t come back’ and ‘there’s no way we follow them’)) 
760. I No, you don’t get any feedback about where [they’re going or what’s  
761. R                  [no: no no 
762. I happening. 
763. R No. 
764. I yah 
765. R there are a few, the one I remember that one is a primary school teacher. 
766. I Uhu yah 
767. R After I had counselled, I have done everything, she was just okay. Then I 
768.    (palpated), then I  said can you follow your fertility awareness days. I 
769.    explained I gave the calendar method. After, she phoned, she became 
770.    pregnant. 
771. I Okay 
772. R The last thing I saw she brought a child. Now calling her that child, she was a 
773.    girl, my name.  
774. I O::h. 
775. R She always (came to ask me) my name. I forgot about your name, this child I 
776.    should give your name. It’s the one who (here I knew) she gave me the 
777.    feedback. 
 
The responses in the extracts above have several features in common. First, all three 
of the respondents make relevant successful outcomes: they point out that their 
patients’ fertility problems are solved.  In extract 1, the respondent describes how 
when she treats men, ‘in one week, that’s it, he will be on the road’ (lines 125-126). 
Hence, she makes clear that a man’s fertility problems will be solved, and moreover, 
that they will be solved quickly. In extracts 2 and 3, both respondents refer to 
patients who became pregnant (extract 2, lines 472- 473; extract 3, line 769-770).  
  A second feature which the responses share is that the respondents construct 
the successful outcome as contingent on their actions (cf. Pomerantz, 1978). They do 
this by first describing their actions (extract 1, lines 118-125; extract 2, lines 444-449 
and 469-472; extract 3, lines 767-768), and then using the temporal adverbs 
‘whenever’, ‘when’ and ‘after’ to connect the successful outcome to their actions. In 
extract 1, the interpreter mentions that ‘whenever she tastes that tea (…) with a week 




follows the moment of tasting of the tea. Likewise, in extract 2, the respondent states 
that ‘when she completes this course she discovers that she is pregnant’ (lines 471-
473), thereby making clear that the pregnancy follows in time the (completion of) the 
course of medication.  In extract 3, the respondent states that ‘after’ (lines 767, 769) 
her interventions and advice, the patient phoned to say that she is pregnant (line 769). 
The respondent thus makes clear that the (announced) pregnancy occurred after her 
interventions.   
   By making relevant their success, and constructing this as contingent on their 
actions, the respondents can be seen to portray themselves as competent 
practitioners.  
9.2 Making claims of success and competence persuasive  
The respondents in extracts 1 to 3, can be seen to use several devices, by means of 
which they make their claims of success factual and persuasive. First, in extracts 1 
and 2, the respondents provide various details regarding their treatment, for instance 
about the number of herbs used (‘three’, extract 1, line 113), how medicines are 
administered (‘pounded’, ‘put in tea’, extract 1, lines 118-121; taken together with ‘a 
little roasted maize’, extract 1, line 124-125; blown through ‘a plastic’, extract  2, 
line 448), when they should be taken (‘as he goes to sleep’, extract 1, line 122) and 
how often (‘twice’ extract 2 line 469). By providing these details, respondents 
demonstrate their knowledge regarding treatment for infertility. The respondent in 
extract 1 reinforces this by showing the medicine to the interpreter and interviewer 
(line 146), and thus giving empirical evidence of her knowledge and possession of 
medicine which can cure men’s infertility. 
   Second, in extract 3, the respondent demonstrates her knowledge of treating 
infertility by using relatively formal and specialist terms, such as ‘fertility awareness 
days’ (line 768) and ‘the calendar method’ (line 768). Thereby she makes relevant 
her knowledge of standardized, accepted methods of treating infertility, and thus 
sustains, and makes more persuasive, her claim of success and competence.   
  Third, in extract 3, the respondent points out that ‘the last thing I saw, she 
brought a child’ (line 771). By referring to her own direct observations, she provides 




  Fourth, the respondent makes her construction of her interventions being 
successful convincing by pointing out that her client wanted to name her baby after 
her: ‘now calling her that child, she was a girl, my name.’ (lines 771) and ‘she 
always (came to ask me) my name (…) this child I should give your name’ (lines 
773-774). Here, the respondent uses a form of corroboration (Potter, 1996), in that 
she puts forward a ‘witness’ who acknowledges and supports her claims regarding 
successful interventions, thereby making it more persuasive. 
  Fifth, in extract 1, the interpreter makes the respondent’s claim persuasive as 
well.  He translates the respondent’s claim that ‘one week, that’s it, he’ll be on the 
road’ as ‘possibly within a week or two, then he will be assisted’ (lines 139-141). 
‘Within a week or two’ tones down the swiftness of the cure achieved, ‘possibly’ 
characterises the cure, or the time scale, as uncertain. Hence, the interpreter plays 
down the efficacy of the respondent’s medication. In so doing, he can be seen to 
bolster it against sceptical reactions, which the claim that patients are ‘on the road’ 
within ‘one week’ could invoke. Consequently, the interpreter makes the claim of 
success more persuasive. Nevertheless, the interpreter still makes clear that the 
respondent’s patients will be helped quickly, as can be inferred as well from the 
interviewer’s reaction in lines 140-141, when she states: ’Oh that’s quite quickly’. 
 Especially in extract 2, the respondent’s portrayal of success and the design 
of this claim as persuasive appears to be touched off by the interactional context. Just 
before the extract, the respondent mentioned how she sometimes fails to help 
infertility patients. Thereby she arguably opened herself up to doubts regarding her 
competence, in particular because immediately thereafter the interviewer and 
interpreter indicate that the interviewer has obtained enough information (‘she has 
finished what she came here for’), and initiate closure of the conversation (lines 438-
443). The respondent can be seen to inoculate herself from doubts regarding her 
competence by re-opening the conversation with ‘so let’s tell her more’ (line 444) 
and making relevant her success, in a persuasive manner. 
In extract 4 too, the respondent bolsters his claim of success when it appears 
to be doubted.  
 




825. I And, but so do 
826.       you usually manage to 
827.       (.) help people who 
828.       come to you who (.) 
829.       want to have children, 
830.       do they usually 
831.       succeed in having 
832.       children after they 







 [She says, from the people do they get uh  
children? The people you help? 
That is why you see a lot of friendship. They 
come with the children. If you help eleven 
people to bear children, is  that not a lot? 
839. T He’s saying that he has 
840.       helped eleven out of- from the eleven 















=Have you helped eleven people only?  
Here in Mangochi I can say that I have helped 
eleven but in Makanjira Ihh=.. 
=How many have not been successful? In 
your whole life how many people have been  
unsuccessful in bearing children? 
A lot. 
Are there some who have failed? The ones 
who have been unable to bear children? 
The ones who have failed to have children. 
Ye::s.  
They are there? 
They are there, but there are three of them 
855.T 
856.R  
857. T So he’s saying that he has helped 
858.       eleven people to have 
859.      [children. 
860. I     [hmhm 
861. T    Those have successfully now bear 
862.       (.)  
863. I Hmhm= 
864. T =children. 
865. I Yah. 
866. T But only possibly three of them e:h 
867.      failed to have. [Children. 
868. I          [Okay. 
869. T Yes. 
870. I That’s a very h[igh success r-hhu-ate. 
871. T            [possibly  
872. T hhhahaha. 
873. I Hm:: 





Asked whether the people he helps ‘get children’ (line 834-839), the respondent 
makes clear that he is successful in solving fertility problems. He does this explicitly 
when he refers to successful outcomes (‘they come with children’, line 837; ‘if you 




you see a lot of friendship’ (line 836). As the respondent has just been asked whether 
the people he helps get children (line 828), he can be seen to imply that the 
friendship, is due to his successful assistance.  
The respondent uses several discursive devices to make his claim of success 
persuasive. First, his use of numerical detail ‘eleven people’ (line 838) strengthens 
the factuality of his claim of his success (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996a; 
Wooffitt, 1992). Second, the respondent uses a rhetorical question to make clear that 
his success is considerable: ‘if you help eleven people, is that not a lot?’ (line 838-
839). The question is rhetorical, in part because it is treated as not in need of an 
answer by the interpreter, who immediately translates it as a statement ‘he has helped 
eleven’ (line 841). Therefore, the question has as function to make a point, namely 
that having helped eleven people is ‘a lot’, rather than to ask a question. Hence, the 
respondent establishes his success rate as high. Third, when this construction is 
challenged by the interpreter, who says ‘have you helped eleven people only?’ (line 
843), the respondent upgrades his success rate. He does this by providing additional 
information: ‘Here in Mangochi I can say that I have helped eleven, but in Makanjira 
I’ (line 844-845). Thereby the respondent reframes the eleven people he helped as 
only part of his success, and implies that his total success rate is larger than ‘only’ 
eleven.  
Fourth, the respondent sustains his construction of success rate as high by 
pointing out, when asked (line 849-851), that the number of failures is significantly 
smaller. Asked ‘how many have been unsuccessful’ in his life (line 849), the 
respondent states initially ‘a lot’ (line 849). However, in response to the interpreters’ 
probe, ‘are there some who have failed?’ (line 850), the respondent heavily tones 
down ‘a lot’ into the ‘there are three of them’ (line 855). As in line 838, the 
numerical detail makes the respondent’s claim persuasive, also because it contrasts 
with the more vague description ‘a lot’. In addition, three is a small, but reasonable 
number, and therefore makes the respondent’s claim more realistic than ‘1’ or ‘none’ 
would have done. The interpreter attends to three as ‘few’ by contrasting it, by means 
of the contrast marker ‘but’, with the eleven success cases: ‘he has helped eleven 




have children’ (line 870-871). In addition, he portrays three as a small number by 
saying ‘only’ (line 867).  
 Hence, the respondent constructs himself as successful, and makes this 
convincing, in part when challenged. The interviewer’s upshot in line 871-872 
sustains this analysis of the respondent’s establishment of himself as being highly 
successful. As Watson and Heritage (1984) have pointed out, upshots select and 
propose the meaning of the preceding utterances, in this case that the respondent’s 
success rate is high: ‘that’s a very high success r-hhu-ate’ (line 874).  
 However, some further observations show that constructions of success are 
not necessarily taken at face value. In line 872, whilst the interviewer produces an 
assessment of the respondent’s success rate as high, the interpreter comes in, saying 
‘possibly’. Thereby he calls into question the respondent’s high success rate. The 
interviewer appears to pick up on this by her (sniggering) laughter towards the end of 
her assessment: ‘success r-hhu-ate’, which is followed by the interpreter’s laughter 
(line 873). The laughter makes the assessment hearable as ironic, and implies that the 
respondent’s claim of success is not straightforwardly accepted.  
In conclusion, at least some respondents construct themselves as successful in 
solving fertility problems, and thus as competent practitioners. In some instances, 
they do this when it can be inferred that their competence may be doubted. This 
suggests that the respondents have a stake in coming across as skilful practitioners. It 
is noteworthy that only extract 3 is from an interview with a biomedical practitioner; 
the others are from interviews with indigenous healers. In addition, extract 3 is the 
only extract in which the respondent attends to her success in a specific case, 
whereas in all other extracts, the respondents make relevant their success in general. 
This appears to reflect a more general pattern in the data. There are seven45 
indigenous healers who point at their success in treating infertility patients, and six 
biomedical practitioners. All of the seven indigenous healers, who point at their 
success in solving their patients’ fertility problems, make clear that they are in 
general46 able to cure infertility, whereas of the six biomedical practitioners who 
acclaim their success, four make clear that they have been successful in specific 
                                                 
45 For a discussion of issues involved in counting, see chapter 10.  
46 ‘In general’ does not mean that these respondents indicate that they always solve fertility problems, 




cases. It thus seems that indigenous healers attend to their success more frequently 
than biomedical practitioners, and construct it as more widespread. I will return to 
this issue in the next section.  
 
9.3 Dealing with questions about problems in the provision of 
care 
 
Having shown how respondents construct themselves, persuasively, as successful 
and competent, I will now examine extracts in which respondents deal with questions 
about problems in helping patients. Such questions appear particularly interesting as 
they can be seen to, literally, question the respondents’ competence.  
 
9.3.1 Rejecting disappointment 
In extracts 5 and 6, the respondents are asked about whether their patients are ever 
disappointed with the help they get.  
   
Extract 9:5 Int. 30 TBA (respondent has just said that her patients are satisfied with her advice 
because ‘what they look for, they find it’) 
283. I Have you also ever 
284.       experienced that 
285.       your patients were 








She says (.) ’Are there some 
that g- (.) et disappoint (.) some 
others that say; ‘ah (.) yah, (.) 
somehow these people, ah 
(.)they are not really that 
helpful.’ Are they there? 
Akuti (.) ‘Plai wena amene a- 
(.)makhum(.)wena wake 
amati; ‘ah,(.) tja, komabe 





295. I  Okay.47 
No, I should not lie. There are 
none. 
 
Aiyi, ndisaname. Palibe. 
((interviewer moves on to next topic)) 
   
Extract 9:6 Int. 8 m.a 
287. I Hmhm okay. Hmhm. And ehm, ·HH so you said that often they are quite 
288.    happy with what you tell them because it’s new information for them, 
289.    ehm have you also seen any time that peop- patients are disappointed 
290.    with what  you can do for them? 
291. R Yah, most of the times, to me I have never seen the patients eh being 
292.    disappointed.  
293. I Okay. 
294. R Just because most of the times I do tell them about the physiology of their 
295.    body 
296. I Yeah. 
                                                 




297. R And they are very much happy to hear since it is the first time to them. 
 
Both respondents are asked whether their patients are ever disappointed in the help 
given by the respondents. In extract 5, the interviewer’s question is translated as 
whether there are people who say ‘somehow these people, eh (.) they are not really 
that helpful’ (lines 290-292). ‘These people’ appears to refer to the TBA, or similar 
practitioners. In extract 6, the respondent is asked whether he has ‘also seen that 
patients are disappointed with what you can do for them’ (lines 289-290).  
   Note that this question about patients’ disappointment in the respondents’ care 
forms, at least potentially, a problem for the respondents. For, ‘proper’, competent 
health practitioners are expected to provide health care which is, at least overall, 
satisfactory, both according to ‘objective’ standards and from a patient perspective. 
In other words, disappointing patients, certainly when this is related to the assistance 
offered, is at odds with certain category bound activities of practitioners, such as 
providing satisfactory care. 
   The respondents appear to deal with the problem posed by the question in 
several ways. Both respondents deny that they disappoint their patients, first of all by 
means of direct denials: ‘No’, ‘There are none’ (extract 5, line 293-294) and ‘I have 
never seen the patients eh being disappointed’ (extract 6, line 291-292). Second, in 
extract 6, the respondent makes clear that patients are not disappointed by claiming 
the opposite: they ‘are very much happy’ (line 297). 
  The respondents make their claims persuasive. In extract 5, the respondent 
says ‘I should not lie.’ (line 293). By framing what she says as not a lie, she stresses 
its veracity. In extract 6, the respondent accounts for his claim that his patients are 
happy: ‘I do tell them about the physiology of their body’ (line 294-295), about 
which ‘they are very much happy to hear since it is the first time to them’ (line 297). 
Hence, the respondent explains the basis for his claim about his patients’ happiness 
and lack of disappointment, thereby making it convincing. In addition, the 
respondent makes clear that it is his actions (i.e. the providing of certain information) 
which make patients happy, which aids the construction of his care as being not 
disappointing. Furthermore, the respondents use extreme case formulations (ECFs), 
namely ‘none’ (extract 5) and ‘never’ (extract 6) in the denials. In extract 5, ‘never’ 




out, ECFs make the claim persuasive, and are used especially when a sceptical 
response is anticipated. In both extracts 5 and 6, there are grounds for taking into 
account the possibility that the interviewer is sceptical regarding the respondents’ 
claims. Both respondents mentioned before that their patients are satisfied, as pointed 
out in extract 6 by the interviewer: ‘you said that often they are quite happy with 
what you tell them’ (line 288). As in a sense, the respondents have already answered 
the interviewer’s question about whether their patients are disappointed, it can be 
inferred that the interviewer may be sceptical about the veracity of the respondents’ 
claims.      
   By persuasively denying that their patients are disappointed by their 
assistance, the respondents forestall the inference that their care is seen as inadequate 
and thus, it can be argued, that their competence is doubted. 
  
9.3.1 Making oneself not accountable for problems  
Nevertheless, respondents do acknowledge at times the occurrence of troubles in 
helping infertility patients. However, as I will show, respondents account for these 
problems in a way that they cannot be held responsible for them. Consider extracts 7 
and 8.  
 
Extract 9:7 Int. 32 c.o 
630. I Okay, yah. Hm. If you would have to give a very rough 
631.   estimation about how often can you help these patients, how 
632.    often can you solve their problem? 
633. R  E- e- we have seen that the prognosis of such people is very low, very low. 
634.    The chance of having children is very low. 
630. I Okay. Yah, so mostly you can’t. 
631. R You cannot solve the problem. Whatever we, we do have because we 




Extract 9:8 Int. 50 ind.h 
725. I Okay, yah. Ehm, 
726.       are there any problems 
727.       you are faced with 
728.       when you are trying to 
729.       help this kind of 




She says is there any other 
problem that you meet/face 
Bati pali suzgo linyakhe ilo 






when you are helping an 
unproductive person? 

















Uhh (.) ah (.) problem (.) 
Apart from those that you said 
those (     ) 
We meet problems. Meeting the 
(.) problem is like this, me, I 
know medicine that help a 
person to the point of having a 
child. But it happens that (.) 
others, with that same tree that 
I used to cure the other patient, 
that is it (.) to this other 
person, that (.) is also 
unproductive, that is it,(.) it (.) 
does not work again! 
Uhh (.)ah (.) suzgo (.) 
Apart from yara 
mwanguyowoya yara (      ) 
Suzgo tikusangana nazo. 
Kusangana na.(.) suzgo kukuba 
kwakuti nthe, ine, nkhumanya 
mankhwara yakuti munthu 
mupaka wababe mwana. Kwene 
pakuza sangika kuti (.) 
anyakhe, na khuni lira 
nachizgira munyawo lira, 
mbwenu (.) kwa uyu munyakhe 
uyu, naw (.)wakulekaso 
kubaba uyu, mbwenu,(.) liku 
(.)ligwira ntchito cha! 








Is it something to do with the 
blood, or what? The blood 
according to person, is it? 
It is like this; as for some of 
them, they are those that have 
not been productive for a long 
time. 
Vikukhwafya na mu ndopa, 
panyakhe mu vichi?... Ndopa 
umu yiliri ya munthu, eti ? 
Pali nthe; para banyakhe, 


















Now, ther: women and we men, 
are different.  
Hm 
Women, if they have not been 
productive for a long time, 
Hm 
The hous- we say that; “The 
house has fallen.” 
Hm 
Yes. So although you may look 
for medicine there, she can’t 
heal! That is it, that one  also 
just stays like that, like that.  
Hm 
Sono, paa.(.) anakazi na 
tabanalume, tikupambana. 
Hm 
anakazi, para baleka kubaba 
panji nyengo yitali, 
Hm 
nyu-. tikuyowoya kuti;  
“Nyumba yawa.” 
Hm 
Eeh. So nawuli ungapenja 
munkhwala para, wangachira 
cha! Mbwe yura nayo wakhara 
nthe, nthee. 
776. I Okay. 
777. R   
778. T Okay, he says at times 
779.       there are some women 
780.       who can – ladies who 
781.       do have a child maybe, 
782.       some past years, 
783.       maybe 10 or 15 years 
784.       ago. 








786. T He had a child. 
787. I Uhu. 
788. T But from there, he 
789.       have been (hard) 
790.       finding a boy to have 
791.       another child with. 
792. I uhu 
793. T So, as long as the 
794.       period is very (    ), 
795.        very (wrong/long) like 
796.        that, that lady will not 
797.        have a child again just 
798.        because his 
799.        reproductive organ is 
800.        maybe bad to what, I 
801.        can say, is over, 
802. I [Uhu 
803. T  [time for her to have a 
804.        child, is over. 
805. I Okay, yah.  
806. T So, no matter you can 
807.       try this [medicine  
808. I                  [Hm 
809. T     and that, you not do 
810.        anything,  
811. I Okay, yah. 
812. T which means that lady 
813.       will just turn this one 
814.       a failure, while she is a 
815.       failure.  
816. I  Yah, okay, so 
817.       sometimes it’s a 
818.       problem to help 
819.       someone if she is 
820.       basically too old to 




Both respondents attend to the problem of failing to solve people’s infertility. In 
extract 7, asked for a rough estimation of ‘how often can you help these patients’ 
(line 631), the respondent points out that ‘the prognosis of such people is very low, 
very low. The chance of having children is very low’ (line 633-634). Thereby implies 
that he cannot often solve fertility problems. In extract 8, the respondent refers to the 
problem of not being able to cure a patient when he states that  ‘it happens’ that his 
‘tree’, ‘does not work again’ (line 748), ‘she can’t heal’(lines 773-774) and ‘that one 
also just stays like that, like that’ (line 775).   
  Both respondents account for why (certain) fertility problems do not  
get solved, in which they attribute, in several ways, not curing infertility to the kind  




respondent states ‘we cannot change how their body is making the cells’ (line 636- 
637). Thereby the respondent implies that infertility, at least infertility which he  
cannot cure, is due to the way the body makes cells, and thus due to people’s  
physical constitution. Second, in extract 8, the respondent states ‘women and men,  
are different’ (line 763), and points out that ‘if women have not been productive for a  
long time (line 766-767), ‘she can’t heal’ (line 773-774). Thus, the respondent  
suggests that, at least in part, people’s sex, and hence their biological make-up,  
determines the solvability of fertility problems. Third, by describing the condition of  
women who have not been productive for a long time as ‘the house has fallen’ (line 
769-770), the respondent makes the problem literally, into a problem of the physical  
foundation or constitution. Furthermore, the interpreter attends to incurable cases of  
infertility as a matter of people’s physical make-up, when he speaks about ‘his [her]  
reproductive organ is maybe bad to what, I can say is over’ (line 799-801).  
 By constructing (certain) fertility problems as due to people’s physical  
constitution, the respondents imply that failure to solve such  fertility problems is not  
related to their own actions.  The respondents make this clear in other ways as well. 
First, the respondents construct (certain) fertility problems as impossible to solve.  
In extract 7, the respondent states: ‘you cannot solve the problem’ (line 636) and   
‘we cannot change’ (line 637). Similarly, in extract 8, the respondent says ‘she can’t  
heal’ (line 773-774). Second, in extract 7, the respondent points out that you can’t  
solve the problem, ‘whatever we, we do have’  (line 636), which can be taken to  
mean either ‘whatever we do’ , or ‘whatever medicine we have’. In either case, the  
respondent makes clear that not curing a fertility problem is independent of treatment  
given.  In extract 8, the respondent does this by stating ‘although you may look for  
medicine there, she can’t heal!’ (line 772-774). In addition, when he mentions that  
medicine ‘used to cure the other patient’ (line 744) does not work with others, and  
that he knows ‘medicine that help a person up to the point of having a child’ (line  
739-742), the respondent makes clear that he is in principle able to cure  
infertility. Consequentially, he portrays failure to do so as unrelated to his treatment.  
The interpreter in extract 8 attends to failure to cure as being independent of  
the respondent’s medication in his translation: ‘no matter you can try this medicine  




  It is worth noting that the respondents use the pronoun ‘we’ in several 
instances:  ‘we have seen’ that the prognosis is very low (extract 7, line 633), 
‘whatever we, we do’, ‘we cannot change’ (extract 7, line 636), ‘we meet problems’ 
(extract 8, line 738), and ‘we say that, the house is fallen’ (extract 8, line 769-770). 
‘We’ can be seen to fulfil two functions in these extracts. First, it makes respondents’ 
claim more convincing, as it is a form of corroboration (Edwards & Potter, 1992; 
Potter, 1996), a discursive technique of putting forward ‘witnesses’ who support 
one’s claims. Hence, by using ‘we’, the respondents make their claims, that chances 
of solving fertility problems are low, cells cannot be changed and  that ‘the house is 
fallen’,  into shared factual knowledge rather than subjective opinions.  Second, ‘we’ 
makes clear that the problem of not curing infertility is faced by practitioners in 
general, or at least several practitioners, rather than just themselves. Therefore, the 
use of ‘we’ aids respondents’ construction of failure to cure infertility as independent 
of their own interventions. In extract 8, the idiom ‘the house is fallen’ serves the 
same dual functions. An idiom can be seen as a cultural manner of expression, and is 
attended to as such by the respondent when he precedes it with ‘we say that’ (line 
769). Thus, by using the idiom, the respondent constructs the idea that certain 
fertility problems are fundamental and definite as consensual, cultural common 
sense. As a result, his claim becomes more convincing (cf. Drew & Holt, 1988), and 
is portrayed as valid for practitioners in general, making the incurability of certain 
fertility problems independent of the respondent’s actions. In extract 7, the 
respondent’s reference to ‘prognosis’ (line 633) has the same effect. As prognoses 
are derived from statistical analysis of a number of cases, talking about a bad 
prognosis conveys the notion that infertility is in general found to be difficult to cure, 
and not just in the respondent’s case. By implication, the respondent suggests that the 
difficulty in curing infertility is not due to a problem with his own medical 
interventions. 
By constructing failure to solve fertility problems as due to the physical 
make-up of some infertility patients, and making clear that the incurability is 
independent of their treatment, the respondents make themselves not accountable for 
failure to solve patients’ infertility. As a result, they prevent that the failures are seen 




extract 8 explicitly attends to, and rejects, the idea that the respondent is seen as a 
‘failure’, and thus as incompetent, due to not solving (some) fertility problems. In 
line 812-815, he states this ‘lady will just turn this one a failure, while she is a 
failure’. ‘This one’ can be taken to refer to the healer. Here, the interpreter can be 
seen to use a reality-appearance device (Edwards, 1991; Eglin, 1987; Wetherell & 
Potter, 1997), by means of which he makes failure on behalf of the healer into the 
apparent reality, with failure on behalf of the patient into the ‘real’, underlying 
reality. In other words, he diverts accountability away from the healer to the patient 
and forestalls the perception that the healer is incompetent because of not being able 
to cure (certain) infertility patients.  
  Note that in extract 7, the respondent attends to the problem of solving  
fertility problems of ‘such people’ in general, whereas in extract 8, the respondent  
restricts the issue to a specific kind of fertility patient, namely women ‘who have not  
been productive for a long time’ (line 759-761).  Hence, the respondent in extract 7  
constructs failure to solve fertility problems as more widespread than the respondent  
in extract 8, who moreover, also draws attention to the possibility, and his ability, to  
solve fertility problems (lines 739-742, 744). The respondent in extract 7 is a  
biomedical practitioner, and the respondent in extract 8 a traditional healer. Again,  
these observations appear to reflect a more general pattern in the interview data I  
collected. Only three healers talk about their failure to solve fertility problems, and  
all three make clear that their failures pertain to specific (types of) patients. However,  
eight biomedical practitioners point at their inability to solve fertility problems, and  
all eight make this pertain to infertility in general. I will return to this issue in the  
discussion of this chapter. 
  In the next two extracts, another way in which respondents attribute problems 
to their patients, and thereby make themselves not accountable for them can be 
observed.  
 
Extract 9: 9 Int. 62 c.o  
417. I  I was wondering what, infertility is that from your perspective very difficult to treat or 
418.    good to treat? 
419. R It’s easy.  
420. I It’s easy. 
421. R It’s easy. 




423. R Because you depend on first of all examining the woman or the client, 
424.    whoever it is, examine urine, stool, blood for VDRL, and then you can 
425.    decide from there. But if at all he really obeys the rules of medicine, there 
426.    will be no problem. No problem. Because they usually, they get 
427.    infected. After the infection you want to clear the infection away, but they will mix. 
428.    You see that’s where we get the problem. They will get the medicine okay from the 
429.    hospital but when they go home they will try the herbalist. So they cannot go well if 
430.    they mix this and that. 
431. I Okay. That’s a problem if they mix medicine from the traditional healer and the hospital. 
432.  R Uhu. 
 
Extract 9:10 Int. 9 gyn (expat.) ((respondent is responding to question ‘ehm are there any other 
kinds of communication problems or  misunderstanding you sometimes encounter of which you can 
give me some examples?’)) 
482. R Ehm, the other thing is ehm hhu, sometimes like this was more like in  
483.    ((X))48 I think that- because you might say to them,  I’ve been doing this for 
484.    twelve years you know, hhuhu and there’s always this misunderstanding in 
485.    ((X)) where I I’ll be talking to the nurses and and or you know I’ll have to 
486.    ask the nurse to translate and I’ll say you know we have to tell them that the 
487.    sperm analysis is abnormal and probably a lot of the problem has to do with 
488.    the with the husband and they’ll say well it’s very hard for the husband to 
489.    accept that. And than I’ll go well, pfff ((laughs)) ((smiley voice)) I’m sorry 
490.    it’s very hard for the husband to accept it, but I (.) you know I can only, you 
491.    know, I only just have my work here as a doctor 
492. I yeah 
493. R you know I can’t really, I don’t know how to help somebody accept something  
494. I No 
495. R That I think is true and that they can’t accept. So I‘ll say I’m so sorry I’m just 
496.    a doctor and I can’t, he ca-  they came here because they wanted to have a 
497.    baby, I’m doing the best I can and if he can’t accept it, then he can’t accept it 
498.   , I mean I can’t help as I’m at the end of my, what I can do, okay. 
 ((some lines omitted)) 
529.    I   Yah yah yah and that’s of course yah the end of your limits and if if they can’t 
530.            deal with that then eh you can’t help them really 
 
In extract 9, the respondent is asked whether infertility is difficult to treat, in extract 
10, the interviewer asks specifically about ‘communication problems or 
misunderstandings’ encountered. Note that although the respondent is not asked 
about her ability to solve patients’ fertility problems, it is to be expected that 
communication problems can lead to problematic inferences as well. This is so 
because competent practitioners ought to communicate well with their patients.    
 In their replies, both respondents acknowledge that they experience problems, 
and they do so in a way that they make themselves not accountable for them.  
They do this first of all because of the nature of the particular problems they 
describe. In extract 9, the respondent refers to patients mixing medication: ‘they will 
                                                 




mix. You see that’s where we get the problem’ (line 427-4428) and ‘so they cannot 
go well if they mix this and that’ (line 429-430). In extract 10, the respondent 
mentions a ‘misunderstanding’ (line 484), namely that when she asks nurses to 
translate for patients that their sperm is abnormal and that ‘probably a lot of the 
problem has to do’ with the husband, they will tell her ‘well it’s very hard for the 
husband to accept that’ (lines 488-490).  
 Mixing types of medication, and not accepting a diagnosis, are both problems 
for which patients can be held more readily accountable than practitioners.  In 
general, patients are expected to adhere to and accept a doctor’s advice regarding 
medication or diagnosis (cf. Parsons, 1951). In addition, according to common sense 
understandings, practitioners can exert limited influence on whether patients mix 
medication, or accept their diagnosis. 
 Second, the respondents imply that their patients rather than they themselves 
are accountable for problems encountered by constructing their patients as 
predisposed to respectively mix (extract 9) and not accept a diagnosis (extract 10).  
They do this by using what Edwards (1995, p. 319) has called ‘script formulations’, 
which are descriptions which characterize actions or events as recurring and 
predictable. The respondents use several of the scripting devices which Edwards 
(1995) has identified. For instance, the respondents use temporal adverbs like 
‘usually’ (extract 9, line 440) and ‘always’ (extract 10, line 485), and verb forms 
with an iterative aspect, in particular ‘will’, to refer to the problems which they 
address. Hence, the respondent in extract 9 states ‘they will mix’ (line 430), ‘they 
will get the medicines okay from the hospital’ (line 448-429), and ‘they will try the 
herbs’ (line 429). The respondent in extract 10 says ‘they [will] say’ that its hard for 
the husband to accept (line 488), and ‘and then I’ll go well, pf:::’  (line 489) and ‘I’ll 
say I’m so sorry’ (line 495). In addition, the respondent in extract 10 uses an implicit 
if-then construction: ‘when [if] they go home [then] they will try the herbalist’ (line 
429). Such a construction suggests a law-like regularity in patients’ trying of the 
herbalist (cf. Edwards, 1995).  
  Furthermore, the respondent in extract 10 portrays patients’ behaviour as 
scripted by constructing men’s problems with accepting the diagnosis that ‘a lot of 




issue in a specific African country: ‘this was more like in (X)’ (lines 482-483) and 
‘there’s always this misunderstanding in (X)’ (line 485). In addition, in lines 484 to 
485, the respondent says ‘I’ve been doing this for twelve years you know’. Before, 
she explained that she worked for 12 years in this other African country. Hence, the 
respondent can be seen to make relevant that she possesses specific ‘insider 
knowledge’ due to an enduring stay in the setting. As a result, she makes the 
phenomenon she describes into a cultural issue, for the understanding and 
explanation of which local knowledge is useful, if not necessary. By constructing 
men’s inability to accept a diagnosis as cultural, the respondent portrays it as 
common, shared and thus recurrent and predictable (see also chapter 4).  
 As authors like Edwards (1995) and Smith (1978) have pointed out, 
descriptions of practices as recurrent and predictable make available inferences about 
the disposition of the actors. Likewise, I argue that, by using script formulations the 
respondents construct their patients’ mixing of medicine and lack of acceptance as 
being due to some (cultural) disposition on behalf of their patients. Consequently, the 
respondents themselves cannot be held accountable for these problems, and they do 
not reflect badly upon their competence.  
  The respondents can be seen to attend to their own  lack of accountability for 
the problems experienced. First, the respondent in extract 9 makes clear that that 
there is no problem with the treatment which he gives to patients. He does this when 
he states ‘They will get the medicine okay from the hospital’ (line 428-429). As the 
respondent is a health practitioner who works in a hospital, he can be seen to imply 
that his own medication as ‘okay’. The respondent reinforces the problem free status 
of his treatment by constructing treating infertility as ‘easy’ (lines 419, 421), and by 
pointing out that if a patient ‘obeys the rules of medicine, there is no problem’ (line 
425-426). Hence, the respondent constructs problems in solving fertility problems as 
dependent on the behaviour of the patient rather than on his own medical 
interventions, or ‘the rules of medicine’, and makes himself not accountable for 
them.  
Second, the respondents attend to their lack of accountability by suggesting 
that the problems they encounter, and solving it, falls outwith their realm, or 




states ‘I only just have my work here as a doctor’ (line 492), ‘I’m just a doctor, I 
can’t-’ (line 496-497). She thus makes relevant her identity as doctor, and makes 
clear that this has implications for the kind of work she can do. More specifically, the 
respondent makes clear that dealing with the problem of patients being unable to 
accept a diagnosis is not a category bound activity of the identity category ‘doctor’. 
She does this when stating: ‘I don’t know how to help someone accept something’ 
(line 493) and ‘if he can’t accept it, then he can’t accept it, I mean I can’t help as I’m 
at the end of my, what I can do, okay’ (line 497-498). Note that considering that the 
respondent has just made relevant her identity as a doctor, she occasions the 
inference that the limitations are  ‘category bound’, rather than personal. The 
interviewer shows to infer that the respondent implies that solving problems of 
acceptance falls outside the respondent’s realm as a doctor when she says: ‘that’s of 
course yah the end of your limits and if if they can’t deal with that then eh you can’t 
help them really’ (line 530). By constructing the encountered problem and solving it 
as falling outwith her work remit as a doctor, the respondent becomes not 
accountable for it. The respondent in extract 9 achieves a similar effect by pointing 
out that problems occur ‘when they go home’ (line 429). Arguably, according to 
common sense understandings, doctors cannot be reasonably expected to control 
what happens at their patients’ homes, in their absence.  Hence, the respondent 
attends to his lack of accountability for patients’ mixing of medication. 
Third, in extract 10, the respondent and interviewer do this by constructing 
the respondent as unable to do something about patients’ inability to accept a 
diagnosis: ‘I can’t help’ (line 498) and ‘you can’t help them’ (line 530).  
Fourth, in extract 10, the respondent states  ‘they came here because they 
wanted to have a baby, I’m doing the best I can’ (line 497-498). Here, the respondent 
makes clear that she has responded to their patients’ request, and moreover that she 
has responded as well as she can. Hence, the respondent suggests that she has done 
her ‘duty’, and makes clear that she is not held to blame. 
 Thus, as in extracts 7 and 8, the respondent in extracts 9 and 10 make their 
patients, rather than themselves accountable for problems encountered, this time by 
attributing them to their patients’ behaviour and underlying dispositions. This is 




problems, which could easily be seen as caused by factors residing in patients and 
health practitioners, in particular because the practitioner is born and trained in the 
west. This makes it seem reasonable to expect that the practitioner may lack certain 
language skills or cultural knowledge which could lead to communication problems. 
However, the respondent in extract 10 is not the only western practitioner who 
constructs herself as not accountable for communication problems experienced. 
Consider extract 11; like in etxract 10, the respondent is also an expatriate 
gynaecologist.  
 
Extract 9:11 Int.18 gyn.(expat.) 
1100. I Okay, yah I see ehm do you also sometime experience maybe certain eh 
1101.    misunderstandings between you and patients 
1102. R Oh you- there’s a lot of misunderstandings I mean eh ehhh (1) because they 
1103.    they eh yah they have no idea what problems they have. He of course often 
1104.    they do- they have heard of the womb, they have heard of the tubes but that’s 
1105.    all what they he what thet know he and if you tell people just what I said the  
1106.   woman who has cancer and you tell them that she’s going to die from from eh 
1107.    cancer if nothing is done, well eh probably she doesn’t realize 
1108. I uhu 
1109. R  that he what it means although she she speaks English he that means she is a 
1110.    bit educated  
1111. I uhu but she doesn’t rea- realize what that means 
1112. R No she doesn’t real- yah lots of women they have no idea about wombs 
1113.   etcetera  
1114. I Okay yah hmhm. 
1115. R he although probably they slaughtered some animals , 
1116. I Hhuhu 
1117. R but the wombs of animals are different from wombs of eh people 
1118. I Uhu okay yah 
1119. R he and eh so I’m I’m definitely sure that there’s  a lot of misunderstanding  
1120. I Okay yah  
1121. R but also because I don’t speak the language,  
1122. I Yah. 
1123. R He, so so I have always an interpreter  
1124. I Uhu 
1125. R and I’m not hundred percent sure if she tells what I’m telling the woman. 
((several lines omitted in which respondent mentions, amongst other issues, that ‘the anatomy is not  
all eh all clear because ‘their background is is not eh enough’)) 
1175. I Not everyone understands completely [then  
1176. R                [No and that depends probably also on the 
1177.    intelligence of the of the people [ you have to deal with.  
1178. I                                    [yah yah   
1179. I Yah 
1180. R If they are intelligent probably they understand very well if they are not,  
1181.   [(maybe)  [ (.) not at all [so 
1182. I [okay       [ya:h   [yah 
1183. I  So there may be some misunderstandings which arise either due to lack of 
1184.    anatomical knowledge or intelligence which is not very high or that there are 
1185.    translations problems really 





Asked whether he sometimes experiences misunderstandings, the respondent 
acknowledges that ‘there’s a lot of misunderstandings’ (line 1102, 1119). He makes 
himself not accountable for these misunderstandings, by attributing them, in various 
ways,  to patients’ lack of knowledge or intelligence. First, the respondent does this 
by making clear that his patients ‘have no idea what problems they have’ (line 1103), 
that ‘they have heard of the womb, they have heard of the tubes but that’s all what 
they he, what they know’ (line 1104-1105). Hence, the respondent restricts his 
patients’ knowledge to basic organs, like the womb and tubes. Second, the 
respondent portrays his patients’ knowledge as limited by saying that ‘lots of women 
they have no idea about wombs etcetera’ (lines 1112-1113), and thus making clear 
that there are also many who do not know ‘even’ about basic organs. Note that the 
respondent’s ‘etcetera’ (line 1113) implies that the lack of knowledge is extendable 
to an unspecified number of other organs or biological features. Second, the 
respondent provides an example of a particular patient (lines 1105-1107). He 
mentioned earlier in the interview that this patient refused an operation, in which a 
tumor would be removed, but which would also make her infertile. The respondent 
reiterates that she will die of cancer if nothing is done about it (line 1106-1107), and 
attributes the refusal to have something ‘done about it’ to the patient’s lack of 
knowledge: ‘probably she doesn’t realize that he what it means’ (line 1107-1109).49 
Noteworthy is the respondent’s additional information that this patient speaks 
English (line 1109) and is therefore ‘a bit educated’ (line 1110). Thereby he implies 
that patients who do not speak English, and are less educated, will certainly lack 
knowledge needed to understand him adequately. Third, in lines 1115 to 1117, the 
respondent sets up a straw man argument. He states: ‘although probably they 
slaughtered some animals’ (line 1115), thereby suggesting that his patients could 
know about wombs because they slaughtered animals. However, the respondent 
subsequently makes clear that this experience is not sufficient: ‘but the wombs of 
animals are different from wombs of eh people’ (line 1117). Hence, the respondent 
                                                 
49 Interestingly, the first time in which the respondents brings to bear this example, he attributes this 
example to the importance of bearing children in Malawi. This shows how utterances in interviews 
depend on the interactional context, which includes the questions asked, and the interactional issues 




makes clear that his patients have insufficient knowledge, in this case regarding his 
work. By constructing misunderstandings as based on patients’ lack of knowledge, 
the respondent makes himself not accountable for them. 
  Fourth, the respondent states explicitly that patients’ understanding ‘depends 
probably also on the intelligence of the of the people’ (line 1176-1177) and that ‘if 
they are intelligent probably they understand very well, if they are not, (maybe) (.) 
not at all’. (line 1180-1181). By means of the if-then construction (Potter & Edwards, 
1992), the respondent constructs intelligence into a necessary and sufficient 
condition for understanding, and hence, makes lack of intelligence into a sufficient 
explanation for not understanding50. 
 As mentioned, in interactions between western practitioners and their patients it 
is to be expected that misunderstandings arise due to the practitioner’s inability to 
speak the local language. Indeed, the respondent makes this issue relevant: ‘also 
because I don’t speak the language’ (line 1121). However, he subsequently 
constructs also the problems related to this inability in such a way that he is not 
accountable, or to blame for them. The respondent explains that his inability to speak 
the language can lead to misunderstandings due to the interpreter he uses: ‘I have 
always an interpreter (…)and I’m not hundred percent sure if she tells what I’m 
telling the woman’ (lines 1123-1125). This is another way in which the respondent 
can be seen to forestall that he is held accountable.   
 It appears then, that also when it seems reasonable to expect that practitioners 
themselves contribute in some way to problems encountered, such as communication 
problems, respondents can construct themselves as not accountable for problems in 
helping infertility clients. 
  
9.4 Summary and Discussion 
In this chapter, I have shown how practitioners, both indigenous healers and 
biomedical practitioners, persuasively acclaim their success in treating infertility 
patients, and make their success contingent on their own actions. In so doing, I have 
                                                 
50 There are more respondents, including Malawian biomedical practitioners, who attribute 





argued, they make relevant their competence as health practitioners. In addition, 
respondents appear to forestall that their competence is doubted, by denying that 
their assistance disappoints patients and constructing problems in such a way that 
they are not held accountable for them.  For instance, respondents attribute not curing 
infertility to their patients, that is to their physical make-up, (behavioural) 
dispositions, or lack of knowledge or intelligence. Respondents do this as well when 
accounting for communication problems, which could easily be seen as result of 
practitioner ‘factors’ such as inability to speak the local language.   
 The analysis made apparent certain differences between the way indigenous 
healers and biomedical practitioners account for successes and failures. Indigenous 
healers can be seen to make their success pertain to infertility patients in general, 
whilst attending to failures to solve fertility problems as pertaining to only certain 
instances. Biomedical practitioners construct successes as more limited, and not 
necessarily related to their own interventions, while attending to their inability to 
solve fertility problems as pertaining to dealing with infertility patients in general. I 
will return to this issue in the discussion chapter.   
 Other studies have found as well that (health) professionals attend to, defend 
and work up their success and competence in conversations.  An example is Gilbert 
and Mulkay’s (1984) seminal discourse analytic study of accounts provided by 
biochemists in journal publications and interviews. One of the observations which 
Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) make is that scientists account for their own and other 
scientists’ work in such a way that their own work and findings appear correct, and 
others’ erroneous.  In other words, the scientists construct themselves as successful 
and competent scientists, as the health practitioners in my study can be seen to do 
(see also Coelho, 2005).  Parry (2004) shows how physiotherapists account for 
patients’ incompetence in such a way that the therapy they give is not invalidated. In 
so doing, they can be seen as construing themselves as successful, and as forestalling 
that their competence and expertise is threatened by the failings of their patients.  
The observation that practitioners’ competence is a relevant concern for them 
when accounting for success, failures and problems, can have practical consequences 
outside the interview context. For instance, similar concerns may inform their 




medical records, or interviews used for audits. I will elaborate on these issues in 
chapter 10. 
   The analysis presented shows also how success, failure and problems in 
health care, and the challenges which they pose for practitioners’ expertise are, at 
least partially, negotiated.  This has been argued by other authors as well. For 
instance, Waldram (2000) points out that traditional practitioners’ ‘success’ and 
‘failures’ are always negotiated between social actors, in particular between the 
healer and patient, who thereby bring into play their personal perceptions, 
experiences and motives. Lutfey (2005) shows in an interview- and observation 
based ethnographic study how practitioners’ adopt certain roles in the prevention of 
non-adherence in diabetes patients, and use these stances to actively induce patients 
to adhere to treatment. Hence, Lutfey (2005) points out that physicians actively 
contribute to the phenomenon of non-adherence, and that their judgements of non-
adherence should not be seen as passive assessments, straightforwardly reflecting 
their patients’ behaviour.  
Overall then, similar to the analysis presented in chapter 8, this chapter’s 
analytic findings contribute to the argument that medical practices and views are of a 
fundamentally social nature.  I have shown how health practitioners’ constructions of 
successes and problems tie in with interpersonal issues at stake, like not being held 
accountable for problems and being seen as competent practitioners.  
In the next chapter, I will summarize the main analytic findings of this thesis, 
evaluate the study, and discuss its theoretical, methodological, and practical 





Chapter 10. Discussion and conclusions 
 
 
The aim of this study was to gain insight into how people with a fertility problem, 
significant others, and (indigenous and biomedical) practitioners construct infertility, 
in Malawi. I examined constructions of infertility, its causes, solutions and 
consequences in interview data, which I analysed using discourse analysis and 
conversation analysis. This enabled me to examine the discursive devices which the 
different kinds of respondents employ in their constructions, and the interactional 
and interpersonal functions which their constructions fulfil. I paid special attention to 
what kind of normative and moral issues respondents attend to and manage, where 
relevant, as the literature suggests that these issues are pertinent to infertility (Dyer et 
al., 2002; Gerrits, 1997; Inhorn, 1994b; Riessman, 2005; Pashigian, 2002).  
In this final chapter of the thesis, I will summarize the main analytic findings 
(section 10.1), discuss the methodological issues which this study raises (section 
10.2), and evaluate the analysis (section 10.3). I will then discuss various 
contributions of this thesis; to methodological developments in conversation and 
discourse analysis, infertility studies, and to more general, interview based 
qualitative studies (section 10.4.2), to theoretical developments in health psychology 
and health promotion (section 10.4.3), and to practical attempts to alleviate the 
burden of infertility (section 10.4.4). I will end this chapter with a brief recapitulation 
of the study, and will suggest how this work can be taken forward. 
 
10.1 Summary of the main analytic findings: Interpersonal, 
normative and moral issues 
In the data examined, interview-respondents appear to manage various interpersonal  
matters when talking about infertility, in that they attend to others’ judgements and  
inferences about themselves, which their statements can make available. The  
interpersonal concerns which respondents orient to, are predominantly of a normative  
and moral nature, in that respondents attend to various expectations about what they  




way ‘bad’, or ‘good’. These issues have not been discussed before in the literature on  
infertility in developing countries, or from a rather different perspective than mine,  
which focuses on constructions and the social actions which they fulfil. I will  
review the normative and moral concerns to which respondents attend in turn,  
although it should be borne in mind that most of them are intertwined. 
 
10.1.1 Normative concerns 
First, I have shown (see chapter 4) how respondents attend to, and construct, 
normative expectations regarding childbearing; certain people, in particular married 
people, young people or grown ups, ‘ought’ to bear children.  Respondents 
accomplish this construction by using various discursive devices, such as references 
to the cultural context, if-then constructions, and scripting devices. This then, 
provides an alternative perspective on the notion of a cultural norm which prescribes 
procreation. Pronatalist cultural norms abound in the infertility literature (Dyer et al., 
2002, 2004; Inhorn 1994, 2003; McDonald Evens, 2004, Riessman, 2000a, 
Sandelowski, 1988), and many scholars appear to treat them as explanations for the 
problematic nature of infertility. There is therefore a tendency to reify these norms 
into independent cultural ‘facts’, responsible for the pressure on people to reproduce, 
and the hardship involved when people fail to do so. 51 The problems with this 
conceptualisation of ‘culture’ as set of prescriptive rules, which makes people into 
‘cultural dopes’ has been pointed out by Garfinkel (1967) and various other scholars 
(Heritage, 1984; Shotter, 1984, 1993; Wittgenstein, 1953). By contrast, my approach 
draws attention to the active involvement of people in the situated construction and 
reproduction of cultural norms.  As I will discuss in more detail in the next section, 
one of the benefits of such an approach is that it brings to light the functions which 
such constructions can fulfil, which can have useful practical implications (see 
section 10.3.3). 
                                                 
51 Such an approach to ‘culture’ and ‘norms’ as reified ‘agents’ is commonly adopted, also in research 
on various other health issues in developing countries. For instance, two reports related to sexual and 
reproductive health in Malawi (Moser, M’chaju-Liwele, Moser, Ngwira, 2003; Matinga & 
McConville, 2002) draw attention to the importance of cultural norms and beliefs, which lead to 
cultural practices which constitute ‘unhealthy’ or ‘risky’ behaviours. As Jeffery, Jeffery & Rao 
(forthcoming) note, attributing health problems, or behaviours leading to them, to people’s ‘culture’ 
can constitute an undesirable form of victim blaming, which diverts attention away from how (health) 




Second, men and women with a fertility problem attend in several ways to 
not taking action as a problematic breach of normative expectations. Hence, they 
appear to take into account the idea that they ought to take action in order to solve 
their fertility problem. Such normative orientations may inform people’s relentless 
search for solutions, frequently reported in the literature on infertility in developing 
countries (Berer, 1999; Inhorn, 2004, 2003; Sundby, 2002). 
Third, indigenous and biomedical practitioners can be seen to attend to 
normative expectations concerning the actions of competent health experts. I have 
shown (chapter 9) how practitioners persuasively construct themselves as successful, 
deny that this disappoints patients, and construct themselves as not accountable for 
failures and problems in helping patients. In so doing, they can be seen to draw upon 
ideas that ‘proper’ illness experts ought to be able to cure infertility and to help 
patients, and not ‘cause’ problems. 
  I have mentioned (chapter 9) that indigenous healers construct their successes 
as pertaining to infertility patients in general, whilst relating failures to solve fertility 
problems to specific instances. Biomedical practitioners however, construct their 
successes as concerning specific cases, and attend to their inability to solve fertility 
problems as pertaining to infertility patients in general. Tentatively, I would like to 
suggest that this discrepancy may be informed by a difference in the nature and 
status of indigenous healing and biomedicine. Overall, indigenous healing receives 
much scepticism and scrutiny from those with a western biomedical training. Some 
indigenous healers appear to attend to this difference in status, for instance by 
emphasizing that they have been trained by the hospital or that they refer patients to 
the hospital52.  In addition, indigenous healers’, but not biomedical practitioners’, 
employment is dependent on the clientele they can attract. This makes being seen as 
successful more important for healers. The different nature and more dubious status 
of indigenous healing may mean that indigenous healers, unlike biomedical 
practitioners, cannot afford to come across as successful in only certain cases. 
However, this suggestion requires further examination, in particular by examining 
participants’ own orientations regarding the status of their profession.   
                                                 




A fourth set of normative expectations to which respondents attend concerns 
medical knowledge. To begin with, when designing claims about causes of infertility 
as persuasive in repsonse to mild challenges (see chapter 8), indigenous and 
biomedical practitioners appear to attend to the idea that illness experts ought to 
know the facts about causes. Respondents design their claims as persuasive for 
instance by using verbs like ‘must’, if-then constructions to establish the connection 
between a proposed cause and infertility as certain, and by providing empirical 
observations as supportive evidence. In addition, practitioners attend to the basis of 
their claims. In so doing, they can be seen to attend to the notion that in principle, 
expert knowledge ought to have an appropriate basis, in particular, that claims ought 
to be derived from category bound activities, such as testing, calculating and reading 
scientific literature. Furthermore, I have shown (chapter 8) that biomedical 
practitioners’ claims about non-biomedical causes are ambiguous and non committal, 
and that they attend to a conflict between acknowledging non-biomedical causes and 
their biomedical expert identity. In other words, biomedical practitioners can be seen 
to orient to normative ideas that proper medical experts do not acknowledge non-
biomedical causes.  
Unlike practitioners, lay respondents can be seen to take into account a lack 
of entitlement to knowledge in their constructions of causes (chapter 5), when they 
emphatically deny knowledge of causes, design their claims as ambiguous and non-
committal, and make others relevant as the source of their knowledge. This notion 
that lay respondents ought not to know about causes may also inform denials of 
knowledge and ambiguity in claims regarding causes of illnesses, observed in several 
other studies of infertility (Dyer et al., 2004; Gerrits, 1997), and other health issues 
(Joshi, 1995; Steen & Mazonde, 1999). Often, not much attention is paid to these 
observations. My analysis shows how they can be understood as ‘functions’ of 
interpersonal concerns, such as a lack of entitlement to knowledge. This has 
methodological and theoretical implications for common approaches to illness 





10.1.2 Moral concerns  
A first moral concern which respondents manage features in their constructions of 
practices such as extramarital affairs and polygamy. Respondents justify people’s 
engagement in practices such as extramarital affairs and polygamy when no children 
are born, by making them into culturally required, routine, and practical solutions, 
and by denying people’s agency in these practices. Hence, respondents draw upon 
cultural normative expectations to manage and forestall potential moral judgements 
of certain practices, such as extramarital affairs and polygamy.  
Second, respondents can be seen (chapter 6) to attend to moral judgements 
which a breach of expectations regarding taking action may invoke. I have discussed 
several ways in which respondents play down their culpability for not taking actions, 
in several ways: they make clear that they have tried to take action, and (thus) to be, 
in principle, motivated to do so; they play down their responsibility for their inaction 
by attributing it to barriers external to themselves (e.g money, other people); and they 
construct inaction as a reasonable decision. 
Third, respondents appear to deal with moral issues when identifying causes 
of infertility. I have shown how respondents, after identifying STDs or abortions as 
potential causes of infertility, forestall the inference that they themselves are infertile 
because of these causes. I have suggested that this may be due to negative ‘immoral’ 
connotations of contracting STDs and abortions.  
The relevance of such moral judgements for claims about causes, sheds light 
on findings reported by Gerrits (1997). She mentions that although many of her 
Mozambiquan respondents identified STDs as cause of infertility, and had had a STD 
themselves, none of them related it to their own infertility. My analysis suggests that 
this may be informed by potential, morally problematic consequences of being seen 
as infertile due to STDs.  Like the normative issue of lack of entitlement, the 
relevance of moral judgements has implications for the status of people’s claims 
about causes, as I will discuss in sections 10.3 and 10.4.  
Furthermore, biomedical practitioners also deal with moral concerns related 
to identity issues. I have shown how biomedical practitioners avoid dismissing non-
biomedical causes, for instance by reframing them as psychological factors. I have 




cast in a morally problematic identity category such as ethnocentric white doctor, or 
‘improper’ cultural member. 
A fourth and last set of moral concerns is made relevant in constructions of 
relationships. Respondents construct their relationships as good, play down the 
significance of spouses’ extramarital affairs, and avoid complaining about, or 
blaming others for relationship troubles (chapter 7). I have suggested that 
complaining and blaming in this context are sensitive issues, as they may invoke 
moral judgements regarding the respondents themselves. Respondents may be seen 
as being to blame themselves for relationship trouble, or may be judged negatively 
when complaining about or blaming spouses, relatives or fellow community 
members.  
In some other studies, the responses of some participants appear to fulfil a 
similar function of ‘not blaming’ spouses, relatives or community members for 
relationship troubles (Dyer et al., 2004; Gerrits, 1997; Gerrits et al., 1998; Riessman, 
2000). Nevertheless, men and especially women are normally portrayed in the 
literature as suffering from, and thus victims of social exclusion, accusations, 
stigmatisation and abuse (Dyer et al., 2002; Gerrits, 1997; Sundby, 1997; Inhorn, 
2004; Mariano, 2004; Neff, 1994; Riesman, 2005, 2000). These descriptions denote 
that hardship is inflicted upon people with a fertility problem by others, who are thus 
to blame. Thus, as argued in chapter 7, it appears that although authors’ glosses may 
fulfil a laudable political function of giving voice to infertile men’s and especially 
women’s suffering, they may not be in line with people’s own constructions of 
relationships and relationship trouble, and the moral concerns they thereby attend to 
(cf. Widdicombe, 1995). Therefore, these constructions and concerns, and how they 
may be triggered by the questions asked, require more attention.  
This is so, in addition because the literature portrays extramarital affairs and 
other forms of marital instability as one of the main hardships which women with a 
fertility problem must endure. However, my analysis suggests that it should be taken 
into account that certain practices, for instance extramarital affairs or polygamy, are 





As mentioned in chapter 7, I would like to emphasize that I do not mean to 
say that being (seen as) infertile is less problematic than is suggested elsewhere. 
First, discourse analysis and conversation analysis do not enable one to obtain insight 
into people’s experiences, and thus I cannot make claims about the extent to which 
people experience hardship or not. Second, not blaming others or playing down the 
significance of extramarital affairs can be problematic in itself, as it would seem that 
this makes it more difficult to ‘speak out’ or ‘stand up’ against the relationship 
troubles experienced (see also section 10.3.4). 
 
10.1.3 Overarching insights 
Two overarching insights can be distilled from the above summary of the findings. 
First, my exploration of respondents’ situated orientation to, and invocation of, 
normative concerns provides insight into what explicit or implicit references to the 
normative nature of practices can mean ‘for all practical purposes’ (Garfinkel, 1967). 
When practices in foreign cultures are studied, it is common to label them as 
‘normative’, or ‘cultural’, or both (see e.g. Moser, M’chaju-Nwele, Moser & Ngira, 
2003; Matinga & McConville, 2002), as happens with childbearing in infertility 
studies. However, this is a rather vague, opaque label, which needs further 
unpacking. I have been able to show how cultural or normative expectations are 
resources, available for use. To begin with, they can be used to justify certain 
practices, such as when respondents appeal to the cultural requirement of bearing 
children in order to justify people engaging in extramarital affairs or polygamy.  In 
addition, respondents draw upon normative expectations regarding practices, typical 
for certain categories of people, in order to work up an identity. For instance, 
practitioners attend to expectations that they are successful and perform certain 
activities, such as testing and calculating, and thereby bolster their identity as 
competent illness experts.  Hence, I subscribe to Kitzinger’s (2006) claim that 
providing insight into the invocation of mundane understandings regarding what is 
normative, and hence the situated (re)production of culture in interaction, is one of 





Second, as I have shown that both lay respondents and practitioners attend to 
normative and moral issues, my analysis contributes to insights into the social nature 
of medical practice. So far, the focus has mainly been on how practitioners’ practices 
and views are informed by the ‘macro’ cultural context (Finkler, 2004; Lock, 1988),  
or on their normative and moral consequences for people with a fertility problem 
(Pfeffer, 1993; Sandelowski, 1990; Malin, 2003). Inhorn’s (1994) study is different, 
in that she discusses how medical practice is informed by practitioners’ interests. 
However, she does not examine whether and how practitioners themselves attend to 
those interests. My analysis brings to light interpersonal, normative and moral 
matters at stake for the practitioners themselves, to which they attend in concrete, 
actual, situated interactions. 
 
10.2 Methodological issues  
My study raises several methodological issues, related to the use of interview data, 
interpreters and translators, and quantification.  I will discuss these issues in turn. 
 
 
10.2.1 Interview data 
In chapter 3, I pointed out that conversation analysts, and, increasingly, discursive 
psychologists, have a ‘dispreference’ for interviews (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998; 
Speer, 2002). Interview data are seen as biased by the researcher’s agenda and 
analytic ideas (Potter, 2004b; Ten Have, 1999, 2002b), which leads participants to 
provide normatively appropriate descriptions by the participants (Potter, 2002). I 
argued that as this argument relies on participants orienting to the situation as 
specifically ‘being in an interview’, the best strategy seems to be to stick to the 
criterion of procedural consequentiality (Schegloff, 1991; 1992). Hence, interview 
data should be treated as ordinary conversations, unless it is observable that and how 
respondents attend to the situation in the specific extracts as ‘being in an interview’ 
(Widdicombe & Wooffitt, 1995). On some occasions, participants and in particular 
interpreters could indeed be seen to attend to the situation as an interview. This 
happens for instance when a respondent points out that a question has already been 




necessary’53. In this instance, respondent and interpreter attend to the situation as not 
an ordinary conversation, but one with a predetermined, uni-directional (i.e. the 
interviewer asks, the respondent answers) question-answer format.  However, these 
orientations to the interview situation are rare. 
 Another way in which the interview situation would be procedurally 
consequential, is if respondents treat me in terms of my interviewer identity, rather 
than in terms of the many other identities according to which I could be treated, such 
as woman, westerner, or academic. Interestingly, in several instances, respondents 
treat me as a medically informed person, for instance when respondents with a 
fertility problem ask for advice about what to do about their fertility problem, or 
when indigenous healers asked about how to cure certain illnesses. In addition, as I 
will discuss in the next section, at times, respondents or interpreters took into account 
my status as foreigner. However, although at times some of the identity categories to 
which I could be allocated are procedurally relevant, this was normally not my 
identity as interviewer.  
Therefore, the interviews which I conducted can be treated as ‘natural-
interaction-in-interview’ (Potter, 2004b, p.9) and exhibits of culturally shared 
accounting and reasoning practices (Silverman, 1985; Wooffitt & Widdicombe, 
2006), which are at least potentially generalizable to situations outside the interview 
context (see section 10.3 for further reflections on generalizability). Moreover, as I 
will explain in the next section, in studies like this one, conducted in and pertaining 
to a foreign context, interviews are a particularly useful, if not necessary, method of 
data collection.  
 
10.2.2 Cultural context 
As explained in chapter 3, conversation analysts normally do not rely on information 
about the external, cultural context in which conversations occur. It is argued that 
context should only be taken into account when it is ‘procedurally consequential’, 
that is when it is observable that, and in what way, conversation partners design their 
talk according to certain contextual features (Schegloff, 1991, 1992; ten Have, 
1999b). When interactants belong to different cultural-linguistic communities, it 
                                                 




seems likely that the analyst lacks certain cultural knowledge and competence, 
necessary for analysis (ten Have, 1999b; Wong & Olsher, 2000). Using interview 
data, in which the interviewer belongs to a different cultural community than the 
other participants, appears to be one particularly suitable way to remedy such lack of 
cultural knowledge (de Kok, 2004). This is so, first, because such interviews can 
function like Garfinkel’s (1967) ‘breaching’ experiments, in which taken for granted 
assumptions and sense making practices are breached, and therefore made visible 
and available for analysis (see chapter 3). The interviews accomplish a similar 
breaching effect, due to the interviewer’s questions about issues which normally 
might be taken for granted by the ‘members’, and would otherwise not be explained, 
or referred to only in highly implicit ways.   
  Second, according to the principle of recipient design (Sacks & Schegloff, 
1979), interactants design their utterances in such a way that they are understandable 
for a particular speaker with a certain presupposed knowledge (ten Have, 1999; cf. 
Haywood, Pickering & Branigan, 2005). Therefore, it is to be expected that 
participants will, at times, have provided more information54 than they would have 
done in interactions with fellow cultural members.  
Hence, using interviews is one, particularly suitable, way to deal with the 
analyst’s lack of cultural knowledge, as participants themselves bring to bear cultural 
information ‘there and then’. Consequently, there is no need to look elsewhere for 
ethnographic data about the context, and one can avoid invoking contextual 
information, which may seem relevant to the analyst but does not necessarily tie in 
with the orientations of the interactants themselves.  
This principle of recipient design may be especially pertinent to interactions 
mediated by an interpreter. Wadensjö (1998) has pointed out that the task of 
interpreters is to promote a shared understanding, rather than merely translating. 
Fulfilling such a task may require filling the gaps in the interviewer’s cultural 
knowledge. Indeed, in several extracts the interpreter provides additional contextual 
information, or explicates the upshot of what the respondent says. For instance, in 
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they draw upon understandings and normative notions which pertain specially, and only, to the 




chapter 5, extract 6, the respondent mentions ‘girls initiation’ (lines 843-850). In her 
translation, the interpreter does not use the same term, and provides additional 
information: ‘in African countries, people- especially girls, are taken to go 
somewhere else and be advised.’ (lines 860-864). Hence, the interpreter can be 
observed to take upon herself the task of being a cultural translator by adding cultural 
information to the respondent’s answer.  
Although the presence of an interpreter seems to have benefits for the 
analysis, it also evokes some methodological problems. I will address these in the 
next section. 
 
10.2.3 Issues of language, interpretation and translation  
In chapter 3, I introduced several language-related issues which my study raises. 
First, participants’ non-native speaker status means that what respondents say and 
how they say it, depends on participants’ limitations in fluency, as well as on the 
interpersonal and interactional issues at stake. However, in chapter 3 I have 
discussed several analytic strategies which I have adopted, which limit the relevance 
of participants’ fluency for the analysis.   
  Second, interpretations, like any kind of translation, are active re-
constructions of what was originally said, rather than a neutral ‘passing on’ of the 
message (Riessman, 2000; Temple, 1997; Pitchforth & van Teijlingen, 2005; Venuti, 
1998; Wadensjö, 1994). This is less of a problem for a study like mine, which is 
based on a relativist epistemology and aims to examine the situated co-construction 
of meaning, than for researchers who adopt a realist perspective and treat statements 
as pathway to an objective reality ‘out there’, or in people’s minds.  In my study, I 
obtained translations of the interpreter’s utterances, for the extracts which I used in 
the final analysis. This enabled me to see what the interpreter omits from, adds to, or 
changes in, the respondent’s and interviewer’s utterances, and how they thereby 
contribute to the production of meanings and actions. In this way, the interpretation 
formed a useful tool to obtain insight into inferential and interpersonal issues at 
stake, rather than an impediment to analysis (cf. Wadensjö, 1998).55 For instance, in 
chapter 5 I have shown how interpreters treat respondents’ denial of knowledge 
                                                 




about causes of infertility as ‘reluctance to tell’, in part by repeating questions about 
causes, or by encouraging respondents to ‘feel free’. These observations, and others 
(e.g. regarding the non committal design of responses), suggest that identifying 
causes is a sensitive issue for respondents. 
 It has been suggested that researchers should discuss the interpreter’s or the 
translator’s social position (Temple, 1997), in order to be able to examine how 
characteristics such as educational background, life experiences, or beliefs may have 
affected the production of the translated text. However, like the relevance of the 
interviewer’s identity as interviewer, the relevance of the social position, or identity 
of the interpreter, should be treated as an empirical question. Like interviewers, 
interpreters are categorizable in various ways. In the interview extracts which I 
examined, I have not been able to observe that interpreters or respondents attend to 
the interpreters’ identity as, say woman or man, or health surveillance assistant. In 
other words, I have not been able to establish that interpreters’ identities were 
procedurally consequential for respondents’ talk. Although I do not see this as a 
guarantee that interpreters’ social positions did not matter for respondents’ 
utterances, there seems to be no firm basis for assuming that characteristics of the 
interpreter influenced the data in some systematic way.   
 The criterion of procedural consequentiality (Schegloff, 1993) cannot be 
employed to gauge the relevance of the translators’ social identities for their 
translations and data ‘production’. These could matter for instance if identities, such 
as those based on religious affiliation, make translating certain phrases, such as those 
about extramarital relationships or sexual activities, rude or improper. This is one of 
the reasons why the third language issue, the contribution of the translators to the 
production of my data, poses a greater problem. It makes that the analysis is, even 
more than normally, not based on the ‘thing-in-itself’. 
 However, I have adopted several strategies which minimize any systematic 
distortion. First, I have used several translators of diverse backgrounds (female and 
male, students in linguistics and nursing at universities in Malawi and in Scotland, 
and professional translators). The variety in translators will, to some extent, have 
prevented a systematic ‘bias’ in the translations. Second, all translators which I used 




interactions they translated. It has been argued that in order to obtain ‘conceptual 
equivalence’, or comparability of meaning, in translations, translators need to have 
‘intimate’ knowledge of a culture (Frey, 1970; Warwick & Osherson, 1973). 
Considering their ethnicity, it can be expected that the translators whom I used had 
the necessary cultural competence. Third, I asked translators to put additional 
information or interpretations in brackets, when they thought that literal translations 
might make certain sentences or passages difficult to understand for me. While these 
interpretations and information appeared seldom necessary for the analysis, they 
enabled me, to some extent, to literally ‘bracket’ translators’ interpretations. Fourth, 
analytic claims are normally based on a variety of extracts from both translated and 
un-translated interviews, that is interviews which were conducted in English.  
Exceptions are claims which pertain specifically to the indigenous healers, as these 
were all conducted with an interpreter. 
 Overall, it seems that although issues of language, interpretation, and 
especially translation make my claims somewhat more tentative, they do not make 
the data ‘unworkable’, or my claims unfounded. This is so in part because of the 
strategies I adopted, due to certain features of the translators, and because my study 
is based on a relativist epistemology and an analytic tradition which has a strong 
interest in, and sees as inevitable, the co-production of meaning by interactants, 
including interpreters.  
 
10.2.4 Quantification 
In three analytic chapters, I provided counts in order to support analytic claims.  This 
is unusual in qualitative research, including discourse analytic and conversation 
analytic studies. Nevertheless, several authors have argued that a commitment to 
constructionist research, or qualitative research in general, does not necessarily imply 
a commitment against counting (Potter, 1996; Sandelowski, 2001; Silverman, 2000; 
Dey, 1993). However, counting should be done only in order to support analytic 
observations rather than as an aim in itself (cf. Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998) and only 
when meaningful for the analysis (Hakaana, 2002; Sandelowski, 2001; Schegloff, 
1993). For instance, counting in qualitative projects could be useful in that it gives a 
reader a feel for the data as a whole (Silverman, 2000), and (thereby) makes patterns 




support observations regarding patterns in accounting practices, that is differences 
observed between types of respondents (e.g. those with and without children, or 
indigenous healers and biomedical practitioners).  
Schegloff (1993) points at another requirement of meaningful quantification: 
it needs to be built on the back of detailed case-for-case analysis (Haakana, 2002; 
Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998). This is so, first, because counts should be based, as 
much as possible, on participants’ own categories and orientations (cf. Hutchby & 
Wooffitt, 1998; Schegloff, 1993; Silverman, 2000). The counts which I have 
provided pertain to categories which stay close to respondents’ own terms (e.g. 
‘claims success’ and ‘accounts for, or explains, not taking action’) rather than to 
abstract theoretical categories (e.g. ‘internal locus of control’), which are potentially 
of little relevance for participants themselves. 
Second, analysis is needed in order to be able to decide what ‘counts’ as the 
phenomenon under investigation, or the actions which speakers perform in talk, as 
this requires insight into the various ways in which actions can be achieved 
(Schegloff, 1993). I have made various decisions about what counts as ‘in-action’, 
‘indicates success’ or ‘indicates failure’, on the basis of analysis of the individual 
cases.  For instance, I excluded references to practitioners’ ability to ‘help’ infertility 
patients in ways other than solving their fertility problem, such as informing them 
about the cause of their infertility, or providing reassurance. Such responses appeared 
to fulfil the function of not coming across as useless, but were not designed as 
displays of being successful in treating fertility patients. 
Third, if one wants to make claims regarding the frequency of phenomena in 
terms of proportions (i.e. an action occurred  x out of y times), one needs to analyse 
individual cases for whether and when the phenomenon could have occurred, that is 
whether performing a certain action was possible and relevant (Schegloff, 1993). I 
have taken into account ‘environments of possible relevant occurrence’ (Schegloff, 
1993, p. 103), in that for instance in chapter 9, the count of general or specific claims 
of success and failure is only based on interviews in which practitioners could 
reasonably address issues of success or failure in helping infertility patients. Hence, I 




made it clear that they do not treat people with fertility problems and only refer them 
to other practitioners, as their ability to solve fertility problems was not a relevant 
issue. 56  
It should be clear then, that the counts provided are based on decisions, which 
could have been taken in other ways. Nevertheless, I feel that the counts are 
sufficiently grounded in participants’ orientations and detailed analysis, in order to 
be useful heuristic tools which support observations regarding patterns in the data. 
 
10.3 Evaluation of the analysis 
Evaluating discourse analytic studies is not a straightforward matter (Taylor, 2001).  
Discourse analysis is based on a relativist, constructionist epistemology. Therefore,  
instead of  adhering to the realist, positivist assumption that there is one reality ‘out  
there’, to be revealed through proper use of scientific methods, discourse  
analysts consider research ‘findings’ as inevitably, at least partially, constructed by  
researchers, in interaction with participants (Madill, Jordan & Shirley, 2000; Willig,  
2001). Consequently, several authors have argued that the standard criteria of  
objectivity, validity (i.e. research findings should represent the ‘truth’) and reliability  
(i.e. another researcher, using the same methods should obtain the same findings)  
have to be adapted, or replaced. This will enable the evaluation of discourse analytic  
studies in a way which fits in with its epistemological basis  (Elliott et al., 1999;  
Madill et al., 2000; Taylor, 2001; Willig, 2001). Various new criteria have indeed  
been developed in order to assess the quality of discourse analyses (Potter &  
Wetherell, 1987, Potter, 1996a; Taylor, 2001), which I will use for the evaluation of  
my analysis. 
 
10.3.1 Evaluation of the analysis in terms of new criteria 
To begin with, Antaki, Billig, Edwards and Potter (2003, p.2) have identified six 
pitfalls, or forms of ‘under-analysis’, which ought to be avoided in order for 
discourse analysis to be rigorous. My analysis satisfies their recommendations. First 
of all, I have avoided merely summarizing the (content based) themes which can be 
                                                 




identified in data, which leads to a loss of information (Antaki et al., 2003). Instead, I 
have always added information, by detailing the discursive devices used, how certain 
constructions are built, and how these constructions function. Second, I have avoided 
‘isolated quotation’ (Antaki et al., 2003), in which quotations are divorced from their 
context, and left to stand for themselves.  I have provided full sequences, normally 
starting with a question by the interviewer which initiates a topic or question, and 
following through the interaction until a next topic or action was initiated, usually by 
means of a next question by the interviewer (Pomerantz & Fehr, 1997).  In addition, 
as I discussed analysis of the extracts in detail, they were certainly not left to speak 
for themselves. Third, I have avoided under-analysis through ‘circular discovery’ 
(Antaki et al., 2003). For instance, I have not inferred the existence of a cultural 
norm, for instance regarding childbearing, from respondents’ expressions, and 
subsequently used this norm to explain respondents’ expressions or actions from 
which the ‘norm’ was inferred in the first place. Fourth, I have done more than 
merely ‘spotting’ discursive devices in the data which have been identified in other 
studies; I have explained how respondents exactly use these devices in situ, in order 
to manage the interactional business relevant for them. Fifth, I have not engaged in 
what Antaki et al. (2003) call a ‘false survey’; I have not treated findings as 
generalizable to the other members of the categories to which I as analyst could 
allocate the participants to, such as ‘middle aged male with fertility problem, 
belonging to Tumbuka ethnic group’. This is not to say however, that I withhold any 
claims regarding the generalizability of my analysis, as I will discuss in more detail 
below. 
 Sixth, I have not substituted detailed analysis for ‘taking sides’. Antaki et 
al. (2003) point out that analysis should not be led by the aim of evoking the reader’s 
sympathy for, or condemnation of, a certain phenomenon, as this can lead to a 
simplification of the discursive complexity in what was said. It should be noted that 
Antaki et al.’s (2003) caution does not pertain to taking sides in itself. They appear to 
adopt a stance, common for conversation analysts (Wetherell, 2001): any critical or 
political interrogation of the data, ought to be carried out after rigorous analysis of 
data ‘in its own terms’ has taken place. I have indeed adopted a particular position 




attention to infertility, highlighting that infertility in developing countries is a serious 
problem at both a personal and public health level. I will develop this stance further 
in this discussion chapter. However, I have, as much as possible (see Burman, 2002), 
not let my personal position drive the analysis, basing analytic claims instead on the 
actual details of the interactions and, most importantly, participants’ orientations. 
Note that the qualifier ‘as much’ is important. I want to avoid the overly empiricist 
stance which conversation analysts have been accused of because of their emphasis 
on the possibility and importance of making theory-less, disinterested, direct 
observations regarding the organisation of conversations (Atkinson, 1988; Lynch & 
Bogen, 1994, cf. Hammersley, 2003). Inevitably, analytic claims are not merely 
based on neutral, direct observations of ‘what is there’; my analysis of the 
interactions will have been led as well by my own analytic and personal interests and 
presuppositions (cf. Coelho, 2005; Wetherell, 2001).  
 In addition to this outline of pitfalls to be avoided in discourse analysis, 
criteria for analysis have been framed in more positive terms. A first criterion is 
basing claims on participants’ understandings or orientations, as displayed in their 
utterances (Potter, 1996b; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Second, analyses ought to be 
coherent (Potter, 1996b; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). This means to begin with that 
analytic claims should hang together well and should not be contradictory (Madill et 
al., 2000; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Each of my chapters has a story to tell, and 
these stories all tie in with a larger narrative regarding the relevance and management 
of interpersonal, normative and moral issues in talk about infertility in Malawi. In 
this sense, my analysis is coherent. In addition, throughout the analysis I have taken 
into account deviant cases, that is, those which do not fit in with identified patterns. 
This is deemed important for achieving coherence (Potter & Wetherell, 1997; Potter, 
2004b). As Potter and Wetherell (1987) recommend, I have adjusted my claims when 
they did not fit in with certain extracts I encountered, unless some features, as made 
relevant by participants themselves, could be identified which made these extracts 
clearly different from the others. For instance, I have pointed out in chapter 6 that 
three respondents did not account for their claims that they did not take action. 
However, these were all respondents who had one or more children. Therefore, I 




preference to take action, although they suggest that this pertains especially to those 
people without any children.   
 Furthermore, as Potter (2004; 2006b) points out, analyses are coherent if in 
line with, and building on, other CA or DA studies. I have noted that respondents use 
various discursive devices, such as extreme case formulations (Pomerantz, 1986), or 
scripting devices (Edwards, 1994; 1995), in similar ways as have been identified in 
other discourse analytic and conversation analytic studies. In addition, respondents 
perform similar actions, in comparable ways, as observed in other studies.  For 
instance, in chapter 5, I have pointed out that respondents attribute their knowledge 
to third parties. This has been found to be a strategy, used by lay people to deal with 
a lack of entitlement to medical knowledge, in other studies as well (Drew, 1991; 
Gill, 1998).  These similarities between devices used, the way they function and the 
actions which speakers thereby engage in, lend more credence to my claims.  
 A third criterion which has been proposed is reader evaluation (Potter, 2006a; 
2004); presentation of the very extracts to which analytic claims pertain enables 
readers of studies, like mine, to judge for themselves whether my claims are 
convincing and valid.  
 Fourth, analysis can be evaluated on the basis of its fruitfulness (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987; Taylor, 2001); analysis ought to generate novel explanations, 
insights and solutions for problems in a particular field of research. Since my 
doctoral research is the first study of infertility which uses discourse analysis and 
conversation analysis, it has led to various new observations and insights in 
constructions of infertility and the management of interpersonal, in particular 
normative and moral issues, as discussed in section 10.1. They have various 
methodological, theoretical and practical implications (see section 10.4), and open up 
new avenues for enquiry. Hence, my study is fruitful (see section 10.5). 
  Overall then, the analysis presented in this thesis is rigorous, in that it 
satisfies several criteria which have been developed specifically for discourse 
analytic work. This lends credence to my analytic claims. In the next section, I will 





10.3.2 Generalizability  
Generalizability, or the degree to which the results of a study can be extrapolated to 
other circumstances, is not normally seen as an evaluation criterion of discourse 
analytic research. Nevertheless, it is an issue of importance, in particular if one is 
interested in, as Potter and Wetherell (1987, p.174) recommend,  ‘the practical use of 
[one’s] work over and above the amassing of researching findings and the 
furtherance of careers’.  
 The generalizability of discourse analytic research, as of qualitative research 
in general, is normally seen as highly limited, in particular due to its reliance on 
relatively small, non-random samples (Bryman, 2004). However, although the 
statistical generalizability of discourse analytic studies may be limited, there appears 
to be scope for their theoretical generalizability: findings may generate theoretical 
propositions which are generalizable (Bryman, 2004; Willig, 2001; Yin, 1994). 
Discourse analysis provides insights into how discursive constructions function in 
certain social, or more specifically, interactional contexts. It may be possible to 
generalize such ‘theoretical’ insights regarding the functions of constructions to 
similar social and interactional situations: insights into how constructions can deal 
with certain interactional and interpersonal issues raised by the social situation, 
should be transferable to comparable social situations. With ‘comparable’ I mean 
situations which are likely to raise similar interactional and interpersonal issues. For 
instance, in chapter 6, I have shown how identifying causes of infertility appears 
problematic due to participants’ lack of entitlement to knowledge about causes. It 
therefore seems likely that these questions will raise a similar interactional problem, 
and may be dealt with in similar ways, when patients address their ideas about the 
cause of their fertility problem in consultations.  In this case, the potential theoretical 
generalizability is backed up by the findings in several others studies that lay people 
attend to a lack of entitlement regarding medical knowledge in consultations (Gill, 
1998; Drew, 1991), and also in conversations with other lay people (Drew, 1991).  
 It is worth noting that it is conceivable that respondents encounter many of 
the kinds of questions asked in the interviews in their daily lives (cf. Gillies & 
Willig, 1997). For instance, research participants in both my study and in other 




question them about the causes of their fertility problem by asking ‘what is wrong 
with them’, or ask about the kind of actions they are taking to solve their problem. It 
is conceivable that practitioners will be asked about their successes and failures, by 
patients, colleagues or those concerned with their evaluation. This pleads in favour of 
the potential generalizability of the insights gained. However, whether or not 
participants attend to similar concerns, and engage in similar actions, in other social 
situations will always have to remain an empirical question, answerable only on the 
basis of concrete observations in those situations. 
Another argument regarding how it may be possible to generalize this study’s 
insights is that discourse analysis focuses on how interaction partners use culturally 
shared understandings and methods of making sense. These are therefore in principle 
available in the culture or society, making insights gained potentially generalizable to 
other cultural members (Taylor, 2001; Widdicombe, 1993; Willig, 2001). Taylor 
(2001, p. 25) points out that in this argument, ‘culture’ is loosely defined, and does 
not necessarily mean a distinctive national culture or ‘neatly bounded’ grouping. 
This raises the question however, to which cultural groupings one’s findings and 
insights can be exactly generalized (cf. Hammersley, 2003). 
Thus, although there are several reasons why the findings of my study are at 
least potentially generalizable, no prediction can be made about the exact situations 
or members to which insights will apply. However, this does not appear to be an 
issue particular to this study, to discourse analytic research, or qualitative research in 
general. As some scholars have argued, the generalizability of a study can never be 
fully determined in advance, and to some extent, researchers will always have to 
explore and judge themselves whether and to what extent the study’s findings can be 
transferred to other populations and contexts (Alasuutari, 1995; Seale, 1999; Taylor, 
2001; Wetherell et al., 1998).  
 At this moment, a reflexive ‘note of caution’ seems in place. As Willig 
(2001) points out, discourse analysts’ assumptions that language is constructive, 
implies that the researcher necessarily obtains the role of the author of the study, 
actively contributing to the construction of the research ‘findings’, rather than a mere 
witness or discoverer. By implication, this thesis, as any (academic) text, could be 




convincing (cf. Potter & Wetherell, 1987).  Hammersley (2003) points out that few 
discourse analysts actually engage in such a de-construction of their own writings.  
Although Hammersley (2003) therefore accuses discourse analysts of being 
inconsistent and of ‘ontological gerrymandering’, there are pragmatic reasons for not 
engaging in a detailed reflexive analysis of one’s own work (Nicolson and 
McLaughlin, 1995; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell, 2001). As Nicolson and 
McLaughlin (1995, p.116) explain, the aim of social constructionist studies is 
normally to provide insight into the constructed nature of others’ claims rather than 
one’s own, and  ‘it seems good practice to do either one or the other, and not both 
simultaneously’.  Similarly, Potter and Wetherell (1987, p.183) point out that ‘the 
most practical way of dealing with this issue is simply to get on with it, and not to get 
either paralysed by or caught up in the infinite regresses possible’. Hence, also I will 
leave, out of practical considerations, such a rhetorical analysis for a future project.  
 However, I do want to acknowledge that the analysis presented is one of 
various ‘readings’ of the data which could have been presented (Willig, 2001). Note 
that I am not claiming that any other interpretation could have been put forward. I 
have shown that my analysis obeys various criteria, according to which the analysis 
is rigorous and credible, rather than idiosyncratic or subjective. Nevertheless, I could 
have chosen to focus on different action-themes, which could have led to a selection 
of different extracts. Therefore, I subscribe to Stainton Rogers’ (1998, p.10) remark: 
‘I am not, then setting out to ‘tell it like it is, but rather saying ‘look at it this way’’. I 
have intended to provide one particular, alternative perspective on infertility and its 
management, regarding the interpersonal, normative and moral issues it evokes. 
Although not leading to the one and only ‘truth’ about infertility and its management, 
this perspective appears to be useful (cf. Nicolson and Mclaughlin, 1995); it leads to 
insights which form various valuable contributions, as I will discuss in the next 
section. 
10.4 Contributions & implications of the thesis  
10.4.1 Contributions to methodological developments  
My study has several methodological contributions to make. First of all, the 




in other CA and DA studies. This is noteworthy, as the vast majority of these studies 
has been conducted in western contexts. Therefore, this study demonstrates the cross-
cultural relevance of at least some of the discursive devices identified in the 
discourse and conversation analytic literature. A second, related, methodological 
contribution is that my study suggests that CA and DA can be fruitfully employed 
when analyzing data from other cultures, as others have also argued (d’Hondt, 2002; 
Moerman, 1988; Wong & Olsher, 2000). 
Third, this study can be seen as a plea for the usability of interviews, in 
particular when conducting research in foreign contexts (see section 10.2.1). As such, 
it forms a counter argument against the ‘dispreference’ for interviews, which has 
been present traditionally amongst conversation analysts, and is growing amongst 
discourse analysts, at least those belonging to the discursive psychology tradition in 
the United Kingdom (Edwards & Potter, 1992).  
A fourth methodological contribution pertains to infertility studies, and more 
in general, to interview-based qualitative research. My study demonstrates the value 
of analysing in detail what people say, the concerns they thereby attend to, and how 
this is informed by the interactional context, including the questions asked (Wooffitt 
& Widdicombe, 2006). Such an analytic approach is all the more important for 
scholars looking at infertility in developing countries. One of their main aims seems 
to be to ‘give voice’ to the suffering of those faced with fertility problems (Inhorn, 
1994b), and to pay attention to what people themselves deem important rather than to 
priorities identified by policy makers (e.g. birth and population control).  ‘Giving 
voice to’ and pointing out people’s own concerns requires detailed attention to what 
people say, and the issues they thereby make relevant (cf. Widdicombe, 1995). 
Hence, my argument is very similar to Moerman’s (1988, p.9) recommendation for 
ethnographers: ‘I am not proposing that ethnographic data be restricted to 
conversational transcripts and ethnography to their analysis. But I am insisting that 
those who use talk in order to discover what people think, must try to find out how 
the organization of talk influences what people say’. 
The demonstration of the relevance of details in the design of utterances and 
their interactional context, leads to a fifth methodological implication which 




talk as pathway to reality, ‘out there’, or in people’s minds. This is a common 
practice in studies of infertility. To begin with, authors normally allocate research 
participants’ statements about causes, provided in interviews or questionnaires, to 
mutually exclusive categories of illness beliefs, such as ‘STDs’, ‘witchcraft’, ‘don’t 
know’ (see for instance Dyer et al., 2004; Mariano, 2004; Meera Guntupalli & 
Chenchelgudem, 2004; Papreen et al., 2000), or, at a more abstract level, 
‘personalistic causes’ or ‘naturalistic causes’ (Gerrits et al., 1997). However, in order 
to be able to do this, authors will have to suppress the inevitable variability and 
ambiguity in responses (Potter & Wetherell, 1987), leading to an artificial 
categorisation and a reification of people’s causal beliefs (Inhorn, 1994). My analysis 
shows that if one instead pays attention to variability and ambiguity in responses, and 
examines how this relates to features of the interactional context, it becomes apparent 
that statements about causes deal with normative and moral concerns. This 
problematizes the widespread assumption that people’s expressions regarding causes 
reflect the state of their knowledge, or cognitions (Drew, 1991).  
In addition, I have shown that reasons for not taking action too, can at least in 
part be based on the interpersonal functions which they fulfil. For instance, in my 
data, respondents explain their inaction in such a way that they play down their 
culpability, by constructing inaction as reasonable or attributing it to external factors, 
thereby mitigating their responsibility. In studies of infertility in developing 
countries, not much attention has been paid to people’s reasons for not seeking 
(medical) help (but see Sundby et al., 1998; Unisa, 1999). However, many scholars 
have examined  reasons for not using health services for other reproductive health 
issues in the developing world57, such as sexually transmitted diseases (Manhart, 
Dialmy, Ryan & Mahjour, 2000), and childbearing (Gloyd, Floriano, Seunda, 
Chadreque, Nyangezi & Platas, 2001; McCray, 2004), in relation to obstetric 
morbidity and mortality (Lindstrom & Munoz-Franco, 2006; MacLeod & Rhode, 
1998; Nabukera et al., 2006). In these studies, reasons for not taking action as 
indicated by people in questionnaires or interviews are treated as indicators of 
barriers which should be removed, in order to enable people to make use of health 
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services available. It will be fruitful to take into account that reasons are put forward 
within a specific interactional and interpersonal context, and will deal with certain 
normative and moral issues, rather than seeing them only as straightforward 
reflections of barriers which need to be tackled. I am not suggesting that reasons 
which people give for not taking action, such as lack of money or a husband’s refusal 
to go to the hospital, should not be taken seriously and addressed. However, by 
paying attention as well to the interpersonal functions which such reasons fulfil, one 
can gain new insights into alternative interpersonal issues at stake for people in 
taking action or not taking action. These could then form a starting point for 
developing interventions for the promotion of alternative behaviours, which are 
based on people’s own concerns (see section 10.4.3).  
Furthermore, assessing the quality of the relationship’s of people with a 
fertility problem on the basis of verbal reports appears also problematic. Considering 
the apparent relevance of interpersonal, moral issues related to blaming others and 
being blamed, respondents’ constructions of people’s relationships can perform 
various functions. I have mentioned that there is a certain ambiguity in the literature 
on infertility in developing countries. Overall, the detrimental impact of infertility on 
people’s relationships is emphasized  (Gerrits et al., 1998; Inhorn, 2004; Mariano, 
2004; Neff, 1994; Riesman, 2005, 2000; Sundby, 1997; Unisa, 1999), but some 
authors mention that at least some research participants report having good 
relationships with relatives or community members (Meera Guntupalli, 1998, Dyer et 
al., 2004), or with their spouse (Dyer et al., 2002; Gerrits et al, 1999; Inhorn, 2003; 
Pashigian, 2000; Riessman, 2005; Unisa, 1999). It therefore appears that more 
attention should be paid to the variability in reports regarding the quality of the 
relationships of people with a fertility problem. In particular, it seems fruitful to 
examine how variability may be the result of the functions which descriptions of 
(troubled) relationships fulfil, that is, the interpersonal and moral issues they deal 





10.4.2 Contributions to theoretical developments in health psychology 
and health promotion  
My analysis highlights problems with common approaches to, and theories of, health 
related behaviours.  Scholars with an interest in health seeking behaviour tend to 
focus on individual decision makers, whose decisions are dependent on, and caused 
by, demographic and psychological, cognitive characteristics, in combination with 
practical inhibitors (cf. MacKian, 2003). This has certainly been the default approach 
of health psychologists, and those who, working in fields such as health promotion 
and public health, draw upon health psychology. The causal relationship between 
individual characteristics and behaviour is explicitly posited and formalised in social 
cognition models (Connor & Norman, 2005), such as the ‘health belief model’ 
(Becker & Rosenstock, 1984), ‘theory of planned behaviour’ (Ajzen, 1985), or ‘self 
regulation model’ (Leventhal, Diefenbach, & Leventhal, 1992). 58 These social 
cognition models are normally represented as flow-chart diagrams, in which arrows 
connect cognitions and actions, thus symbolizing the causal relationship between the 
two (see for an example Appendix C). Psychological attributes which are considered 
to be predictors of health related behaviour include perceived susceptibility, 
perceived seriousness (Leventhal et al., 1992) and perceived causes (Leventhal et al., 
1980). Causes are seen as determinant of people’s health seeking behaviour as well 
in studies which adopt a less formalized approach and do not draw upon the 
aforementioned models, (e.g. Meera Guntupalli, 2004; McDonald Evens, 2004) . 
I will briefly recapitulate the shortcomings of these common approaches to health 
seeking behaviour, discussed before in chapter 6. First, they largely neglect the social 
context in which health related behaviours occur, and the social meanings which 
these behaviours can obtain (Crossley, 1998; Marks et al., 2005; McKian, 2003; 
Obermeyer, 1998; Ogden, 1996). I should mention that some social cognition models 
have attempted to incorporate the social context. For example, the ‘Theory of 
Planned Behaviour’ (Ajzen, 1985, 1988) includes the factor ‘subjective norm’, which 
is a combination of individuals’ perceptions of social norms regarding certain 
actions, and their motivation to comply with the norm. However, as Ogden (1996) 
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points out, as the social context is only included in the form of a measurement of 
individuals’ beliefs about it, the individualistic nature of this model remains 
essentially unchanged.  
Second, health seeking behaviour is often seen as an outcome of an overly 
rational calculation of the behaviour’s costs and benefits, based on a systematic 
evaluation of available information (Crossley, 1998; Gillies & Willig, 1997; McKian, 
2003; Obermeyer, 2002; Ogden, 1996, Yoder, 1997).  
There has been a growing call for more social approaches which pay attention 
to emotional, interpersonal issues which could be of relevance for people’s 
behaviour, rather than focussing on the individual as a more or less rational, 
solipsistic decision maker (Crossley, 1998; Gillies & Willig, 1997; Hepworth, 2003; 
MacKian, 2003; Ogden, 1996; Obermeyer, 2002).59 This is informed by an 
increasing recognition that providing information at the individual level is not 
sufficient to promote health and healthy behaviours (MacKian, 2003) and that 
avoiding health risks is not necessarily a priority for people (Crossley, 1998; 
Obermeyer, 2002).  
My findings both lend support to, and meet this demand. First, in chapter 5, I 
highlighted the ambiguity, variability and hesitancy in people’s explanations of 
infertility. Second, I showed how ‘illness attributions’ are co-constructed in situ, 
between respondents, interpreters and interviewer, in order to deal with the 
interactional and interpersonal business at hand. These observations call into 
question the widespread notion that individuals’ illness cognitions are pre-existing 
mental templates for behaviour, and bring out the problems of rational approaches 
according to which illness attributions are the result of rational evaluation of 
information (see chapter 5). Third, in chapter 4, I discussed how people justify 
engaging in extramarital affairs by constructing a cultural norm which mandates 
childbearing. This suggests that people’s behaviour is informed at least also by social 
and normative concerns which people bring to bear, and not only by their knowledge 
about the risks involved in having unprotected sex. Hence, educating people about 
the health risks of such behaviours appears indeed of limited use. Fourth, the analysis 
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presented in chapter 6 also shows that people make taking action into a normative 
affair, by attending to their inaction as dispreferred breach of normative expectations 
that they take action, and by playing down their culpability, using various discursive 
devices and constructions. This highlights the relevance of normative meanings of 
people’s ‘health seeking behaviour’, which may inform their actions.  
Overall then, these findings cast doubt on individualistic and rational 
approaches to health seeking behaviour, by drawing attention to how people co-
construct the meanings of ‘illness cognitions’, (in)actions, and their reasons, in 
specific social contexts. The analytic findings discussed are not only of relevance for 
theoretical notions of health related behaviours, but also have implications for 
practical attempts to change them. I will address these in the next section. 
 
10.4.3 Practical contributions to health service development and health 
promotion 
Few discourse analysts have attempted to put their work to use (Burr, 1998; Willig, 
1999), and applying findings from DA study is not a simple matter (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987). Yet, discourse analysis appears particularly suitable to contribute 
to social and political change. Perhaps counter intuitively60, this is so in part due to 
its relativist epistemology. As relativism rejects the notion of objective truth, ‘[it] 
offers an ever available lever of resistance’: ‘nothing ever has to be taken as merely, 
obviously, objectively, unconstructedly, true’ (Edwards et al., 1995, p.39). DA has a 
liberatory potential because it enables one to challenge and question what is normally 
taken for granted (Burr, 1995), shows how things could be different, and can create a 
space for alternative realities (Burr, 1998; Potter, 1998; Willig, 1998).  
Moreover, Burr (1998) and Willig (1998) point out that discourse analysts 
have a responsibility to put their work to use and contribute to social and political 
change. This in part because in-action too, is a form of action, as disengagement 
entails supporting the status quo (Willig, 1998). Therefore, scholars inevitably take 
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up a certain position in their work and support or subvert particular practices, even if 
they do this only implicitly. However, leaving it up to the reader’s imagination how 
one’s analysis can exactly be put to use, may lead to distortion and abuse (Willig, 
1998).   
Discourse analytic interventions are not necessarily restricted to facilitating 
change in ways of talking; they may also contribute to changing ways of acting.  As 
early as 1940, Mills argued that discourse and practices are interrelated, and after 
him several authors have done the same,  arguing that discursive constructions and 
accounts can constrain or facilitate what can be done (Burr, 1995; Foucault, 1973, 
1978; Shotter, 1984, 1993; Stainton-Rogers, 1991; Willig, 1998; 1999). According to 
Shotter (1984, 1993), this is so because the conversational realities which people 
construct in talk, have a certain morally coercive structure to them. That is, only 
certain kinds of next actions, verbal or non verbal will be seen as ‘fitting’, in that 
they are in line with what others can be assumed to deem appropriate and justifiable 
(cf. Garfinkel, 1967; cf. Heritage, 1984). To give an example of how discursive 
constructions and practices may be intertwined, Willig (1999) notes in her study of 
safe sex practices that participants construct marital relationships as necessarily 
sexually safe, ‘by definition’. This makes marriage incompatible with condom use, 
and requires partners to take sexual risks in order to negotiate a trusting relationship.  
Challenging such a construction of marital relationships could therefore facilitate the 
use of condoms.  
Several, interrelated, ways have been identified in which DA can be used for 
interventions in order to accomplish a certain improvement in people’s lives (Taylor, 
2001; Willig, 1999). First, discourse analytic work can be used as social critique 
(Willig, 1999; Taylor, 2001). This involves a critical examination of language use 
and its consequences, leading to resisting and challenging problematic constructions. 
Willig (1999) notes that in order to transform social critique into a tool to challenge, 
authors need to propose how resistance and challenge can be achieved, and in which 
contexts (e.g. courtrooms, campaigns), in addition to academic publications. 
Second, DA can be used as a form of empowerment (Taylor, 2001; Willig, 
1999), by raising awareness, legitimising what was previously denied or negatively 




addition, Willig (1999) sees empowerment as exploring alternative accounting 
practices and constructions which are more helpful for people.  
In the analytic chapters, I have identified various accounting practices and 
constructions which seem at least potentially unhelpful. Hence, challenging these 
constructions, raising awareness of them, and stimulating people to search for 
alternative constructions whilst increasing their skills to do so, could lead to an 
improvement in people’s lives. First, the construction of a cultural norm, according 
to which one ought to bear children, appears to contribute to the ordeal of not bearing 
children, or having only few children. Therefore, the focus could be on the 
promotion of constructions which acknowledge that bearing children is not a 
necessity. Second, constructing practices like extramarital affairs and polygamy as 
logical, necessary and ‘automatic’ solution to fertility problems may induce people to 
place themselves at risk of contracting or spreading STDs, including AIDS. In 
addition, it may contribute to the personal suffering of the wives whose husbands 
have an affair or take another wife. Thus, it seems desirable to facilitate ‘talk’ which 
constructs not engaging in extramarital affairs and polygamy as acceptable, as well 
as to challenge constructions of ‘culture’ as ‘force’ which makes people behave in 
certain ‘inevitable’ ways. I have shown how this is one strategy which respondents 
use to justify extramarital affairs and polygamy when faced with fertility problems.61 
There is a risk however, that such a de-construction  would result in making people 
themselves unduly responsible and to blame for having extramarital affairs or 
polygamous marriages, whereas it may be difficult for them not to engage in these 
practices. Hence, the emphasis should be put on people’s positive potential to make 
their own decisions, whilst acknowledging the limitations in self-determination as 
well.  
It is worth noting that accounts which reject practices like extramarital affairs 
when a marriage remains childless may already have a certain ‘currency’ in Malawi. 
For instance, in chapter 4, extract 10, the respondent distances himself from the 
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practice that the brother of someone who has a fertility problem sleeps with his wife, 
by arguing that ‘these days, because of this deadly disease, Aids, they are avoiding it 
now’ (lines 127-129). In addition, some respondents rejected engaging in 
extramarital affairs, divorce or polygamy on the basis of their religion. Making use of 
such existing health promoting accounting practices will increase the chance of 
accomplishing change.  However, further research is needed in order to examine the 
prevalence of these practices, and how they are used within specific contexts. 
Third, respondents’ orientation to seeking action as preferable seems 
unhelpful, especially in a context in which few medical solutions are available. This 
strategy may lead to people putting time, effort and money in obtaining what often 
seems unattainable; a cure for their fertility problem. It may give rise to financial 
troubles (Inhorn, 1998; Sundby, 2002; Unisa, 1999) and even additional health 
problems (see chapter 2, Inhorn, 1998; Sundby, 2002). 
 Note that the construction of taking action as preferable seems unfortunate 
especially considering practitioners’, in particular indigenous healers’ claims of 
(widespread) success, which may give false hope to people in search of a cure.  
Therefore, it could be beneficial to stimulate people with a fertility problem to frame 
inaction as deliberately chosen, rather than as prevented by external obstacles. As a 
result, not taking action, or discontinuing action at an earlier stage may become 
easier for men and women with a fertility problem.  
Fourth, the practice of constructing relationships and any potential troubles, 
such as extramarital affairs, in such a way that others are not blamed for it, impedes 
‘standing up’ and ‘speaking out’ against potential trouble. It could therefore be 
helpful, to critically examine accounts of relationship troubles together with people 
with a fertility problem, their relatives and community members, and discuss who is 
made responsible for the trouble, and who else could play a role in troubles. This 
could be combined with promoting constructions which deem inappropriate 
differential treatment of people with a fertility problem are given different treatment 
than other community members, regardless of whose ‘fault’ this is.   
Fifth, I have shown how practitioners manage their competence by attributing 
problems to external factors, including patients' behaviour and intelligence. This 




unjustifiably responsible, and possibly to blame for problems. In addition, it appears 
to obstruct critical reflection on whether the particular design and delivery of health 
services could contribute to problems, and the role which practitioners themselves 
can play in preventing communication or other problems. Hence, awareness could be 
raised amongst practitioners about how they construct themselves as not accountable 
for problems and instead, attribute them to their patients. I have argued that this ties 
in with practitioners’ pursuit of an identity project as competent practitioner (see 
chapter 8 and 9). Therefore, it seems desirable to search for constructions, together 
with practitioners and their managers, which enable, if appropriate, attributing 
problems to the design or delivery of services, or to practitioners’ own inevitable 
shortcomings, without threatening practitioners’ identities as competent practitioners. 
It could also be useful to reflect together with aforementioned professionals on issues 
of professionality, and how this affects practitioners’ practices and their interactions 
with patients.    
  Several platforms can be identified for the promotion of accounts which are 
empowering and health promoting, and can contribute to the improvement of service 
design and delivery. For instance, the media could be used as a resource, in 
particular, soap-operas and debates on the radio, or plays in villages. Both the radio 
and plays are popular in Malawi, and already commonly used means for health 
promotion62(Matinga &McConville, 2002). In addition, group discussions could be 
organised in communities about infertility, its consequences and solutions. This 
would enable identification and discussion of problematic constructions, and 
alternative, more empowering constructions can be proposed. This could be done as 
well in marriage rites (personal communication, Rachel Fiedler, July 2003), in which  
instruction is given to newly married couples about sexual behaviour and about how 
‘proper’ spouses should behave (de Kok, 2005; Matinga & McConville, 2002). It 
may be possible to design together with the ‘instructors’ at these rites instructions 
which include more beneficial, enabling constructions of childbearing and sexual 
behaviour.  
                                                 
62 See also the website of the story workshop (http://www.storyworkshop.org), a well-run NGO in 





  In order to raise awareness of, and challenge practitioners’ accounting 
practices, meetings can be organised, for instance in hospitals or institutions of 
medical education, with practitioners themselves, managers and those involved in 
medical training. In these meetings, extracts from interviews with practitioners could 
be discussed, with particular attention for the actions which practitioners engage in, 
and their consequences.   
 Although in principle desirable, using discourse analysis to contribute to 
change and development is not without its problems (Willig, 1999; Taylor, 2001). 
Both Willig (1999) and Taylor (2001) point out that discourse analytic interventions 
may have unintended, negative consequences. Because research findings are 
inevitably situated and contingent, ‘yesterdays’ critique may no longer be relevant, 
and liberatory discourses can always be subverted’ (Taylor, 2001, p. 327). In 
addition, interventions change contexts, and thus may not longer ‘work’ in the way it 
was hoped they would. Willig (1999) argues that therefore, discourse analytic 
interventions, as any intervention, should always be reflexively monitored for their 
consequences.   
  In addition, there is the risk that designing interventions on the basis of 
discourse analysis leads to the reification of participants’ situated construction work 
and accounting practices (Widdicombe, 1995; Willig, 1999, 1998). Widdicombe 
(1995) emphasizes the need to retain a focus on how accounts are designed for the 
local interactional contexts in which they occur. There is no obvious way to solve 
this problem; it seems that the best one can do is to be aware of the occasioned nature 
of accounts and design interventions for a specific socio-cultural context, which is 
the same as the one in which one’s research was conducted (Willig, 1999). 
Furthermore, using discourse analysis for interventions which promote 
alternative constructions and accounting practices can be seen as manipulation 
(Willig, 1999), and thus a problematic exploitation of (white) academics’ power. 
However, Willig (1999) points out that a difference should be made between 
perpetuating power relations, and the strategic use of ‘power’ to pass on expertise or 
skills. In addition, she suggests that discourse analysis can be made into a tool which 
can be used by collectives to change themselves, rather than a tool to manipulate 




would seem that this necessitates an intense involvement of members of the 
communities, or those for whom one intends to do good, in the design of 
interventions63.  
 Moreover, Willig (1999) warns that one should acknowledge that talk is 
grounded in social, material, and institutional structures, as otherwise one would 
falsely suggest that individuals can ‘shake off’ unhelpful constructions. This could 
lead not only to unrealistic optimism, but also to a form of victim blaming, making 
people responsible for whether they get rid of unhelpful constructions or not.   
Therefore, as Willig (1999) points out, discourse analytic interventions are no 
substitute for other, more ‘direct’, political interventions. 
 It will be clear then, that applying discourse analysis is not a straightforward 
or simple matter, and the suggestions provided in this chapter need to be further 
researched and developed before they can be implemented. However, the problems 
and challenges involved in applying discourse analysis do not mean that one cannot, 
or should not, attempt to put discourse analytic work to use. I agree with Willig 
(1999, p.158) that the risks of withholding recommendations for change are greater 
than its benefits: ‘we need to mobilize our skills as discourse analysts in order to 
intervene in the struggle over how language constitutes our world(s)’. 
 
10.5 Conclusion 
This study is the first qualitative study of infertility in Malawi, and the first study of 
infertility which uses discourse analysis, informed by conversation analysis. In this 
thesis, I have shown that ‘norms’ regarding childbearing are resources available for 
use, rather than causal, explanatory factors; that ‘illness attributions’ and ‘health 
seeking behaviour’ are intertwined with normative and moral concerns rather than 
neutral, cognitive matters; and that also indigenous and biomedical practitioners’ 
explanations and descriptions of practices are of a fundamentally interpersonal 
nature, in that they are employed to manage accountability, in relation to their 
professional expert identity.  
                                                 
63 This suggestion is in line with community development, an increasingly popular approach in health 




 My study then, demonstrates that people are far from ‘cultural dopes’ 
(Garfinkel, 1967). In their descriptions of their knowledge and actions, people with a 
fertility problem, significant others, and practitioners, actively and skilfully employ 
normative notions to manage the interactional and interpersonal business at hand, 
which is often imbued with (potential) moral judgements. Thus, my research lends 
support to Crossley’s (1998, p.39) claim that people’s actions ‘have their own 
alternative logic and validity that is related in a complex fashion to the cultural and 
moral environment in which they live’, and do not ‘conform to rational, logical, 
value-free ways of thinking’ 
In future work, it will first of all be valuable to explore in more detail how  
interventions can be developed on the basis of this study’s findings. Second, it would 
be interesting and useful to record and analyse interactions in consultations between 
different kinds of practitioners (e.g. indigenous healers, Malawian and expatriate 
practitioners) and infertility patients, in particular to see how (communication) 
problems which may arise are managed in situ. Third, it will be valuable to focus on 
other (reproductive) health problems to which moral and normative issues seem 
pertinent. Examples of these, of particular relevance to sub Sahara Africa, are 
abortions, miscarriages, and maternal mortality, as these bring issues of blame and 
responsibility, for couples, community members and practitioners, into sharp relief.    
To conclude, although seemingly benign, infertility in sub Saharan Africa is a 
serious problem, which has too often, and for too long, been ignored. In Malawi, as 
well as in other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, there is a great need for the design 
of culturally sensitive, reproductive health promotion programs and services, which 
focus on people’s own concerns related to childbearing. My thesis can form a 
valuable contribution to the design of such services and programs. It gives voice to 
people in Malawi who suffer from fertility problems, their significant others, and 
those who provide care for them, by examining in detail what people say, the 
understandings they thereby draw upon, and the interpersonal issues they deal with, 
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Appendix A: Methodological features of the 
studies reviewed 
 
Table 2. Epidemiological and demographic studies of infertility 
Study 
 
Location Sample Data collected  Analysis 
Gabon 




urban centre in 
Gabon 
Women, suffering from 
primary and secondary 
infertility (N=350), 
constituting the total of 
clients of infertility clinic 
during 2 years 
















20 villages in the 
Gambia 
1) Female community 
members (N=1348) 

































(N=678: age 15-34) & 
male  (N=362: age 20-
44) 
Sampling: random 
(multi stage  probability 
sampling) 
• Longitudinal (2 
years) survey 



















Favot et al. 
(1997) 
Infertility 






1) Women (N=154) 
presenting in infertility 
clinic and not having 
given birth during 5 year 




2) Women (N=259) who  
came to hospital for 












































Sample Data collected  Analysis 
Cates et al. 
(1985) 
Infertility 
Infertility clinics in 
25 developing 
and developed 
countries   
 
 
8500 couples suffering 
from primary and 
secondary infertility, 
during a period of at 





























1) Women without life 
born child  
(primary infertility) or 
with at least  
one life born child 
(secondary  
infertility) who have 
been exposed to  
conception for between 




and Health          
Surveys & 
World Fertility  
















between 20-44, not  
having given birth for at 




and Health          
surveys & 
World fertility  



























between 20-44, not  
having given birth for at 




and Health          
   Surveys &        
   World Fertility  


























Sample Data collected  Analysis 
Health seeking behaviour  
 








national survey  
Sampling: random 









USA • infertile women and 
previously infertile 




• Survey re. solutions 
sought and variables 
such as intent to get 









• couples (N=732), 
clients and former 























• infertile clients of 
infertility clinic 
(N=37), below 45 
years old 























Anderheim et al. 
(2005) 
Germany • female clients of 







One month before start 
IVF treatment , and 1 hr 
before ocyte retrieval: 
• Various psychometric 
assessments: General 
psychological well-
being; Effects of 
















Table 3. cont’d 
Study Location 
 
Sample Data collected  Analysis 
Anderheim et al. 
(2005) 
Germany • female clients of 








One month before start 
IVF treatment , and 1 hr 
before ocyte retrieval: 
• Various psychometric 
assessments: General 
psychological well-
being; Effects of 











Dhillon et al. 
(2000) 
Canada • male clients (N=90) 









dyadic adjustment,  










• women (N=120) 
presenting for first 
time at infertility 
clinic. Women 
belonged to black, 
white and coloured 
ethnicities 
• women (N=120) 




















Fassino et al. 
(2002) 
Turin, Italy • Infertile couples 
(N=119), 
presenting for the 
first time at 
infertility clinic 
hospital, all white, 
age 18-45. 
 
• 80 fertile couples, 
recruited through 
nurseries, all white, 
age 18-45 (control 
group) 
 
Sampling:  Purposive 
• Temperament and 
Character Inventory 
(TCI) 
• Interviews by 
psychiatrist 
















Sample Data collected  Analysis 
Lancastle & 
Boivin (2005) 
U.K • Women (N=97) 
presenting at 
infertility clinic, 
about to undergo 
IVF treatment 
 
Sampling:  Purposive 
• Psychometric 
assessment (three 















•  Couples (N=113), 
presenting at 
infertility clinic, 





















• Infertile couples 
(N=48) presenting 












Pook, Krauze & 
Rohrle (2000) 
Germany • Male clients (N=55) 
of infertility clinic, 
with no organic 



























• Demographic data , 
e.g. age, cause of 
infertility, 
primary/secondary 
infertility, number of 
clinic attendances  
• Psychometric 
assessments: anxiety, 
depression ( GHQ-28), 




















• Longitudinal: ENRICH 
inventory (assesses 
partners’ evaluation of 
relationship), 
administered at first 
treatment, 6 months 






















U.K  • Group 1: infertile 
couples (N=116) 
presenting at 
infertility clinic  
• Group 2: infertile 
couples (N=130) 












administered at first 
consultation and 7 
months (group 1) / 6 
weeks (group 2) later 
and after completion 1
st
 
















also from self-help 




• Structured interviews 
with husbands and 
wives separately: 
assessments of various 
psychological factors, 
e.g. life quality, self 
esteem, perceived 





van den Akker  
(2005) 
U.K 176 women, former 
clients of ART clinics 
(n=43), adoption 





• Demographic data 




Quality of Life, coping 












• women (N=310), 










style (Coping with 
Infertility 
Questionnaire), 
emotional distress  and 
wellbeing (Infertility 
Specific Well-being and 











Table 3. Cont’d 
Study Location 
 
Sample Data collected  Analysis 
Litt et al. 
(1992) 
USA • Female clients 




primary infertility, who 
completed IVF cycle. 
 
Sampling: Purposive  
• Demographic data 
• Questionnaire about 
perceived effects of 
infertility on various 









and post IVF 
treatment (e.g. locus 
of control, coping 












3 ART units 
in U.K 
• 20 men and 30 
women presenting at 
infertility clinic (18 










Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale 
(HADS), 










• Infertile men and 
women presenting at 
infertility clinics, who 
had not achieved 
pregnancy after 12 
months of infertility 
treatment. N=2250 at 
T1 (start treatment), 
N=1934  at T2 (after 
12 months of 
treatment) 
Sampling : Purposive 
Longitudinal: 
Questionnaire, partly 
based on the Fertility 
Problem Stress 
Inventory, 
administered at T1 
(start treatment)  and 







Vieyra et al. 
(1990) 
USA • men (N=33), 31 
women (N=31), not 
married to each 
other.39 recruited 
from infertility clinic, 
10 through 
newspaper, 13 from 


























Table 4a. Ethnographic studies of infertility in sub Saharan Africa. 
 
                                                 
64
 The category ‘community members’ includes both people with and without fertility problems 
65
 Many qualitative studies do not state explicitly what type of analysis used, nor describe how data 
were analysed. I use the label ‘thematic analysis’ for those studies, in which data is categorised 
according to certain themes (e.g. ‘consequences’, ‘solutions sought’), which do not appear to have 
used a pre-structured coding scheme, and which do not provide a label for the type of analysis they 
used.  







































1) Community members (42)    
2) Biomedical practitioners (53) 
3)  Traditional healers (7)   
4) Schoolchildren (238)  
Sampling: unknown 
• Semi-structured 
interviews (1, 3)  
• Questionnaires (2)  
• Essays (re. e.g. 
family planning, 
sterility) by school 
children (4)  
• Archival research in 
governmental, trade 
and mission archives. 
• Participant 
observations in royal 














1) Women over 15 years old 
(N=170) 
Sampling: Random (cluster 
sampling) 
2) Women who defined 
themselves as having 
fertility problems (N=21), 
including women suffering 
from primary and 
secondary infertility. 
Sampling: Purposive  
• Semi-structured 
interviews (1) 
















1) Women (N=243) 
Sampling: Random 
99% currently married, 35% had 
been married before, 16% more 
than once 
2) Infertile women  
(N= 21), infertile men (N=2) 
3) Health care workers (N=7) 
4) Local leaders (N= unknown) 
5) Traditional healers 
(N=unknown) 
Sampling 2-5: Purposive 






















1)  Head of households (N=500) 
Sampling: Random 
2)  Women suffering from 
primary and secondary infertility, 
based on criterion of 3 years of 
exposure to conception without  
giving birth (N>25) 
3)  Village leaders: traditional 
leaders,  traditional birth 
attendants, village health 
workers, ‘influential women’ (N= 
unknown) 
4) Biomedical practitioners  






number and age of 
women of fertile age 
per household, 
number of children) 
(1) 
• Questionnaire for 
infertile women (re. 
fertility  & marital 
status, use of family 
planning, traditional 
and biomedical care 
(2) 
• 25 semi-structured 





interviews  (4) 



















(city)        
1)Women (N>84) 
2) Men (N>60)  




interviews (1,2: 84 
women and 60 men) 





















1) Infertile women (N=34):Want 
to get pregnant but fails to do so, 
irrespective of duration.  
2) Cured women (N=6):Resolved 
their fertility problem in someway 
3) Fertile women (N=10): Never 
experienced any infertility  
problems 
All belonging to ethnic group 
‘Macua’. 
4) Traditional healers (‘several’) 
5) Biomedical personnel: medical 
doctor (N=1), nurse (N=1) 
6) Community members 
(including elderly men). 
Sampling: mainly snowballing/ 
• Semi-structured 
interviews(1-6) 













Table 4a. Cont’d 












1) Infertile women (18) suffering 
from primary (never conceived) 
and secondary infertility (6), i.e 
having at least one live child. 
2)  traditional healers  




interviews (1), held in 
women’s homes 
 






















1) Male and female community  
members (N=104)  
2) Members of Charismatic 
church in Yoruba land 
(N=unknown) 
All respondents belonging to 
ethnic group Yoruba 
 
Sampling: Unknown/purposive 




• Focus groups (2) 
















1) Men  (N=27),  suffering  
from both primary and secondary 
infertility 





















1) Women (N=30), suffering both 
primary and secondary infertility 























1) Key informants (N=() 
Sampling: Purposive 
 
2) Female community members 
(N=114), age between  





focussing on life 
narratives, i.e. major 
events in women’s 
lives, details of 
childbearing/ illness 
• Survey about 
demographic data, 
reproductive health 

















Table 4b  Ethnographic studies of infertility outside sub Saharan Africa 
 Study 
 




















2) Fertile men (60) and 




3) Infertile women (20),  
defined as not having 
conceived after trying 
for at least 2 years  
3) Key informants: 
traditional healers (2)  
and religious leader (1) 
Sampling: purposive  
• Semi-structured 
interviews 
• Interviews conducted 







Alexandria  1) Infertile women (N= 


















1) Infertile women (N= 
190) 
2) Infertile couples (N= 
66) 
 
Sampling: Purposive , 
most recruited in infertility 
































1) Women (N=5) suffering  
from primary or 
secondary Infertility: 
wanting to get 
pregnant but not 
succeeding, 
irrespective of time.  
2) Cured women(N=22) 
3) Fertile women (N=11)  
4) Key informants: elderly 
women (N=5), midwife 
(N=1), Shamans/spiritual  
 healer (N=2), herbalists 
(N=2), tribal village heads 
(N=2). 
-all participants belong 
to ethnic group Chenchu 












Table 3b. Cont’d 
 Study 
 








Ethnic group ‘Nayars’ in South 
India 
Sampling: unknown 
• Participant observations 









1) Childless women (N=32),  




Conducted in women’s 











1)Childless women (3), selected 




Conducted in women’s 








1) Childless women (N=332)  
Sampling: All childless women 






• Clinical examination 
















1) Women who were seeking 
infertility treatment or had 
sought treatment in the past 
(N=39), suffering from primary 
(N=20) or secondary infertility 
(N=19) 
2) Husbands of women 
seeking infertility treatment 
(N=?) 
3) Women with at least 1 
child, who had not 
experienced infertility (N=10) 
 Sampling: Unknown 
• Questionnaires 
• Interviews 
• Reproductive and life 
histories 
Data collected in infertility 
clinic in hospital, maternity 
clinic, women’s homes, 
locations in the city 
Thematic 
 
Table 5. Studies of medical practice in relation to infertility 
Study Location Sample Data Analysis 
Malin 
(2003) 
Finland Physicians providing IVF 
and other infertility treatment 
(N=14) 
Sampling: Purposive? 
• Semi-structured interviews Thematic 
Pfeffer 
(1993)  






• American medical 
literature on infertility from 
19
th




U.K IVF practitioners working in 
IVF clinics in U.K (N=24) 
Sampling: Purposive 







Appendix B: Numbers of respondents, per 
category 
 
Table 6a. Respondents pilot and main study 
 
 
Table 6b. Respondents main study 
Respondents main study 














- 1  
- 



































 5 2 - - 





Woman 8 5 
 
1  
Respondents pilot study 
Recorded Not recorded  
 Without 
interpreter 







4 - 1 - 
Nurse 1 - - - 






 Expatriate doctor - - 4 - 













Table 6c. Total number of respondents in recorded interviews 
 
Total number of recorded respondents in pilot + main study 
 Without interpreter With interpreter 






Indigenous practitioners - 
 
8 
Significant others 5 
 
2 
People with fertility problem 12 
 
9 






Appendix C: Interview-schedules 
 
I. Men and women with a fertility problem 
1. Experience of being infertile 
1. (if unknown ) Do you have any children?  
2. Would you like to have some (more)?  
a. Why? 
3. For how long have you been trying? 
4. With whom do you live? 
5. (if spouse not mentioned) Does your husband/wife live there too? 
6. Would he like to have more children? 
a. Why? 
7. Has anything changed in the relation with your husband/wife because you can’t  have 
(another) child(ren)? 
a. In what way, can you give examples? 
8. Has it affected anything in your relationship with others, such as friends, relatives, people 
here in the village /neighbourhood? 
9. With whom has your relationship changed? 
a. In what way? 
10. Do you think that people would treat you differently if you’d get pregnant (once more)? 
a. In what way? 
 
2.Explanations of infertility  
11. Why do you think that people here become infertile sometimes?  
12. (give examples if no response forthcoming, e.g STDs, abortion) 
a. And does witchcraft make them infertile ? 
b. And what about spirit possession? 
c. Is there anything else what you think may cause infertility? 
13. What do you think is the cause of your infertility?  
a. Why do you think that is the cause?  
b. Solutions sought  
14. Did you do anything in order to try to have a baby?  
a. What did you do? 
15. Did your husband do anything? 
a. What did he do? 
16. Did you speak to others about your child-wish? 
a. Whom did you speak to? 
17. Can you tell be something about what you discussed with them? 
18. Did you seek other people’s help? 
a. From whom did you seek help? 
b. (if doctor) Was it a particular kind of doctor? 
c. Why did you go to that specific doctor? 
d. Did you go to other doctors as well? 
e. Why? 
 
3.Expectations western/indigenous doctor 
19. Before you visited him/her, did you expect that the doctor would be able to help you? 
20. What did you expect the western doctor would do at the consultation? 
21. Did you expect him/her to examine you? 
a. (if yes) What kind of examinations did you expect?  
22. Did you expect him to examine your husband? 
23. Did you expect him to give you advice? 
a. What kind of advice did you expect? 
24. Did you expect him to give you some kind of treatment? 





4.Experience western/indigenous doctor 
25. (if consulted doctor) What happened at the consultation?  
26. Did he examine you? 
a. (if yes) What kind of examination? 
27. Did he give advice?  
a. What kind of advice? 
28. Did he give you some kind of treatment? 
a. What kind of? 
29. Could the western doctor help you with your problem? 
30. Did you feel comfortable when you were talking to the doctor? 
a. (if not) Why not?  
31. Did you understand what the doctor was doing? 
a. If anything, what did you not understand? 
32. Did you understand what he/she was telling you?  
a. If anything, what did you not understand? 
33. Do you think that the doctor understood you?  
a. Did he for example understand what exactly your problem is? 
b. Why do you think that? 
 
       34. Did you perhaps do anything else to try to get pregnant? 
 
II. Indigenous and biomedical practitioners 
1. Experience with infertility-patients 
1. Could you tell me about the kind of work you do, in this hospital/centre/clinic? 
2.Do you sometimes see people with a fertility problem at your consultations? 
        a. How often do you see patients with a fertility problem? 
        b. Are those mostly men, women, or do couples come together? 
3.Could you tell me about these consultations, what happens at them?  
4.What do the patients usually tell you about why they come and see you? 
5.What do you tell them at the consultation? 
6.Are there any non medical problems you are faced with when trying to help infertility-patients? 
7.Did you ever experience misunderstandings or other communication problems between you  
    and your patients? 
a. Can you give me an example? 
8. Have you had any special training for dealing with infertility patients? 
a. (if yes) what kind of? 
b. Where?  
 
2.  Explanations of infertility  
8. What are the main causes of infertility of the patients you see?(if not mentioned yet) 
a. And does witchcraft make them infertile ? 
b. And what about spirit possession? 
c. Could God or Allah make people infertile? 
d. Any other causes not mentioned yet?  
9. What do your patients think is the cause of their infertility?  
10. Did your ever experience that your patients have a different opinion about the cause of  
their infertility than you? 
a. (if yes) How did you notice? 
b. What did you tell them? 
 
3. Solutions offered  
11.How do you in general try to help infertile patients?  
12.Do patients usually accept your advice? 
a. (if not) Can you give me an example of a case in which a patient did not accept your  
advice? 
13. Do you have any idea why patients sometimes do not accept your advice?   




a. Are they satisfied with what you offer them? 
b. Can you tell me about a time that that was the case?  
c. Are they also disappointed sometimes? 
d. Can you tell me about a time that that was the case? 
  
4. Ideas about patients’ expectations 
15. What do you think your patients expect from the consultation with you?  
a. For instance, in terms of treatment, examinations 
b. Do they expect you can cure them? 
 
5. Relationship with other healers       
16. Do your patients also seek other solutions than consulting you? 
a. What kind of?  
17. What do you think about that? 
18. Do you know what indigenous healers/western doctors do for people with an infertility  
  problem?  
19. Do you ever meet indigenous healers/western doctors yourself? 
a. When for example do or did you meet a traditional healer/western doctor ?  
20. Do you ever meet up with indigenous healers to discuss medical problems you encounter  
  during your work? 
21. Do you ever refer your patients to traditional healers? 
 
 
6. Perceptions of fertility/infertility 
22. Is it important to be fertile here?  
a. Why? 
23. What are the consequences of being infertile for the people you see?  
a. Are these the same for men and women? 
b.(if different) In what way are they different? 
 
III. Significant others 
1. Experience with someone who is infertile 
1. Do you know someone who has a problem with having children? 
2. Is he/she married?  
3. What is your relationship with him/her/them? 
4. How do you know that she/he/they66 have this problem? 
5. Did they tell you themselves?  
a. What did they tell you? 
 
2. Attribution of importance to (in)fertility 
6. Do you think it is important for your …(e.g friend/relative/neighbour)  to have (more) 
children? 
a. (if yes) Why do you think is having (more) children important for them? 
b. Is this important in the same way for your ….as for his/her partner?  
(if not) Why not? 
7. Did he/she/they themselves tell you it is important for them to have (another )  
 baby? 
a. What did he/she/they tell you? 
8. Do you think he/she/they are unhappy with the number of children they  
have/with the fact that they do not have a child? 
a. Why do you think that?  
 
3. Explanations of infertility 
9. What do you think is the cause of your friends’/neighbour’s/…. problem?  
10. Why do you think that? 





11. What do you think are in general the main causes of infertility in Malawi? 
a. Do you think STDs can be a cause? 
b. And abortion? 
c. And does witchcraft make people infertile? 
d. And what about spirit possession? 
e. Is there anything else what you think may cause infertility? 
 
4.  Perceived Solutions 
12.   Do you have any idea about whether your friend/neighbour/…. has tried to do anything 
about their problem? 
a. (If yes) Do you know what kind of solutions he/she/they have sought? 
13. Do you think these were the right solutions?  
a. Why/why not? 
14. What would you recommend them to do?       
a. Do you think that they should go to some kind of doctor? 
b. What kind of doctor do you think they should go to? 
c. Why that type of doctor? 
d. (if not mentioned) Should they go to a traditional healer? 
e. Why? 
f. (if not mentioned) Should they go to a western doctor? 
g. Why? 
 
5. Role of relationships  
15.Is there any way in which you could help your……. 
a.In what way? 
b.Did you give him/her/them advice? 
c.Could you give them any kind of emotional support to cope with their problem?   
16. Would your relationship with him/her/them be different if they would have  
children? 
a. In what way? 
b. (if unclear) Would you for example do other things together with  
him/her/them if they would have children? 
 
6. Community’s perceptions of people with a fertility problem  
17. Do you think that people here in the village/neighbourhood/community  
know about his/her/their problem? 
a. Many? 
b. Why do you think that, how do you know? 
c. Do you think his/her/their family knows? 
d. Which members of the family? 
18. How do you think do other people know about your friends’/neighbours’/…  
problem? 
19.  How do you think that people, here in the  
  village/neighbourhood/community think about him/her/them? 
a.  How do they treat him/her/them? 
b. Do they treat them differently then those couples who have (plenty of) children?  
c. (if yes) What is your opinion about that? 
d. Is there a difference between how people treat your friend/neighbour/.. and his/her partner? 
e. (if yes) What is your opinion about that? 
20. What do people in the community here think is the cause of his/her/their  
failing to have (another) baby? 






Appendix D: Transcription notation67 
 
 
(.)  Shortest hearable pause 
(3)  Exactly timed pause68 
Cu-  A dash denotes a sharp cut-off of a prior word or sound 
Lo:ng Colons show that the speaker has stretched the preceding letter or sound 
(word) Material within brackets represents the transcriber’s guess at an unclear utterance 
(    )  Unclear speech or noise to which no approximation is made 
run=  ‘Equals’ signs link material that runs on 
=on 
?  Indicates a rising tone 
.  Indicates a ‘natural’ ending 
,   Indicates a ‘continuing’ intonation 
!  Exclamation marks are used to indicate an animated or emphatic tone 
under  Underlining indicates emphasis 
CAPITALS Capitals indicate speech noticeably louder than that surrounding it. 
° soft °  Degree signs indicate speech spoken noticeably more quietly than the surrounding      
       talk. 
Over[lap           Square brackets between adjacent lines of concurrent speech denote 
        [Overlap the start of overlapping talk 
>              <      ‘More than’ and ‘less than’ signs indicate that the talk they encompass was  
   noticeably faster than the surrounding talk 
↑  Hightened intonation 
((brother )) Material in square brackets indicates transcriber’s commentary. 
[his]                     When context suggests that respondent uses the ‘wrong’ gender, this is put in square  
brackets. Note that indigenous languages in Malawi do not have a specific words to 




I used the following abbreviations to indicate ‘categories’ of respondents: 
Inf.w = Woman with fertility problem 
Inf.m = Man with fertility problem 
s.o.    = Significant other 
gyn.   = Gynaecologist 
m.d    =medical doctor 
c.o.    = Clinical officer 
m.a.   = Medical assistant 
HSA  = Health surveillance assistant 
Ind.h  = Indigenous healer 
TBA   =Traditional birth attendant 
((expat.))= expatriate practitioner 
 
 
All text in italics is a translation. 
                                                 
67  Modified version of those developed by Gail Jefferson (1984) 




























Figure 1. A self-regulatory model for coping with illness (Leventhal, 
1999) 
